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ABSTRACT 
 
The United Nations Security Council is entrusted under the UN Charter with primary 
responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of the international peace; it is the only body 
with the power to legally authorise military intervention and impose international sanctions 
where it decides. However, its decision-making process has hitherto been obscure and allegations 
of political bias have been made against the Security Council in its responses to potential 
international threats. Despite the rule of law featuring on the Security Council’s agenda for over 
a decade and a UN General Assembly declaration in 2012 establishing that the rule of law should 
apply internally to the UN, the Security Council has yet to formulate or incorporate a rule of law 
framework that would govern its decision-making process. 
 
This thesis explains the necessity of a rule of law framework for the Security Council before 
analysing existing literature and UN documents on the domestic and international rule of law in 
search of concepts suitable for transposition to the arena of the Security Council. My analysis 
emerges with eight core components, which form a bespoke rule of law framework for the 
Security Council. I then evaluate the Security Council’s decision-making process since 1990 
against this framework, illustrating where and how the rule of law has been undermined or 
neglected in its behaviour. I conclude by finding that the Council and other bodies are unwilling 
or unable to adequately regulate the decision-making process against a suitable rule of law 
framework, before arguing for the establishment of a Rule of Law Tribunal as a subsidiary organ 
to the Council under its Charter powers that would be solely responsible for both the regulation 
of Council practice and judicial review of its decisions. 
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CHAPTER I 
SOURCES AND THEORIES RELATED TO THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW AT THE COUNCIL 
 
I.1  Introduction 
The rule of law has become synonymous with principles of democracy, equality, freedom, good 
governance and other elements of a civilised society which are generally agreed to be beneficial 
to mankind. Similarly, the United Nations may conjure up images for many of a utopian ideal 
that values strength in diversity and leads the way in impartiality of procedure and composition. 
After all, the General Assembly offers in its structure, amongst other benefits, a means of placing 
less developed nations on a par with industrialized States – Nauru and China on the same stage 
despite their massive size difference, the DRC alongside the United States despite their divergent 
respective GDPs and States hostile towards one another such as Iran and Israel are viewed 
equally in the Assembly chamber and granted equal rights. Indeed, even the seating arrangement 
of States, ordered alphabetically and in proximity to the front rotated based on a ballot, is 
swimming in even-handedness and fairness. However, whereas UN member States in the 
General Assembly are equally represented, meaning each has a single vote irrespective of size, 
population, economic size or other distinguishing feature, the Security Council is an inherently 
different system altogether.  
Although not in contradiction with the international principles of State sovereignty due to 
the fact that all Members of the UN have entered voluntarily to be bound by the UN Charter 
which regulates the Security Council mechanism in all manners, it can appear this way at first 
glance. The Council is formed of 15 members,1 only 10 of which are alternated every two years 
on a staggered basis: 5 each year. The remaining 5 permanent members are equipped with the 
power to unilaterally prevent a resolution from even coming into existence through the power of 
veto.2 Furthermore, the Security Council has been mandated by the UN Charter to maintain the 
international peace and security by any means necessary, including but not limited to the use of 
sanctions and the use of force. Recent decades have seen the definition of international peace 
                                                 
1 UN Charter (1945) art 23(1) 
2 ibid art 17(3) 
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and security expand, although not without concern by member States, non-governmental 
organizations and scholars.3  
Thus, with a third of seats within the organ occupied by permanent members wielding the 
veto and the Security Council’s apparently unfettered powers to subject UN Member States to 
legally binding obligations without their consent,4 the Security Council is far from proportionally 
representative or equal in its composition. Calls for reform have fallen on deaf ears for decades, 
with the exception of token changes such as the 1963 expansion of the number of non-permanent 
seats on the Council from 6 to 10, bringing the total from 11 to 15 members.5  It would seem, 
then, that despite purporting to be an organ that claims to represent the entirety of the United 
Nations member States, the Security Council must be accepted as a flawed system, at least from 
the perspective of  the proportional representation, standards of equality and other democratic 
principles that the General Assembly displays. Perhaps more concerning than the flawed system 
itself is the notion that Security Council action is not subject to any adjudication, review, 
standards of accountability or other elements of what those involved in the fields of law, politics 
and international relations might term the rule of law.  
 However, this situation seems on the cusp of change: on 24th September 2012, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a landmark declaration that “the rule of law applies to all States 
equally, and to international organizations, including the United Nations and its principal 
organs, and that respect for and promotion of the rule of law and justice should guide all of their 
activities and accord predictability and legitimacy to their actions.”6 After years of debate on UN 
reform and discussion on how the rule of law can be internationalised, the question has transited 
from whether the rule of law should be applied to the United Nations and its organs to how this 
can be done.  
                                                 
3 eg Jacob Cogan, ‘Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law’ (2006) 31 Yale J Intl L 189; Simon 
Chesterman, ‘The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law: The Role of the Security Council in Strengthening a 
Rules-based International System- Final Report and Recommendations from the Austrian Initiative, 2004-2008’, ¶33 
(Institute for International Law and Justice 2008); Jared Schott, ‘Chapter VII as Exception: Security Council Action 
and the Regulative Ideal of Emergency’ (2008) 6(1) Northwestern J Intl Hum Rts 24; Björn Elberling, ‘The ultra 
vires Character of Legislative Action by the Security Council’ (2005) 2 IOLR 337 
4 eg UNSC Res 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/RES/955, where the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
was created despite the objections of Rwandan delegate. A more recent example is the referral of several members 
of the Sudanese government, including President Omar Al-Bashir, to the International Criminal Court, despite 
Sudan not being a State Party to the governing Rome Statute 
5 UNGA Res 1991A (1963) UN Doc A/RES/17/1991A. 
6 Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and 
International Levels, UNGA Res 67/1 (2012) UN Doc A/RES/67/1, ¶2 [emphasis added] 
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The UN Charter allows the Security Council to set its own agenda in maintaining 
international peace and security, without defining the term or giving it a specific mandate with 
respect to armed conflict or any other definition. Whilst the expansive nature of a “threat to the 
peace”7 can be argued to have evolved since 1945, when the Security Council was established, 
from the perspective of an inquisitive and legal researcher, the lack of oversight or monitoring of 
Security Council decisions is a metaphorical thorn in the side. The competence of the Council to 
self-regulate as well as regulating others, such as appointments to the International Court of 
Justice8 and the post of Secretary-General of the UN9, allows it a great deal of freedom without 
the type of review one may traditionally associate with comparable domestic organisations.10  
Similarly, as arguably the closest organisation to a ‘world government’, with the power to 
impose economic sanctions, military intervention and, most recently, criminal sentences,11 the 
Council does not benefit from the impartiality and separation of powers that a domestic 
government that abides by the principles of a rule of law might.  
To add to this situation, the focus of the United Nations, as well as other international 
organisations and governments,12 has shifted increasingly towards the establishment of the rule 
of law. It is found in the doctrines, resolutions, statements and official records of the United 
Nations at all levels and has been cited as one of the core foundations for peace and security. 
Indeed, since 2004, the rule of law has increasingly featured on the agenda of the Security 
Council itself and held numerous thematic debates on the subject;13 yet it was only recently that 
the United Nations began looking internally when discussing the rule of law and even more 
recently that any action was taken in moving the United Nations towards compliance with a rule 
of law. In the aftermath of the General Assembly’s recent declaration on the rule of law, I ask 
                                                 
7 UN Charter (1945) art 39 
8 Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) art 4(1) 
9 UN Charter (1945) art 97 
10 Domestic governments are traditionally subject to checks and balances to ensure that the rule of law is maintained 
effectively 
11 The subsidiary organs of the ICTY and ICTR, in addition to the ICC to which the Council may refer situations 
under Rome statute art 16, are enabled with the power to hand down criminal sentences to convicted parties. This is 
attributable to the Security Council and thus, indirectly, the Security Council has granted itself the power to hand 
down criminal sentences. For imputability of actions of a subsidiary to an organ back to the parent organ, see 
generally, Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions 
(OUP 2011) and Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation 
by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (OUP 1999) 
12 eg States’ constitutions and UN resolution 
13 See eg UNSC Presidential Statement 15 (2003) UN Doc S/PRST/2003/15, UNSC Presidential Statement 2 (2004) 
UN Doc S/PRST/2004/2, UNSC Presidential Statement 32 (2004) UN Doc S/PRST/2004/32, UNSC Presidential 
Statement 30 (2005) UN Doc S/PRST/2005/30; UNSC Presidential Statement 28 (2006) UN Doc S/PRST/2006/28 
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how the rule of law can be applied to the Security Council, what it would be comprised of and 
how it can inform decisions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter dealing with threats to 
the international peace. 
 
I.2 Research Methodology 
I.2.1 Research Questions 
It can be said that there are three basic aims of research: exploration, testing out and problem 
solving.14 This thesis fits into the scope of both exploration and testing out, as it attempts to 
create a definition of the international rule of law for the Security Council and then make 
generalisations from specific instances and cases within this framework. It will identify 
individual components of the international rule of law and refer to decisions taken by the Council 
either passing a resolution or deciding not to do so, exploring whether the Council has acted 
differently in similar circumstances and whether it has complied with the rule of law. In this 
thesis, I will establish what the components of an international rule of law for the Security 
Council are and how they differ from a domestic or general international rule of law. I will also 
identify situations where the Council acted according to these principles and situations where it 
failed to do.  
As such, there appear to be two distinct elements to this thesis: defining the rule of law as it 
pertains to the Security Council and measuring the Security Council’s decision-making process 
in Chapter VII resolutions against this standard. A successful project should have clearly 
articulated research questions, pursued through appropriate methods and using appropriate data. 
Thus, there are two core questions that I wish to tackle in this thesis:  
 
1) What should the rule of law be at the Security Council level? 
2) Have the Security Council responses under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to 
actual or potential threats to the peace incorporated these elements of the rule of law into 
its decision-making process, where pertinent? 
 
                                                 
14 See eg Nicholas Walliman, Your Research Project (2nd edn, Sage 2005) 249; Estelle Phillips and Derek S. Pugh, 
How to get a PhD (Open UP 2010) 58-9 
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Within the framework of the above two questions, there are several sub-questions that shall be 
answered: 
 
i. What is the rule of law in the domestic and international spheres? 
ii. How and why does a rule of law for the Security Council differ from the rule of law 
in other contexts? 
iii. Why should the Security Council be subject to a rule of law? 
iv. What are the comparable cases of threats to the peace that the Council has dealt with? 
v. Is there a case for subjecting the Security Council to either judicial or independent 
review as part of compliance with the rule of law? If so, do suitable means of review 
currently exist? If not, what means can be used?  
 
I.2.2 Research Scope 
It is important at this stage to explicitly note the focus of my research- although it would be 
interesting to analyse how a rule of law can be implemented across the board in Security Council 
decisions, including administrative decisions or those, for example, that elect judges to the ICJ or 
recommend a Secretary-General to the UN General Assembly, this thesis will focus exclusively 
on the rule of law within the framework of the Council’s primary responsibility to maintain the 
international peace and security as outlined in the UN Charter. It will not address the rule of law 
outside of this scope, meaning that only decisions taken by the Security Council to maintain 
international peace and security will be examined against rule of law elements. 
To analyse every decision taken by the Security Council, or even all resolutions that have 
been passed with reference to or under Chapter VII since its establishment, would be a herculean 
task that, moreover, would not result in concise and manageable outcomes or findings. It is for 
this reason that this thesis will benefit from purposeful sampling relating to selected cases that 
highlight instances where the Council may have avoided, neglected or side-stepped the 
implementation of rule of law components in its decision-making process. Temporal limitations 
for data collection are normally vital to research- as Walliman notes, data “only provide a 
fleeting and partial glimpse of events, opinions, beliefs or conditions. What may be an accurate 
and valuable observation today, might be irrelevant and incorrect tomorrow. Data are not only 
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ephemeral but corruptible.”15 However, any shifting standards in Council behaviour will be 
useful in this research, since it may suggest a change in the stance of the Council or an 
acceptance that its process requires amendment to bring itself more in line with the underlying 
principles of equality, fairness, transparency or any of the other rule of law components; as this 
thesis will demonstrate, for example, with respect to incorporation of human rights 
considerations in sanction regimes or the expansion of the term “threat to the international 
peace”, the act of contrasting resolutions that emerged decades apart grants an insight into the 
evolution of the thinking of Council Members and marks a shift in what is considered integral to 
its responsibilities. 
This thesis does not primarily seek to explicitly trace an evolution in practice, although 
evolving practices will indicate a willingness of the Council to change its approach to responding 
to threats to the international peace as well as the UN’s – and by extension the Council’s – ability 
to self-reflect on the most appropriate methods of upholding its responsibilities under the UN 
Charter; this thesis primarily focuses on the establishment of a bespoke rule of law for the 
Council and the comparison of Council behaviour with this rule of law. Therefore, due to the 
concept of peace and security and its development throughout the decades since the 
establishment of the United Nations, I have chosen not to exclusively temporally limit the scope 
of this thesis; however, although resolutions dating back to the establishment of the Council in 
1946 are not precluded, I anticipate that resolutions dating from 1990 – after the fall of 
communism and the collapse of the USSR – will be more useful to my research and I expect to 
rely more heavily on these for numerous reasons.16  
Firstly, the end of the Cold War appears to be a point that scholars agree constituted a 
great shift in Council politics and heralded the beginning of an increased activity on its part in 
the maintenance of international peace and security.17 The impact of the Cold War on the work 
                                                 
15 Walliman (n 14) 241 
16 Some analysis of resolutions prior to this will be necessary to derive Council interpretation of its mandate and 
powers at the time of and shortly after its establishment. For example, the Council’s approach to its reform, its 
transparency, its interaction with other UN organs and the use of the veto are not issues that must be necessarily 
temporally limited 
17 See eg Susan Lamb, ‘Legal Limits to UN Security Council Powers’ in Guy Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon (eds), 
The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (OUP 1999) 361; Antonios Tzanakopoulos, 
‘Transparency in the Security Council’ in Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters (eds), Transparency in International Law 
(CUP 2012) 368; Elberling (n 3); John Dunbabin, ‘The Security Council in the Wings: Exploring the Security 
Council’s Non-involvement in War’ in Vaughan Lowe and others (eds), The United Nations Security Council and 
War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, (OUP 2010) 495 
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of the Council is starkly contrasted by a post-Soviet Security Council, exemplified most clearly 
by the juxtaposition of the paralysis suffered prior to 1990 to the cascade of Council-mandated 
and related activity on the front of peacekeeping activities,18 adopted Council resolutions,19 
proliferation of subsidiary bodies20 and significant decline in the number of vetoes used by P5 
member States;21 this increased cooperation of the Council members after 1990 is sure to have 
impacted on the stance and behaviour of its decision-making process. Secondly, to discuss the 
threat to international peace from the early 20th Century, in the aftermath of World War II, at the 
height of the Cold War or prior to the expansion of the definition of a threat by the Council 
would be irrelevant; ultimately, the emergence of new threats to the international peace22 and a 
greater focus on the impact of intra-State conflict on regional stability rather than the now 
antiquated inter-State conflicts23 highlights that the international arena the peace of which the 
Council is tasked to maintain or restore has change drastically. Thirdly, this work must 
endeavour to remain relevant and contemporary – the decision-making process of the Council 
may well have changed over the course of seventy years and to identify a pattern in the mid-
twentieth century that no longer exists would produce no answers as to the extent to which the 
Council maintains the rule of law today. As a result, the focus of this research must be relatively 
recent and a quarter of a decade appears a naturally suitable period of time for examination 
whilst also allowing sufficient scope for detailed and varied illustrations of Council behaviour. 
                                                 
18 Between 1990 and 1994, the UN’s annual peacekeeping budget rose from $500m to over $3bn; during the same 
period, the number of peacekeepers deployed rose from 10,000 to 70,000 troops. See, Security Council Report, ‘UN 
Peacekeeping: Deployments and Budgets, 1946-2013’ (2014) 
19 In the years 1985-89, 87 resolutions were passed – an average of 17 per year; in the period 1990-1994, a total of 
323 resolutions were passed – around 64 per year 
20 There are only a handful of existing subsidiary organs that date back prior to 1990: three standing committees 
(Committee of Experts (1946); the Committee on Admission of New Member States (1946); and the Committee on 
Meetings away from UN Headquarters (1972)) and one Charter-mandated subsidiary body (the Military Staff 
Committee (1946)). Since 1990 the Council has created three ad-hoc committees (the UN Compensation Committee 
(1991), the Counter-Terrorism Committee (2001) and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee (2004)), three 
ad hoc International Tribunals (the ICTY (1993), the ICTR (1994) and the International Residual Mechanism 
(2010)), six working groups (on Peacekeeping operations (2001), on Resolution 1566 (2004), on Children and 
Armed Conflict (2005), on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa (2002), on Documentation and other 
Procedural Questions (1993), on International Tribunals (2000)) and thirteen sanctions committees (on Somalia and 
Eritrea (2002, 2009), Al-Qaeda (1999, 2011), the Taliban (2011), Iraq (2003), Liberia (2003), Democratic Republic 
of Congo (2003), Cote d’Ivoire (2004), Sudan (2005), Lebanon (2005), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(2006), Iran (2006), Libya (2011) and Guinea-Bissau (2012)) 
21 In 1989 the same number of veto votes were cast as throughout the entire decade of the 1990s (9 in total); the 
1970s saw 51 vetoes and the 1980s saw 72, whilst the 1990s saw only 9 and the 2000s saw 16 
22 Eg non-proliferation, international terrorism, climate change, gender inequality and others 
23 Typified by the discussions and responses of the Council on and to the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Libya, Syria, 
Kosovo, Iraq, Haiti and numerous other internal State conflicts 
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Finally, it would be remiss to attempt to impose a standard of the rule of law, mention of which 
as a concept itself only appeared on the Council agenda at the advent of the new millennium, 
with the standards of the Charter drafters at San Francisco in 1945; as a concept only recently 
acknowledged as applying internally to the UN system, there would be little use in measuring the 
decision-making process of the Council against a standard that did not exist a quarter of a 
century ago. Such analysis would attempt an ex post facto critique of the Council that violates 
the principle of nullem crimen sine lege. Nonetheless, there remains a vast quantity of Council 
material for comparison and numerous conflicts and threats that are ripe for discussion even 
within the period 1990 onwards; since 1990, the Council has passed over 1500 resolutions,24 
which seems a wealthy pool of resources from which to derive patterns of behaviour and, most 
importantly, timely, relevant and pertinent examples. 
In contrast to the definition of international peace and security, the rule of law can benefit 
from a long-standing history of attempts to define it. The rule of law varies not as a result of 
temporal differences but rather ideological, geographical, philosophical and other ethereal and 
abstract reasons; the rule of law, then, is defined differently depending on the individual or State 
defining it and what may be valued as paramount to some will not necessarily be held inviolable 
to others. As Chapter II will illustrate, the components of a rule of law are far from agreed upon, 
but the core thread or concept itself has existed for centuries without being defined in detail. 
Attempts to define it, rather than superseding or replacing previous definitions appear to have 
augmented and enhanced predecessors’ classifications and descriptions whilst simultaneously 
leaving the core values of a rule of law intact; it is a case of refinement rather than replacement. 
Thus, temporal limitation will not be necessary when it comes to defining the rule of law, since 
its definition can be said to benefit from the extensive examination that it has undergone. 
 
I.2.3 Methods 
The exact detail of how each component of the rule of law can be established will be addressed 
in Chapter III, but this short overview aims to give an insight into the overarching structure that 
this thesis will take. This thesis intends to be a legal study of the rule of law principles in the 
decision-making process by the United Nations Security Council; it will address the process by 
                                                 
24 Figured calculated through author’s own analysis of UN documents. There were 646 resolutions passed between 
the years 1946 and 1989; since then there have been over 1500 resolutions passed. 
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which the Council reaches a decision to adopt or reject a resolution, as well as its inaction, which 
in itself can be seen as a concerted decision. Therefore, this thesis will not simply be an 
empirical study of what is (lex lata), but also a normative study of what the rule of law at the 
level of the Security Council should be (lex ferenda). In doing so, of course, an element of 
empirical research will be necessary – most notably the analysis of Security Council resolutions, 
Council President statements, verbatim records and other primary sources – to establish a frame 
of reference of the status quo as opposed to my proposition for Security Council rule of law; this 
will be particularly relevant when addressing the current definition of the rule of law, which has 
been discussed at length and at various echelons of society from the individual to international 
organisations. I intend to juxtapose these types of Security Council documents with a bespoke 
rule of law framework that I will derive from existing literature and UN documents themselves, 
such as UNGA Res 67/1 and Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s 2004 report outlining the 
components of the rule of law.25 
My primary focus will be the work of the Council itself, as well as the reactions and 
statements of its constituent Members and the wider international community; Council 
resolutions and Presidential statements are central to my research but verbatim records and 
voting statistics will assist in analysing not only the end result but also the reasoning behind the 
outcome and the process through which it was reached. This work draws primarily on qualitative 
methods, where the theory of a bespoke rule of law is applied in practice to the Council decision-
making process. I do not attempt to deeply immerse myself in only a few situations as case study 
methods may necessitate, but rather I will take a thematic approach to derive only the necessary 
data of the response of the Council to numerous situations at different stages, each illustration26 
supporting my argument in relation to a particular facet of the rule of law – from the tabling of 
an agenda item to the adoption of a Council resolution – from a wide range of selected examples 
of Council behaviour and hold these against the principles and norms of a bespoke rule of law 
derived from existing literature and UN documents. Thus, in doing so, I focus only on the 
relevant extracts of the Council decision-making process; I have also studied the threats that have 
                                                 
25 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict 
Societies’ (2004) UN Doc S/2004/616 
26 I have termed the examples used later in this thesis as illustrations rather than case studies to differentiate between 
the connotations attributed typically to case studies and the selective elements of the examples where Council 
behaviour will be measured, the latter of which is what I intend to make use of.  
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been discussed at the Council and have selected certain situations as the basis of my illustrations 
that highlight where the Council is lacking in compliance with the rule of law. 
Since the international rule of law is at the heart of this research, selecting appropriate 
cases to highlight specific examples of Council action within a framework of the individual 
components of the international rule of law appears more logical than attempting to fit the 
components to a small number of cases that may not be truly representative of the nature of the 
Council’s work. I intend to interpret these resolutions side-by-side, using juxtaposition in a 
comparative analysis of Council action, contrasting the similarities and patterns in their decisions 
and the process leading up to a decision to either pass or fail a proposed resolution. Resolutions 
will be examined according to their relevance to the rule of law component under discussion, 
since I predict that there will be more pertinent examples depending on the particular strand of 
the rule of law in question. In essence, rather than selecting a handful of resolutions against 
which to compare all of the elements of the rule of law, I will select different resolutions for each 
rule of law component depending on their relevance to the argument being made. It is for this 
reason that a case study approach or a purely quantitative analysis has not been selected for this 
thesis.27 However, this is not to say that quantitative methods are entirely unhelpful in the 
research of this thesis; historical data forms a part of the analysis of my research insofar as 
concluding whether a pattern exists and in juxtaposing the behaviour of the Council today with 
its decision-making process in the past. 
I intend to select two types of resolutions of the Security Council: those dealing with 
situations that contain similar features but where the course of action taken by the Council was 
different – for example, the reactions to popular uprisings in Libya and Syria – or where the 
situations were different but the course of action taken by the Security Council was the same – 
such as the use of the veto under different circumstances. This thesis will not limit itself to 
resolutions that have been passed, but will also address resolutions which have been proposed 
but failed as well as situations that might constitute a threat to the international peace where 
resolutions were not posed at all. In doing so, I aim to examine a wide cross-section of Council 
action over the decades since its creation, attempting to chart the rise of the international rule of 
law in Council action, if at all, with a particular focus on Council decisions since the rule of law 
                                                 
27 Quantitative analysis may also have allowed me to enter into historical data analysis, finding patterns in the way 
that the Council has reacted to situations since 1945; however, it would have failed to establish the rule of law itself 
as a standard against which Council action can be measured. 
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began to appear on its agenda in 2003 and was mentioned as relating internally to the UN in 
Annan’s report of 2004. However, I also intend to ask whether the rule of law for the Security 
Council is enshrined in its responsibilities as outlined in the UN Charter, and therefore must 
relate examples back to Council action as far back as 1946.  
I have chosen to examine all substantive resolutions28  and Presidential statements that 
have emerged from the Council since 1990, with a particular focus on those dealing with the 
maintenance of the international peace, before narrowing these down to examples where I have 
found relevant data to be extrapolated. This thesis firstly argues that the Council should be held 
to standards of the rule of law and, accordingly, the crux of my original research focus in this 
thesis is to analyse examples where the Council has failed to do so. In researching these 
documents, as well as the Council discussions that have taken place,29 I have highlighted in my 
research situations where the Council has departed from adherence to the rule of law. I have 
chosen the illustrations contained in this thesis based on their relevance to each of the 
components of the rule of law; each illustration is included by design to prove a point, help 
demonstrate a pattern of behaviour or accentuate a variance in approach by the Council. As a 
result, although there may be instances where the Council does adhere to the rule of law in its 
decisions, by definition the rule of law is a standard from which no deviation should be 
permitted. Accordingly, a failure on the part of the Council to adhere in some situations with the 
rule of law cannot be found to be a simple deviation but rather, given the nature of the Council’s 
powers and position within the UN system, a symptom of wider nonconformity. 
This thesis will draw upon both the doctrinal and reform-oriented approaches, using a 
black letter definition of the law based upon the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a 
framework for analysis. Although the rule of law itself is not clearly defined and one cannot 
speak of a black letter definition of the rule of law in the same way as some fields of law may 
benefit from, this thesis establishes a rule of law framework and the black letter law approach 
will be used to apply the technical legal rules of the components outlined in Chapter III to the 
behaviour of the Council in Chapter IV - XI. My research attempts to analyse the Council’s 
adherence to the principles of the rule of law, whilst also evaluating the adequacy of the existing 
structure of the Council and its subsidiary, complementary and peripheral bodies, organs and 
                                                 
28 These are non-procedural resolutions that do not deal with issues such as the appointment of ICJ judges, 
Secretary-General, etc. 
29 This was carried out through analysis of verbatim records. 
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establishments in relation to its work; this thesis will identify if it is appropriate and feasible to 
impose a structure of the rule of law upon the Council and whether it would be appropriate and 
feasible for an external entity to monitor its compliance. I identify that there exists a need for a 
rule of law framework, expand on potential areas of friction between current practice and best 
practice30 and attempt to predict future developments within the Council, whilst simultaneously 
suggesting means to incorporate these rule of law components within Council activity. 
 
I.2.4 Sources 
The overarching primary source for this thesis will be the UN Charter, which operates as the sole 
governing text that empowers the Security Council to take actions including sanctions, military 
intervention and the creation of subsidiary organs. Within this framework there are additional 
considerations which impact on the duties and responsibilities of the Council, such as State 
practice and compliance, the Council’s Rules of Procedure or the interaction between the 
Council and the International Criminal Court under the Rome Statute; however, as the document 
from which the Council draws its legitimacy, power and the legality of its actions, the UN 
Charter must be central to this thesis and it must be the standard against which its actions are 
measured, particularly with respect to the case studies on ultra vires action. Similarly, the 
Council has adopted its own Rules of Procedure – albeit provisional in name – by which it 
should abide and these Rules will also serve as central to the thesis. 
Other primary sources for this research will consist of United Nations documents 
including Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions and decisions and judgements of 
international courts such as the International Court of Justice, ICC, International Tribunals for 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda insofar as they mention, interact with or review the actions 
of the Council. These are all widely available electronically through either the respective court's 
websites or the United Nations News Centre.31 They are also collated in volumes of Council 
resolutions, Assembly resolutions and other tomes of central UN and UN organ literature.32 
Other primary sources will include State declarations and statements. 
                                                 
30 “Best practice” is defined as action by the Council in compliance with the rule of law components. 
31 <www.un.org/news> accessed 16 December 2014, <www.un.org/Docs/sc> accessed 16 December 2014, 
<www.un.org/en/unpress> accessed 16 December 2014. 
32 eg United Nations Resolutions, UN Juridical Yearbooks, ICJ Yearbooks, Annual Review of United Nations 
Affairs, Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals. 
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This thesis will therefore make use of a wide variety of resolutions and treaties as 
primary sources. In interpreting these, I have chosen the guidelines of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties to ensure that my analysis is consistent and transparent and thus it is vital to 
establish my theoretical perspective when doing so. Interpretation of international treaties are 
regulated by articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention and as such I will use this framework to 
interpret all international treaties and the UN Charter, since this is, in essence, the largest multi-
lateral treaty in international law.33 Despite the Vienna Convention entering into effect several 
decades after the UN Charter was established, it remains the framework that I choose for 
interpretation.34 Far from being an example of ex post facto law, the Vienna Convention was in 
part a codification of existing norms and law.35  
Resolutions, however, are more difficult to analyse, as they are not strictly treaties and 
therefore cannot be analysed within the same Vienna Convention framework mutatis mutandis. 
The Vienna Convention, can, however, serve as a fine starting point for the interpretation of 
                                                 
33 Some commentators interpret the UN Charter as a constitution. See eg Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations 
Charter as the Constitution of the International Community (Brill Nijhoff 2009) 169; Ernst-Ulrich Petermann, 
‘Constitutional Justice and the Perennial Task of ‘Constitutionalizing’ Law and Society through ‘Participatory 
Justice’’ (2010) European University Institute Working Paper Law 2010/03, 2 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13590/LAW_2010_03.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 16 December 2014. 
However, this would colour the UN in a different light – more as a governmental entity with intertwining and inter-
supportive judiciary, executive and legislative branches – and therefore would shift the perspective of analysis for 
this thesis, particularly when discussing rule of law elements such as separation of powers in Chapter II. I strongly 
disagree with this view given the voluntary accession of States to the UN, the independence of UN organs from one 
another and the non-vertical nature of international law. The United Nations system was created so that organs are 
independent of one another, which is one of the reasons why issues such as my research questions are being posed. 
As such, the Charter should be interpreted under article 31 and 33 of the Vienna Convention (Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), 1155 UNTS 331) 
34 To take a traditional view of the Charter would mean abiding rigidly to the definitions and meanings of the 
drafters of the Charter, as derived from documents and State practice of the time; to take a liberal view would be to 
accept the changing thresholds, values, standards and practices of international law, international politics, diplomacy 
and inter-state relationships. This is the crux of the debate between a positive and negative interpretation of the 
definition of a threat to the international peace and security. For further discussion of positive and negative 
interpretations of the threat to the peace, see Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security 
Council (Hart 2004) 138-139 
35 The concept of codification of existing customary law into a treaty is one that has previously been supported by 
the ICJ in the Continental Shelf case; therefore, the principles that are enshrined in it can be sufficiently recognised 
to have been principles of customary law at the time of the Charter’s creation. See, Continental Shelf case (Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya v Malta) (Judgment) [1985] ICJ Rep 13, ¶27, where the ICJ found that “the material of customary 
international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States, even though 
multilateral conventions may have an important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving from custom, or 
indeed in developing them”. See, also, cases where customary law is reflected in article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention: Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) (Judgment) [1994] ICJ Rep 6, ¶41; Oil Platforms 
(Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Preliminary Objections) [1996] ICJ Rep 803, ¶23; 
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) (Judgment) [1999] ICJ Rep 1045, ¶18; LaGrand (Germany v United 
States of America) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 466, ¶99 
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Security Council resolutions.36 In contrast to legal treaties, most Security Council resolutions are 
not self-contained and are a continuation of previous decisions or resolutions; thus, all Security 
Council documents or other reports referred to in the opening of a resolution should be 
considered the travaux preperatoires of the resolution and are relevant to the interpretation of the 
object and purpose of the resolution.37 For instance, the agreement of States in itself is a method 
of establishing the meaning or intent of a resolution and comments, statements and press releases 
frequently supplement the black letter text of the resolution, adding facets to the often skeletal 
resolution. 
The Security Council in its decisions often veers outside of the scope of traditional black-
letter law into the sphere of international politics and relations and the full depth of their meaning 
is often only discovered when the “legal documents” of resolutions are taken in conjunction with 
non-legal texts and verbal statements that assist in further defining the purpose and intention of a 
resolution. Even treaties cannot be addressed as exclusive self-contained entities as, particularly 
when referring to documents that were drafted over half a century ago, often the debates that 
raged between States on exact wordings apprise us of the potential hidden meanings that were 
included or excluded from the finished legal texts.38 This leads to my decision to use the travaux 
preperatoires as a supplementary means of interpretation 
The following section examines existing secondary sources in a brief literature review, 
explaining where my research is located and why existing works do not fully answer the research 
questions I have proposed above.  
 
I.3  Literature Review 
Existing discussions of the international rule of law either approach the questions of its 
existence, relationship to the Security Council and intersection with the maintenance of 
international peace and security from isolated perspectives, that is to say from one particular 
                                                 
36 Sir Michael Wood has written an article on the matter, although he by no means intended it to be definitive. See, 
Michael C Wood ‘The Interpretations of Security Council resolutions’ (1998) 2 Max Planck Yrbk UN L 73 
37 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), 1155 
UNTS 331, art 32. This is supplemented by the principles highlighted in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention to 
interpret in good faith, in a general context as lex generalis– unless otherwise stated to be lex specialis – and the fact 
that with Security Council resolutions, State practice can often serve as an indicator of the nature of a resolution. 
38 This is certainly the case where the UN Charter is concerned and the definition of peace and security is examined. 
In order to discover this, the text of the Charter alone is wholly insufficient and the conferences at Yalta, San 
Francisco and other formative meetings must be considered. 
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facet, or insufficiently address the complexities of an international rule of law as it pertains to the 
Security Council. This thesis is also located in the void left by previous authors and researchers 
that have focused on an international rule of law solely with reference to isolated fields of 
international law – such as that of international refugee law39 – or on the existence of an 
international rule of law as a general concept,40 the fruits of which would be borne on the 
domestic level. The imposition of a rule of law upon the Security Council internally, as opposed 
to its numerous resolutions and statements emphasising the importance of a rule of law at the 
domestic level in the pursuit of good governance, human rights and democratic principles, is a 
new initiative that has been years in the making. Indeed, “the international rule of law is most 
commonly understood as the regulation of horizontal relations between states”41 and hitherto, 
any notion of abidance by the rule of law would have been almost unthinkable for the Security 
Council, which had, and continues to practice, compétence de la compétence42 insofar as its 
decision-making process. A different understanding of the international rule of law is evident 
amongst scholars, excluding the Security Council as subject to its components and regulation and 
focusing either on the interaction between the domestic and international spheres or the 
horizontal application of a vertical system upon States themselves43 or on the Council’s role in 
                                                 
39 eg Susan Kneebone, ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Law: Refugees and Asylum Seekers’ in Susan Kneebone 
(ed.), Refugees, Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law (CUP 2009), 32-77 
40 eg Thomas Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin 2011), 110-29, in which an international rule of law would 
include the reliance on law as opposed to arbitrary power in international relations, the settlement by law for 
settlement by force and the use of law for the cooperative international furtherance of social aims; Jeremy Waldron, 
‘The Rule of International Law’ (2006) 30 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 15, where an international rule of law constrains 
states in the same way that domestic law constrains lawmakers; Simon Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ 
(2008) 56(2) Am J Comp L 331, in which an international rule of law can be understood to be the application of rule 
of law principles to relations between States and other subjects of international law; Dennis Jacobs, ‘What is an 
International Rule of Law?’ (2006) 30 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 3, where cultural activities create linkages that bypass 
national and governmental designations. 
41 Machiko Kanetake, ‘The Interfaces between the National and International Rule of Law: A Framework Paper’ 
(2006) Amsterdam Centre for International Law Research Paper No 2014-44, 6 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2480965> accessed 16 December 2014 
42 This is the power of a Court to determine the scope of its own jurisdiction. The UN Charter clearly states that 
“[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace . . .” UN Charter 
(1945) art 39 
43 eg Thomas A Vandamme & Jan-Herman Reestman (eds), Ambiguity in the Rule of Law: The interface between 
National and International Legal Systems (Europa Law 2001) is an example of this phenomenon and takes as its 
central theme the interface between national and international legal systems; Dennis Jacobs, André Nollkaemper and 
Simon Chesterman each briefly introduce the international rule of law in their respective pieces, where an 
international rule of law constrains states in the same way that domestic law constrains lawmakers- Jacobs (n 40); 
Chesterman (n 40); André Nollkaemper, ‘The Internationalized Rule of Law’ (2009) 1 HJRL 74. The 
Internationalized Rule of Law addresses the dichotomy between the rule of law at the domestic and international 
levels, finding that the international rule of law “influences and often even determines the domestic rule of law”, at 
75, the “application of international law . . . depends on the rule of law at the domestic level”, at 75, and that 
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promoting the rule of law in post-conflict States.44 No authors have created a bespoke rule of law 
for the Council45 and very few have put forward the concept of a rule of law to govern the actual 
decisions or the resolutions of the Security Council;46 other authors that have broached the topic 
of a Council rule of law have taken a piecemeal style. Such authors have typically taken one of 
three approaches to discussion on the rule of law for the Council: analysis of specific 
components of the rule of law in relation to Council behaviour, such as transparency47 or ultra 
vires action;48 thematic discussions of the Council’s part in broader issues such as UN 
sanctions,49 collective security50 and non-proliferation;51 or examination of post-facto responses 
to the Council’s actions, including State disobedience52 and judicial review mechanisms.53 This 
                                                                                                                                                             
“domestic institutions can fill rule of law gaps at the international level”, at 76. Waldron (n 40) is a short 
introduction to the 2006 International Law and the State of the Constitution symposium and as such, it is a very brief 
account of international rule of law from an American perspective, drawing heavily on US constitutional protections 
as a reference point.  
44 See eg David Toblert & Andrew Solomon, ‘United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in Post-
Conflict Societies’ (2006) 19 Harv Hum Rts J 29 
45 Thomas Fitschen, ‘Inventing the Rule of Law for the United Nations’ (2008) in 12 Max Planck Yrbk UN L 347 
discusses the rule of law for the Council but stops short a detailed analysis of the rule of law components on the 
decision-making process of the Council itself. Simon Chesterman was the drafter of the final report and 
recommendations that emerged from the Austrian Initiative on the role of the Security Council in strengthening a 
rules-based international system that ran from 2004 to 2008: Chesterman (n 3) ¶33. This report approached the rule 
of law and Security Council in tandem, emerging with seventeen recommendations for the Council but does not 
enter into an academic analysis of the rule of law or the role of the Security Council and, much like government 
documents and reports, focuses on the practical application without encompassing the theoretical framework 
necessary for a scholarly piece. Accordingly, it is more akin to a policy paper, with suggestions, recommendations 
and assumptions without referential support. 
46 Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
United Nations (Nijhoff 1998), 214-18; Simon Chesterman, ‘'I'll Take Manhattan': The International Rule of Law 
and the United Nations Security Council’ (2009) 1 HJRL 1 67; Jason Dominguez Meyer, ‘From Paralysis in Rwanda 
to Boldness in Libya: Has the International Community taken “Responsibility to protect” from abstract principle to 
concrete norm under International Law?’ (2012) 34(1) Hous J Int’l L 87 
47 Tzanakopoulos (n 17) 
48 Schott (n 3); Benedetto Conforti, ‘The Legal Effect of Non-compliance with Rules of Procedure in the UN 
General Assembly and Security Council’ (1969) 63 AJIL 479; Bardo Fassbender, ‘Quis judicibit? The Security 
Council, Its Powers and Its Legal Control’ (2000) 11 EJIL 219; Elberling (n 3); Eric Rosand, ‘The Security Council 
As ‘Global Legislator’: Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?’ (2004) 28(3) Fordham Int’l L J 542 
49 Christopher Michaelsen, ‘The Security Council’s Practice of Blacklisting Alleged Terrorists and Associates: Rule 
of Law Concerns and Prospects for Reform’ (2010) 8 New Zealand J Public Int’l L 71; Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘A 
Machiavellian Moment? The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law’ (2006) 3 IOLR 189; August Reinisch, 
‘Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of 
Economic Sanctions’ (2011) 95(4) AJIL 851 
50 Sarooshi (n 11); Karel Wellens, ‘The UN Security Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to the Future’ 
(2003) 8(1) J C & S L 15 
51 Daniel Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (OUP 2009); Daniel 
Joyner, ‘The Security Council as a Legal Hegemon’ (2012) 43 Geo J Int’l L 225, 227 
52 eg Cogan (n 3); Tzanakopoulos (n 11) 
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fragmentary and disconnected mosaic of works even when read together cannot provide the 
interconnectivity I seek to achieve in a holistic approach to a system of rule of law components, 
tailored to the characteristics of the Council as defined by the UN Charter and held against the 
realities of its decision-making process and composition.  
Accordingly, existing literature does not suffice in answering the research questions that I 
have posed in section 2.1 of this Chapter. The focus of this thesis can be distinguished, for 
example, from studies exclusively centred on the intra or ultra vires action of the Council, 
“whether the body’s powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are virtually unlimited, how 
far the Council can extend the scope of its activities, and whether there are sufficient means of 
legal control.”54 Although accountability and review of Council action forms part of this thesis, it 
is but one component of a wider rule of law system and it is this system that is original in its 
proposal. Individual components addressed in isolation will not serve to explain whether and 
how the Council complies with the rule of law; nor will such isolated examinations provide a full 
picture as to of what the rule of law for the Council would consist and to what extent the Council 
has made efforts to bring itself in line with such standards since 1990.   This thesis will not 
examine one component of the rule of law, but rather all components; as the thesis will show, 
there is clear overlap between components of the rule of law and the sole means of gaining an 
accurate picture of the Council’s compliance with the rule of law is to examine the system in its 
entirety, as opposed to existing literature on a single theme, component or aspect of Council 
procedure. Existing literature is also incapable of being read in light of the new situation that the 
Security Council finds itself in after the adoption of the General Assembly declaration on the 
Rule of Law in 2004;55 whilst the Council’s decision-making process will be examined since 
1990 when a new stage of cooperation between Members can be seen, it is the adoption of 
UNGA Res 67/1 that supposedly heralded a new era in steps taken internal to the UN system for 
compliance with the rule of law. 
This thesis is therefore unique, too, in the temporal scope of its analysis; from a political 
standpoint, scholarly books that exist on the functions and powers of the Security Council seem 
                                                                                                                                                             
53 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Acts of the Security Council: Meaning and Standards of Review’ (2007) 11 Max 
Planck Yrbk UN L 143; Bernd Martenczuk, ‘The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: 
What Lessons from Lockerbie?’ (1999) 10(3) EJIL 517 
54 Fassbender (n 48) 
55 UNGA Res 67/1 (n 6) 
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outdated, having been published in the 1990s or early 2000s,56 although there are examples of 
journal articles that have addressed this topic more recently.57 However, this literature predates 
the declarations relating to the rule of law that have emerged from the various organs of the UN 
since 2004, the increased focus on the recent wave of revolutions and depositions of Heads of 
State that have taken place in Tunisia, Egypt, in which Syria currently finds itself mired and of 
which Libya finds itself in the aftermath. Moreover, in addition from benefiting from a decade of 
Council activity since UNGA Res 67/1, this thesis is a unique study of the Council’s decision-
making process over the 25 years since fall of Communism.58 It will look for patterns and themes 
in Council action, evolution in its decision-making process, search for reform, self-awareness 
and autonomous review mechanisms. Studies, even within the framework of components of the 
rule law and their applicability to the Council, have not attempted to chart a course of action by 
the Council. Therefore, despite a broad spectrum of literature that exists on the international rule 
of law, the limits of the Security Council or attempts to define and interpret the meaning of an 
international peace and security, there exists a gap in the existing field of research that I aim to 
fill with my choice of thesis. 
 
I.4  Thesis Overview 
Chapter II will introduce the need for a rule of law framework for the Council and will elaborate 
on the goals and sources of the rule of law in both the domestic and international spheres. The 
concept of the rule of law has been much-debated for many centuries, yet no common 
terminology or definition has been agreed upon. My research will therefore begin by isolating 
the relevant components of a rule of law for the Security Council before settling on eight 
components for a bespoke rule of law framework in Chapter III. This Chapter will then 
investigate in depth these components – each aspect of the definition will be examined, 
explaining the standards to which Council decision-making should be held and how to identify 
                                                 
56 eg Hazel Fox (ed), The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (BIICL 1997); Sarooshi (n 11); de Wet (n 
34); Lamb (n 17) 361 
57 eg Fitschen (n 45); Tzanakopoulos (n 17); Hitoshi Nasu, ‘The UN Security Council’s Responsibility and the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’’ (2011) 15 Max Planck Yrbk UN L 377 
58 Some analyses have been undertaken on the formative years; see, eg, Frederic L Kirgis Jr, ‘The Security Council’s 
Firtst Fifty Years’ (1995) 89(3) AJIL 506. However, as highlighted previously, the Council’s work has grown 
exponentially since 1990 and any conclusions derived from such analyses are likely to be outdated both in terms of 
the Council’s attitude towards the definition of a “threat to the international peace” as well as the Council’s self-
proclaimed powers to respond. 
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where the Council has reached these goals. Chapters IV to XI will compare and juxtapose the 
components of the rule of law that I have described in further detail against Council decisions 
and resolutions in order to discern whether a pattern of behaviour exists and if this pattern falls 
within the definition of a rule of law. Chapter XII will examine external mechanisms for review 
and propose the establishment of a Rule of Law Tribunal for the Council, dealing specifically and 
exclusively with Council rule of law issues and holding it accountable for its decisions.  The 
thesis will come to an end in Chapter XIII with general conclusions. 
20 
 
CHAPTER II 
DEFINING AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW FOR THE COUNCIL: HOW, WHY AND WHAT? 
 
II.1 Introduction 
This Chapter aims to answer the first of my research questions, by addressing three of the sub-
questions: 
 
i. What is the rule of law in the domestic and international spheres? 
ii. How and why does a rule of law for the Security Council differ from this? 
iii. Why should the Security Council be subject to a rule of law? 
 
In order to answer these questions we must first have an understanding of the general concept of 
the rule of law.  Despite the almost sacred importance and the religious connotations of the rule 
of law in the above citation, “[t]he ‘rule of law’ is widely embraced at the domestic and 
international levels without much precision as to what the term means”59; for example, although 
the UK’s Constitutional Reform Act states that “[n]othing in this Act shall detract from the 
existing constitutional principle of the Rule of Law”60, it does not seek to offer a definition of 
what that principle is.61 
In many minds62 and political systems63 the national incarnation of the rule of law has 
become synonymous with good governance, maintenance of human rights and an equitable, 
                                                 
59 Chesterman (n 3) Executive Summary ¶ii 
60 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s 1(1) 
61 See, also Venice Commission, ‘The Rule of Law: Concept, Guiding Principle and Framework’ (2010) Council of 
Europe Doc CDL-UDT(2010)022, 3, where “[t]he rule of law is part of the inseparable and steadfast triangle, 
trilogy, trinity, or triumvirate “human rights, democracy and rule of law”. It is the cornerstone of national political 
and legal systems. The principle’s importance within this framework has stimulated debate leading to what scholars 
often describe as a profoundly contested concept. It is therefore indispensable and worthwhile that more 
international organisations and bodies take a firm stand with regard to its content”; generally, UNGA Res 67/1 (n 6) 
62 See eg, Brian Z Tamanaha, ‘The Rule of Law for Everyone?’ (2002) 55 CLP 97, 107; EP Thompson, Whigs and 
Hunters: the origin of the Black Act (Penguin 1975) 266; International Commission of Jurists, The Rule of Law in a 
Free Society: A Report on the International Congress on Jurists, New Delhi, India January 5-10, 1959 (International 
Commission of Jurists 1959), vii 
63 In addition to UN declarations on the rule of law, which are formed of sovereign States and therefore political 
systems, individual states such as Russia and China have come forward to highlight the importance of the rule of 
law. See, eg Alexander Lebed, ‘Rule of Law for Russia’, The Moscow Times (1 June 1996) 
<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/rule-of-law-for-russia/323583.html> accessed 16 December 2014; 
Erik Eckholm, ‘China Sign UN Pact on Rights and Rule of Law’, New York Times (21 November 2000) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/21/world/china-signs-un-pact-on-rights-and-rule-of-law.html> accessed 16 
December 2014 
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robust judicial system- it is “a signal virtue of civilized societies.”64 However, surprisingly, it is 
certain that there is no singular, simplified definition of a domestic rule of law; indeed it has been 
described as “an exceedingly elusive notion.”65 It is truly a labyrinthine and tortuous term that 
would not be difficult imagining collapsing under its own weight.  In fact, it has been posited 
that “the phrase ‘the Rule of Law’ has become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and 
general overuse"66. There are at least five pertinent points that all contribute to the tortuously 
meandering convolutions of the term “the rule of law”. 
Firstly, the definition itself of the term in the legal domain is obscure and opinion is 
divided on its components: curiously for a legal term, none have agreed on an exact definition.67 
Secondly, the exact meaning of the concept differs not only between academics and scholars, but 
also along geographical lines: despite the rule of law featuring heavily for centuries in literature 
and legal texts, after the end of the Cold War – when the concept itself spread most notably – in  
Latin America the rule of law meant a focus on judicial reform, in the Eastern European States 
legal change alone was thought sufficient and the US viewed the phrase "rule of law" to mean 
assistance efforts to support legal judicial and law enforcement reform efforts undertaken by 
foreign governments.68 Thirdly, beyond geographical borders, the term “rule of law” has 
transgressed the legal borders, pervading discussions in the economic arena, where it “is held to 
be not only good in itself, because it embodies and encourages a just society, but also as a cause 
of other good things, notably growth.”69 Fourthly, as this chapter will show, the rule of law has 
also evolved to become not only a concept related to what rules should be included, but also now 
                                                 
64 Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning (OUP 2009) 12 
65 Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (CUP 2004) 9 
66 Judith N Shklar, ‘Political Theory and the Rule of Law’ in Allan C Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan (eds), The 
Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology? (Transnational 1987) 1. 
67 Lord Bingham suggested that it meant “that all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, 
should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future and 
publicly administered in the courts”, Bingham (n 40) 8; Hayak stated that “stripped of all technicalities this means 
that a government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand -- rules which make it possible 
to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one's 
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge", Fredrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Routledge 1994) 54; Allott 
states that it is “the judicial control of the legal terms and conditions of all public realm powers”, Philip Allott, ‘Law 
and the Re-Making of Humanity’ in Prosser Gifford & Norman Dorsen (eds), Democracy and the Rule of Law (CQ 
Publications, 2001) 19. See, also Brownlie (n 46) 213-4; Tamanaha (n 62) 102; Cheryl Saunders & Katherine Le 
Roy, ‘Perspectives on the Rule of Law’ in Cheryl Saunders and Katherine Le Roy, The Rule of Law (Federation 
Press 2003) 5; Jean Ely and Richard Ely (eds), Lionel Murphy: The Rule of Law (Akron Press 1986) 
68 Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law’ in Thomas Carothers (ed), Promoting the Rule of 
Law: In Search of Knowledge (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2006) 33 
69 ‘Economics and the Rule of Law: Order in the Jungle’, The Economist (13 March 2008) 
<http://www.economist.com/node/10849115> accessed 16 December 2014. 
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how these rules are created, enforced and maintained.70 Finally, the rule of law has transitioned 
from being a strictly domestic concept to one that is now discussed and incorporated in 
international law; as such, there are two types of the rule of law that need to be discussed: the 
domestic rule of law and the international rule of law.  
Noteworthy, then, are the different dynamics of the domestic and international spheres, 
which appear to be in a constant state of polar opposition: codified laws are necessarily binding 
on subjects at the domestic level but only voluntarily at the international level; un-codified norms 
are not binding at the domestic level but necessarily binding at the international level without 
consent of States. Whilst a domestic legislation features a hierarchical vertical structure, where 
promulgated laws are imposed upon citizens of a State, under international treaty law in the 
international sphere this vertical hierarchy is instead replaced with a horizontal architecture that 
is built upon voluntary accession of States to international legal obligations, treaty accession and 
permissive of reservations.71 Indeed, voluntary adjudication of States is an integral part of 
international law, where States must first accede to treaties governing the mandate of 
international courts72or accept the jurisdiction of international courts on an ad hoc or compulsory 
basis.73 Contrastingly, customary international norms are binding on all States without their prior 
consent, in contrast to the clear codification strived for in domestic legislation.74 Finally, at the 
domestic level, a constitution takes precedence over government powers, which is not the case at 
the international level; there is no hierarchy where a constitution can be proven to trump State 
sovereignty.75 
This chapter attempts to define the rule of law for the purposes of a comparative analysis 
between the elements of a domestic rule of law and the rule of law at a level of the Security 
                                                 
70 Kleinfeld (n 68) 33-4, where the rule of law encompasses not only “the goods that the rule of law brings to society 
. . . such as law and order, a government bound by the law, and human rights . . . [but also] the institutions a society 
must have to be considered to possess the rule of law . . . such as an efficient and trained judiciary, a noncorrupt 
police force, and published, publicly known laws” 
71 Although allowed under the Vienna Convention, reservations should not defeat the purpose of the treaty. See, 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), 1155 UNTS 
331, art 19 
72 Such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, without which the ICC has no jurisdiction save that 
over situations referred to it by Security Council Chapter VII resolutions relating to peace and security, Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 
(Rome Statute) 
73 Such as the ICJ. See Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) arts 36(2)-(5) 
74 The public promulgation of laws is a central theme of the domestic rule of law, as this chapter will explore. 
75 This thesis has already discussed the proposition advocated by Fassbender that the UN Charter is a constitution 
and rejected it in Chapter I. 
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Council – what would rule of law for the Security Council look like? What would its goals be 
and where would the sources of such a rule of law be rooted? It will also address the question 
why the Security Council should be subjected to the rule of law and to what extent; this thesis 
does not attempt to suggest a rule of law should be abided by in all aspects of Security Council 
business, but rather – due to constraints of length – will discuss only the legally binding 
decisions of the Security Council.  
This chapter will therefore begin by examining why the Security Council should be 
subjected to a rule of law at all, focusing on four core reasons why the establishment of such a 
framework for the Council’s work is essential. It will then continue to address what the rule of 
law entails at the domestic level and how it can inform a definition of the rule of law on the 
international plane. It will then address the argument that the international rule of law can be 
directly transposed from the domestic rule of law, which some academics have attempted to 
suggest. Based upon international rule of law principles, this chapter will then establish a rule of 
law specific to the Security Council drawing on primary sources of the UN itself, such as 
declarations, resolutions and statements. This will result in a comprehensive definition of the 
international rule of law as it pertains to the Security Council. The chapter will conclude by 
examining each of these components in detail with reference to Security Council action, in order 
to discover to what extent the Council has been abiding by the international rule of law and in 
what ways it can implement international rule of law elements further in its decisions and 
resolutions. 
 
II.2 Why is the rule of law necessary for the Security Council? 
 
We remain convinced that the best way for the Security Council to promote 
international law and the rule of law is to lead by example. We challenge the 
view—and, to some extent, the conventional wisdom—that regards the Council as 
a purely political body. Its authority is based on the world's supreme international 
treaty, the United Nations Charter. The Council is legally bound by the applicable 
rules of the Charter and of international law. Those rules leave the Council much 
room to take decisions based on political, legal and other considerations—but that 
room is not without limits. It is both a legal necessity and a wise policy choice for 
the Council to respect and promote international law and the rule of law.76 
 
                                                 
76 Liechtenstein, UNSC Verbatim Record (29 June 2010), UN Doc S/PV.6347 (Resumption 1), 6 
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The notion that the Council “cannot be subject to the rule of law in any meaningful way”77 is 
antiquated; such a theory predates the 2012 declaration bringing the Council under the scrutiny 
of rule of law elements. This declaration by the Assembly has made it clear that the rule of law 
can and must form part of the working practices of the Security Council; the existence and need 
for implementation of an international rule of law for the Security Council is no longer debatable 
nor, indeed, is it necessary to intricately examine the reasons and arguments for and against such 
a rule of law. Nonetheless, it would be prudent to identify four clear arguments favouring a rule 
of law for the Security Council in order to highlight the focus of this particular thesis, in line 
with the facets of the research questions and sub-questions that it intends to answer. 
 
II.2.1 The limited composition of the Security Council 
Although the Council consists of only 15 members,78 originally 11, it is tasked with acting on 
behalf of them all79– these members represent 193 States, each with its own respective 
government, political agenda and interests. Without doubt, frequently the interests of States are 
aligned and cooperation is assured; however, the Security Council was created as maintainer of 
international peace and security. Given that the UN Charter provides that “[t]he Republic of 
China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security 
Council,”80 (P5) one can infer that their interests and the interests of those aligned to them will 
be perpetually represented on the Council. But selected interests and topics of discussion and 
debate will not suffice for a body that purports to truly represent all States; the question then 
arises- how does the Security Council ensure that it is truly representative as it was created to be? 
This thesis proposes that, given the low ratio of Council members to UN Member States, a rule 
of law would ensure that its procedures and decisions are more representative of the general will 
of the UN member States, as it was arguably envisioned in the Charter.81 
                                                 
77 Christine Gray, 'The Security Council and the Rule of Law: An overview’ (2009) 103 ASIL 245, 246 
78 UN Charter (1945) art 23(1) 
79 UN Charter (1945) art 24(1): The UN Charter states that “[i]n order to ensure prompt and effective action by the 
United Nations,its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security 
Council acts on their behalf” 
80 UN Charter (1945) art 23 
81 Although the Charter does not explicitly state that the Council should be representative of Member States, Article 
24(1) does state that “the Security Council acts on [UN Members’] behalf.” The allusion to “equitable geographical 
distribution” in Article 23(1) and the fact that the non-permanent members of the Council are rotated on a staggered 
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II.2.2 The decision-making process and use of the veto  
The manner, too, in which decisions are reached should also be noted: “[d]ecisions of the 
Security Council on [non-procedural] matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine 
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members.”82 This is the clause upon 
which the power of veto,83 held by the P5 members, is built; in essence, all non-procedural 
matters are conditioned on the non-opposition84 of all P5 members. Thus, no Chapter VII 
resolution emerges from the Security Council without at least P5 acquiescence, and it is not 
difficult to imagine, given this power, how self-serving political agendas can rapidly colour the 
decision-making process in order to protect the P5 members and their allies from the far-reaching 
jurisdiction of the Council. This was an issue raised by both the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan 
delegates at San Francisco in 1945, who were concerned that the Charter “contains such a broad 
delegation of the powers of the [United Nations] to the Security Council that it appears 
practically inacceptable . . .”85 Stretching beyond the previous point on the representative nature 
of the Council, and taking into consideration the inherent bias attributed to the veto power given 
to the P5, the question here, then, is how does the Security Council ensure that its decisions are 
free of improperly biased agenda?86  
 
II.2.3 The extended competence of the Council 
The scope of Security Council jurisdiction has expanded far beyond that initially envisioned at 
the time of its creation- issues that have been deemed to pose a threat to the international peace 
and security such as the AIDS epidemic in Africa87, climate change88 and women in conflict89 
                                                                                                                                                             
basis every two years for a four year term also heavily suggest that all Member States can and should be part of the 
decision-making process, both directly as serving Council members and indirectly through their geographical blocs. 
82 UN Charter (1945) art 27(3) 
83 The word veto is Latin and translates as “I forbid”. Its usage within the context of the Security Council denotes a 
decision to unilaterally cease the passing of a resolution or to overrule a decision being made by other members, 
which is the substantive effect of Article 27(3) of the UN Charter. 
84 That is to say, P5 members must not vote against; either affirmative votes or abstentions are acceptable. 
85 United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), Vol 4 (1945), 253 
86 As political decisions, resolutions of the Security Council will inherently be politically biased, for example, in 
situations where the Council decides to take action against a State by means of sanctions, which will be 
fundamentally biased against the State in question. However, the issue is how to ensure this political bias used 
appropriately to ensure that veto-holders do not abuse the powers they have been granted under the Charter. 
87 UNSC Res 1983 (June 7 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1983 
88 UNSC Verbatim Record (20 July 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6587, 2 
89 UNSC Res 1325 (31 October 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1325 
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have slowly crept into the remit of the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers during the last 60 
years. Whilst these are all valid issues in their own rights, the question must be whether they 
were originally envisioned in the minds of drafters when granting the Council such all-pervasive 
control. As Palau’s Permanent Representative to the UN noted, “the Council may employ ‘such 
action…as may be necessary to maintain or restore’ [international peace and security]. Such 
constitutional carte blanche, as well as the Council’s increasing invocation of Chapter VII to 
justify quasi- legislative and quasi-judicial actions, gives cause for concern to detractors wary of 
an unrepresentative Council whose powers continue to broaden in scope faster than do 
corresponding guarantors of accountability and legitimacy.”90 Indeed, as the representative from 
Brazil argued at the establishment of the ICTY, 
 
[i]t is precisely because the Council exercises a delegated responsibility in a field 
as politically sensitive as the maintenance of international peace and security that 
the task of interpreting its competences calls for extreme caution, in particular 
when invoking language of Chapter VII of the Charter . . . [T]he definition of 
such powers must be construed strictly on the basis of the text of the relevant 
Charter provisions. To go beyond that would be legally inconsistent and 
politically unwise. 
 
Joyner comments on the expansion of both the scope and quality of the expansion of Security 
Council powers, stating that the Council now believes that it  
 
is empowered not only to act as an executive body, but rather also to act as a 
legislative body crafting proactive and permanent legal edicts covering important 
areas of international relations including terrorism (UNSC Resolution 1373) and 
weapons of mass destruction proliferation (UNSC Resolution 1540) and even 
further to act as a judicial body determining the legal rights and obligations of UN 
members (UNSC Resolutions 1874 and 1929)91 
 
This is in direct correlation to the fears of Ecuador at San Francisco, who wished to “forbid the 
Council – as the Inter-American Juridical Committee has wisely suggested – to establish or 
modify principles or rules of law”92 and which submitted an amendment to this effect,93 
unsuccessful though it may have been. 
                                                 
90 Schott (n 3) 
91 Joyner, ‘Legal Hegemon’ (n 51) 226 
92 United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), Vol 3 (1945), 408 
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II.2.4  The legally binding nature of Council resolutions 
Membership to the United Nations obliges all States to “agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the [UN] Charter.”94 At times, these 
decisions are even to be imposed on non-Members, since the UN is also charged with ensuring 
that “states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles 
so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.”95 This 
effectively brings non-Member States under the jurisdiction and control of the Security Council 
and its decisions. The debate over what constitutes a legally-binding decision of the Security 
Council as opposed to an advisory opinion or non-binding resolution is one that has been entered 
into by other authors96 and which I will not enter into at length, but which, due the integral 
necessity for a legally binding resolution to exist in order for there to be a rule of law, a brief 
encounter with arguments for and against the binding nature of Council resolutions is required. 
Briefly, the parameters of a legally binding resolution have been argued to be not 
necessarily analogous with any resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; that is 
to say, there are some resolutions the obeisance to which is paramount, whereas other resolutions 
might tolerate less compliant behaviour. There appear to be clear examples of situations where 
                                                                                                                                                             
93 Ecuador’s proposed amendment read: “In the fulfilment of the duties inherent in its responsibility to maintain 
international peace and security, the Security Council shall not establish or modify principles or rules of law but 
shall respect and enforce and apply the principles or rules of existing law”, United Nations Conference on 
International Organization (UNCIO), Vol 3 (1945), 438 
94 UN Charter (1945) art 25; see also, arts 2(5) and 49 
95 ibid art 2(6) 
96 Orakhelashvili argues that the “Security Council’s interaction with international law can take place in two 
dimensions . . . represented by the number of Council resolutions in which the Council confirms its support for the 
validity and enforcement of the relevant international norms and instruments . . . [or] resolutions by which the 
Council either purports to impact, qualify or modify the existing legal position under international law . . .”, 
Orakhelashvili (n 53) 143-195. Wood’s standard definition of the legally binding nature of resolutions comprises 
three segments: [W]hen the resolution in question (or an earlier closely related one) states that the Council has 
determined that such-and-such is, or continues to be, a threat to the peace; that it is acting under “Chapter VII” or 
under a specific provision in Chapter VII, such as Article 41; and that it ‘decides’ that something shall be done”, 
Michael C Wood, ‘The UN Security Council and International Law’ (Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures 2006, 
Cambridge, 7 November 2006) 
<http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/lectures/2006_hersch_lecture_1.pdf> accessed 16 
December 2014, ¶39 [emphasis in original]. Hurd argues that resolutions “are generally seen as important 
documents in international politics, but this certainly does not mean they are automatically followed. Despite the 
legal obligations they might create, Council resolutions clearly do not necessarily elicit full and complete 
compliance by nation-states. States still seem to ‘pick and choose’ from Council decisions those elements they 
respect while pretending other elements do not exist”, Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United 
Nations Security Council (Princeton UP 2008), 4. In support of this assertion, Hurd refers to Joseph Grieco, 
‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’, in David A 
Baldwin (ed), Neorealism and Neoliberalisation: The Contemporary Debate (Columbia UP 1993) and John J 
Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’ (1994/5) 19(3) Int’l Sec 5. 
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Council action is not legally binding; for example, under article 26 of the UN Charter, the 
Council has the authority to formulate plans “for the establishment of a system for the regulation 
of armaments”97 with the goal of “the establishment and maintenance of international peace and 
security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources”98. 
However, both Joyner and Kelsen observed that “[m]embers may . . . choose either to accept or 
reject these plans”99 and that such plans “are binding upon the members only if accepted by them 
. . . Article 26 does not provide expressly for the ‘adoption’ of the plan by the members . . .”100 
Nonetheless, whilst both Chapters VI and VII relate to the Council’s responsibilities with respect 
to international peace and security, some scholars argue that it is only Chapter VII that allows the 
Council to pass legally binding resolutions.101 In its Namibia case,102 the ICJ suggested that 
Article 25 of the UN Charter103 was an obligation that should be carried through on all Security 
Council when it stated that,  
 
Article 25 is not confined to decisions in regard to enforcement action but applies 
to "the decisions of the Security Council" adopted in accordance with the Charter. 
Moreover, that Article is placed, not in Chapter VII, but immediately after Article 
24 in that part of the Charter which deals with the functions and powers of the 
Security Council. If Article 25 had reference solely to decisions of the Security 
Council concerning enforcement action under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, 
that is to say, if it were only such decisions which had binding effect, then Article 
25 would be superfluous, since this effect is secured by Articles 48 and 49 of the 
Charter.104 
                                                 
97 UN Charter (1945) art 26. 
98 ibid. 
99 Joyner, ‘Legal Hegemon’ (n 51) 233. 
100 Hans Kelsen, Collective Security under International Law (Lawbook Exchange 2011) 214. 
101 For the non-binding nature of Chapter VI resolutions see eg Philippe Sands & Pierre Klein (eds), Bowett's Law of 
International Institutions (Sweet and Maxwell 2011) 46; David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council 
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Kluwer Law International 2001) 33; Ken Matthews, The Gulf Conflict and 
International Relations (Routledge 1993) 130; André De Hoogh, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes 
(Nijhoff 2012) 371 
102 Legal Consequences for States of the Contitiued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16 
103 UN Charter (1945) art 25: “Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter" 
104 Namibia (n 102) ¶113. The ICJ continues to qualify this statement, however, by noting that “[t]he language of a 
resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding 
effect”, Namibia (n 102) ¶ 114. Wood builds on this suggestion, finding that, although there are no definite 
standards, a resolution should have three elements to be legally binding: “First, a determination by the Council, 
under Article 39 of the Charter, of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. 
Second, evidence that the Council is indeed acting under Chapter VII. And third, that the Council has taken a 
decision within the meaning of Article 25”, Wood (n 96) ¶38 [emphasis in original]. 
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The debate rages on the exact definition of a legally-binding resolution and where obligations of 
compliance cease for States. However, one point upon which almost all parties appear to agree is 
that there exists a point at which resolutions do become legally-binding upon States. The 
question of exactly where these boundaries lie is not central to the current thesis; it is sufficient 
to note that the Council, in certain circumstances, benefits from the discretion to impose legal 
obligations upon States Member to the UN. 
Thus, there is nothing and, seemingly, no State beyond the reach of the Security 
Council.105 The Council is tasked with representing all States, yet the great power bestowed upon 
it by the founding delegates in San Francisco is undoubtedly at risk of abuse by some in the 
decision-making process. More hazardously, perhaps, these politicised decisions are binding on 
Member States. Browlie noted in 1998 that “[t]he active agenda of the Security Council and its 
relative solidarity creates a paradox. Its increased political power is a source of hope but the 
modalities of the exercise of power present problems of principle and of legal control.”106 In the 
years since he made this observation, the international political arena has not become any less 
complex or dark: terrorist attacks have struck the United States, UK, Spain, Nigeria and 
elsewhere; wars have since broken out in Afghanistan, Iraq; internal conflict has fatally 
fragmented countries such as Syria, Sudan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and others. As Tamanaha 
remarked in 2002, “[o]ne must wonder whether the same has not been said at all times, but 
around the world today there appears to be more than the usual doses of war, oppression, and 
insecurity.”107 Indeed, the Security Council was born of war108 and found itself confronted with 
its first ideological conflict “[o]n 19 January 1946, before the first Security Council had ever 
met, [when] the Iranian ambassador addressed to it a letter complaining about the failure of 
Soviet troops to evacuate Azerbaijan . . .”109 It is therefore of the utmost importance for the 
                                                 
105 The advent of International Criminal Law in the late 20th Century was not foreseen in its entirety when the 
Council was created, despite ad hoc trials such as the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials. I will examine the relationship 
between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court in a later chapter, as this relationship appears to 
be an additional route for Security Council jurisdiction to be extended to cover the new field of International 
Criminal Law. 
106 Brownlie (n 46) vii. 
107 Tamanaha (n 62) 97. 
108 The Security Council, and indeed the United Nations as a whole, was created in the wake of World War II and 
the permanent five members of the Council reflect the victors and major powers at the time. 
109 Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations: Vol. I (St. Martin’s Press 1982) 106 
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Security Council to work as effectively and impartially as possible, in order to maintain 
international peace and security as it has been tasked with. 
 
II.3 The rule of law in domestic legal orders 
Whilst Dicey was perhaps the first to popularise the phrase “rule of law”110, the ethereal content 
of his tripartite proposal111 dates back to Greek philosopher Plato’s Politicus,112 in which he 
advocates the notion that law should be a means through which to rule, but not an impediment to 
the ruler himself,113 and later Laws.114 Subsequently, his student Aristotle expounded this 
notion115 recognising, as Plato before him, the corruptibility and fluidity of man’s nature: “he 
who entrusts man with [absolute power], gives it to a wild beast, for such his appetites 
sometimes make him; for passion influences those who are in power, even the very best of men: 
for which reason law is reason without desire.”116  
In the centuries even before the Middle Ages, during the eras of the Ancient Romans117 
and the Ancient Chinese,118 the rule of law underscored revolutionary political theories of 
                                                 
110 Albert V Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th edn, Liberty Classics 1982) 107. 
111 No one can be punished or made to suffer except for a breach of law proved in an ordinary court; No one is above 
the law and everyone is equal before the law regardless of social, economic, or political status; The rule of law 
includes the results of judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons. 
112 Julia Annas and Robin Waterfield (eds), Plato: The Statesman (CUP 1995). 
113 Such a hypothetical ruler would needs act benevolently and in the best interests of his people: “[H]e who has 
knowledge and is a true Statesman, will do many things within his own sphere of action by his art without regard to 
the laws, when he is of opinion that something other than that which he has written down and enjoined to be 
observed during his absence would be better,” Plato, The Dialogues of Plato translated into English with Analyses 
and Introductions by B. Jowett, M.A. in Five Volumes (3rd edn, OUP 1892), 504 
<http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/768504> accessed 16 December 2014. 
114 “Mankind must have laws and conform to them, or their life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast”, 
Plato, Laws (trans. Benjamin Jowett, Cosimo 2008) 221. In his earlier Republic, Plato supported the rule of 
“Philosopher Kings”, ruled by knowledge but above the law. This was to change gradually throughout his writings 
until LAWS, where notions of “super-legal” rulers were replaced by a comprehensive system of laws used to found 
his Cretan utopia of Magnesia. Noting the temptation of corruption and self-interest, Plato finally arrived at the 
conclusion that human nature’s fallibility and vulnerability resulted in the fact that “no man's nature is able to know 
what is best for human society; or knowing, always able and willing to do what is best,” ibid  
115 “It is more proper that law should govern than any one of the citizens: upon the same principle, if it is 
advantageous to place the supreme power in some particular persons, they should be appointed to be only guardians, 
and the servants of the laws”, Aristotle, Politics (William Ellis trans, Echo Library 2006) 79 [emphasis added]. 
116 ibid. 
117 “The mind, and spirit, and wisdom, and intentions of the city are all situated in the laws . . . The ministers of the 
law are the magistrates; the interpreters of the law are the judges; lastly, we are all servants of the laws, for the very 
purpose of being able to be freemen,” Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero (Charles D 
Yonge trans, London 1856) Ch 53 s 146 <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Cic.%20Clu.%205 
3.146&lang=original> accessed 16 December 2014 [emphasis added]. 
118 eg Randall P Peerenboom, Law and Morality in Ancient China: The Silk Manuscripts of Huang-Lao (SUNY 
Press 1993) 171, which reports that Huang-Lao school of Daoist thought found inadequate the widely accepted, 
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governance and popular equality; indeed, under the Islamic Caliphates the subordinance of rulers 
to the supremacy of law was heavily entrenched from the outset in accordance to Sharia Law.119 
The fledgling insistence on what we recognise today as being a rule of law gradually formed in 
the West more solidly through such works as Samuel Rutherford’s Lex, Rex. John Locke’s 
Second Treatise of Government and Montesquieu’s Esprit des Lois each coined a branch of the 
trias politica theory of separation of powers that lies at the core of modern Western 
governments. Such works entrenched themselves in direct opposition to the theories of Thomas 
Hobbes120 and other advocates of absolutist monarchies121 and, although it can be argued that the 
Magna Carta of 1215 was the start of the imposition of limitations on the powers of a monarch, 
it was not until the Bill of Rights Act 1689, that British “kings could no longer suspend or 
dispense with the laws, were obliged to acknowledge the privileges of Parliament and to seek 
legislative approval to raise revenue,”122 essentially entrenching the  subjugation of the 
monarchy to the representatives of the people. Since this time, legal professionals,123 
international declarations,124 UN resolutions125 and academic scholars126 have consolidated the 
                                                                                                                                                             
contemporary Confucian sage-justices legal order, revealing the belief that “[l]aw is not what the ruler says it is. 
Rather, it is discovered in and determined by the Way . . . Huang-Lao foundational naturalism serves to curtail both 
aristocratic and imperial powers by subjugating everyone to an objective natural standard.”  
119 See, eg Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago UP 1991) 91, where “[t]he Muslim ruler may 
be and usually is an autocrat, but . . . [h]is office, and his tenure of that office, are established and regulated by the 
law, by which he is bound no less than the humblest of his slaves . . . His task is to maintain and enforce the law and 
. . . if he fails in these tasks, still more if he violates the law, then he is in breach of his duty and of the contract . . . 
by which he was installed as ruler . . .”; Christopher G Weeramantry, Justice Without Frontiers: Furthering Human 
Rights (Vol. 1) (Kluwer Law International 1997) 132, where “[n]o Sovereign and no official could claim to be above 
the law . . . [T]here was a strong tradition that the power of the judge derived from a higher source than the mere 
authority of the state.” 
120 See eg Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford World’s Classics 2008). 
121 For an examination of absolute monarchist and enlightened absolute monarchist themes see eg Niccolò 
Machiavelli, The Prince (Penguin 1988); Voltaire, Candide (Penguin 1998). 
122 Caroline A Edie, ‘Revolution and The Rule of Law: The End of the Dispensing Power, 1689’ (1977) 10 
Eighteenth Century Studies 434 
123 See, International Commission of Jurists conferences, which brought together judges, lawyers and professors 
from 53 countries at Act of Athens (1955); Declaration of Delhi (1959); Law of Lagos (1961); Resolution of Rio 
(1962); Declaration of Bangkok (1965); Declaration of Colombo (1966). 
124 eg Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR), 
preamble; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR), preamble. 
125 eg UNGA Res 61/39 (18 December 2006) UN Doc A/RES/61/39; UNGA Res 62/70, (8 January 2008) UN Doc 
A/RES/62/70; UNGA Res 63/128 (15 January 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/128; UNGA Res 64/116 (15 January 2010) 
A/RES/64/116; UNGA Res 65/32 (10 January 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/32. 
126 eg Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Hart 1998); Bingham (n 40); Freidrich A Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 
(Routledge 1976). 
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existence of the domestic rule of law, leading to its enshrining at the foundation of modern 
democratic societies around the globe.  
As a result of these myriad influences no exhaustive list of components of a rule of law 
has emerged. The reason for these discrepancies in interpretation appears to be that the rule of 
law represents different ideas to each analyst or theorist; indeed, as Chesterman notes, “[s]uch a 
high degree of consensus on the virtues of the rule of law is possible only because of dissensus as 
to its meaning.”127 Referring to judges’ varying interpretations of law, Dworkin suggests that 
“the artist can create nothing without interpreting as he creates, [and the critic] creates as he 
interprets.”128 If one takes this analogy further, it seems logical that the rule of law might seem 
slightly, if not vastly, different according to ones positioning and environment. Each individual’s 
experiences, outlooks and moral school of thought subtly but significantly colour their personal 
definition not only of the rule of law itself as a concept, but also all others’ definitions- a 
constant echo of interpretative reverberations.  
There are, however, certain elements that appear to be inherently shared between all of 
these varied descriptions and the purpose of this thesis is to analyse whether such elements of a 
domestic system can be transposed or adapted to fit the international legal model. In order to do 
so, one must first analyse the domestic model: the definition of a “political ruler” and the various 
components of “a rule of law” as opposed, for example, to “rule by law”. This latter notion is not 
technically opposed to absolute monarchic system since a political ruler who imposes laws 
arbitrarily and for the sake of personal gain, for example, would still be ruling by law; what the 
rule of law encapsulates at its very inception is the subjugation of all individuals, irrespective of 
stature, creed or other defining characteristic, to laws promulgated by the representatives that are 
appointed to do so by democratic means. Paradoxically, the “rule of law” is in itself a misnomer- 
law cannot rule; “being a human creation, [it] must be subject to human will.”129 Therefore, to 
assess the rule of law requires analysis of both the “political ruler” and the intended 
beneficiaries, as well as the standards to which actions will be held accountable. In such a 
system, actions taken by any actor, ranging from the individual citizen to the government itself, 
are accountable- normative law. One should recall, however, that incorporation of elements of 
                                                 
127 Chesterman (n 40) 332. 
128 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’ in Dennis Patterson (ed), Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory: An 
Anthology (Wiley-Blackwell 2003) 382. 
129 Gifford & Dorsen (n 67) 62 
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the rule of law does not amount to comprehensive definition. The transient nature of the rule of 
law is reflected in the difficulty of identifying an exhaustive list of its components and the 
hitherto lack of precise definition; it seems that there is much literature130 and debate131 about its 
origins, what it might consist of and what it might seek to avoid, yet no standard or all-
encompassing pithy delineation.  
Holmes argues that two major features of the domestic rule of law are predictability and 
equality, enumerating various hypotheses as to why “political actors might furiously resist or 
warmly embrace the rule of law.”132 Indeed, Holmes begins his thesis with the assumption that 
any given ruler has at their disposition the means of repression and makes the coherent, rational 
choice whether to make use of it or not, depending on the benefits each of the actions promises 
to yield. In other words, the rule of law to Holmes is merely a form of governance that has little 
to do with ensuring that society has full access to equal, transparent and predictable rights under 
the laws of the land and more to do with a self-centred vested interest in personal gains and 
goals. Citing Machiavelli’s statement that “[p]rinces must make others responsible for imposing 
burdens, while handing out gracious gifts themselves,”133 what Holmes is truly suggesting is that 
political impetus lies at the root of all legal norms associated with a “rule of law”.134  
                                                 
130 Further to the literature review in Chapter I, there is a wealth of literature discussing either the rule of law, 
examples of its (re)construction or elements of it. See eg Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the 
International Criminal Court- Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (OUP 2003); Gerhard Werle, ‘‘We asked 
for justice and got the Rule of Law’: German Courts and the Totalitarian Past’ (1995) 11 S Afr J Hum Rts 70; 
Tolbert and Solomon (n 44); Davis R Robinson, ‘The Role of Politics in the Election and the Work of Judges of the 
International Court of Justice’(2003) 97 ASIL PROC 277; Eric A Posner and John C Yoo, ‘Judicial Independence in 
International Tribunals’ (2005) 93 CLR 1; Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court 
of Justice, 1951-54: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points’(1957) 33 British Ybk Intl L 203; Kneebone (n 
39); John Laughland, Travesty: The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic and the Corruption of International Justice (Pluto 
Press 2006); Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (OUP 
128); Ruth MacKenzie and others, Selecting International Judges: Principle, Process, and Politics (OUP 2010); 
Jennifer A Widner, Building the Rule of Law (Norton 2001). 
131 Chesterman (n 3); International Bar Association ‘Rule of Law Resolution’ (September 2005) 
<http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=a19de354-a0d7-4b17-a7ff-f6948081cd85> accessed 
16 December 2014. 
132 Allott (n 67). 
133 Machiavelli (n 121). 
134 Gifford and Dorsen (n 67) 39: “According to the standard list, a constitutional government maintains its 
legitimacy, and thereby ensures a relatively high degree of compliance, by issuing its commands in the form of 
general rules (not ad hoc instructions) that are spelled out publicly and in advance, that are understandable, that are 
mutually consistent, that are stable over time (though changeable), that are not retroactive, and that are enforced 
reliably by the various professional agencies that make up the system of justice, including an independent judiciary. 
Public readiness to comply also seems to increase if the government observably obeys its own rules . . [and] if the 
public believes that rules are being enforced fairly, so that privileged groups with special access are not allowed to 
exempt themselves egregiously from laws that should apply to all.” 
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Two overarching attributes of the rule of law emerge from this discourse: the first is that 
a set of laws is established; the second is that this set of laws is equally enforced. The two exist 
in unison and are inter-reliant: a set of laws that is arbitrarily or sporadically enforced is 
ineffective in achieving the goals of uniformity and would reduce the rule of law to a game of 
probabilities, where committing an illegal act is balanced against the likelihood of repercussions 
for its commission, or a corrupt and nepotistic system whereby those in select positions such as 
those of government and power are above the laws and able to escape the negative consequences 
of illegal acts with impunity; similarly, in order to follow a set of laws effectively and 
consistently, the framework of laws by which a structure is governed must be put in place based 
upon stable pillars that are communicated to those it governs, with a clearly evident chain of 
events that enumerates both what acts or actions are outlawed and the punishment for the 
commission of said acts or actions. 
However, no strict definition of the rule of law exists. The International Bar Association 
(IBA) has deemed the rule of law to be “the foundation of a civilised society”,135 incorporating, 
non-exhaustively, “[a]n independent, impartial judiciary; the presumption of innocence; the right 
to a fair and public trial without undue delay; a rational and proportionate approach to 
punishment; a strong and independent legal profession; strict protection of confidential 
communications between lawyer and client [and] equality of all before the law.”136 To add even 
further complication, as the Council of Europe found, ‘the discussion is also muddied by the fact 
that the meaning of the term ‘rule of law’ may not be the same in different languages;137 the term 
is subject to various definitional and normative disputations in the respective countries.”138 The 
United States Supreme Court has offered yet another slightly different definition,139 shifting the 
                                                 
135 ‘Rule of Law Resolution’ (n 131). 
136 ibid. 
137 For example ‘Etat de droit’ (France), ‘Rechtsstaat’ (Germany), ‘Stato di diritto’ (Italy), ‘verkhovensto prava’ 
(Russia) or ‘estado de derecho’ (Spain). 
138 ‘The Rule of Law: Concept, Guiding Principle and Framework’ (n 61) [emphasis in original]. 
139 “The law is superior to, and thus binds, the government and all its officials. The law must respect and preserve 
the dignity, equality, and human rights of all persons. To these ends, the law must establish and safeguard the 
constitutional structures necessary to build a free society in which all citizens have a meaningful voice in shaping 
and enacting the rules that govern them. The law must devise and maintain systems to advise all persons of their 
rights, and it must empower them to fulfil just expectations and seek redress of grievances without fear of penalty 
and retaliation”, Justice Anthony Kennedy, ‘Remarks to the American Bar Association’, (ABA Annual Meeting, 
Honolulu, 5 August 2006). 
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passive role of law as being an avenue that should be made available if and when needed to an 
active role where the law is obliged to devise, maintain and empower. 140 
The concern that emerges, then, is that with differing contextual practices and laws, 
standards between nations can differ depending on the specific circumstances of that 
environment. For example, where a government dictates that certain moral codes allow for 
employment discrimination in favour of previously disadvantaged groups, the social 
backgrounds or racial profile of potential employees become disproportionately important in 
relation to qualifications, allowing, or even encouraging, employers to choose those who will 
fulfil certain criteria on paper and leaving a significant number of the population struggling to 
compete in the job market. Moreover, the rule of law is adapted to serve specific national needs 
that would be irrelevant or even counter-intuitive in other States. In post-Apartheid South Africa 
the introduction of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) legislation141 may be deemed 
appropriate for social cohesion and political, economic or other national advancement, but would 
clearly be erroneous and abhorrently discriminatory if imposed in another nation. Thus, the rule 
of law is this case is clearly only judged as being equal and transparently rational relative to the 
domain to which it relates. 
The rule of law as a concept must, nevertheless, have certain elements upon which most, 
if not all, parties can agree. The phrase “rule of law”, or a variation thereof, is explicitly 
mentioned as being at the core of domestic constitutions the world over;142 the elements, 
nonetheless, remain elusive. The late practitioner and rule of law authority Thomas Bingham 
attempted to unravel the mystery of a definition of its elements in one volume, entitled quite 
                                                 
140 Once again, this is diametrically opposed to the prevalent Hobbesian theory of government in the 17 th Century. 
See eg Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford World’s Classics 2008). 
141 The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003. A points-based system encourages businesses 
to employ ethnic groups including black Africans, Coloureds and Indians, in an attempt to “redress[. . . ] the 
imbalances of the past by seeking to substantially and equitably transfer and confer ownership, management and 
control of South Africa's financial and economic resources to the majority of the citizens”, ‘Report of the Black 
Empowerment Commission’ (Skotaville Press, 2001) 2 . 
142 “[t]he Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on . . . [s]upremacy of the 
constitution and the rule of law”, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, ¶1(c); “Canada is founded 
upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law”, Constitution Act, c. 11 (U.K.), Schedule 
B, 1982, preamble; France the constitution shall “assure l’égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction 
d’origine, de race ou de religion . . . [et elle] respecte toutes les croyances”, [ensure the equality of all citizens 
before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion and respect all beliefs] Constitution de la République 
française, 1958, art 1; Spain’s constitution “ proclama su voluntad de . . . [c]onsolidar un Estado de Derecho que 
asegure el imperio de la Ley como expresión de la voluntad popular”, [proclaims its will to . . . consolidate a state of 
law which insures the rule of law as the expression of the popular will]. La Constitución Española, 1978, preamble 
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aptly The Rule of Law.143 A detailed analysis of the individual components of a domestic rule of 
law feature heavily in Bingham’s work and a comprehensive list of seven elements emerges: 
accessibility of the law;144 applicability of the law as opposed to the use of discretion;145 equality 
before the law;146 judicial review of public entities and servants;147 protection of human rights;148 
the enforceability of rights and laws;149 and the availability of a fair trial.150 These sum up the 
definition of the rule of law at the domestic level and encompass issues that might be debated 
when discussing the domestic rule of law; for example, judicial review ensures lack of 
corruption, abuse of powers and the dominance of the law over all persons regardless of their 
stature or power. 
The principles identified by Bingham in The Rule of Law were no doubt derived from 
intensive study of different constitutions; they are enshrined widely across nations as being at the 
core of the rule of law at the domestic level. Equality can be seen in Belgium’s constitutional 
protection that “[n]o class distinctions exist in the State . . . Belgians are equal before the law”151 
or Australia’s affirmation that “all laws made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth under the 
Constitution, shall be binding on the courts, judges, and people of every State and of every part 
of the Commonwealth”152. Judicial review through the separation of powers is woven into the 
fabric of many constitutions, such as those of the United States,153 South Africa,154 Brazil,155 
Belgium156 and France.157 The right to a fair trial is also enshrined in the constitutions of South 
Africa158 and Canada159, as are the accessibility of the law, also understood as clarity or legal 
                                                 
143 Bingham (n 40). 
144 ibid 37. 
145 ibid 48. 
146 ibid 55. 
147 ibid 60. 
148 ibid 66. 
149 ibid 85. 
150ibid 90. 
151 The Constitution of Belgium, 2012, art 10. For similar rights, see also South African constitution (n 142) art 9; 
Constitution of Brazil, 1998, art 5; Constitution of India, 2011, art 14; Canadian Constitution (n 142) art 15(1). 
152 An Act to constitute the Commonwealth of Australia [1900] 63- 64 Victoria, Chapter 12, ¶5 ¶See also South 
African Constitution (n 142) art 9. 
153 Articles I, II, III of the U.S. Constitution delineate the exact roles of the legislative, executive and judiciary 
branches of the U.S. government. United States Constitution (1787). 
154 South African constitution (n 142) art 40. 
155 Brazilian constitution (n 151) art 18. 
156 Belgian constitution (n 151) art 36. 
157 French constitution (n 151) art 34. 
158 South African constitution (n 142) art 34. 
159 Canadian constitution (n 142) art 11. 
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certainty,160 and non-arbitrariness, which incorporates the prohibition of ex post facto law and 
habeas corpus rights.161 Legal aid, or dispute resolution as Bingham names it, is also available in 
some nations162 but does not appear to have reached the level of being a constitutional right.163 
Therefore, although there are undoubtedly a relatively large number of elements upon which 
many States and scholars are able to agree, the exact definition of a rule of law remains 
debatable; this in turn makes the definition of an international rule of law all the more difficult. 
Despite the fact that there are inherent differences between the two systems of domestic and 
international law, there do exist arguments both for and against the motion to use the domestic 
rule of law as the foundation for an international rule of law. 
 
II.4  Searching for a definition of the international rule of law for the Council 
There appear to be two paths available when making the leap between domestic and international 
rule of law systems – the more straightforward approach is to isolate each component of the 
domestic rule of law and simply attempt to apply these to international law; however, as this 
section will explore, there are elements of the domestic rule of law that are unsuitable for 
transposition in this manner, since the structure of domestic law frequently differs greatly from 
that of the international sphere. Therefore, this approach is simply the starting point. The second, 
more complex, bespoke method of deducing an international rule of law is to build upon this first 
approach, examining each of these components and attempting to add to or detract from them in 
order to create the most legitimately applicable rule of law system possible; this would be far 
more suitable to the idiosyncrasies of the international legal system and pays heed to the 
dissimilarities between it and the domestic legal model. It is for this reason that I have elected to 
commence with the generic transposition of domestic norms, before narrowing my focus to 
                                                 
160 ibid; Indian constitution (n 151) art 20. 
161 Indian constitution (n 151) art 22; Constitution of the United States, 1787, Amendment VI; Canadian constitution 
(n 142) arts 9-10; South African constitution (n 142) art 35; Belgian constitution (n 151) art 12. 
162 In the EU, States must provide legal aid in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, 2000, art 47, although the UK in 2010 removed funding from legal aid pertaining to cases of family law, 
clinical negligence, education, employment, immigration, benefits, debt and housing cases under Schedule 2 of the 
Access to Justice Act 1999; India guarantees legal aid under art 39A of its constitution; In New Zealand this is 
covered by the Legal Services Regulation 2011. 
163 In Canada, legal aid was identified in Canadian Bar Assn v British Columbia, 2008 BCCA 92, to not be a 
constitutionally protected right. The USA provides State-funded legal aid in criminal cases to those unable to afford 
legal services themselves, but does not do so in civil cases; in Australia there are eight legal aid commissions 
established in partnership with the government under the National Partnership Agreement on Legal Assistance 
Services 2010. 
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whittle away irrelevant components at the international level and add elements customised to the 
international sphere. 
 
II.4.1  Direct transposition of domestic norms to the international plane 
Although Bingham quite proficiently discusses the domestic rule of law, he does not address in 
depth how it might look in the international arena164, which is a particularly important issue now 
that the rule of law has also gained recognition as a necessary aspect of international law and 
given the recent General Assembly declaration on the rule of law that “the rule of law applies to . 
. . the United Nations and its principal organs.” 165 Brownlie states that “it would be absurd if it 
were not possible to evaluate the workings of the international system in terms of the Rule of 
Law”166 but stops short of filling in the blanks.167 Bingham’s assertion that “the rule of law in the 
international order is, to a considerable extent at least, the domestic rule of law writ large”168 is 
not unanimously shared within the academic community.169 There is some debate over the 
distinction to be made between the rule of law at the domestic level and the international rule of 
law.  
The argument against direct transposition is strengthened by the fact that traditional 
concepts of international law such as State sovereignty must be accommodated in a discourse on 
                                                 
164 Bingham touches on the use of the rule of law in international instruments briefly at the beginning of his book 
and dedicates a chapter to ‘The Rule of Law in the International Legal Order’ but does not expand greatly. See 
Bingham (n 40) at 6-7, 110-133. 
165 UNGA Res 67/1 (n 6) ¶2. 
166 Brownlie (n 46) 213. 
167 See also, William Bishop, ‘The International Rule of Law’ (1961) 59 Mich L Rev 553, where “[w]ithout precise 
definition . . . the concept includes reliance on law as opposed to arbitrary power in international relations; the 
substitution of settlement by law for settlement by force; and the realization that law can and should be used as an 
instrumentality for the cooperative international furtherance of social aims, in such fashion as to preserve and 
promote the values of freedom and human dignity for individuals.” 
168 Bingham (n 40) 111. 
169 See, eg Thomas Eijsbouts, ‘Introduction’ in Vandamme and Reestman (n 43) 6, where “[a]t first blush, there is a 
sheer contradiction between rule of law and the sphere of international relations, diplomacy, where executive rule 
reigns . . . It shuns forms of control to which executive power almost instinctively reverts.”; Chesterman (n 3) ¶12, 
where although there exist transferable components of the rule of law, “[n]ot all concepts will translate directly, 
however. If the domestic legal order may be thought of as a vertical hierarchy, the ‘anarchical society’ lacks such an 
ordering principle. Applying the rule of law to the international level thus requires an examination of the functions 
that it is intended to serve”; Saunders and Le Roy suggest that one dimension of the rule of law at the international 
level “concerns its effect on governments, in the exercise of external sovereignty, contributing to or reacting against 
the developments of an international kind. Theoretically, even in this context, governments are bound by rule of law 
principles. The practical effect, however, is different. The subtle balance of institutions and powers that has 
produced the rule of law domestically does not carry through to the international sphere”, Saunders and Le Roy (n 
67) 14; Franz L Neumann, The Rule of Law: Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society (Berg 1985) 
4, where he argues that State sovereignty and the rule of law are fundamentally opposed constitutive elements of a 
modern state. 
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the rule of law at the international level. Moreover, the fields of diplomacy and international 
politics are reliant on undocumented negotiations, which although one might find at the domestic 
level appear to be more prevalent in international relations and politics. As Eijsbouts notes, 
“[e]ven in the European Union, with its relatively high degree of transparency in the legislative 
process, there is no record of the final exchanges leading up to the enactment of legal 
instruments . . .”170 There are, of course, the travaux préparatoires of the meetings that result in 
these documents; nonetheless, one cannot say the same of all UN Security Council resolutions, 
for example, which may begin with a closed-door meeting of selected Council members, 
allowing for political bargaining or negotiations the details of which will never see the light of 
day and may merely be distilled to a yes or no vote in the Council chambers with no subsequent 
explanation.171 
Another fundamental distinction that must be made between the rule of law at the 
domestic level and any comparable rule of law at the Security Council level is that, whereas at 
the domestic level an integral part of the rule of law is that no individual should be beyond the 
reach of the law, no organisation above scrutiny and no body exempt from judicial oversight, the 
Security Council appears to be all three. Although the UN Charter stands as both the founding 
text and regulatory document for the Security Council, there is no independent judiciary that 
reviews its actions or decisions. In a domestic rule of law setting, clearly enumerated laws are 
promulgated by the legislature to be uniformly enforced upon all citizens irrespective of power 
or status. These laws are heavily scrutinised by an independent judiciary to ensure they are not 
unconstitutional or similarly invalid and in the event that a citizen wishes to challenge the 
validity of a law, adequate channels of impartial judicial recourse are made available. Such a 
separation of powers ensures that there exists an environment for the rule of law to be established 
and continue to thrive.  
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 Transposing this to the Security Council framework, the UN Charter contains a hazy 
definition of Security Council powers, which has led to a plethora of understandings and 
interpretations; nevertheless, in the hypothetical scenario that it was more specific and 
expansively definitive, there exists no body established to ensure that the Council adheres to its 
mandate- a counterpart to the judiciary on the domestic level. Thus, in the event that the Security 
Council is capable of acting ultra vires, there exists no mechanism to state this fact; “the Security 
Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal 
question”172 but as a principal organ of the United Nations on a par with the General Assembly, 
the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council and the 
Secretariat,173 and with the Statute annexed to and forming part of the UN Charter, the ICJ does 
not have any jurisdiction over the Security Council, particularly given that the Court’s 
jurisdiction is over any “legal question”174 and “[t]he Council is a political body par 
excellence.”175 As an organ of the UN parallel to the Security Council, a sibling relationship 
between the ICJ and Security Council cannot suffice. 
For these reasons, Chesterman’s cautious approach is the more pragmatic and adoptable 
of proposals for the framework of a rule of law for the Council. In his report for the Austrian 
Initiative, Chesterman expands on this notion and identifies more acutely the discrepancy 
between the domestic rule of law and the international rule of law, finding that   
 
[a]t the national level, [the rule of law] requires a government of laws, the 
supremacy of the law, and equality before the law. Strengthening a rules-based 
international system by applying these principles at the international level would 
increase predictability of behaviour, prevent arbitrariness, and ensure basic 
fairness. For the Council, greater use of existing law and greater emphasis on its 
own grounding in the law will ensure greater respect for its decisions.176 
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The structure of the international plane, in addition to the legal obligations on States as opposed 
to citizens, are poles apart from the domestic counterpart and the mechanisms and structures in 
place are accordingly disparate. Chesterman’s understated assertion that not all norms may 
translate well to the international sphere calls for a measured approach to which norms can work 
and which are obsolete or unsuitable for the international level.  
 
II.4.2 A more cautious examination 
UNGA Res 67/1 tackled these issues and enumerates several aspects of what an international 
rule of law should strive for; in addition to “predictability and legitimacy”177, the declaration 
calls for the international rule of law to comprise “fair, stable and predictable legal 
frameworks”178, “economic, financial or trade measures”179 that are consistent with international 
law, “the independence of the judicial system, together with its impartiality and integrity”180; and 
“equal access to justice for all”181. Furthermore, it identifies that the “rule of law and 
development are strongly interrelated and mutually reinforcing.”182 It is clear from this 
description that the rule of law at the international level differs quite significantly from the rule 
of law at the domestic level; in addition to direct references to the work of four of the principal 
organs of the United Nations – the Security Council183, the Economic and Social Council184, the 
International Court of Justice185 and the General Assembly186 – mention of supra-national 
organisations such as the International Criminal Court187 and “the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea as well as other international courts and tribunals”188 show not only that the 
scope of this declaration, and the concept of the international rule of law of which it speaks, is far 
broader and more far reaching than that of the domestic rule of law, but also that the United 
Nations itself is one, if not the main, member of the audience to which the declaration speaks. 
The declaration also stresses “the importance of strengthened international cooperation, based on 
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the principles of shared responsibility and in accordance with international law”189, stressing its 
international direction. Though it enumerates too many beneficial results that the international 
rule of law can and should create – “the protection of the rights of the child, . . . conflict 
prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding”190 – and potential threats and 
hindrances to the rule of law – “illicit networks and counter the world drug problem and 
transnational organized crime . . . corruption . . . [and] terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations”191 – there is no exhaustive list of where the parameters of an international rule of 
law might lie. Reinforcing the need for an expansive approach as noted in Chapter I, in order to 
delve deeper into the question of what an international rule of law comprises, it is necessary to 
read this declaration in conjunction with other documents that have emerged from the General 
Assembly or United Nations in general.  
Bühler noted in 2008 that “it is only since a few years that the United Nations has started 
to develop comprehensive common concepts, coordinate, and give coherent policy direction to 
the manifold activities of the UN system in the field of rule of law . . . [before which] activities 
of the United Nations followed a piecemeal approach, were limited in scope . . and lacked 
coordination and a coherent policy.”192 Indeed, despite the fact that the Assembly has considered 
rule of law as an agenda item since 1992193 and numerous thematic debates spearheaded by the 
Security Council194, until recently the internalised rule of law for the United Nations, and in 
particular the Security Council, appeared to be neither a feasible reality nor a goal towards which 
the evidence suggested the Council could be seen to be working. Although the Council had in the 
past adopted resolutions reiterating the importance of the international rule of law, it had always 
                                                 
189 ibid ¶24. 
190 ibid ¶17-18. 
191 ibid ¶24-26. 
192 Konrad G Bühler, ‘The Austrian Rule of Law Initiative 2004-2008’ (2008) 12 Max Planck Yrbk UN L 409, 410. 
193 See UNGA Res 61/39 (18 December 2006) UN Doc A/RES/61/39; UNGA Res 62/70, (8 January 2008) UN Doc 
A/RES/62/70; UNGA Res 63/128 (15 January 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/128; UNGA Res 64/116 (15 January 2010) 
A/RES/64/116; UNGA Res 65/32 (10 January 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/32. 
194 See UNSC Presidential Statement 15 (2003) UN Doc S/PRST/2003/15 on “Justice and the Rule of Law: the 
United Nations Role”; UNSC Presidential Statement 2 (2004) UN Doc S/PRST/2004/2 on “Post-conflict national 
reconciliation: role of the United Nations”; UNGA Res 67/1 (n 6); UNSC Presidential Statement 30 (2005) UN Doc 
S/PRST/2005/30 on “The maintenance of international peace and security: the role of the Security Council in 
humanitarian crises: challenges, lessons learned & the way ahead”; UNSC Presidential Statement 28 (2006) UN Doc 
S/PRST/2006/28 on “Strengthening international law: rule of law and maintenance of international peace and 
security”; UNSC Presidential Statement 28 (2006) UN Doc S/PRST/2006/28; UNSC Presidential Statement 11 
(2010) UN Doc S/PRST/2010/11. 
43 
 
done so within the framework of connected issues such as women, peace and security195, 
children in armed conflict196, the protection of civilians in armed conflict197 and counter-
terrorism.198  
In so far as a bespoke working definition of the rule of law for the Council as a tool for 
comparison to its decision-making process, there has been none. The Austrian Rule of Law 
Initiative199 attempted to address this gap but falls short of creating a comprehensive or requisite 
standard. The report is an initiative of a Member State – Austria – and is an external analysis 
commissioned neither by the Security Council nor any other UN organ despite the wide range of 
scholars, practitioners and other knowledgeable individuals it purports to have consulted in its 
creation.200 Notwithstanding the seventeen bespoke recommendations for the Security Council 
outlined,201 each pertaining to an aspect of Council behaviour within the framework of the rule of 
law, the report does not enumerate a list of components of the rule of law, resorting instead to a 
piecemeal approach of Council actions that revolve centrally around issues of transparency,202 
accountability203 and review204. Although it does not direct them towards Council action directly, 
it is fortunate, however, that the United Nations itself expanded quite substantially on the simple 
definition of a rule of law to incorporate different strands within these three principle features 
that accommodate the expansive nature of an international rule of law as opposed to its domestic 
counterpart. 
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There are quite clearly elements of the rule of law in domestic legal orders that can be 
adopted at the international level; transparency, equality before the law and the avoidance of 
arbitrariness are all examples of rule of law elements that are equally important at the 
international level as at the domestic. However, there are components that need to be added to 
the domestic elements to reflect the international nature of law governing and between States – 
international human rights law and the abidance by international human rights treaties is a prime 
example of this, as well as elements that are not applicable to the Security Council, such as the 
public promulgation of laws. This thesis will therefore adapt the elements of the international 
rule of law to fit the mould of the Security Council.  
For the purposes of delineating the specificities of an international rule of law, perhaps 
the most important document is the definition given by the then-serving Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, Kofi Annan, in 2004. The work of the Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon is 
referred to explicitly in UNGA Res 67/1205, specifically with reference to the 2012 Report of the 
Secretary-General ‘Delivering justice: programme of action to strengthen the rule of law at the 
national and international levels’206; however, this report also does not create a list of 
international rule of law components. Rather, it refers207 back to Annan’s 2004 report to the 
Security Council and uses the same definition of the rule of law which Annan announced four 
years prior. This definition, which relates to “a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s 
mission . . .”208 can be read to apply not only to States themselves, but also to international 
organisations and the United Nations itself. It stated that the rule of law was 
 
a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and 
private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as 
well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality 
before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance 
of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.209 
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Fitschen comments that Annan “identifies no less than fifteen elements that are decisive for his 
understanding of the rule of law.”210 Insofar as the content of Annan’s definition is concerned, 
whilst I am convinced that the former Secretary-General succeeded in encompassing the 
numerous elements of a very broad concept, I note repetition in the definitions given. There 
appear to be only eleven components of an international rule of law suitable for application to the 
Security Council, as derived from the Annan’s report:  public promulgation of laws; consistency 
with international human rights norms and standards; supremacy of the law; equality before the 
law; accountability to the law; fairness in the application of the law; the separation of powers; the 
equitable participation in decision-making processes; legal certainty; the avoidance of 
arbitrariness; and procedural and legal transparency. These are the components that this thesis 
accepts as the definition of an international rule of law. 
One potential reason for this discrepancy in the number of elements to Annan’s definition 
could be that, just as at the domestic level, the international rule of law can be divided into two 
mutually supportive and symbiotic elements: the existence of laws and their impartial 
maintenance. Whilst there are undoubtedly differences between, for example, the principle of a 
government that is accountable to laws that are equally enforced, and measures to ensure the 
adherence to these standards, the crux of the definition centres around the existence of the latter 
list of principles. That is to say that measures of enforcement and adherence are secondary to the 
existence of laws to enforce and adhere to, for what is a court without laws to uphold but an 
establishment devoid of meaning and reason? What would a judge use if not the laws 
themselves?  
Nonetheless, Annan points to an integral issue in adding to the definition of a rule of law 
the entities that will uphold them. A law may well be publicly promulgated, legally certain, avoid 
arbitrariness and so forth, but without an independent adjudicator there is no recourse for 
resolution of inevitable problems such as misinterpretation, not to mention the Aristotelian point 
mentioned earlier about the corruptibility of Man in positions of power. As Dicey puts it, 
“whenever there is discretion there is room for arbitrariness and . . . in a republic no less than 
under a monarchy discretionary authority on the part of the government must mean insecurity for 
legal freedom on the part of its subjects.”211 At the heart of this thesis is the same distinction: not 
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only must there be a framework for the Council to abide by, but there must also be a form of 
independent review. The Austrian Initiative found that “the Council’s own voting rules are a 
check on the unfettered exercise of those powers”212; however, if one approaches the Council not 
as a self-contained organ of the United Nations but as a legislative, governing international 
body,213 self-regulation is weakly compliant with the principles of a rule of law. Separation of 
powers and judicial review are two of the core values of a rule of law, both at the domestic and 
international levels. Dicey’s statement rings true; even if such abuse is not proven in practice, the 
absence of a mechanism to review Council decisions and ensure that they are in accordance with 
the rule of law casts doubt on the entire process, and threatens to undermine the goals that the 
Council is tasked with in maintaining and reinstating the international peace. The existence of an 
independent body is in itself an aspect of transparency and accountability – without such an 
entity, the Council will continue to be subject to allegations of political corruption, national gain 
by permanent members and general inequality. 
With respect to the applicability of these principles to the Security Council, whilst 
Fitschen might take a pessimistic view of the report,214 stating that the Secretary-General 
“strictly avoids even to suggest that what he has termed a ‘concept’ for internal use by the United 
Nations was meant to define the rule of law in a way that could apply also outside the Secretariat 
[i.e. other organs of the United Nations]”215, I am in agreement with the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights and others216 that this constitutes a definition of the rule of law that can be 
taken for all United Nations organs.  This seems particularly the case given the 2012 General 
Assembly declaration that seems to put to rest any arguments over whether the rule of law should 
be applied internally to the United Nations – Fitschen’s position in 2008 seems untenable today. 
Naturally, this did not immediately end all debate about the components of the rule of law, nor 
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stem the debate about the concept. As a later working paper emerging from the Secretariat stated 
quite explicitly “there is no universal agreement as to what the term rule of law actually means . . 
. The rule of law is a system of interrelated principles that extend widely into social, economic, 
cultural and other structures in present-day societies.”217 However, perhaps spurred on by the 
necessity of establishing a working definition of the term rule of law given the attention it has 
been given in recent years imposed on both the Secretariat and General Assembly the obligation 
to adopt one and Annan’s has seemingly been the reference to which resolutions have pointed 
since. 
Thus, generally – and as a foundation for the purposes of this thesis – Annan’s is an 
excellent summary of the principles of the rule of law that may serve as the parameters for 
comparison with the decisions of the Security Council.  The fact that the definition was furnished 
by the then-serving Secretary-General of the United Nations imports additional relevancy to the 
definition for the purposes of this thesis, for who could be better placed than he to know the 
mandate of the United Nations, its regulations, direction and the intricate workings of the 
organisation, allowing his report pin-point accuracy and topical pertinence to this thesis? In 
addition, given the questions this thesis raises around the impartiality and independence of the 
Security Council, a definition from the Secretary-General is more reliably independent than one 
from the Council itself and will ensure that any standards of the rule of law compared to Council 
actions will not be tautologous, biased or self-serving. 
Following Annan’s report to the Council, Member States unanimously recognized the 
need for “universal adherence to and implementation of the rule of law at both the national and 
international levels” and reaffirmed their commitment to “an international order based on the 
rule of law and international law”218 at the United Nations World Summit in September 2005. 
This echoed far earlier calls in documents such as the Declaration on Friendly Relations,219 
which in 1970 referred to the “promotion of the rule of law among nations”220 and inextricably 
linked the rule of law to a “contribut[ion] to the strengthening of world peace.”221 This 
declaration, which was adopted without a vote, also proclaimed that “States shall comply in good 
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faith with their obligations under the generally recognized principles and rules of international 
law with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, and shall endeavour to 
make the United Nations security system based on the Charter more effective.”222 In 2012, the 
Assembly indeed found that “the Charter . . . , international law and justice, and  . . . an 
international order based on the rule of law . . . are indispensable foundations for a more 
peaceful, prosperous and just world.”223 The seeds of the international rule of law can be viewed 
as having been sown several decades ago, in the drafting States’ decisions to “promote through 
joint and separate action universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms . . . the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to 
above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom 
and independence . . . [or] the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international 
obligations.”224 Similarly, in the 2000 Millennium Declaration,225 Member States resolved to 
“strengthen respect for the rule of law in international as in national affairs.”226 Although the rule 
of law was mentioned in passing in this document, it is significant that it was done within the 
section dealing with “Peace, security and disarmament”227 as this couches the rule of law in the 
pursuit of peace and security. 
It is, perhaps, also worthy of note at this point that there is no specific role laid out for the 
Security Council in Annan’s definition; all organs of the United Nations are treated in the same 
way. That each organ of the United Nations would interpret the provisions of the Charter and the 
means of implementation of its provisions which concerned its activities was a decision taken at 
the very outset of the creation of the United Nations;228 it therefore follows that each organ 
should decide how best to implement the international rule of law, particularly in light of the 
equality and competence principles229 that prohibit organs from either instructing one another or 
depending upon another organ in the conduct of their mandates and missions. Indeed, just as 
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organs can and should be independent in deciding the manner or path chosen in reaching their 
respective goals, so too in the implementation of the rule of law internally it would be remiss for 
the Secretary-General, or the Assembly, to impose structures and specificities upon the Council’s 
behaviour. Annan’s definition of the rule of law understandably, then, does not distinguish 
between the organs of the United Nations; however, there can be no doubt that Annan’s 
definition of the rule of law is sufficient, having been included, and thereby endorsed, by 
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon in the Secretary-General’s 2008 Delivering Justice report and 
again by the General Assembly in UNGA Res 67/1.  
Although not unilaterally legally binding,230 certain resolutions of the General 
Assembly231 can still be argued to amount to the custom of States for the purposes of 
international customary law.232 Indeed, it has been posited in relation to resolutions of the UN on 
the use of outer space that there is a concept of “instant customary law”, where “unanimously 
adopted General Assembly resolutions (or draft texts of other bodies) reflect a communis opinio 
juris which in itself will suffice for the formation ‘overnight’ of customary law.”233 The Statute 
of the International Court of Justice does not elaborate on the components of customary law, 
stating simply that customary norms must be supported by “evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law.”234 Indeed, although the International Court of Justice agreed in principle with 
the possibility of General Assembly resolutions bearing some weight under some circumstances, 
any interpretations of customary law still require the two-fold standard of “the material element 
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of State practice and psychological element of acceptance of norms thus practiced as legally 
binding”235, which has previously been supported by the ICJ.236   
In the ICJ’s Nicaragua case, both the near-universal acceptance of the UN Charter and 
the wide approval of relevant General Assembly resolutions resulted in finding that the non-
intervention rule had reached a customary legal status.237 Indeed, individual General Assembly 
resolutions have also been recognised as representing opinio juris: in the Nicaragua case, “the 
adoption by States of [resolution 2625(XXV) on Friendly Relations Between States] afford[ed] an 
indication of their opinio juris as to customary international law on the question.”238 UNGA Res 
67/1 shows a similar opinio juris to UNGA Res 2625(XXV); both were adopted by consensus239 
and enumerated rules and standards that had been accepted by a large number of States, most 
importantly without record of opposition.240  
 Supportive of State practice are the sheer number of represented States241 and organisations242 
at the high-level meeting, in addition to the existing actions taken and efforts made by States to 
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[1986] ICJ Rep 14, ¶188. 
238 ibid ¶191. The ICJ found that “[t]he effect of consent to the text of such resolutions cannot be understood as 
merely that of a ‘reiteration or elucidation’ of the treaty commitment undertaken in the Charter. . . [but] an  
acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves”, ibid ¶188. 
239 UNGA Verbatim records (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/PV.1883, ¶7 for the adoption of resolution 2625(XXV) 
In contrast, although in Nuclear Weapons (n 236) ¶70 the ICJ found no “conventional rule of general scope, nor a 
customary rule specifically proscribing the threat or use of nuclear weapons per se” this was due to “tensions 
between the nascent opinio juris on the one hand, and the still strong adherence to the practice of deterrence on the 
other”(ibid ¶73) – essentially, the fact that “resolutions under consideration in the present case [had] been adopted 
with substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions” (ibid ¶71) undermined any assertions of opinio juris. 
240 UNGA Verbatim records (24 September 2012) UN Doc A/67/PV.3 (UNGA Res 67/1 Verbatim records). It has 
been recognised that “the statements in the preparatory and plenary phases, the absence of ‘reservations’ by States, 
and the voting records (namely unanimous patterns) may constitute first instances of State practice, which contribute 
towards a new customary rule by stating its substance and effects, and by revealing the opinio juris of member 
States”, Villiger (n 232). See also, Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12, ¶32; Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Company, Limited (Judgment) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, ¶320; South West Africa, Second Phase 
(Judgment) (Judge Tanaka Dissenting Opinion) [1966] ICJ Rep 6 ¶291. 
241 Heads of State from Benin, Cyprus, Estonia, Honduras, Austria, Iran, Latvia, Finland, Bulgaria, Maldives, 
Equatorial Guinea, Mongolia, Gabon, Albania, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Zambia, Bangladesh, Croatia, Haiti, Lesotho, Samoa, Switzerland and Guatemala were all in attendance, with a 
further 35 nations represented by senior ministers and other high-level officials.  
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implement the core themes of UNGA Res 67/1 at the domestic level.243 UNGA Res 67/1 can be 
seen, then, not only as an affirmation of State willingness but as an exercise in stock-taking; 
States attending the high-level meeting put forward examples, some over a decade-old, of how 
they have been implementing the rule of law at both the international and domestic levels. 
UNGA Res 67/1 is, in a sense, reiterating the existing practices and willingness in the form of an 
official written document and setting out a plan for further expansion of State practice in the 
form of pledges – it is a codification of principles that does amount to the existence of a 
customary norm. The rule of law, then can only be seen as an obligatory norm for a modern 
democratic society.244 
Whilst comments of States focus mainly on the rule of law at the national level and how 
to implement international obligations domestically, a few States have commented on the 
relationship between the UN system and the need for a rule of law to apply to it internally, which 
is at the core of this thesis and of primary significance to its argument. On the whole, however, 
Member States did so within the context of criticism of the Security Council itself to be failing to 
implement the rule of law internally, be that through “the undemocratic and unrepresentative 
nature of the Security Council”245, the need to “completely reform and change the rules and 
regulations governing the Security Council, in terms of both its powers and its structures”246 or 
simply the belief “that [the Council] is far from making a positive contribution to the rule of 
law.”247 In fact, the rule of law for the Security Council, or even the United Nations system as a 
                                                                                                                                                             
242 Addressing the meeting were the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UNDP Administrator, UNODC 
Executive Director, President of the Security Council as well as representatives of the UN Commission on 
International Trade Law, International Development Law Organisation, International Crisis Group and the 
International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Science. 
243 In Maldives a “2008 Constitution guarantees the separation of powers, a universal bill of rights and a free 
media”, UNGA Res 67/1 Verbatim records (n 240) 18; Mongolia has already enacted “more than 20 legislative acts 
aimed at bringing about the structural reform of [their] legal system”, UNGA Res 67/1 Verbatim records (n 240) 
21.; Gabon’s multi-party system established in 1990 was tested in 2009, “when Gabon successfully navigated a 
delicate political transition that was praised by the international community”, UNGA Res 67/1 Verbatim records (n 
240) 21; Kenya’s “democratic enterprise over the past 49 years has been to strengthen the rule of law . . . [and its 
2010 Constitution] implemented far-reaching legal, institutional and administrative reforms which have further 
strengthened the rule of law in Kenya”, UNGA Res 67/1 Verbatim records (n 240) 26; and Bangladesh “made legal 
services affordable to such vulnerable and marginalized groups as women and minorities by enacting the 2001 Legal 
Aid Services Regulation Act”, UNGA Res 67/1 Verbatim records (n 240) 33. 
244 Notably, many States used the opportunity to comment on the dramatic situation in Syria as a concrete example 
of a lack of rule of law and the resulting violence and human suffering. See, eg the comments of the EU at ibid 32; 
Austria, ibid 13; Bulgaria, ibid 17; Albania, ibid 23. 
245 President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, ibid 29. 
246 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, ibid 14 
247 Venezuela, ibid 40. See also, Cuba, ibid 41; and Bolivia, ibid 42-43. 
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whole, is explicitly mentioned but a handful of times throughout the comments – the UN 
Secretary-General, argued that “rule of law activities . . . deserve a central place in the structure 
of [UN] work”248;  the President of the ICJ articulated his view that “the concept of the rule of 
law is, and should be at the very heart of the Organization’s mission”249; and the European 
Commission’s President recognised “the importance of linking the rule of law agenda to the 
work of the United Nations on peace and security, human rights and development, which are 
simultaneously preconditions for and enablers of democracy and the rule of law.”250  
In light of these statements, UNGA Res 67/1 therefore grants authority and gravitas to the 
concept of an international rule of law for the Security Council – leaders from more than 80 
States were reportedly present at the meeting.251 As the deliberative organ of the UN tasked to 
“initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of . . . promoting international co-
operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law 
and its codification”252, the Assembly’s official recognition of the applicability of the rule of law 
internally to the United Nations and its organ signifies a landmark event in the organisation’s 
history and a concrete base for this thesis. However, it cannot be said to yet constitute 
international customary law in relation to the applicability of the rule of law to the Security 
Council, or even the United Nations in general.  
The Council itself has also previously emphasised its commitment “to ensure that all 
United Nations efforts to restore peace and security themselves respect and promote the rule of 
law”253 and maintained that “the rule of law is an important concept in the work of the Security 
Council”254, citing the thematic debates, presidential statements and Council resolutions on the 
topic of the rule of law. Somewhat promisingly, the President of the Council offered measurable 
targets for change in Council procedure in the form of Council commitment “to fair and clear 
procedures for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as well 
                                                 
248 Ban Ki-Moon, ibid 3. 
249 Peter Tomka, ibid. 
250 Jose Manuel Barroso, ibid 32. 
251 UN Press release, ‘World Leaders Adopt Declaration Reaffirming Rule of Law as Foundation for Building 
Equitable State Relations, Just Societies’ (24 September 2012) < 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11290.doc.htm> accessed 16 December 2014. 
252 UN Charter (1945) art 13(1). 
253 UNSC Presidential Statement 11 (2010) UN Doc S/PRST/2010/11. See also, President of the Security Council, 
UNGA Res 67/1 Verbatim records (n 240) 5. 
254 ibid 
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as for granting humanitarian exemptions”255, although this could cynically also be argued to have 
been either a moot point in light of or a direct result of the quasi-judicial review undertaken by 
the European Court of Justice in the Kadi decision.256 The fact remains, though, that the Council 
acknowledges the need for the rule of law in its own decision-making process and attempts to 
place on record its willingness, intent and quantifiable steps to do so. 
  
                                                 
255 ibid 6. 
256 Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation. v 
Council of the European Union and Commission [2008] ECR I-06351, where the implementation of the Council’s 
sanctions regime was nullified after the Court found EU law to enjoy primacy over Security Council resolutions in 
its ruling that the application of a Security Council sanction to the plaintiff constituted a violation of his human 
rights. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE COMPONENTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 
 
The successive failures of the Council show that the permanent members have not 
kept their part of the bargain struck in 1945: permanent seats and a veto in 
exchange for responsibility to the broader membership. Indeed, they are clearly 
making any attempt at reform in terms of composition or working methods 
impossible. It is time for them reconsider and to make possible true change that 
will revitalize the Organization and enable it to fulfil its purposes and 
principles.257 
 
 
Whereas a wider discussion on international law might incorporate different fields of 
international law, from human rights or the law of the sea to public international law or trade 
law, this thesis is specifically focused on Security Council action, particularly when faced with a 
threat to the international peace. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, certain components of 
the rule of law are addressed together due to the fact that they may not perhaps examine various 
independent elements of the vast field of international law, but rather different facets of Security 
Council action. These groups, which will be examined in greater detail below, are as follows: 
clarity of action (incorporating procedural transparency and public promulgation); legal 
certainty; equality before the law; The Predictability Paradox (incorporating the avoidance of 
arbitrariness, supremacy of the law and fairness in the application of the law); consistency with 
international human rights norms and standards; the separation of powers; the equitable 
participation in the decision-making process; and accountability before the law. It is also 
essential to note that there is a great deal of overlap between some of the components; at times it 
seems that the same concept is referred to in two different components. However, this could be 
as a result of different facets to Council actions, as mentioned previously, or similar means to 
decipher if the Council is abiding by the rule of law. For example, a clear legal basis underpins 
the component of both legal certainty and the predictability paradox, incorporating the avoidance 
of arbitrariness, supremacy of the law and fairness in the application of the law, just as a clear 
pattern is necessary for equality before the law.  
 
 
                                                 
257 Argentina, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 16. 
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III.1 Clarity of action: Transparency and public promulgation  
Although these two components are separate concepts under the rule of law at the domestic level, 
I have chosen to merge them for the purposes of this thesis due to their similarity in practice 
when discussing the international rule of law as it pertains to the Security Council. They are, 
essentially, two facets of the same theme of clarity in Security Council action and I have elected 
to address them first for the simple reason that they are the information channels through which 
all other elements are measured; together they form the administrative component of the rule of 
law. The primary sources that emerge from the Security Council are only as beneficial as they 
are detailed and widely available. It may hypothetically be the case that the Council conducts its 
work with the utmost respect for the rule of law. However, without clarity of material and the 
public dissemination of material, it would be impossible for both this thesis and any State in 
general to discern the facts of Council decisions.  
 Firstly, procedural and substantive transparency is vital to the work of the Council, 
meaning that the way in which a decision of the Council was taken and the reasons for this 
outcome must be comprehensible. The language should be accessible and understandable, the 
goals should be clear and the decisions taken should be unambiguous; this last aspect on 
decisions is doubly important for States when duties are imposed upon them. Resolutions 
displaying a high level of procedural transparency would include full verbatim minutes and a full 
outline of voting, allowing those wishing to access the information to clearly view whether 
decisions have been taken in accordance with the correct procedure and what factors, if any, 
played a role in the final decisions. Verbatim records allow the reader to gain full details on the 
political stance of each voting State and gives the most accurate picture of the sequence of events 
leading from the introduction of a proposed resolution and the conclusion of the meeting. 
Verbatim records are also vital for pursuing a specific situation or debate through various 
resolution proposals, some of which may have failed to be adopted. Verbatim records should 
therefore also be available for meetings where resolutions were not adopted, as well as for 
meetings where they were. 
 Running parallel to this is public promulgation, which in the case of the Security Council 
requires the full dissemination of each resolution and the debates around its adoption. Although 
debates and discussions are frequent between States on either bi-lateral or multi-lateral 
diplomatic levels, the finalised text should contain elements such as when the resolution shall 
56 
 
come into force, the temporal limits of the resolution and should be publicly and readily 
available prior to its adoption. Resolutions that are effectively publicly promulgated “should be 
legible and accessible in the formal sense of having been . . . brought forth in public debate, 
having made their appearance in and become part of the public realm and having attracted the 
public’s involvement and attention.”258  In the case of the Security Council, the immediate 
concern is for that of member States of the UN, although these resolutions and peripheral 
material such as voting records should also be accessible to the general public directly. 
Clarity of action is integral to the work of the Security Council for several reasons, most 
notably as a means of establishing the actual meaning of a resolution, for “there cannot be a Rule 
of Law without rules of law . . . Values like legal certainty and legal security can be realized only 
to the extent that a state is governed according to pre-announced rules that are clear and 
intelligible themselves.”259 Clarity of action is therefore central to the process of resolutions 
themselves; it would render futile even the most pioneering resolution on reinstating peace or 
eliminating a threat if the Member States that are bound to abide by it did not agree on the 
meaning of the content, were not in swift receipt of it or, indeed, if they did not comprehend how 
the result was reached. Indeed, to fail to comprehend the path taken by the Council or the reasons 
behind a resolution’s passing or the use of a veto would reduce all but the serving Council 
members at the time obsolete and would subvert the Charter’s stipulation that the Council “acts 
on their behalf.”260  
It is key also for the purposes of transparency; of the 195 UN State Members, only 15 are 
allocated seats in the Council chamber and therefore, for the vast majority of States wide-
ranging, swift dissemination of high calibre, transparent and complete information is one of the 
key means of maintaining credibility of Council decisions among UN Member States. However, 
a transparent legal text does not ensure that it will be enforced consistently, nor that it is 
constitutionally sound, nor indeed that the law itself is impartial In a domestic example of a 
government that abides by the rule of law, citizens are assured of the knowledge that should a 
government pass an unconstitutional law or engage in pernicious behaviour, citizens have the 
option to refer to a legal system or, more simply, vote in a new government at the following 
elections; there is no such assurance with the Council. Indeed, the P5 members, in whose hands 
                                                 
258 Eijsbouts in Vandamme and Reestman (n 43). 
259 MacCormick (n 64) 12. 
260 UN Charter (1945) art 24(1). 
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the greatest power lies, are the ultimate example of hereditary peers, continuing through the 
years from one government to another. Although the citizens of each P5 member have the option 
to vote in new governments, which might in turn change their foreign policy stances and 
therefore elicit a political shift in the outlook of the Council, this is a matter of serendipity for the 
rest of the UN Members and their own citizens, who may stand a chance of a 4 year term serving 
on the Council and effecting change themselves, but will always face the insurmountable might 
of the P5 will. It is for this reason that the remainder of the elements of the rule of law, and the 
Council’s absolute adherence, is paramount. 
 
III.2 Legal Certainty 
This element of the rule of law asks whether Chapter VII resolutions, which contain legally 
binding elements and can be seen as parallel to legislation on the domestic level, are accessible, 
clear and predictable. This component explores whether States can be reasonably expected to 
comprehend the regulations and stipulations of the resolutions, or whether there are elements of 
the resolutions that are vague, convoluted or open to interpretation.  
Legal certainty would firstly require that the results of non-compliance by States to a 
resolution be predictable in order to allow UN member States to regulate their conduct in 
accordance with the legally binding obligations of a resolution.261 The lack of legal certainty 
risks not only eliciting confusion amongst the correct means of compliance but also paves the 
way for the legitimate refusal of a Member State to comply, with the defence that the legal text 
did not stipulate sufficiently the provisions and parameters of its scope. An example of the 
necessity for legal certainty would be in cases where sanctions have been imposed upon a UN 
Member State, in which case other Member States would be barred from conducting trade or 
other business. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where vague or ambiguous terminology 
might result in certain States inadvertently, or perhaps knowingly, acting in contravention of a 
resolution where sanctions have been imposed, or where the Council has passed the imposition 
of a no-fly zone, arms embargo or repercussions.  
                                                 
261 At the domestic level, the UK House of Lords found that “the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must 
be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case . . . a 
norm cannot be regarded as a ‘law’ unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate 
his conduct: he must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail”, Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 
EHRR 245, 271, ¶49. 
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Legal certainty, then, also assists in predicting future violations of resolutions. In an 
equation where the Council acts to maintain the international peace, legal certainty of resolutions 
should enable States to reasonably predict other actions that might result in similar resolutions. 
For example, resolutions based on human rights violations or the failure of a State to adhere to an 
international principle should contain structured and detailed examples of the exact threats to the 
international peace, in order to allow States to predict under what circumstances their behaviour 
might fall foul of the Council. Similarly, where similar violations have been committed by 
States, one would expect to find that the Council has responded in the same manner, to the same 
extent and with the same degree of proportionality.  
 This thesis will therefore look for a clear legal basis in all Chapter VII resolutions. In the first 
instance, resolutions that are taken under Chapter VII should explicitly state that the Council is 
acting under these Charter powers and should enumerate whether this is under article 41, article 
42 or any other relevant provisions. All resolutions relating to maintenance of peace and security 
must explicitly state this in the text and must delineate the boundaries of both Council action and 
the action of entities, States or organs that it tasks with any related action, for example, in cases 
of military intervention; the legal justification for this action must also be apparent and clearly 
explained. The existence of this in a resolution would be a clear indication that the Council views 
legal certainty as being imperative to its role; conversely, failure to stipulate this could suggest 
one of a number of options. The second legal basis that I will seek is the identification of the 
exact threat to the peace that the Council is aiming to eliminate by taking such Chapter VII 
action. Moreover, it is essential that the Council stipulate specifically what the nexus between the 
threat and its proposed action is; that is to say, the Council has an obligation to explain how the 
actions outlined in the Council resolution will assist in the restoration of international peace and 
security. 
Contrastingly, the absence of legal bases might primarily suggest that the Council does 
not value the importance of legal certainty and, by virtue of this element, the rule of law; 
secondly, it could suggest that the Council cherishes its prerogative to ambiguity, in which case 
this thesis will establish where the Council provides a legal basis and where it neglects to do so, 
attempting also to discover why; finally, the lack of legal clarity could suggest an abuse of power 
on the part of the Council that is thinly veiled behind its uncertainty of legality, which is 
indicated by its failure to clearly justify its actions within the boundaries of law.  
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III.3 Equality before the law 
On a domestic level, equality before the law ensures that all individuals are subject to the same 
laws and the same rights, avoiding a hierarchical structure in which monarchs or other State 
rulers were above the law. At the Council level, where legally-binding resolutions are being 
discussed, the question has two core elements. The first is ensuring the equitable application of 
the resolution to all States and avoiding targeting resolutions that would inherently impede or 
adversely affect either individual or a selection of States; put simply, resolutions should not 
arbitrarily target a particular faith, nationality, ethnicity or other characteristic – this is most 
easily compared to non-discrimination laws at the domestic level and is, perhaps, the simpler of 
the two to maintain in an increasingly globalised, open world where cosmopolitan lifestyles, 
open borders and multi-nationalism is increasingly becoming the norm for a larger proportion of 
the global population, in contrast to the more closed world in which the UN was created. The 
second element is that all States should be subject to the same standards, whether these are 
human rights norms, financial sanctions or any other stipulations of a resolution. Essentially, 
there should not be one rule for the powerful, and another for the weak. The Charter explicitly 
states that “the Security Council acts on [UN Member States’] behalf”262 and Bingham writes 
that “although the citizens of a democracy empower their representative institutions to make 
laws which, duly made, bind all to whom they apply . . . nothing ordinarily authorizes the 
executive to act otherwise than in strict accordance with those laws.”263 Within the Council 
context it is vital, then, that the States passing the resolution are seen to adhere to its contents, 
meaning and purposes. Resolutions that display a high level of adherence to equality before the 
law will contain provisions that are applied to all members of the Security Council as well as the 
intended subjects of a resolution.  
Resolutions will also adhere to the component of equality before the law when there is a 
similar reaction by the Council to similar threats or situations; it seems self-evident that where an 
armed conflict has broken out the Council must act to quash the threat to the peace. Although the 
sources of the conflict are often different and require different approaches, the Council has a 
responsibility to end bloodshed, violence and conflict as soon as possible. Most recently the lack 
of military intervention in Syria in the aftermath of Council-mandated NATO action in Libya 
                                                 
262 UN Charter (1945) art 24(1). 
263 Bingham (n 40) 60. 
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for, arguably, equally threatening security issues raises has resulted in criticism of the Council 
for shunning its primary responsibility to maintain peace, both internally from Council members 
that voted for action and external observers. As a result, Council members are obliged to provide 
reasoned arguments for their actions or inaction- where clear evidence of the necessity for 
Council intervention is apparent through the statements, declarations and resolutions of other UN 
organs, agencies and representatives and the Council fails to act, the risk of inequality before the 
law is high. 
This component will explore why the Council acts immediately in certain circumstances and 
more slowly, if at all, in others. Potential explanations for this might be the necessity to wait for 
results of fact-finding missions, UN reports or other information gathering projects before taking 
definitive action; more cynically, however, it could also be due to a hesitation on the part of the 
Council to act against the interests of its allies, the victimisation of States in opposition to the P5 
members, strategically geographical locations that Council members are reluctant to tamper with 
due to their own vested interests or simply a lack of interest by Council members due to its lack 
of political value. Through comparison of different resolutions and situations, this thesis will 
identify whether this element of the rule of law has been adequately upheld in the decisions of 
the Council and, if not, what the reasons for this failure were.  
This thesis will also argue that resolutions should impose the same standards upon all States, 
as opposed to different standards for different States. Equality before the law requires that 
resolutions contain provisions that are equally applied to all members – for example, the 
possession of nuclear weaponry or the reaction to armed conflict. However, Council members 
are highly unlikely to state outright that their actions were taken with biased or self-serving 
motivations at their root; as such, concrete evidence to suggest that a double-standard exists is 
unlikely to result from analysis of verbatim meeting records or other material emerging from the 
Council directly. 
Therefore, at its core, this component is fundamentally speculative, although certain evidence 
of bias can be found in statements made on the domestic level – for example, the declaration of 
P5 member’s unwavering support for another State.264 Nonetheless, the most that this component 
                                                 
264 It can also be found in the internal criticism found in verbatim records of meetings, such as the vitriolic assault on 
China and Russia by several members, including the P5 members of France, UK and USA, over the use of the veto 
in UNSC Draft Res S/2012/77 (2012), see China, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV/6717, 
5-6; Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV/6717, 5-6. 
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can hope to prove is that certain decisions of the Council appear to contravene the principle of 
equality before the law. 
This element of the rule of law also links inextricably into the absence of arbitrariness, 
another element of the rule of law. As Justice Jackson noted over half a century ago,  
 
there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable 
government than to require the principles of law which officials would impose 
upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door 
to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose 
only a few to whom they will apply legislation . . . Courts can take no better 
measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in 
operation.265 
 
III.4 The Predictability Paradox: the avoidance of arbitrariness, supremacy of the law and 
fairness in the application of the law 
Whereas equality before the law deals with potential biases that might be found at the core of the 
Council in its decision-making process and the potential blind eye that it turns to certain 
situations in contrast to others, The Predictability Paradox component asks whether decisions of 
the Council  are taken with discretion or based on a set of principles that allow States to 
reasonably regulate their behaviour in accordance with standards derived from existing Council 
decisions, resolutions and discussions. The reference to a paradox is fitting for the Council, 
which must ensure that it allows States to reasonably anticipate its response based on a precedent 
of Council action, or inaction, in the past, whilst also addressing each individual threat on a case-
by-case basis. The plethora of tools at the disposal of the Council were granted by design to 
allow it to respond effectively to any threat that the international community might face; 
nonetheless, it should ensure that its response is not disproportionate, contradictory or unsuitable. 
The Predictability Paradox is the amalgamation of non-arbitrary action, the supremacy of the law 
in decision-making processes and fairness in the application of the law. It is highly successful 
when States are able to forecast the Council’s decisions based upon existing clearly elucidated 
                                                 
265 As Justice Jackson noted over half a century ago, “there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary 
and unreasonable government than to require the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority 
must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those 
officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation . . . Courts can take no better measure to 
assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation”, Railway Express Agency, Inc v New 
York (1949) 336 US 106, 112-113. 
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decisions (as highlighted in the component on clarity of action), the legal basis for comparable 
situations (as in legal certainty), the knowledge that the Council’s actions will not be arbitrary 
and that legally sound decisions will be fairly applied. The difficulty lies, however, in analysing 
where the Council has reacted either similarly or differently to a similar threat and has done so 
unfairly or arbitrarily. The Council, as a political body that was established to adapt to shifting 
definitions of a threat, must necessarily change its approach accordingly when faced with each 
threat; therefore it is insufficient to claim that where it has reacted differently to an analogous 
threat, it has failed in the principle of fairness or avoidance of arbitrariness. Conversely, where 
there has been a marked shift in approach or where States are not held accountable to the same 
principles or standards, without compelling and thorough explanation of the reasons for the 
Council shift in approach, it will be clear that there has been arbitrary behaviour and a lack of 
fairness and equality in the application of its powers. 
The Council is, by definition, a political body and to impose upon it the stiff restrictions of 
an unwavering set of standards would both defeat the purpose of its existence by crippling its 
diplomatic and political capabilities and run contrary to the intentions of the drafters at San 
Francisco to allow it a wide berth in which to operate. Indeed, as Bingham notes, even “judges 
should enjoy a measure of discretion when passing sentence on convicted criminals, since if they 
are obliged to impose a prescribed penalty for a given offence they are unable to take account of 
the difference between on offence and another and between one offender and another . . . The 
rule of law does not require that official or judicial decision-makers should be deprived of all 
discretion, but it does require that no discretion should be unconstrained so as to be potentially 
arbitrary. No discretions may be legally unfettered.”266 
Concern arises when “the behaviour of states, on which the rule of law ultimately depends, 
often is arbitrary and self-interested, in a way that is the antithesis of rule of law norms.”267 The 
Council is charged with the primary maintenance of international peace and is tasked with 
“discharging these duties  . . . in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations,”268 which include “international co-operation in solving international problems . . .  
[and] harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.”269  
                                                 
266 Bingham (n 40) 53-54 [emphasis added]. 
267 Saunders and Le Roy (n 67) 15; see also Brownlie (n 46) and Martin Lughlin, Sword and Scales (Hart 2000). 
268 UN Charter (1945) art 24. 
269 ibid art 1(3)-(4). 
63 
 
This thesis will argue that Council members, when acting on official Council business, 
should pay primary attention to the maintenance of the peace above their own national interests; 
that is to say, the maintenance of international peace should be valued at all costs, even at the 
expense of domestic welfare. Whilst it may seem to be politically naive to suggest this hierarchy, 
and it would not be surprising to find that such a system did not exist, this thesis confines its 
approach to the letter of the UN Charter, which states that the Council shall exercise its duties 
within the parameters of the purposes and principles of the UN270 – far from advocating 
unilateral decisions and self-serving actions, article 1(1) of the Charter refers to “collective 
measures”. To use a domestic analogy, representatives of the subjects of the law – members of 
parliament – are the source of outrage when it is revealed that laws and decisions are taken to 
benefit their own personal, affiliated or company interests and in some cases are fatal to their 
political careers271; fairness and supremacy of law for the Council  should elicit the same 
standards of integrity, particularly given the high stakes of international peace and the 
repercussions that Council decisions have not only on individuals but on entire populations. Two 
potential examples of this are sanctions, which often do not result in targeting the governments 
of a targeted State but rather the people of that State due to diversion of funds internally, and the 
failure to intervene in situations where human rights are being grossly violated on a wide scale 
level, which requires international intervention.  
The first element of non-arbitrary behaviour of the Council is a clear legal basis for its 
action or decision – this is an example of the overlap between Security Council rule of law 
components. In the case of resolutions, they should contain the component of legal certainty and 
in the case of decisions that do not result in the passing of a resolution, sound judgement must be 
displayed with a reasoned argument for the decision that is clearly outlined in the statements or 
speeches made. Secondly, a clear pattern of action should be evident; for example, when dealing 
with the same situation, previous decisions and resolutions should be taken into consideration to 
ensure that a clear trajectory is charted, rather than an ad hoc response that differs in 
proportionality, direction and substance. Thirdly, resolutions should take account of comparable 
situations, where Council action should not vastly differ. In essence, this means that where 
                                                 
270 ibid art 24(2). 
271 An example of this was the criticism that was directed in the US towards representatives who vote for lower 
taxation on companies or those earning above a certain threshold, due to the personal gain that they or others 
connected to them will benefit. 
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similar situations have a clear causal link it should be evident why the same action was taken or 
why a different course was pursued. 
 
III.5 Consistency with international human rights norms and standards 
Recent decades have heralded a wave of concern from international bodies with respect to the 
human rights implications of actions and decisions; indeed, they have even been at the core of 
decisions to create international criminal tribunals and at the root of relatively new phenomena 
such as the erosion of State sovereignty272 and the new hierarchy that places human rights above 
State immunities. The potential impact of project outcomes on the human rights situation are 
carefully assessed by the UN, certainly more expansively than initially envisioned in the UN 
Charter.273 Human rights elements can be found as considerations in resolutions that primarily 
deal with other issues; for example, UNSC Res 1373 on the freezing of terrorist assets might not 
initially be seen to concern human rights, but it was based on “the rights of the defence, in 
particular the right to be heard, and the right to effective judicial review of those rights”274 as 
well as the “unjustified  restriction of his right to property”275 that the European Court of Justice 
overturned the Council of the EU’s implementation of the resolution. It would appear, then, that 
the Council at times does not fully contemplate the human rights effect of its resolutions and this 
sub-section intends to discover the extent of this phenomenon. 
 Human rights can be relevant to the Security Council in two ways: as a competence and as a 
limitation. Whereas the competence element relates to a catalyst for Council action, this 
component also explores whether Council action is bound by some limitations imposed on it by 
human rights law. However, the debate reaches further than this to one of the Council’s 
adherence to jus cogens and international customary norms relating to human rights. This 
component asks whether the Council is bound by these norms or the Council can act outside of 
international human rights law, asking whether the Council has acted consistently with jus 
cogens and customary norms and if so, how it balances these with the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Resolutions and decisions that include smart sanctions and the 
                                                 
272 For example, the responsibility to protect (R2P). 
273 Although “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights” is stated in the purposes of the UN at 1(3) of the 
UN Charter, human rights are not explicitly linked to the work of the Security Council. Indeed, they are only 
mentioned as being directly within the remit of the General Assembly (UN Charter (1945) art 13(b)), ECOSOC (UN 
Charter (1945) art 62(2); UN Charter (1945) art 68) and the Trusteeship Council (UN Charter (1945) art 76(c)). 
274 Kadi and AlBarakat, (n 256) ¶334. 
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establishment of review committees might suggest that the Council considers it bound by them, 
whereas the absence of their mention in resolutions could suggest that the Council sees its role as 
maintainer of peace and security to incorporate an exemption. This thesis will address this by 
examining whether jus cogens norms and customary international law are noted, mentioned and 
respected in Council action. 
In either case, human rights protections extend further than this and potential violations can 
be seen not only as the effects of a resolution to be considered during deliberations on the 
drafting and passing of a resolution, but also as the reason for the creation of a resolution itself. 
Although human rights often lie at the root of a decision to act, there is the argument that human 
rights violations are not always effectively handled in a timely fashion, or even that certain States 
block the passing of resolutions that centre around human rights issues for reasons that run 
contrary to the philanthropic goals upon which the UN is built. The question is, then, whether 
every decision of the Security Council to act, or not to act, accommodates its responsibility to 
ensure the protection of human rights or whether there is a selective approach to the response to 
human rights depending on other factors. If the latter is true, these factors will be addressed. 
 
III.6 The separation of powers and acting ‘ultra vires’ 
Linked to the accountability issue, at first glance this particular element of the rule of law might 
not stand out as applicable to the Security Council, given the independent core organs that the 
UN system is formed of and the horizontal nature of the international sphere in comparison to the 
domestic system. However, it is in fact a pertinent topic for discussion when addressing the 
Council; as referred to in my literature review, authors such as Joyner, Elberling and 
Nollkaemper have raised substantial concerns regarding the encroachment of the Council on the 
judicial realm of the ICJ and the legislative space that should be occupied by national 
governments. Bingham states that “[t]he constitution of a modern democracy governed by the 
rule of law must . . . guarantee the independence of judicial decision-makers, an expression [he 
uses] to embrace all those making decisions of a judicial character, whether they are judges (or 
jurors or magistrates) or not.”276 Sharing these concerns, this thesis takes the view that it is 
vitally important that the Security Council ensure that it does not act ultra vires in the course of 
its action. This component discusses the limits to Chapter VII resolutions and the expansion of 
                                                 
276 Bingham (n 40) 91. 
66 
 
its powers to include legislative authority in pursuing apparent breaches of or threats to the 
peace. 
In the wake of international terrorist attacks in the early 21st Century, the Council took the 
unprecedented step of imposing legally binding, general and non-temporally limited obligations 
upon States through Chapter VII resolutions;277 this precedent was recently bolstered by another 
general resolution combatting terrorism in 2014.278 In 2005, by imposing binding obligations on 
all States to adopt legislation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons,279 the Council’s powers were again called into question, as it was alleged to have 
installed itself as a form of global governor in contravention to principles of State sovereignty. 
The separation of powers component intends to identify any situations where the Council 
appears to have overstepped the boundaries defined for it in the UN Charter, either by 
trespassing on the territory of another UN organ or extending its reach to impose legally binding 
obligations upon States that were not in accordance with its powers in the Charter, both of which 
should be examined within the constraints of the parameters set out for the Council in the UN 
Charter. 
 
III.7 The equitable participation in decision-making processes 
This is the counterweight to the above point on equality before the law; whereas equality before 
the law relates to the subjects of a law – in the context of the Council, Member States that are 
bound to abide by the stipulations of a given Chapter VII resolution – and is therefore externally-
facing, the equitable participation in decision-making is introspective. It relates to the 
background of such resolutions and the history of a given resolution from tabling to passing, or 
failure, incorporating consultations with Member States and the inclusion or at least 
consideration of the diverse opinions that are often expressed in the Security Council chamber 
during resolution discussions.  
Perhaps the most obvious of issues that spring to mind when discussing the equitable 
participation of States in the decision-making process of the Security Council is the existence of 
the veto power available to the P5 members. This thesis will not broach the topic of altering the 
status quo of P5 veto power, but rather attempts to define how an equitable participation in the 
                                                 
277 UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373. 
278 UNSC Res 2178 (24 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2178. 
279 UNSC Res 1540 (28 April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1540. 
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decision-making process can exist alongside it. The existence of a select group of members that 
have the power to unilaterally block the passing of a resolution may appear to be a lop-sided 
system that undermines the very fabric of equitable participation, but it is a structure that has not 
changed since the conception of the Council and, despite repeated reform efforts, looks to remain 
cemented thus for the foreseeable future. 
The equitable participation in the decision-making process demands that representatives of 
the UN Member States be consulted on all decisions of the Council. In order to discern whether 
this element has been satisfied, I will firstly examine the Charter for the principles relating to 
voting and composition of the Council, as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Council. Does 
the Charter contain specific provisions that oblige the Council to offer equitable participation? If 
so, it would suggest that, with the exception of the veto, an equitable process for Council 
decision-making was envisioned for the Council under the Charter. However, if not it would 
suggest that an inherent bias was created from the outset, although this does not negate the need 
for it entirely as a component of the rule of law for the Council. If, as expected, this element 
exists, I will then address the procedure of the Council in its decision-making and try to establish 
whether a practice of closed-door meeting and agreement between States, in the same vein as 
took place prior to the establishment of the UN at Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks, still exists or 
whether decisions, debates and full and frank disclosure have been incorporated in the Council’s 
decision-making process. Even in instances where the veto has been used, it is vital that the P5 
member making use of this privilege be forthcoming in its explanation of the reasons why it feels 
the course of action it disagrees with cannot benefit the restoration and maintenance of the 
international peace. In order to discern these points, it is not the text of the resolutions that will 
be most important but rather the comments of States – the verbatim records – that will grant 
proof of compliance. For example, evidentially-based accusations by member States of collusion 
or agreement of some States prior to official Council meetings would run contrary to this 
component of the rule of law. 
 
III.8 Accountability before the law 
Accountability is akin to a thread that runs through all elements of Council decision. If clarity of 
action and transparency are the starting points of the rule of law for the Council, accountability is 
the end; it is the means of measuring and reviewing how effectively the Council has adhered to 
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the principles of the rule of law and gives a forum for amendments to Council practice. 
Accountability of the Council is not something that is likely to be found entrenched in the 
resolutions of the Council, since the notion of its accountability is clearly not a matter that the 
Council considers a requirement. 
Identifying that “[a]n important element of the rule of law is the ability to have one’s 
grievances heard before an impartial judge”,280 accountability requires a mechanism in place to 
which States may turn should they suspect that the Council has taken an illegitimate or ultra 
vires decision; accountability also requires the existence of an independent monitor of the 
Council’s compliance with the rule of law. Article 24(3) of the UN Charter stipulates that the 
Council is to “submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for 
its consideration.” However, these reports are insufficient for the purposes of accountability, 
since they do not fulfil the requirements of judicial review and fit more within the context of sub-
heading 5.1 on the administrative elements of procedural transparency and public promulgation. 
The structure of the Council and its position as an organ of the United Nations dictates that any 
accountability mechanisms be horizontal; discussions on the benefits and disadvantages, as well 
as the feasibility and practicality of review by a fellow UN organ such as the ICJ have been 
conducted by delegate States at the formational meetings of the United Nations itself in addition 
to more recently by scholars such as Sarooshi, Tsanakopoulos and Joyner, as already referred to 
in the literature review. This component will build on these proposals by discussing the powers 
of UN organs to monitor and review the decision-making process of the Council itself. 
 
III.9 Chapter Conclusions 
These components of the rule of law have been tailored to fit the Council and reflect the 
behaviour expected of it in order to abide by its principles. They delineate the approach that I 
will use to enter into an in-depth analysis of each component with reference to the primary 
material that I outlined in Chapter I, including the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions and 
verbatim records. I have grouped certain components together due to similarities in both 
substance and methodology, as well for ease of examination since certain elements are inherently 
linked or overlap. In reaching this stage, I have partly answered the first of my two thesis 
research questions, namely, what the rule of law, if any, is at the Security Council level; the next 
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chapter will continue to answer this question by expanding on the points that I have highlighted 
here and giving further detail on how the Council has or has not complied with the provisions of 
each element. I have also succeeded in answering the three sub-questions that I aimed to address 
at the start of this chapter: what the rule of law is in the domestic and international spheres; how 
and why a rule of law for the Security Council differs from this; and why the Council should be 
subject to the rule of law at all. The following chapters will now examine the components that I 
have identified in this chapter in more detail. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CLARITY OF ACTION: PROCEDURAL TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PROMULGATION 
 
IV.1 Introduction 
This element of the rule of law examines the extent to which the Council’s decision-making 
process is clear, transparent and publicly available to other Council member States, non-Council 
Member States and the general public. The dissemination of information around the path taken to 
reach any given decision by the Council is integral to public awareness of Council action and 
reflects a transparent procedural process. The absence of clear information is the hallmark of 
secretive decision-making; it is vital that all States are able to understand the options considered 
by the Council and the reasoning behind the decision that emerged from their meeting and 
discussions. Similarly, if such information exists but is not released to the public, this might 
suggest a hierarchy in the United Nations, wherein some States are permitted to be privy to 
discussions and knowledge and others are not. The same principle applies to the citizens of each 
Member State, to whom the governments and authorities on a domestic level, represented at the 
United Nations by delegates and ambassadors, are ultimately answerable.  
Therefore one could advance the theory that any lack of public promulgation of detailed 
documents and information at the Council level impacts upon the rule of law at a domestic level 
in each Member State and that this element of the rule of law for the Council has a global 
domestic knock-on effect. Tzanakopoulos argues that transparency  
 
is not a free‐standing primary norm, which prescribes or proscribes or permits 
certain action, but rather it is a norm without any independent normative charge. 
It is an ancillary obligation (of the Council) and right (of the Member States) 
which mediates between the powers of the Council to act, and the residual powers 
of Member States to exercise diffuse control over the exercise of those Council 
powers.281  
 
Clarity of action, then, is to the remainder of the components of the rule of law what the Vienna 
Convention on the Laws of Treaties is to international law – a secondary source of interpretation. 
Transparency of itself provides little independent use, but is valuable when examined in tandem 
                                                 
281 Tzanakopoulos (n 17) 386. See, also Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and 
Character of Norm Creation Changing?’ in Michael Byers (ed), The Role of Law in International Politics (OUP 
2000) 213-216. 
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with another component of the rule of law. In this sense, too, it is integral to accountability,282 as 
“it enables critique and control by the public of the actor one is seeking to hold accountable.”283 
Accordingly, it is also the gateway to interpretation – without transparency, it is unlikely that any 
component of the rule of law can be examined fully, as the information accessible would be 
unreliable, incomplete or erroneous. Clarity of Action is linked to other components of the rule 
of law – for example, The Equitable Participation in Decision-making Processes. The presence 
in Council discussions of non-member States and non-State actors is part of the issue of 
procedural transparency and closely linked also to the rule of law at the domestic level.284 The 
inability, should it exist, of a relevant non-state actor or Member State to participate in 
proceedings would surely be a substantial failing of the component of both Clarity of Action and 
Equitable Participation. 
I have identified two major elements to this component of the rule of law: the first is 
whether mandatory official documents, as stipulated in the Rules of Procedure, UN Charter or 
other governing text, exist and are available to parties permitted access to them by these texts. 
This requires examining what rules are in place for the dissemination of official Council 
documents and whether the Council complies with these obligations. The second element 
focuses on the composition of these documents and the transparency of the information 
contained in them. This requires an examination of the texts themselves and whether all relevant 
information that should be contained in the documents can indeed be found in all official Council 
documents. 
 
IV.2 Council obligations for procedural transparency 
Under the UN Charter, the Council is obligated to present the Assembly “annual and special 
reports. . . includ[ing] an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or 
taken to maintain international peace and security.”285 Moreover, as part of the Secretary-
General’s responsibility to “make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the 
                                                 
282 See eg Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2009) 327; Carol 
Harlow, Accountability in the European Union (OUP 2002) 7. 
283 Tzanakopoulos (n 17) 392 
284 In order for the criteria of transparency to be fully satisfied, it is essential that all parties to an issue be given fair 
and equitable access to the floor to highlight potential issues from, undoubtedly, a closer and more knowledgeable 
perspective. 
285 UN Charter (1945) art 15. 
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Organization”,286 an inference exists that communication between the Council and Secretariat 
will be forthright, transparent and timely in order to facilitate the preparation of the report. The 
Security Council’s Rules of Procedure are also clear on the requirement that verbatim records, 
“records of meetings . . . [a]ll resolutions and other documents shall be published in the 
languages of the Security Council”287 and to be made simultaneously available in all five official, 
working languages of the United Nations – English, French, Arabic, Spanish and Standard 
Chinese.288 Leaving the door open for contingency situations where translation into other 
languages might be necessary, the rules go on to stipulate that “[d]ocuments of the Security 
Council shall, if the Security Council so decides, be published in any language other than the 
languages of the Council.”289 Arabic was introduced as an official language in the General 
Assembly on 18th December 1973290, though it would be almost a further decade before the 
Security Council recognised Arabic as such in an amendment to its Rules of Procedure based on 
the Assembly request of 1980.291 Subsequently, resolutions prior to 18th January 1983292 are 
unavailable.293  
The Council’s Rules of Procedure also take into consideration the necessity of rapid and 
accurate documentation of meeting minutes, imposing a standard that “the verbatim record of 
each meeting of the Security Council shall be made available to the representatives on the 
Security Council and to the representatives of any other States which have participated in the 
meeting not later than 10 a.m. of the first working day following the meeting.”294 There is a 
similar deadline on the dissemination of the public record to States and parties that did not 
participate in the meeting. Indeed, even for members of the public and academics such as this 
author, the ease of access to the repertoire, rules of procedure, working methods, annual reports, 
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287 UNSC Provisional Rules of Procedure (1946) UN Doc S/96/Rev.7, r 45-6. 
288 ibid r 41. 
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292 UNSC Res 529 (18 January 1983) UN Doc S/RES/529. 
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letter exchanges, official statements, meeting records, voting records, a full history of resolutions 
and a variety of other recent Council-related documents are easily accessible online in the 
English language.295 
However, there are several formats of meetings that can take place at the Council level 
and this is where compliance by the Council to the component of clarity of action begins to 
deteriorate. Meetings of the Security Council can be held in public – including open debate,296 
debates,297 briefings298 or adoption299 meetings – or private – including both closed public private 
meetings300 and Troop Contributing Country (TCC)301 meetings. Although official records of 
public meetings are minuted and made available to the public, official records of private, or 
closed, meetings are made in single copy and kept by the Secretary-General, with access to this 
copy only being granted to the select few Council Member States that participated in the 
meetings. Perhaps more worryingly, meetings of the Members of the Security Council can take 
place in “informal consultations of the whole” to which non-Council members are not invited 
and no official record is made; indeed, the French delegation expressed concern as early as 1994 
at the fact that “nearly all the work of the Council takes place in the form of informal 
consultations to which States not members of the Council do not have access.”302 Moreover, 
speaking on behalf of the 115 Non-Aligned Movement States in 2006, the representative from 
Cuba addressed the Council with a damning list of examples of Council behaviour undermining 
transparency, openness and consistency, including 
 
unscheduled open debates with selective notification, reluctance in convening 
open debates on some issues of high significance, frequent restrictions on the 
participation in some of the debates and discrimination between members and 
non-members of the Council, particularly with regard to sequencing and time 
limits of statements during the open debates, failure to submit special reports to 
the General Assembly, as required under Article 24 of the Charter, the submission 
                                                 
295 <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents> accessed 16 December 2014. 
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of annual reports still lacking sufficient information and analytical content, and 
lack of minimal parameters for the drawing up of the monthly assessment by the 
Security Council presidencies.303 
 
There is, therefore, a problem that arises with the actual information both made available through 
attendance at Council meetings and contained within the documentation disseminated. 
 
IV.3 Private (closed) meetings 
Although implicitly permitted by the Council’s own Rules of Procedure,304 private meetings run 
contrary to a transparent Council; whereas public meetings are a matter of public record and the 
verbatim records and other documents are easily accessible by not only UN Member States but 
also the wider public in many guises and media, private meetings are almost wholly segregated 
from the public eye. Whilst it might seem reasonable for the Security Council – which deals with 
matters of international security and potentially sensitive and classified information – to conceal 
sensitive information, private meetings are concerning for two primary reasons: firstly, there 
appears to be no threshold that needs to be met in order to trigger a private meeting, and 
secondly, private meetings have steadily increased in usage by States in place of the public 
forum.305 What this means, in reality, is that a Council member may decide, for whatever reason, 
that it wishes to meet with another Council member to discuss a matter in private, with no 
obligation to divulge the details of the topics discussed. Nonetheless, they are frequently made 
use of, can be attended by any number of invited members and carry with them no stipulation for 
compulsory records analogous to public meetings. Although this is inherent to the nature of 
politics – and the Council is, after all, a political body – the risk then comes with the repeated use 
of behind the scenes discussions that leave other Member States and the wider international 
community at a loss as to what has been discussed: 
 
Like a parliamentary matryoshka (doll), [the Council] now contains ever-smaller 
‘mini-Councils’, each meeting behind closed doors without keeping records, and 
each taking decisions secretly. Before the plenary Council meets ‘in consultation’ 
. . . the P-5 have met in ‘consultation’ . . . and before they meet, the P-3, 
composed of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, have met in 
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‘consultation’ in one of their missions in New York . . . After the fifteen members 
of the Council have consulted and reached their decisions, they adjourn to the 
Council’s chamber, where they go through the formal motions of voting and 
announcing their decision. Decisions that appear to go further than at any time in 
the history of the United Nations are now ultimately being taken, it seems, by a 
small group of states separately meeting in secret.306 
 
Reisman’s observation in 1993 appears only to have gained momentum as the years have passed 
expanding to include other discussion topics besides those initially criticised. Despite increased 
recourse to Council action in the 1990s, the use of closed meetings has grown rapidly since 1999, 
prior to which closed meetings were used for specifically mandated reasons such as the re-
appointment of the Secretary-General in 1996:307 1999 saw only four closed meetings308 leaping 
drastically to nineteen in 2000309. Since 2000, there have been over four hundred closed 
meetings310 and at one point over 20% of Council meetings were conducted in private.311 The 
fact that the usage of private meetings has only increased since their introduction – and shows no 
signs of relenting to this day312 – flies in the face of the Council’s 2010 reaffirmation of “its 
commitment to increase recourse to open meetings, particularly at the early stage in its 
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consideration of a matter.”313 The reliance on closed meetings, to which the public have no 
access, raises grave concerns of transparency and has long led to calls for reform by non-Council 
member States.314 The Representative of Kazakhstan summed up the sentiment when he stated 
that 
 
[w]e non-member States of the Security Council have the right to know first-hand 
what are the possible decisions being discussed within the Council and what are 
the positions of each Council member on current issues, and should not have to 
find this out through the prism of the mass media. Complete knowledge of the 
nature of internal developments in the Council, which are important for the entire 
international community, are of critical importance for our Governments, which 
depend upon objective information in adopting decisions. As concerned members 
of the international community, we believe that we have the right to be 
informed.315 
 
One of the principal concerns with this format, aside from the selective nature of 
participation in the meetings themselves,316 is that the Council “may decide that for a private 
meeting the record shall be made in a single copy alone . . . [to be] kept by the Secretary-
General.”317 Corrections to this record are permitted only through the Secretary-General, by 
States that have attended these private meetings and within a timeframe of ten days;318 access to 
this sole copy is limited to “representatives of the Members of the United Nations which have 
taken part in a private meeting . . . or authorized representatives of other Members of the United 
Nations”319 and the release of meeting records are subject to the Council’s discretion. Indeed, “in 
the case of informal consultations, there have also been instances in which the most directly 
concerned parties were denied participation in open meetings.”320  
It can be argued that such private meetings appear not to be entirely segregated from the 
public eye; at “the close of each private meeting the Security Council shall issue a communiqué 
                                                 
313 UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (26 July 2010) UN Doc S/2010/507, ¶28. 
314 See eg Djibouti, UNSC Verbatim Record (16 December 2014) UN Doc S/PV.3483, 14; New Zealand, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (16 December 2014) UN Doc S/PV.3483, 11; Italy, UNSC Verbatim Record (16 December 2014) 
UN Doc S/PV.3483, 15; Austria, UNSC Verbatim Record (16 December 2014) UN Doc S/PV.3483, 19; Iran, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (16 December 2014) UN Doc S/PV.3483, 22. 
315 UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 4. 
316 These meetings are always closed to the public and closed to non-Council Member States unless they are granted 
express permission to attend. 
317 UNSC Rules of Procedure (n 287) r 51. 
318 ibid 51. 
319 ibid 56. Such authority is granted by the Security Council, although criteria for allowing this access are lacking. 
320 Pakistan, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 24. 
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through the Secretary-General”321 and in the instances where they have taken place, 
communiqués have indeed been submitted.322 However, they are heavily redacted or brief to the 
point of undermining the worth of their issuance in the first place. Indeed, the extent that is 
known about these meetings is the intended topic of discussion, the parties privy to the meeting 
and, usually, that there has been “an exchange of views”.323 There is no means of determining 
the nature of the discussion, arguments, counter-arguments or, indeed, any elements of the 
discussion or exchange; by all measures, these private meetings are selective, exclusive – in the 
sense of excluding some Council member states – and divisive, as they encourage the formation 
and consolidation of pro and con camps for resolutions with respect to voting.  
Closed meetings pose a problem primarily for non-Council Members, due to the lack of 
transparency that is inevitably associated with them. For example, “States that are not members 
of the Security Council are forced to spend more time searching for information in any way they 
can. As a result, they learn either too late or not at all about closed consultations.”324 States must 
therefore sometimes refer to the information gleaned from interviews given to the press by 
Council Members in attendance in order to derive any semblance of awareness of the subject and 
content of the meetings.325 Other UN States Members, too, have noted this deficiency in the 
transparency of the Council proposing that in compliance with its requirements “the Security 
Council should consider the wisdom and propriety of granting the wish of Member States, 
particularly non-Council members, to receive full information on issues discussed by the 
Council.”326 Speaking on behalf of the Pacific small island developing States, the representative 
of Tonga noted that “[m]any of the agreements reached by the Council are negotiated through 
experts meetings, which are not open to non-members . . . and the summaries of the discussions 
are not readily available.”327  
                                                 
321 UNSC Rules of Procedure (n 287) r 55. 
322 See eg UNSC Official Communiqué (19 December 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6456; UNSC Official Communiqué (10 
December 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6443; UNSC Official Communiqué (3 December 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6433; UNSC 
Official Communiqué (11 November 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6420. 
323 See, eg UNSC Official Communiqué (30 October 2010) UN Doc S/PV.5558, where “Members of the 
Council, General Cissé and His Excellency Mr. Elie Dote, Prime Minister of the Central African Republic, 
had an exchange of views”; UNSC Official Communiqué (30 April 2013) UN Doc S/PV.6957, where “The 
members of the Council heard a briefing by the representative of Jordan . . . [and] had an exchange of views.”  
324 Venezuela, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 4. 
325 ibid. 
326 Philippines, ibid 9. See also, Canada, ibid 10. 
327 Tonga, ibid 21. 
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The issue does not appear to centre entirely on the lack of a structure or regulation of the 
type of meetings, but rather the fact that the existing structure is being abused or mis-interpreted. 
There are agreed measures in place for the holding of meetings, both public and private, as well 
as rules governing the appropriate circumstances under which each should be held.328 At the 
heart of the matter, then, seems to be that “these provisions, which are mostly agreed provisions, 
are not being faithfully implemented . . . [which] has a direct negative bearing on the Council’s 
efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy . . . [and calls into question whether] the Council is 
effective in carrying out its core mandate, namely, the maintenance of international peace and 
security.”329 Such closed or restricted meetings, whilst perhaps serving a political imperative as 
an “indispensable tool to facilitate prompt and timely decisions,”330 clearly run contrary to the 
rule of law. They are, however, seen by UN staff as “a valuable time-saving device”331 and an 
inhibition to “diplomats and U.N.officials from using the U.N. organization as a forum to attain 
personal political goals.”332 Quantitative research has led to the explanation that, “[a]ccording to 
one former Security Council President, under these circumstances, the real issues are discussed, 
whereas in larger meetings, members tend to use ‘more diplomatic, but less clear language,’ 
which is likely to obscure rather than clarify important issues.”333 
 
IV.4 Informal consultations 
A further element of concern comes in the form of informal consultations of the whole, to which 
non-Council State members are not invited, and the even more exclusive informal dialogues that 
frequently now precede any actual vote of the Security Council, thereby reducing it from a forum 
of discussion to a forum of formalisation of pre-conceived and pre-agreed decisions: 
 
In many cases the general membership and even the countries concerned are kept 
totally uninformed of the negotiations on draft resolutions or statements directly 
affecting them, let alone being asked their views on the Council’s outcome 
                                                 
328 Chapter XI of the Council’s Rules of Procedure is dedicated to the publicity of meetings and records. 
329 Pakistan, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 24. 
330 ‘Letter dated 4 August 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General’ (6 August 2008) UN Doc S/2008/528 (Annex), 3. 
331 Discussion with Secretariat official (Mar. 9, 1984) and discussion with Secretariat official (Mar. 1, 1984), in 
Feuerle, Loie ‘Informal consultation: A Mechanism in Security Council decision-making’ (1985-1986) 8 N Y U J 
Intl L & Pol 267, 272-3 (1985-1986). cf. Chesterman (n 3) 
332 Feuerle, ibid 271. 
333 ibid 272. 
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documents. That is also the case with regard to non-permanent members, which 
frequently face situations of secretive negotiation between a few permanent 
members on important issues.334 
 
Informal meetings can be central to the achievement of diplomatic and political goals, allowing 
the achievement of “compromises that delegations initially accept ad referendum and not on the 
basis of instructions from the Governments. Holding such negotiations in public would 
obviously slow them and paralyse them.”335 This was shown to be the case after the collapse of 
the USSR “when, after a long period of paralysis owing to the cold war, the Security Council has 
had to learn to work as a unit in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the Organization 
in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter.”336 However, the same cannot be said to be true 
today, over two decades later, when the stagnant condition of Council affairs owing to the 
rigidity of the US and USSR has loosened considerably.337 In contrast to the factual evidence of 
increased Council activity since the fall of the Soviet Union,338 transparent meetings have 
decreased and informal meetings appear to be increasingly relied upon.  
This upwards trend of usage of informal meetings worryingly has only sought to increase 
during the last decade: prior to 2006, there are only two documented instances of informal 
meetings being used – once in 1996 for a General discussion of Council issues in connection 
with the visit of the President of Italy to the UN and a special meeting in 2006 on the 
Relationship between the UN and the USA briefed by the Chairman of the United States Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. Conversely, in the years between 2006 and 2011, a total of 25 
informal meetings are documented to have taken place – an average of 5 a year and over twelve 
times the number in the preceding decade. Informal consultations – undocumented, entirely 
verbal discussions between States – are even more concerning and prompted the French Foreign 
                                                 
334 Iran, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 11-12. 
335 France, UNSC Verbatim Record (16 December 2014) UN Doc S/PV.3483, 3. 
336 ‘Letter dated 9 November 1994 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General’ (11 November 1994) UN Doc S/1994/1279 (Annex), 2. 
337 The renewed anti-US sentiments harboured by the Sino-Russian partnership in recent years will be covered 
briefly in a later sub-chapter; nonetheless, it cannot compare with the precarious Cold War deadlock that lasted for 
decades and ended in the 1990. 
338 In the years 1985-1989 a total of 86 resolutions were passed by the Council; in the years 1990-1994, the total was 
323. In fact, more resolutions were passed in 1993 alone than in 1985-89 combined. 
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Minister to transmit an aide-memoire to the Secretary-General on 9th November 1994,339 in 
which he lamented the evolution of Council procedure: 
 
“there is a certain uneasiness in relations between the Security Council and 
Members of the United Nations . . . result[ing] in large part from the fact that 
informal consultations have become the Council's characteristic working method, 
while public meetings, originally the norm, are increasingly rare and increasingly 
devoid of content: everyone knows that when the Council goes into public meeting 
everything has been decided in advance. Thus, all of the Council’s work takes 
place behind closed doors, without observers and without a written record. We 
think this is a dangerous departure. First of all, it runs counter to rule 48 of the 
Council's provisional rules of procedure . . . Public meetings are therefore the 
rule, and non-public meetings the exception. I should note that informal meetings 
are not even real Council meetings at all; they have no official existence, and are 
assigned no number. Yet it is in these meetings that all the Council's work is 
carried out. The result of this situation is strong frustration and a lack of 
information. There is frustration among nonmembers of the Council; and 
members of the Council have inadequate information because there are too few 
opportunities for debate for them to understand the general feelings of those 
interested in items on the Council's agenda.340 
 
IV.5 Council efforts to reform 
The 3483rd meeting, held on 16th December 1994 – almost 50 years from the establishment of the 
Security Council – was the first instance that the Security Council ever held an open meeting to 
discuss its working methods and procedure. Parallel to this is the fact that since the early 1990s, 
the Security Council has been faced with a volume of work not theretofore encountered; it is 
estimated that “[n]inety-three percent of all Chapter VII resolutions passed from 1946 to 2002 
have been adopted since the end of the Cold War.”341 However, it would appear that the Council 
began carrying out most of its work in its closed consultation room, meeting in public only to 
adopt resolutions already agreed upon, to provide a forum for set speeches regarding the 
resolutions or to give the Council's President a platform for statements reflecting understandings 
reached in private consultation. The adoption of UNSC Res 1695 (2006) highlights this in the 
verbatim records, where the Argentinian delegate ended his speech by thanking “the Ambassador 
                                                 
339 ‘Letter dated 9 November 1994 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General’ (11 November 1994) UN Doc S/1994/1279. 
340 UNSC Verbatim Record (16 December 2014) UN Doc S/PV.3483 [emphasis added]; See also the reports of 
Security Council presidential statements, eg UNSC Presidential Statement (14 October 1994) UN Doc S/PV.3436, 
2. 
341 ibid 19. 
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of the United Kingdom for his intervention to achieve agreement.”342 Non-Council Member 
States – and the wider international community – are left wondering what the extent of this 
intervention was and why the representative of the UK was singled out for thanks when the UK 
delegation was one of eight members - Denmark, France, Greece, Japan, Peru, Slovakia and the 
US being the other seven – to have sponsored the original draft resolution, S/2006/488. What 
exactly transpired in the meeting that brought about harmony in the wording of the resolution 
remains privy only to the members attending the informal consultation. 
 The Council has taken some steps to improve the process by which it addresses issues 
concerning its documentation; “the desire to enhance the flow of information and the exchange 
of views between the Security Council and the General Assembly lay behind the Council’s 
decision of June 1993 to establish an informal working group on documentation and other 
procedural matters.”343 This Informal Working Group (IWG) was designed to make 
recommendations concerning the Council's documentation and other procedural questions and in 
order to promote “efficiency and transparency of the Council’s work, as well as interaction and 
dialogue with non-Council members, the members of the Security Council are committed to 
implementing [these] measures.”344 Indeed, the IWG “has met regularly, and a number of 
important steps have been taken following recommendations made by it”345 such as making 
available draft resolutions to non-members of the Council and the tentative forecast of the 
Council’s monthly work programme, as well as briefing Member States on the progress of 
informal consultations. The United Nations Journal now announces both formal and informal 
consultations of the Council. However, as the representative of Lichtenstein noted in 2008, the 
frequency of their meetings has decreased rapidly,346 and there have been calls for its 
formalisation following questions as to why it remains an informal working group when it deals 
with such an integral and vital aspect of the Council’s work.347 
 
 
 
                                                 
342 Argentina, UNSC Verbatim Record (15 July 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5490, 6-7. 
343 UK, UNSC Verbatim Record (16 December 2014) UN Doc S/PV.3483, 3. 
344 UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (26 July 2010) UN Doc S/2010/507, 1. 
345 UK, UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (26 July 2010) UN Doc S/PV.3483, 3. 
346 Lichtenstein, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 12. 
347 Egypt, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 2. 
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IV.6 Conclusions 
In theory, there should be a wide range of methods through which information is disseminated to 
non-Council Member States. However, it would appear that these are not fully made use of, or in 
some cases neglected entirely. Interactive wrap-up sessions at the end of a Council presidency 
that were designed “to take into account an assessment and evaluation of its work during the 
preceding month”348 and “to be somewhat interactive, so that members would ask questions and 
raise issues”349 gradually waned,350 were not subject to any set procedure351 and were last 
formally held in March 2005.352 Similarly, more substantive and analytical reports would 
improve the transparency of Council procedure. “Publications and submissions of the Council 
could be qualitatively improved to allow the wider membership to gain more insight into its 
work”353; in particular, the annual reports submitted by the Council in accordance with article 
24(3) of the UN Charter require refinement “to add analytical value, rather than merely giving 
descriptions of the work of the Council during a given year.354 
Many States have lamented the fact that Security Council reform, particularly review of 
Council working methods, has “not been accorded due attention.”355 Such States have emerged 
with reasonable and feasible amendments that would ameliorate the current situation and 
improve transparency in the Council’s working methods but these have been ignored or cast 
aside by Council practice. In essence, despite repeated protestations by smaller and medium-
sized States for Council reform of its working methods no substantive changes have come about. 
The use of informal mechanisms that render the Council landscape opaque seem to show no 
signs of tapering; votes in the official meetings are undermined by private discussions between 
all or a selection of Council Members, rendering them a formality that is necessitated by the 
Charter and the Council’s Working Methods; and non-Council Member States continue to 
                                                 
348 UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (29 June 2001) UN Doc S/PV.4343, 2. 
349 ibid 4-5. 
350 Five sessions were held in 2002; three in 2003; none in 2004; one in 2005. 
351 Some were held in public, such as UNSC Verbatim Record (30 April 2003) UN Doc S/PV.4748 under Mexico 
and UNSC Verbatim Record (30 March 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5156 under Brazil, whereas others were held in 
private. 
352 Since then, some Council members have held informal briefings such as Brazil in February 2011, South Africa in 
January 2012. Pakistan held a private meeting in January 2013 as a wrap-up for its work for the month; however, 
details are not available as the record exists to the public only as a communiqué (UNSC Verbatim Record (31 
January 2013) UN Doc S/PV.6914. 
353 Korea, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 19. 
354 ibid. 
355 Iran, ibid 11. See also, Canada, ibid 11; Phillipines, ibid 8; Lichetenstein, ibid 14; Argentina, ibid 16. 
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scramble for information not only relating to meetings to which they were barred from attending, 
but also the locations or existence of meetings that they were eligible or invited to attend. These 
practices, omissions or reluctance to include non-Council Member States cannot be seen as 
compatible with any but the most basic degree of clarity of action: there is superficial 
transparency insofar as information on public meetings can be found after the event; however, 
there is still a great deal to be done on the part of the Council to ensure that the inclusion of all 
UN Member States is adequately accommodated. 
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CHAPTER V 
LEGAL CERTAINTY 
 
V.1 Introduction 
The element of legal certainty is inherently linked to both the legality and legitimacy of Security 
Council action under Chapter VII. This component examines the legal argument for Council 
action; resolutions should highlight which article of Chapter VII any resolutions are taken under 
and its parameters, as well as clearly stating the legal justification for taking such action, the 
nature of the threat that the resolution intends to address and the nexus between the threat and the 
course of action pursued. That is to say, legal certainty is the explanatory element of a resolution, 
showing what the Council has identified as a threat, why it has chosen to respond in this way and 
what the extent of such response should be. Whilst initially eager to adhere to the letter of the 
law after the hard-fought negotiations and text that emerged from the Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta 
and San Francisco meetings and conferences, it is documented that the practice of referring legal 
questions to a committee of legal experts quickly fell by the wayside as the years progressed, 
essentially heralding the age of Council unilateralism that can be argued to exemplify the current 
status quo.356 
This practice runs contrary to the provisions of the Charter, which very clearly stipulate 
the exact procedure that the Council must follow if it is to invoke the clauses of Chapter VII.357 
With the argument of Chapter II in mind, stating that the Council and all its actions are governed 
by its founding text – the UN Charter – it is vital that Council action abide by the stipulations 
therein. Thus, the Charter is the first port of call when exploring what the Council is permitted to 
carry out and what, if any, constraints are imposed upon it. As such, the Charter is quite clear in 
the opening article of Chapter VII on what the Council must provide prior to any further Chapter 
VII action: 
 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
                                                 
356 See Louis B Sohn, ‘The UN System as Authoritative Interpreter of Its Law’ in Oscar Schachter and Christopher 
C Joyner (eds) United Nations Legal Order: Vol 1 169, 227 (CUP 1995) 
357 UN Charter (1945) art 39: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
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decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.358 
 
Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, authorising non-military and military action respectively, are 
subordinate to the above article 39, which provides the threshold of identification of a threat 
prior to any action being instigated under the Council’s Chapter VII powers. There is, then, a 
staged progression that safeguards from arbitrary or frivolous use of articles 41 and 42, albeit a 
caveat that is wildly ambiguous in itself. Nonetheless, in order for Chapter VII to be invoked, the 
threat, breach or act must be expressly stated in the resolution. A determination under Article 39, 
however, does not immediately presuppose action under Chapter VII to follow; that is to say, all 
Chapter VII resolutions should have a determination under Article 39, but not all determinations 
under Chapter 39 lead to Chapter VII resolutions. Two clear examples of this are UNSC Res 
1976 (2011)359 and UNSC Res 1078 (1996),360 both of which contain determinations under 
Article 39 but no Chapter VII references or elements.361 Article 39, therefore, is the “portal” 
through which the Council must enter in order to access its Chapter VII powers and without such 
determination, any Chapter VII resolution would technically be a subversion of the law 
governing the Council;362 indeed, it has been referred to as “the single most important provision 
of the Charter.”363 In essence, what this amounts to is the need to state explicitly the nature of the 
threat to or breach of the peace, in addition to the determination that the Council is acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, which grants the decision a legally binding and more authoritative 
nature. 
 
 
                                                 
358 ibid. 
359 Where a determination was made that “incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia 
exacerbate the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the 
region” but no Chapter VII action was contained in the resolution. 
360 Where “the magnitude of the present humanitarian crisis in eastern Zaire constitutes a threat to peace and security 
in the region” but again no Chapter VII action was taken. 
361 See also, eg UNSC Res 867 (23 September 1993) UN Doc S/RES/867 and UNSC Res 862 (31 August 1993) UN 
Doc S/RES/862. 
362 It is worth noting that a positive determination under Art 39 does not immediately and automatically result in 
Chapter VII action, but merely provides the option to proceed further eg UNSC Res 1078 (9 November 1996) UN 
Doc S/RES1078. 
363 US Secretary of State, ‘Report to the President on the Result of the San Francisco Conference (1945)’ in Jochen 
Frowien and Nico Krisch ‘Article 39’ in Bruno Simma with others (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (OUP 2002) 718. 
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V.2  Determination of a threat under Article 39 
However, such explicit enumeration of the specific threat to the peace is not always given by the 
Council, leading to ambiguity, confusion and disarray. As such, certain resolutions refer to 
explicit determinations under article 39, whilst others determine a threat to the peace either 
implicitly or not at all. These explicit determinations are unequivocal – they leave no room for 
doubt as to what the trigger of any subsequent Chapter VII action might be. Such determinations 
date back almost to the very origins of the Council itself in 1948 – and its first Chapter VII 
resolution – when the Council “determine[d] that the situation in Palestine constitute[d] a threat 
to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations.”364 
Throughout the decades since, there have been numerous examples of explicit determinations 
from the 50s,365 60s,366 70s,367 80s,368 90s369 and even the early 21st Century.370 Moreover, once a 
determination has been made under Article 39, Council practice suggests that it would be 
necessary to reiterate this determination in any and all related resolutions, rather than simply 
referring back to the original resolution in which the determination can be found; that is to say, 
the determination of a threat under Article 39 is valid only for the single resolution in which it is 
made and not subsequent resolutions that make reference to it.371  
Orakhelashvili would dispute any exceptions as being invalid,  as he opts for “the 
standard principle of interpretation of plain and ordinary meaning of terms, which means that 
nothing that is expressed can be disregarded and nothing that is not expressed can be implied, 
unless directly following from an express provision.”372 What Orakhelashvili is advocating is a 
                                                 
364 UNSC Res 54 (15 July 1948) UN Doc S/RES/54, preamble. 
365 eg UNSC Res 82 (25 June 1950) UN Doc S/RES/82; UNSC Res 83 (27 June 1950) UN Doc S/RES/83; UNSC 
Res 84 (7 July 1950) UN Doc S/RES/84. 
366 eg UNSC Res 161 (21 February 1961) UN Doc S/RES/161; UNSC Res 217 (20 November 1965) UN Doc 
S/RES/217. 
367 eg UNSC Res 277 (18 March 1970) UN Doc S/RES/277; UNSC Res 418 (4 November 1977) UN Doc 
S/RES/418. 
368 eg UNSC Res 502 (3 April 1982) UN Doc S/RES/502; UNSC Res 598 (20 July 1987) UN Doc S/RES/598; 
UNSC Res 611 (25 April 1988) UN Doc S/RES/611. 
369 eg UNSC Res 864 (15 September 1993) UN Doc S/RES/864; UNSC Res 1234 (9 April 1999) UN Doc 
S/RES/1234. 
370 eg UNSC Res 1315 (14 August 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1315; UNSC Res 1590 (24 March 2005) UN Doc 
S/RES/1590; UNSC Res 1641 (30 November 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1641. 
371 There are, of course, exceptions to this; for example, UNSC Res 169 (24 November 1961) UN Doc S/RES/169, 
¶6, relating to the Congo requested “the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures to prevent the entry or 
return of . . . foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisors not under the United Nations 
Command” based on a recollection of resolution 143 (1960) in which the original determination under Article 39 
was made. 
372 Orakhelashvili (n 53) 161. 
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closed interpretation of resolutions, where meeting records, statements, comments and other 
peripheral material to a resolution are not used to interpret the meaning of a resolution. Although 
this is generally in stark contrast to my methodology, which, along the lines of Sir Michael 
Wood’s views373 on the manner in which Council resolutions should be interpreted, considers a 
resolution as benefiting from related material not necessarily included in the text of a resolution, 
I am in agreement with his narrow scope of interpretation with respect to a determination of the 
threat to the peace. Orakhelashvili uses this closed definition to discuss jus ad bellum, 
specifically his view that “[t]he authorisation of the use of force by the Council cannot be 
presumed unless the Council’s explicit intention is expressed.”374 In principle this is true: in the 
military intervention in Libya, the phrase “all necessary measures” 375 was tantamount to a green 
light for NATO to mobilise; UNSC Res 1441 on Iraq376 featured no such terminology and  
accordingly, according to the serving Secretary-General, “from the charter point of view, it was 
illegal.”377 
Therefore, Orakhelashvili’s assertion that “whether or not the Vienna Convention 
formally applies to Security Council resolutions, or whether such application takes place by 
analogy, the textual principle is still the dominant principle in interpreting these treaties”378 is 
evidenced by Council practice itself and in the vast majority of cases, references have been made 
on each occasion where Article 39 determinations would be necessary, in addition to various 
Article 39 determinations that were not succeeded by explicit Chapter VII action. The following 
five illustrations clearly show that, while there has been a pattern in the behaviour of the Council 
on this point, there are at times various exceptions to the rule and the Council has not rigidly 
stuck to any specific routine, varying it slightly depending on the situations called for. 
 
V.2.1 Angola 
The case of Angola is perhaps the most straightforward of all; here, the Council made clear the 
reference to Article 39 in 1993 when first “[d]etermining that the . . . situation in Angola 
                                                 
373 Wood (n 36) 73-95. 
374 Orakhelashvili (n 53) 162. 
375 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973, ¶4. 
376 UNSC Res 1441 (8 November 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1441. 
377 ‘Iraq war illegal, says Annan’, BBC News (16 September 2004) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/ 
3661134.stm> accessed 16 December 2014. 
378 Orakhelashvili (n 53) 157 
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constitute[d] a threat to international peace and security in the region.”379 The subsequent 
resolutions that span the years till 2002380 all make reference to a threat to the peace that the 
Council has identified, thereby satisfying the criteria of Article 39. There is a clear pattern of 
reference to Article 39 determinations in every case where Chapter VII powers are invoked; this 
can be seen as the ideal standard to which the Council should adhere in all Chapter VII 
resolutions. 
 
V.2.2 Somalia 
Somalia first appeared on the agenda of the Security Council in 1992, when “the continuation of 
[conflict and loss of human life] constitute[d], as stated in the report of the Secretary-General, a 
threat to international peace and security”381 and a weapons and military embargo was imposed 
on Somalia under Chapter VII.382 In over two decades since, myriad Chapter VII resolutions 
have emanated from the Council on subjects ranging from internal conflict to regional disputes to 
piracy and armed robbery at sea – over 50 resolutions in total.383 With the exception of three 
                                                 
379 UNSC Res 864 (15 September 1993) UN Doc S/RES/864, B preamble. 
380 UNSC Res 1127 (29 August 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1127; UNSC Res 1173 (12 June 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1173; 
UNSC Res 1237 (7 May 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1237; UNSC Res 1295 (18 April 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1295; 
UNSC Res 1336 (23 January 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1336; UNSC Res 1348 (23 April 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1348; 
UNSC Res 1404 (18 April 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1404. 
381 UNSC Res 733 (23 January 1992) UN Doc S/RES/733, preamble. 
382 ibid ¶5. 
383 UNSC Res 751 (24 April 1992) UN Doc S/RES/751; UNSC Res 767 (24 July 1992) UN Doc S/RES/767; UNSC 
Res 775 (28 August 1992) UN Doc S/RES/775; UNSC Res 794 (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/RES/794; UNSC 
Res 814 (26 March 1993) UN Doc S/RES/814; UNSC Res 837 (6 June 1993) UN Doc S/RES/837; UNSC Res 886 
(18 November 1993) UN Doc S/RES/886; UNSC Res 897 (4 February 1994) UN Doc S/RES/897; UNSC Res 923 
(31 May 1994) UN Doc S/RES/923; UNSC Res 954 (4 November 1994) UN Doc S/RES/954; UNSC Res 1425 (22 
July 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1425; UNSC Res 1474 (8 April 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1474; UNSC Res 1519 (16 
December 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1519; UNSC Res 1558 (17 August 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1558; UNSC Res 1587 
(15 March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1587; UNSC Res 1630 (14 October 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1630; UNSC Res 1676 
(10 May 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1676; UNSC Res 1724 (29 November 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1724; UNSC Res 1725 
(6 December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1725; UNSC Res 1744 (20 February 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1744; UNSC Res 
1766 (23 July 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1766; UNSC Res 1772 (20 August 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1772; UNSC Res 
1801 (20 February 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1801; UNSC Res 1811 (29 April 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1811; UNSC Res 
1814 (15 May 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1814; UNSC Res 1816 (2 June 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1816; UNSC Res 1831 
(19 August 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1831; UNSC Res 1838 (7 October 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1838; UNSC Res 1844 
(20 November 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1844; UNSC Res 1846 (2 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846; UNSC Res 
1851 (16 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1851; UNSC Res 1853 (19 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1853; 
UNSC Res 1863 (16 January 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1863; UNSC Res 1872 (26 May 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1872 
(2009); UNSC Res 1897 (30 November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1897; UNSC Res 1910 (28 January 2010) UN Doc 
S/RES/1910; UNSC Res 1916 (19 March 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1916; UNSC Res 1950 (23 November 2010) UN 
Doc S/RES/1950; UNSC Res 1964 (22 December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1964; UNSC Res 1972 (17 March 2011) 
UN Doc S/RES/1972; UNSC Res 1976 (11 April 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1976; UNSC Res 2002 (29 July 2011) UN 
Doc S/RES/2002; UNSC Res 2015 (24 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2015; UNSC Res 2020 (22 November 2011) 
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resolutions, each a decade apart that refer to determinations made previously,384 all Chapter VII 
resolutions – and even resolutions in relation to Somalia not issued under Chapter VII385 – have 
reiterated explicit determinations under Article 39. However, determinations have not been 
forthcoming in every instance – there is slight deviation from the formula of an Article 39 
determination leading to Chapter VII action in the case of Somalia. 
 
V.2.3 Haiti  
The first Chapter VII resolution to deal with Haiti came about in 1993, when a trade embargo 
was imposed by the Council following a determination of threat to the peace and subsequent 
explicit reference to the use of its Chapter VII powers.386 Although Chapter VII resolutions 
dealing with the situation in Haiti are not as numerous as those dealing with Somalia, they are 
nevertheless equally consistent. Almost all of the Chapter VII resolutions that deal with the 
existence of a threat to peace and security in Haiti have explicit determinations made.387 UNSC 
Res 861 (1993), however, makes no mention of a determination of a threat when referring to the 
lifting of elements of the trade embargo; nonetheless, it serves to illustrate a different type of 
Chapter VII resolution that the Council makes use of.  
                                                                                                                                                             
UN Doc S/RES/2020; UNSC Res 2036 (22 February 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2036; UNSC Res 2060 (25 July 2012) 
UN Doc S/RES/2060; UNSC Res 2072 (31 October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2072; UNSC Res 2073 (7 November 
2012) UN Doc S/RES/2073; UNSC Res 2077 (21 November 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2077; UNSC Res 2093 (6 
March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2093; UNSC Res 2111 (24 July 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2111; UNSC Res 2125 (18 
November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2125. 
384 UNSC Res 878 (29 October 1993) UN Doc S/RES/878 reaffirms “resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 
746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 
1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993, 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993 and 865 (1993) of 
22 September 1993”; S/RES/1356 (2001) “reaffirmed resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and 751 (1992) of 
24 April 1992”; UNSC Res 1407 (3 May 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1407 recalled the Council’s “relevant resolutions 
concerning the situation in Somalia, in particular resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992”; UNSC Res 2111 (24 
July 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2111 recalls the Council’s “previous resolutions on the situation in Somalia, in particular 
resolutions 2036 (2012), 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013), and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia”.  
385 eg UNSC Res 1976 (11 April 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1976; UNSC Res 2102 (2 May 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2102. 
386 UNSC Res 841 (16 June 1993) UN Doc S/RES/841. 
387 UNSC Res 873 (13 October 1993) UN Doc S/RES/873; UNSC Res 875 (16 October 1993) UN Doc S/RES/875; 
UNSC Res 917 (6 May 1994) UN Doc S/RES/917; UNSC Res 940 (31 July 1994) UN Doc S/RES/940; UNSC Res 
1529 (29 February 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1529; UNSC Res 1542 (30 April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1542; UNSC Res 
1576 (29 November 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1576; UNSC Res 1601 (31 May 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1601; UNSC Res 
1608 (22 June 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1608; UNSC Res 1658 (14 February 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1658; UNSC Res 
1702 (15 August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1702; UNSC Res 1743 (15 February 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1743; UNSC 
Res 1780 (15 October 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1780; UNSC Res 1840 (14 October 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1840; 
UNSC Res 1892 (13 October 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1892. 
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As the General Assembly affirmed in UNGA Res 192,388 Chapter VII resolutions “can be 
revoked only by a decision of the Council and that any unilateral action in this regard would be 
in violation of the obligation assumed by Member States under Article 25 of the Charter.”389 In 
short, this principle of “parallelism of competence”390 dictates that the Council, as the body to 
have imposed Chapter VII measures, shall also be the body to terminate those measures as and 
when it sees fit. Accordingly, a determination of a threat to the peace under Article 39 would not 
be necessary – and even run contrary to the meaning of a parallelism of competence resolution – 
as the lack of the threat that instigated the Chapter VII measures originally would be the very 
source of the decision to annul those measures in a parallelism of competence resolution; thus, 
resolutions such as UNSC Res 861 (1993) can legitimately exist as rule of law compliant 
Chapter VII resolutions without the need for prior Article 39 determinations.391 However, this 
exemption from the norm is a narrow path that accommodates only the most limited of 
examples; indeed even extensions of a Mission’s mandate require a fresh determination of the 
threat posed, as evidenced by those of MINUSTAH392 in 2010393 and 2011.394 
Until 2012, the sole exceptions to an otherwise consistent application of an Article 39 
determination prior to Chapter VII action are Resolutions 1908395 and 1927,396both increasing 
the number of troops deployed under MINUSTAH. It may be argued that these required a 
determination of their own, as the need for an increase in troops within the context of the 
perceived threat to peace should have been shown as justification for any increase in troop 
numbers. However, each of these resolutions, just as can be observed with Resolutions 878, 1356 
and 1407 dealing with Somalia, contains a reaffirmation of previous resolutions in which 
determinations have been made.  
                                                 
388 UNGA Res 34/192 (18 December 1979) UN Doc A/RES/34/192. 
389 ibid ¶9; this issue was put to rest by the Assembly in response to the unilateral decision of the UK in its letter of 
12 December 1979 (UN Doc S/13688) to end mandatory sanctions on Southern Rhodesia imposed by the Council in 
UNSC Res 232 (16 December 1966) UN Doc S/RES/232 and UNSC Res 253 (29 May 1968) UN Doc S/RES/253. 
390 de Wet (n 34) 251. 
391 See also UNSC Res 944 (29 September 1994) UN Doc S/RES/944, which terminates measures set out in 
resolutions UNSC Res 841 (1993), UN SC Res 873 (1993) and UNSC Res 917 (1994) in ¶4. This, too, is a 
“parallelism of competence” resolution. 
392 United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. 
393 UNSC Res 1944 (14 October 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1944, preamble. 
394 UNSC Res 2012 (14 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2012. 
395 UNSC Res 1908 (19 January 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1908. 
396 UNSC Res 1927 (4 June 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1927. 
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The same concept applies to both Resolutions 2070397and 2119,398 each extending the 
mandate of MINUSTAH. However, the use of the format of reaffirmation in lieu of new 
determinations is a departure for the Council from its own behaviour and may suggest the start of 
a new trend; whereas extensions of the mandate in previous years had seen an explicit 
determination under Article 39,399 resolutions 2070 and 2119 saw only the far weaker reference, 
“Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security 
under the Charter of the United Nations”.400 There was no fresh determination, no reference to a 
threat and no reassessment of the determination as there had been in previous years, leading to 
the question as to what the reasoning behind and purpose of this shift in the Council’s behaviour 
from existing practice. The case of Haiti, then, exemplifies an even larger departure from the 
standard seen in the case of Angola. 
 
V.2.4 Afghanistan 
The Council’s issuance of resolutions dealing with the threat to the peace in Afghanistan is not 
only another example where the Council has repeatedly made determinations under article 39 
before invoking Chapter VII,401 but where the use of parallelism of competence is highlighted. 
UNSC Res 1388 in 2002, where sanctions imposed under Chapter VII against Ariana Afghan 
Airlines were lifted402 using a mirror Chapter VII resolution is a minor example of this, but it is 
Council practice during recent years, where resolutions on Afghanistan have become less 
frequent, that Council behaviour exemplifies the need for and use of parallelism of competence. 
                                                 
397 UNSC Res 2070 (12 October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2070. 
398 UNSC Res 2119 (10 October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2119. 
399 “Determining that the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the 
region, despite the progress achieved thus far”, UNSC Res 1944 (14 October 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1944, preamble 
and UNSC Res 2012 (14 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2012, preamble [emphasis in original]. 
400 UNSC Res 2070 (12 October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2070, preamble. 
401 UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267; UNSC Res 1333 (19 December 2000) UN Doc 
S/RES/1333; UNSC Res 1363 (30 July 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1363; UNSC Res 1386 (20 December 2001) UN Doc 
S/RES/1386; UNSC Res 1390 (16 January 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1390; UNSC Res 1413 (23 May 2002) UN Doc 
S/RES/1413; UNSC Res 1444 (27 December 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1444; UNSC Res 1510 (13 October 2003) UN 
Doc S/RES/1510; UNSC Res 1563 (17 September 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1563; UNSC Res 1623 (13 September 
2005) UN Doc S/RES/1623; UNSC Res 1707 (12 September 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1707; UNSC Res 1776 (19 
September 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1776; UNSC Res 1833 (22 September 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1833; UNSC Res 
1890 (8 October 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1890. 
402 UNSC Res 1388 (15 January 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1388. 
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Since 2009 the Council has adopted the habit of issuing two resolutions per year on 
Afghanistan – one under Chapter VII renewing the mandate of the ISAF403 and another, not 
taken under Chapter VII, renewing the mandate of UNAMA.404 This reflects the origins, and 
indeed the nature, of each of the projects.405 Whilst the latter’s establishment was supported by 
UNSC Res 1401 (2002), which was not issued under Chapter VII, ISAF was unequivocally, and 
necessarily, formalised through a Chapter VII resolution. It therefore follows that UNAMA 
mandate renewals are not taken under Chapter VII, 406 whereas ISAF mandates must always be 
renewed under Chapter VII,407 with an eye to the threat to the peace that exists, despite the fact 
that both UNAMA and ISAF are dealing with the same threats in the same country.  
 
V.2.5 Sudan 
The majority of Council resolutions dealing with the Sudan, including the conflict in Darfur, 
comply with the bi-part formula of a standard Chapter VII resolution – both the determination 
and explicit reference to Chapter VII exist.408 As in previous examples, there are examples where 
                                                 
403 International Security Assistance Force. 
404 United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan. 
405 Whilst UNAMA is a political mission proposed in to “fulfil the tasks and responsibilities, including those related 
to human rights, the rule of law and gender issues, entrusted to the United Nations in the Bonn Agreement,” (Report 
of the Secretary-General, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’ 
(2002) UN Doc A/56/875, ¶97(a)), the ISAF was mandated to assist “the Afghan Interim Authority in the 
maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas” (UNSC Res 1386 (20 December 2001) UN Doc 
S/RES/1386, ¶3) in which participating Member States were authorized “to take all necessary measures to fulfil its 
mandate” (UNSC Res 1386 (20 December 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1386, ¶3). 
406 See eg UNSC Res 1868 (23 March 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1868; UNSC Res 1917 (22 March 2010) UN Doc 
S/RES/1917; UNSC Res 1974 (22 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1974; UNSC Res 2041 (22 March 2012) UN Doc 
S/RES/2041; UNSC Res 2096 (19 March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2096. 
407 See eg UNSC Res 1943 (13 October 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1943; UNSC Res 2011 (12 October 2011) UN Doc 
S/RES/2011; UNSC Res 2069 (9 October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2069; UNSC Res 2120 (10 October 2013) UN Doc 
S/RES/2120. 
408 UNSC Res 1054 (26 April 1996) UN Doc S/RES/1054; UNSC Res 1070 (16 August 1996) UN Doc 
S/RES/1070; UNSC Res 1556 (30 July 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1556; UNSC Res 1564 (18 September 2004) UN Doc 
S/RES/1564; UNSC Res 1590 (24 March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1590; UNSC Res 1591 (29 March 2005) UN Doc 
S/RES/1591; UNSC Res 1593 (7 April 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1593; UNSC Res 1627 (23 September 2005) UN Doc 
S/RES/1627; UNSC Res 1651 (21 December 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1651; UNSC Res 1663 (24 March 2006) UN 
Doc S/RES/1663; UNSC Res 1665 (29 March 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1665; UNSC Res 1672 (25 April 2006) UN 
Doc S/RES/1672; UNSC Res 1679 (16 May 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1679; UNSC Res 1706 (31 August 2006) UN 
Doc S/RES/1706; UNSC Res 1709 (22 September 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1709; UNSC Res 1713 (29 September 
2006) UN Doc S/RES/1713; UNSC Res 1714 (6 October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1714; UNSC Res 1755 (30 April 
2007) UN Doc S/RES/1755; UNSC Res 1769 (31 July 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1769; UNSC Res 1779 (28 September 
2007) UN Doc S/RES/1779; UNSC Res 1784 (31 October 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1784; UNSC Res 1841 (15 
October 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1841; UNSC Res 1891 (13 October 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1891; UNSC Res 1945 
(14 October 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1945; UNSC Res 1982 (17 May 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1982; UNSC Res 1996 (8 
July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1996; UNSC Res 2035 (17 February 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2035; UNSC Res 2046 (2 
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Article 39 determinations are made without subsequent Chapter VII invocation409 and where the 
parallelism of competence doctrine lies behind instances in which Chapter VII is legitimately 
invoked without prior determination of the threat to the peace.410 
However, there are examples where this is not the case, in contrast to the examples of 
Haiti and Afghanistan. The establishment of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei 
(UNIFSA), for example, emerged from a resolution taken under Chapter VII;411 therefore, any 
resulting extension of the duration or scope of the mandate should, by virtue of the principle of 
parallelism of competence, also be issued under Chapter VII. Such was not the case; whilst each 
of the subsequent resolutions to UNSC Res 1990 included a determination of the threat to the 
peace,  in accordance with Article 39,412 there was no reference to Chapter VII. This raises the 
question as to why the Council felt it necessary to deal with the mandate of UNISFA in a way 
different to MINUSTAH, as already discussed above, and other peacekeeping missions such as 
UNMIL413 and UNOCI.414 
                                                                                                                                                             
May 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2046; UNSC Res 2063 (31 July 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2063; UNSC Res 2109 (11 July 
2013) UN Doc S/RES/2109. 
409 UNSC Res 1812 (30 April 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1812; UNSC Res 1828 (31 July 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1828; 
UNSC Res 1870 (30 April 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1870; UNSC Res 1881 (30 July 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1881; 
UNSC Res 1891 (13 October 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1891; UNSC Res 1935 (30 July 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1935; 
UNSC Res 1978 (27 April 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1978; UNSC Res 1997 (11 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1997; 
UNSC Res 2003 (29 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2003; UNSC Res 2024 (14 December 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2024; 
UNSC Res 2032 (22 December 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2032; UNSC Res 2047 (17 May 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2047; 
UNSC Res 2057 (5 July 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2057; UNSC Res 2063 (31 July 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2063; UNSC 
Res 2113 (30 July 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2113; UNSC Res 2126 (25 November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2126. 
410 UNSC Res 1372 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1372, which terminated elements of Chapter VII 
resolutions UNSC Res 1054 (1996) and UNSC Res 1070 (1996). 
411 UNSC Res 1990 (27 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1990. 
412 UNSC Res 2024 (14 December 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2024; UNSC Res 2032 (22 December 2011) UN Doc 
S/RES/2032; UNSC Res 2047 (17 May 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2047; UNSC Res 2075 (16 November 2012) UN Doc 
S/RES/2075; UNSC Res 2104 (29 May 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2104; UNSC Res 2126 (25 November 2013) UN Doc 
S/RES/2126, UNSC Res 2156 (29 May 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2156; UNSC Res 2179 (14 October 2014) UN Doc 
S/RES/2179. 
413 Established under Chapter VII by UNSC Res 1509 (19 September 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1509 and renewed 
under Chapter VII in UNSC Res 1626 (19 September 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1626, UNSC Res 1667 (31 March 
2006) UN Doc S/RES/1667, UNSC Res 1712 (29 September 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1712, UNSC Res 1750 (30 
March 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1750, UNSC Res 1777 (28 September 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1777, UNSC Res 1836 
(29 September 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1836, UNSC Res 1885 (15 September 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1885, UNSC 
Res 1938 (15 September 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1938, UNSC Res 2008 (16 September 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2008, 
UNSC Res 2066 (17 September 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2066, UNSC Res 2116 (18 September 2013) UN Doc 
S/RES/2116, UNSC Res 2176 (15 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2176. Interestingly, the very first renewal of the 
mandate – S/RES/1561 (2004) – was not conducted under Chapter VII. Apart from this resolution, however, all 
renewal resolutions contained new determinations of a threat to the peace. 
414 Established under Chapter VII by UNSC Res 1528 (27 February 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1528 and renewed under 
Chapter VII in the following: UNSC Res 1609 (24 June 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1609; UNSC Res 1652 (24 January 
2006) UN Doc S/RES/1652; UNSC Res 1726 (15 December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1726; UNSC Res 1739 (10 
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V.2.6 Patterns in Council practice  
Thus it seems that there exists, in the majority of cases, a determination of threats to the peace 
prior to, and even in the absence of subsequent, Chapter VII action, particularly in recent years 
where the practice of the Council appears to have incorporated elements of transparency in 
ensuring that all States are clearly aware of the obligations of and procedural path to Chapter 
VII. Even in the case of Iraq – where among the plethora of Chapter VII resolutions on Iraq 
passed between the years 1990 and 2003415 only four determinations were made under Article 
39416 – the last decade has seen a significant improvement in the number of determinations in 
Chapter VII resolutions relating to Iraqi affairs.417 This is, though, one half of the formula for 
Chapter VII action, the other being the explicit reference to measures being taken under Chapter 
VII itself, which will now be addressed. 
 
V.3 Explicit reference to Chapter VII 
In addition to the discussions of Chapter II on what constitutes a threat to the peace, there is also 
disagreement on whether certain resolutions can be classed as constituting a Chapter VII 
resolution at all. In The Procedure of the UN Security Council, Bailey and Daws present a list of 
                                                                                                                                                             
January 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1739; UNSC Res 1763 (29 June 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1763; UNSC Res 1765 (16 
July 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1765; UNSC Res 1826 (29 July 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1826; UNSC Res 1880 (30 July 
2009) UN Doc S/RES/1880; UNSC Res 1911 (28 January 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1911; UNSC Res 1924 (27 May 
2010) UN Doc S/RES/1924; UNSC Res 1933 (30 June 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1933; UNSC Res 1962 (20 December 
2010) UN Doc S/RES/1962; UNSC Res 1981 (13 May 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1981; UNSC Res 2000 (27 July 2011) 
UN Doc S/RES/2000; UNSC Res 2062 (26 July 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2062; UNSC Res 2112 (30 July 2013) UN 
Doc S/RES/2112; UNSC Res 2162 (25 June 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2162. With the exception of UNSC Res 1981 
(2011) all these resolutions contained new determinations of a threat to the peace. 
415 Fifty-nine resolutions in total by this author’s count. 
416 UNSC Res 660 (2 August 1990) UN Doc S/RES/660; UNSC Res 687 (3 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/687; UNSC 
Res 688 (5 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/688; UNSC Res 1137 (12 November 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1137. It is also 
noteworthy that between 1997 and the invasion of Iraq by multi-national forces in 2003, there was no determination 
of a threat under Article 39. 
417 UNSC Res 1483 (22 May 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1483, UNSC Res 1511 (16 October 2003) UN Doc 
S/RES/1511, UNSC Res 1518 (24 November 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1518, UNSC Res 1546 (8 June 2004) UN Doc 
S/RES/1546, UNSC Res 1637 (8 November 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1637, UNSC Res 1723 (28 November 2006) UN 
Doc S/RES/1723, and UNSC Res 1790 (18 December 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1790 are Chapter VII resolutions that 
have clear, express determinations of a threat to the peace under Article 39; UNSC Res 1472 (28 March 2003) UN 
Doc S/RES/1472, UNSC Res 1476 (24 April 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1476, UNSC Res 1490 (3 July 2003) UN Doc 
S/RES/1490, and UNSC Res 1762 (27 June 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1762 are Chapter VII resolutions that do not 
make mention of any determination. UNSC Res 1859 (22 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1859, UNSC Res 1905 
(21 December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1905, UNSC Res 1956 (15 December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1956, UNSC Res 
1957 (15 December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1957, UNSC Res 1958 (15 December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1958 are 
also Chapter VII resolutions that do not make mention of a determination of threat to the peace; however, they are 
example of “parallelism of competence”, i.e. necessarily issued under Chapter VII to revoke a previous Chapter VII 
decision, such as the Oil for Food programme. 
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129 Chapter VII resolutions from 1946 through 1995418; however, the Global Issues Research 
Group of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office counts 17 Chapter VII resolutions between the 
years of 1946-1989 and 104 Chapter VII resolutions between 1990-1995 – a total of 121 and, 
perhaps surprisingly, 8 less than Bailey and Daws.419  
This cannot simply be attributed to mathematical error, but reflects two key elements of 
Chapter VII resolutions. Firstly, it exposes the fluid interpretations of Council resolutions, which 
are open to different perspectives depending on the reader; such space for intellectual 
manoeuvring may be appropriate for political and diplomatic situations that encourage a broad 
interpretation allowing for later negotiation or clarification. One might imagine equivocal 
language, inconclusive clauses and abstract notions in the manifestos of a political party or 
pledges of a political candidate that are later spun to reveal an element of hollowness; however, 
such obscurity has no place in the legal sphere that is frequently criticised for overemphasis and 
intricate attention to the most miniscule of legal intricacies and avoidance of loopholes. 
Secondly, it displays a certain failure on the part of the Council itself to abide by the specificity 
demanded of it by the Charter.  
Nonetheless, it would appear that the Council has increasingly shifted its behaviour from 
one of opacity in its resolutions to one of increased clarity and specificity. Whether in response 
to the criticism of States such as South Africa, which in 2007, accused the Security Council of 
having “resorted to Chapter VII of the Charter as an umbrella for addressing issues that may not 
necessarily pose a threat to international peace and security, when it could have opted for 
alternative provisions of the Charter to respond more appropriately, utilizing other provisions of 
the same Charter”420 or due to an increased awareness of the need to implement elements of the 
rule of law in its behaviour to increase legitimacy on the world stage, there has been a marked 
shift in the depth of explanatory provisions of resolutions. 
In recent times, authorising resolutions have often included three elements: a 
determination in accordance with article 39; the statement “acting under Chapter VII;” and an 
explicit decision to authorise member states to use force. Such was the case with authorisations 
                                                 
418 Sidney Bailey and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council (OUP 1998) 271. 
419 Global Issues Research Group, ‘Research Analysts Memorandum: Summary of UN Security Council 
Resolutions, 1946-1998’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1999). 
420 UNSC Verbatim Record (8 January 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5615. 
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regarding Iraq,421 Bosnia,422 Somalia,423 Haiti,424 Rwanda,425 the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo,426 Albania,427 Central African Republic,428 Sierra Leone,429 Kosovo,430 Timor-Leste,431 
Afghanistan,432 Côte d’Ivoire,433 Liberia434 and Chad.435 However, such has not always been, nor 
does it continue to be, the case; historically, Simma notes, there has not been a tendency to 
explicitly refer to action taken under Chapter VII using an unequivocal phrase in the vein of 
“‘acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”436 until the end of the Cold 
War.437  
Although in the teething years of the Security Council explicit reference to “Chapter VII” 
was not made,438 there were nonetheless  numerous references to the relevant articles of Chapter 
                                                 
421 UNSC Res 678 (29 November 1990) UN Doc S/RES/678; UNSC Res 1483 (22 May 2003) UN Doc 
S/RES/1483; UNSC Res 1511 (16 October 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1511. 
422 UNSC Res 770 (13 August 1992) UN Doc S/RES/770; UNSC Res 787 (16 November 1992) UN Doc 
S/RES/787; UNSC Res 816 (31 March 1993) UN Doc S/RES/816; UNSC Res 820 (17 April 1993) UN Doc 
S/RES/820; UNSC Res 836 (4 June 1993) UN Doc S/RES/836; UNSC Res 908 (31 March 1994) UN Doc 
S/RES/908; UNSC Res 1031 (15 December 1995) UN Doc S/RES/1031; UNSC Res 1088 (12 December 1996) UN 
Doc S/RES/1088; UNSC Res 1174 (15 June 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1174; UNSC Res 1575 (22 November 2004) UN 
Doc S/RES/1575. 
423 UNSC Res 794 (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/RES/794; UNSC Res 1744 (21 February 2007) UN Doc 
S/RES/1744. 
424 UNSC Res 875 (16 October 1993) UN Doc S/RES/875; UNSC Res 940 (31 July 1994) UN Doc S/RES/940; 
UNSC Res 1529 (29 February 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1529. 
425 UNSC Res 929 (22 June 1994) UN Doc S/RES/929. 
426 UNSC Res 1080 (15 November 1996) UN Doc S/RES/1080; UNSC Res 1484 (30 May 2003) UN Doc 
S/RES/1484; UNSC Res 1671 (25 April 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1671. 
427 UNSC Res 1101 (28 March 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1101; UNSC Res 1114 (19 June 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1114. 
428 UNSC Res 1125 (6 August 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1125. 
429 UNSC Res 1132 (8 October 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1132. 
430 UNSC Res 1244 (10 June 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1244. 
431 UNSC Res 1264 (15 September 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1264. 
432 UNSC Res 1386 (20 December 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1386; UNSC Res 1510 (13 October 2003) UN Doc 
S/RES/1510. 
433 UNSC Res 1464 (4 February 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1464; UNSC Res 1528 (27 February 2004) UN Doc 
S/RES/1528. 
434 UNSC Res 1497 (1 August 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1497. 
435 UNSC Res 1778 (25 September 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1778. 
436 See eg UNSC Res 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/RES/955 on Rwanda; UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999) 
UN Doc S/RES/1267 on Afghanistan; UNSC Res 1037 (15 January 1996) UN Doc S/RES/1037 on Croatia; UNSC 
Res 1967 (19 January 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1967 on the Cote D’Ivoire; UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc 
S/RES/1973 on Libya. All of these contained this explicit phrase. 
437 Simma and others (n 363) 584: “[w]hile in the early practice of the SC it was more often than not preferred not to 
render the distinction visible, the SC now has taken to making clear what part of a resolution is founded on Chapter 
VII and therefore is endowed with binding force.” 
438 See eg UNSC Verbatim Record (22 August 1947) UN Doc S/PV.138, 2175, where UNSC Res 27 (1947) on the 
Indonesian question made reference to provisional measures in the same line as article 40 without explicit reference 
to Chapter VII; in UNSC Verbatim Record (14 May 1970) UN Doc S/PV.1538, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 
May1970) UN Doc S/PV.1540(OR), and UNSC Verbatim Record (15 May 1970) UN Doc S/PV.1541 the same was 
believed of resolution 279 (1970) on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. 
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VII or the explicit threat to the peace that was being dealt with, if only to give some audit trail of 
the process by which the Council has reached its conclusion: UNSC Res 54 (1948) "[d]etermines 
that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of 
the Charter . . . [and] Orders the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 . 
. . to desist from further military action . . ."439 Indeed, the UN approval for military intervention 
in the Korean War of 1950 came about in UNSC Res 83 (1950), which simply "determined that 
the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitute[d] and 
breach of the peace"440 and where no explicit mention of the term "Chapter VII" or Article 42 of 
the Charter was made despite it being implied in the language.  However, evolution in the UN 
did not come only in the form of new Member States, but also in the terminology used to 
authorise Council action and in 1968, UNSC Res 253 made the first use of the phrase “acting 
under Chapter VII.” 441 Since this time, the use of the phrase to designate Chapter VII resolutions 
has been commonplace and yet there are numerous examples of the Council not providing clear 
Chapter VII status to a resolution that clearly should have been granted such. 
The fact that certain resolutions442 are open to interpretation is an indictment of the 
process by which such decisions emanate from the Council chamber. The simple fact appears to 
be that resolutions should and must be specific and focused, announcing not only what the threat 
is but also whether the resolution has been issued under Chapter VII, and if so whether under 
article 41 or 42 of the Charter. The negligence of the Council in doing so for all resolutions 
results in ambiguity for UN Member States which, as seen in Chapter IV forage for information 
and pore over the records of Council meetings.  UN Member States are able to rely far more 
solidly on a binding, clear Chapter VII resolution when fulfilling their obligations to abide by 
Council decisions and the more structured and limited the leeway given in any resolution, the 
more difficult they might find it to undermine or simply deny its implementation.443 Resolutions 
                                                 
439 UNSC Res 54 (15 July 1948) UN Doc S/RES/54, ¶1-2. 
440 UNSC Res 83 (27 June 1950) UN Doc S/RES/83; see also UNSC Res 84 (7 July 1950) UN Doc S/RES/84. 
441 UNSC Res 253 (29 May 1968) UN Doc S/RES/253, preamble. 
442 As far back as 1947, the US argued that UNSC Res (1947) was tantamount to provisional measures under Article 
40 of the Charter. See, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 August 1947) UN Doc S/PV.138, 2175; see also, more recently 
in 1970, the interpretations of Syria (UNSC Verbatim Record (12 May 1970) UN Doc S/PV.1538, ¶120-121), 
Poland (UNSC Verbatim Record (14 May1970) UN Doc S/PV.1540(OR), ¶13) and Colombia (UNSC Verbatim 
Record (15 May 1970) UN Doc S/PV.1541, ¶8), where provisional measures were deemed to have been taken in 
UNSC Res 280 (1970) despite the absence of specific wording reflecting it. 
443 See, eg Thomas M Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Clarendon 1995) 1-46, where “Franck 
argues that states comply with legal rules they perceive to be fair both in substance (by providing distributive 
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that are not explicitly binding may not be held as such by States; as Judge Hersch Lauterpacht 
has noted, “[a] resolution recommending… a specific course of action creates some legal 
obligation which . . . The state in consideration, while not bound to accept the recommendation, 
is bound to give it due consideration in good faith.”444 An explicit Chapter VII leaves no room 
for interpretation and would affirm the need for abidance.  
Nonetheless, the Security Council has recently continued to blur the lines between 
resolutions adopted under Chapter VII and those not: 
Acting under its special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security . . . Demand[ed] that the DPRK suspend all activities related to its 
ballistic missile programme, and . . . Require[d] all Member States . . . to exercise 
vigilance and prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and 
technology being transferred to DPRK’s missile or WMD programmes . . . and 
prevent the procurement of missiles or missile related-items, materials, goods and 
technology from the DPRK, and the transfer of any financial resources in relation 
to DPRK’s missile or WMD programmes.445 
This is clearly the terminology of a Chapter VII resolution: the threat to the peace is implied in 
the affirmation that the North Korean ballistic missile launches “jeopardize peace, stability and 
security in the region and beyond, particularly in light of the DPRK’s claim that it has developed 
nuclear weapons”446; the Council has imposed demands on North Korea; and it has placed 
requirements to abide by this resolution upon other Member States. Indeed, the meeting records 
show that the representative from Japan saw the resolution to include “a set of binding measures 
that both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Member States are obliged to comply 
with.”447 
Other examples, too, illustrate the blurred lines between legally binding and non-legally 
binding resolutions throughout the history of the Security Council. Some commentators have 
noted that “when the Security Council invoked Articles 25 and 49 in calling on states to carry out 
its decisions during the Congo peacekeeping efforts in 1960, it obviously regarded itself as 
                                                                                                                                                             
justice) and in process due (by providing right process), David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Helene Lambert, 
International Law and International Relations, 113-114 (2012). 
444 South-West Africa – Voting Procedure (Advisory Opinion) [1955] ICJ Rep 67 (Separate Opinion of Judge 
Lauterpacht) 118-9. 
445 UNSC Res 1695 (15 July 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1695, preamble [emphasis in original]. 
446 ibid; UNSC Presidential Statement 41 (2006) UN Doc S/PRST/2006/41, 1, where “ The Security Council stresses 
that a nuclear test, if carried out by the DPRK, would represent a clear threat to international peace and security.”  
447 UNSC Verbatim Record (15 July 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5490, 2. 
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acting under chapter VII despite having made no express determination under Article 39.”448 
Decades later, the Council issued another resolution on the Congo that “Determin[ed] that the 
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to pose a threat to international 
peace and security in the region” and where the Council made “[d]emands once again that 
Kisangani be demilitarized rapidly and unconditionally in accordance with Security Council 
resolution 1304 (2000) . . .”449 Once again, no reference to Chapter VII is made. 
One very recent case where the Security Council has made use of Chapter VII language 
without explicit reference to Chapter VII itself is UNSC Res 2218, in response to chemical 
attacks carried out by Syrian armed forces against its own citizens and civilians. The resolution, 
“[d]etermines that the use of chemical weapons anywhere constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security”450 and imposes obligations on the Syrian Arab Republic when it “[d]ecides 
that the Syrian Arab Republic shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or 
retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to other States or 
non-State actors.”451 Bar explicitly stating that the resolution is being taken under Chapter VII, 
this is the terminology of a Chapter VII resolution.  
The ambiguity, however, lies most acutely in two distinct elements of this resolution. The 
first of these elements is the threat of a further resolution under Chapter VII that would follow 
Syria’s refusal or failure to implement the articles of UNSC Res 2218; the Council “[d]ecides, in 
the event of non-compliance with this resolution to impose measures under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter”452, thereby introducing a clear distinction between this resolution and a 
Chapter VII resolution, which would contain actions taken under Articles 41 or 42 of the 
Charter. The inference is that if a Chapter VII resolution is to follow, then this cannot be a 
Chapter VII resolution and, therefore, lacks the gravity associated with the provisions of articles 
41 and 42 of the Charter. The second confusing element is the decision by the Council – given 
the terminology of a Chapter VII resolution as discussed – to “underscore that Member States are 
obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the 
                                                 
448 Kirgis (n 58) 512; see also, E M Miller, ‘Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo’ (1961) 55 
AJIL 1, 4. 
449 UNSC Res 1376 (9 November 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1376, preamble [emphasis in original]. 
450 UNSC Res 2118 (27 September 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2118, ¶1. 
451 ibid ¶4. 
452 ibid ¶21. 
100 
 
Council's decisions.”453 This element clearly attempts to impose a legally binding obligation 
upon States – particularly Syria itself and its neighbours – to comply with the decisions of the 
Security Council on a par with a Chapter VII resolution. Indeed, one must question the reason for 
the insertion of this phrase; if a legally binding resolution is what the Council sought, surely a 
Chapter VII resolution would have offered this more easily. 
It has been suggested that "[t]his lack of formal clarity is sometimes a result of the 
political environment in which resolutions are negotiated. Pressures to include ambiguities or 
omit explicit references to Chapter VII in Council resolutions are sometimes accommodated in 
order to secure political agreement."454 John Bellinger suggests that the substitution of Article 25 
for Chapter VII reveals the compromise that was necessary in reaching the unanimous approval 
of the resolution without diluting the legal basis attached to the Council’s decisions.455 As a 
political organ, it is understandable that the Council must balance the end with the means, 
particularly given, as some might argue, that “the Security Council’s role under the Charter is to 
further international peace and security and not the rule of law.”456 In this vein, certain 
resolutions that all but mention Chapter VII – that is to say, include explicit reference to a threat 
to the peace and demand action of some sort – are not issued under Chapter VII, despite the fact 
that they are clearly intended to relay the same gravity and legal standing.457 Other resolutions 
act under Chapter VII without first determining the precise threat to the peace, therein bypassing 
the “portal” of Article 39 through which the Council must access its powers under article 41 and 
42.458  
                                                 
453 ibid preamble. 
454 Security Council Report, ‘Security Council Action under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities’ (23 June 2008), 5 
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Research% 
20Report%20Chapter%20VII%2023%20June%2008.pdf> accessed 16 December 2014. 
455 John Bellinger, ‘The Security Council Resolution on Syria: Is it Legally Binding?’ (Lawfare Blog, 28 September 
2013) <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/09/the-security-council-resolution-on-syria-is-it-legally-binding> 
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which were likely resisted by Russia and China.” 
456 Lowe (n 17) 36. 
457 See, eg UNSC Res 1376 (9 November 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1376 on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC).  
458 See eg UNSC Res 1737 (27 December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1737 on Iranian nuclear proliferation, where the 
Council was “[a]cting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations” without prior mention 
of article 39 or a specific threat to the peace [emphasis in original]. 
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In sum, it is clear that terminology of a Chapter VII resolution is being used in non-
Chapter VII resolutions, specifically perhaps for the purposes of ensuring agreement amongst the 
Council members. Whilst this may serve the political motive adequately, it leaves a great deal to 
be desired in terms of equality and legal certainty and clarity. A Chapter VII resolution indicates 
the gravity of a particular situation and to fail to adopt a Chapter VII resolution in such 
circumstances can be argued to both reduce the implied seriousness of the conflict and set the 
tone for other States to follow in their dealings and attitude to Syria. 
 
V.4 A clear legal basis 
Aside from the existence of phrases referring to the procedural requirements of Article 39 and 
the mention of Chapter VII, Legal Certainty requires that there be a legitimate, legally sound 
basis for the invocation of Chapter VII powers. There is a necessity for the Council to explain 
what exactly about the situation poses a threat to the international peace. Although the Council 
has been commendably forthcoming in attempting to increase the clarity and transparency of its 
decision-making with respect to explicitly stating when it is acting under Chapter VII through the 
determination of a threat to the peace, the decisions relating to what exactly such a threat is have 
been far less comprehensible, predictable, consistent and legally reasoned. Whilst equality and 
predictability will be expanded upon in Chapters VI and VII of this thesis, it is important to 
highlight some examples where there has been opacity in the process of determining a threat to 
the international peace. 
There are numerous examples of instances where the Council has not expressly stated the 
nature of the threat that it conceived existed and where the threats themselves, even where 
explicitly stated, are tenuous. UNSC Res 733,459 imposing an arms embargo on Somalia under 
Chapter VII in 1992 reiterated the same concerns that the Secretary General had voiced 
previously in his report, which itself is cited only generally and without specificity; the 
resolution itself makes a generic reference to Chapter VII being necessary “for the purposes of 
establishing peace and stability in Somalia”460 but does not link the actions taken – namely the 
embargo – to the desired outcome – the establishment of peace and stability – or the 
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“consequences on stability and peace in the region.”461 UNSC Res 733 was adopted following 
consultations but no public debate was instigated, shedding no further light on the nexus between 
the two; consequently, the exact reasoning behind the decision remains elusive and shows no 
signs of a legal basis.  
 There are doubts cast, also, on UNSC Res 841 on the subject of Haiti,462 where economic 
sanctions were imposed on the country in an effort to ameliorate the humanitarian situation and 
bring about the return of President Aristide. The debate surrounding the imposition of economic 
sanctions in 1993 focused on the humanitarian crisis and the need to reinstate democracy; there 
was very little reference to any perceived threat to international peace. In fact, only Venezuela – 
one of three sponsors of UNSC Res  841463 – made any explicit mention of the threat to the 
peace that formed the determination underscoring the sanctions taken under Chapter VII:464 yet 
even this threat was non-descript, being linked tenuously to the “substantial increase of hundreds 
of thousands of Haitians, in terrified flight to other countries.”465 The threat, then, according to 
the only representative to have verbalised it explicitly was the flight of refugees out of Haiti to 
other countries and not, as one might have supposed, the coup that ran contrary to democratically 
elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. This contrasts starkly the tone of the rest of the 
representatives speeches, which interpret the “main purpose of the resolution [to be] an early 
political solution to the crisis in Haiti”466 and believe that the goals of the sanctions are to “bring 
the perpetrators of the coup d’état to the negotiating table in order to restore constitutional order 
in Haiti”467 and “to put pressure on those who stand in the way of a solution.”468 Once more, 
those wishing to derive any semblance of structure or definition of the threat to the peace are left 
without any solid answers. 
 
 
                                                 
461 ibid preamble. 
462 UNSC Res 841 (16 June 1993) UN Doc S/RES/841. 
463 UNSC Verbatim Record (16 June 1993) UN Doc S/PV.3238, 3-5. 
464 ibid 11. 
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existing situation in Haiti”, ibid 14, as does that of China, who hoped “such efforts [would] facilitate a settlement of 
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466 China, ibid 21. See also, Canada (ibid 6); France (ibid 9); Pakistan (ibid 15); Brazil (ibid 18); USA (ibid 18). 
467 France, ibid [emphasis in original]. 
468 USA, ibid 19. 
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V.5 Conclusions 
The Council, therefore fails in some aspects of legal certainty. Although determinations are made 
frequently under Article 39 and in most cases where Chapter VII is invoked there is a prior 
determination in accordance with the UN Charter, at least in recent years, the subsequent Chapter 
VII resolutions hides much of what exactly the actual threat perceived to be consists of. There is 
little clarity where meetings are not transparent, as seen in section IV.1, and where the reasoning 
behind a decision is not made by the Council. As the case of Haiti shows, there is 
misunderstanding where no clear definition of the threat is made; parameters and exactitudes 
allow all States – both those in attendance and those reading records – to understand fully where 
the threat lies. An inability to do this suggests, among other likelihoods, volition on the part of 
the Council to stretch the definition of a threat to the peace in order to fit a political imperative. 
As this thesis will continue to show, this in turn has a serious effect on the equality of the law 
amongst UN Member States. Where there is no clear definition of what a threat to the peace is in 
a given instance were Chapter VII has been resorted to, there can be no pattern emerging from 
Council behaviour, which subsequently leaves the door open to accusations of arbitrary 
behaviour and bias on the Council and even actual examples where Chapter VII is used 
inappropriately, insufficiently or excessively. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW 
 
VI.1 Introduction 
Equality before the law is also at the core of both General Assembly469 and Security Council’s470  
rule of law activities to support development and the promotion of international standards, 
particularly in post-conflict societies. At the national level, it is a cross-cutting theme that 
includes gender equality, self-determination and numerous other elements that are slightly 
irrelevant to the current discussion of the Security Council, which operates on an entirely 
different plane to the domestic – this thesis discusses State behaviour and the behaviour of the 
Council. Nonetheless, there are similarities in the definition of the meaning of equality – and as a 
result the avoidance of arbitrariness and bias – that can be encapsulated by the position of 
contemporary philosopher Harry Frankfurt, who discusses the difference between equality and 
what he terms respect, but which for the purposes of this thesis form part of the component of 
The Predictability Paradox, which will form Chapter VII of this thesis: 
 
The most fundamental difference between equality and respect has to do with 
focus and intent. With regard to any parameter – whether it has to do with 
resources, welfare, opportunity, respect, rights, consideration, concern, or 
whatever – equality is merely a matter of each person having the same as others. 
Respect is more personal. Treating a person with respect means, in the sense that 
is pertinent here, dealing with him exclusively on the basis of those aspects of his 
particular character or circumstances that are actually relevant to the issue at 
hand.471 
 
The relevance of this definition to the Council’s decision-making process can be surmised as 
follows: failure to react to analogous threats to the peace by the Council would be unequal and 
contravene the principle of equality before the law; decisions made without fully addressing the 
idiosyncratic and unique characteristics of each threat on an individual basis would be a 
misapplication of the principle of fairness, as well as highlighting an aura of arbitrary behaviour 
                                                 
469 See eg UNGA Res 61/39 (18 December 2006) UN Doc A/RES/61/39; UNGA Res 62/70, (8 January 2008) UN 
Doc A/RES/62/70; UNGA Res 63/128 (15 January 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/128. 
470 See eg UNSC Presidential Statement 15 (2003) UN Doc S/PRST/2003/15; UNSC Presidential Statement 2 
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Presidential Statement 28 (2006) UN Doc S/PRST/2006/28. 
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on the part of the Council.472 In real world terms, this means that the Council should react to all 
potential threats to the peace, but should do so whilst identifying any differences between similar 
threats that might require a different approach to be introduced. This would not only be fair, it 
would also be predictable. Moreover, although each case should be addressed on its individual 
merits, States should be able to predict any repercussions to their actions based on the Council’s 
previous responses to analogous situations. 
Following this logic, then, more than there being no requirement for the Council to react 
in the same way to different threats, they are actively discouraged from doing so in order to 
avoid arbitrariness and ensure fairness, although they are obligated to study and address the 
situation in order to comply with the element of equality before the law. States, on the other 
hand, should be able to establish the extent and parameters of Council action based on the 
precedent of resolutions and other official actions, such as the establishment of tribunals, in order 
to regulate their own actions in turn. Indeed, what equality can be said to exist if some threats are 
left unaddressed when comparable situations have been addressed in other countries? And 
indeed, what country would readily accept a “one-size-fits-all” solution by the Council, which 
might give the impression not only of lethargy or reluctance but, perhaps more dangerously, 
limited resources at its disposal to react to different threats? It is an extremely thin line that the 
Council must be expected to walk, ensuring that it treats all threats equally and consistently, 
whilst also addressing the potential threat on an individual basis.  
It has already been established that the Council has compétence de la compétence insofar 
as its own workload and focus of attention is concerned; however, it is the Secretariat that drafts 
an agenda for the Council’s consideration. Although the Council’s own Rules of Procedure grant 
the Secretariat the power to draft an agenda for its consideration,473 this is more of a “tentative 
forecast of . . . matters that may be taken up during the month pursuant to earlier decisions of the 
                                                 
472 See, eg Thomas M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (OUP 1990) 37-38, where the “sense of 
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473 UNSC Rules of Procedure (n 287) r 7. 
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Council . . . [and] the actual programme of work will be developed by developments and the 
views of members of the Council.”474 Thus, although many of the topics on the forecasted 
agendas are indeed discussed,475 other topics for discussion are created on an ad hoc basis during 
meetings “held at the call of the President at any time he deems necessary”476; moreover, the 
Council may meet at the request of any member of the Security Council.477 This allows the 
Council to respond in real-time to threats,478 allowing it a reprieve from the rigidity that other 
UN organs may suffer from.479 This also supports the role of the Security Council to respond 
rapidly to matters posing a threat to the international peace and fits within the framework of 
powers granted quite clearly by the Charter granting the Council the authority to “determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”480 In essence, the 
Council may direct its efforts freely to whichever cause it deems necessary under the wide scope 
of authority granted by the UN Charter and its rules of procedure.  
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sessions where the agenda is communicated simultaneously with the communication convening the session, any 
special session is also subject to a two week wait whilst the agenda is distributed (r 16). Therefore, it moves 
extremely slowly, by comparison, and forward planning of issues for discussion is paramount, not least also due to 
the necessity for majority decisions of it almost 200 Member State cadre, by which the Council is not lumbered, of 
course. 
480 UN Charter (1945) art 39. 
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VI.2 Council responses to conflicts 
However, the existence of de jure equality before the law does not immediately remove the 
possibility of different justice prevailing de facto.481 Despite the potential for the Council to grant 
bespoke, rapid and effective responses to each potential threat to the peace due to the ability to 
meet at a moment’s notice and take legally binding decisions implementing both non-military 
and armed force measures, the reality at times fails to live up to such expectations. It has been 
alleged that the Council is lethargic in responding to some incidents, whereas others are granted 
the full attention and force of the Council.482 
 
VI.2.1 The case of Syria 
The March 2011 Syrian government crackdowns on civilian protesters first appeared as a topic 
for Council discussion not – as one might expect – as a stand-alone issue, but rather on the 
periphery of an existing Council meeting in April 2011 on the Middle East situation focused on 
the Palestinian question.483 Despite deep concern over “the Government’s brutal crackdown on 
political protests  . . . result[ing] in more than 200 deaths”484 at the time, unequivocal 
condemnation of the violence against and killing of peaceful demonstrators485 and calls for the 
Syrian authorities to “renounce the use of force against demonstrators”486 by three of the P5 
members, it was deemed by Russia “unacceptable [for] any external interference in Syrian 
affairs”487 to take place. Nonetheless, a public debate was held later that month,488 intimating that 
the Council might have begun to address the situation in Syria as a potential threat to the 
international peace separate from the Middle East question as a whole; nonetheless, this did not 
come to fruition and the Syrian situation remained addressed within the general theme of the 
                                                 
481 See eg Kleinfeld (n 68) 38-9, where the caste system of India, for example, where despite constitutional equality 
for all citizens the reality is vastly different.  
482 See eg Pakistan, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 24, where 
“[t]he determination of the Council’s agenda depends to a large extent on the positions and priorities of the 
permanent members and major Powers. We have witnessed inaction and delay in the Council, even in the face of the 
most obvious acts of aggression and breaches of peace. On the other hand, there is proaction, even interference in 
the internal affairs of sovereign States, even in the absence of a clear threat to international peace and security. 
Double standards and selectivity, including in the implementation of the Council’s own resolutions, threats and the 
use of force and other forms of coercion are equally disquieting” 
483 UNSC Verbatim Record (21 April 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6520. 
484 US, ibid 13. 
485 UK, ibid 15. 
486 France, ibid 21. 
487 Russia, ibid 27. 
488 UNSC Verbatim Record (27 April 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6524. 
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Middle East question for quite some time489 and the very first statement by the Council 
condemning the situation in Syria490 came about under the aegis of the situation in the Middle 
East.  
Indeed, even when presented in February 2012 with credible information that “the death 
toll . . . often exceeds 100 civilians per day . . . [and] the total number of people killed so far 
[was] certainly well more than 7,500 . . . [with] 25,000 refugees . . . [and b]etween 100,000 and 
200,000 people internally displaced”491, little was done by the Council to intercede in the 
situation due to a stalemate between the P5 members. Against this backdrop, the only consensus 
that could be reached was the implementation of a six-point proposal, brokered by former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his capacity as Joint Special Envoy for the UN and League of 
Arab States.492 In the year between Syria first appearing on the Council’s agenda in April 2011 
and the first Council resolution in April 2012, two vetoed Chapter VII resolutions493 were tabled; 
conversely, by this time the number of deaths, including women and children, were “well more 
than 7,500 . . . [with] 25,000 refugees . . . [and b]etween 100,000 and 200,000 people internally 
displaced.”494 Undermining the Council’s capacity to respond in real-time in contrast to the 
Assembly, it was the latter that on 19th December 2011 overwhelmingly adopted a resolution 
cosponsored by 61 States condemning “the continued grave and systematic human rights 
violations by the Syrian authorities . . . [and calling ] upon the Syrian authorities to immediately 
put an end to all human rights violations . . and . . . an immediate end to all violence in the Syrian 
Arab Republic”495 whilst the Council had yet implement any binding resolutions and had itself 
only officially managed to break its silence on the situation in Syria through a presidential 
statement in August 2011. 
Frankfurt has posited that “[t]hose who are concerned with equality aim at outcomes that 
are in some pertinent way indistinguishable . . .”496 this can be interpreted not as an expectation 
                                                 
489 See eg UNSC Verbatim Record 6562 (23 June 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6562; UNSC Verbatim Record 6590 (26 July 
2011) UN Doc S/PV.6590; UNSC Verbatim Record (3 August 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6598; UNSC Verbatim Record 
(12 March 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6734. Syria was also mentioned in an open debate on the protection of civilians 
(UNSC Verbatim Record 6650 (9 November 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6650). 
490 UNSC Presidential Statement 16 (2011) UN Doc S/PRST/2011/16. 
491 UNSC Verbatim Record (28 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6725, 2. 
492 UNSC Res 2042 (14 April 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2042. 
493 UNSC Draft Res (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612; UNSC Draft Res (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/2012/77. 
494 UNSC Verbatim Record (28 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6725, 2. 
495 UNGA Res 66/176 (24 February 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/176, ¶1. 
496 Frankfurt (n 471) 9. 
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that the facts themselves should be indistinguishable, but rather that the response should be such. 
Indeed, it would be misguided to suggest that the situation in Syria is exactly the same as the 
facts of Libya and, without addressing the deep-rooted political, ethnic and geographical 
characteristics of each country and its conflict I would be remiss to attempt such a comparison, 
which indeed divided the Council members during discussions on the situation in Syria: whilst 
Russia identified that “[t]he situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately 
from the Libyan experience”497, the US defended “strong Council action on Syria . . . [which] is 
not about military intervention . . . or Libya.”498 Clearly, calls for restraint and reflection on the 
Libyan experience by the Council was key to Russia’s hesitation to intervene in Syria in the 
same way as Libya.499 
However, the intersection of the situations in both countries becomes relevant to this 
component of equality within the framework of the rule of law when addressing how the Council 
responded to each potential threat; this is particularly true when in the case of Libya, less than a 
year passed between the first discussion of the situation at the Council500 in February 2011 and 
the declaration of liberation of Libya by the new National Transitional Council,501 including the 
passing of a Chapter VII resolution502 authorising NATO military involvement in the subsequent 
Operation Unified Protector, officially ending on 31st October 2011.503 In contrast, this same 
period of time – a year – was how long elapsed between the situation in Syria reaching the 
agenda of the Council and its first resolution on the matter; of course, over three years later, the 
situation is not yet resolved and there has not been a single Chapter VII resolution emerging 
                                                 
497 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, 4. 
498 US, ibid 8. 
499 Russia, ibid 4: “For us, Members of the United Nations, including in terms of a precedent, it is very important to 
know how the resolution [on Libya] was implemented and how a Security Council resolution turned into its 
opposite. The demand for a quick ceasefire turned into a full-fledged civil war, the humanitarian, social, economic 
and military consequences of which transcend Libyan borders. The situation in connection with the no-fly zone has 
morphed into the bombing of oil refineries, television stations and other civilian sites. The arms embargo has 
morphed into a naval blockade in western Libya, including a blockade of humanitarian goods. Today the tragedy of 
Benghazi has spread to other western Libyan towns — Sirte and Bani Walid. These types of models should be 
excluded from global practices once and for all.” 
500 UNSC Verbatim Record (22 February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6486, in which Under-Secretary-General for Political 
Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe briefed the Council on the situation in Libya, subsequent to which a press release by the 
Council condemned the use of force on civilians (UN Press Release, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Libya’ 
(22 February 2011) <http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10180.doc.htm> accessed 16 December 2014). 
501 ‘NTC declares ‘Liberation of Libya’’, Al Jazeera (24 October 2011) <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/ 
2011/10/201110235316778897.html> accessed 16 December 2014. 
502 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973. 
503 UNSC Res 2009 (16 September 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2009, ¶20 repealed the authorisation to use “all necessary 
measures” in UNSC Res 1973 (2011). 
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from the Council despite the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the standing total of over 3.2m 
refugees504 and an estimated 200,000 deaths.505 
Despite this severe disparity in the length of time that was taken in dealing with each 
situation, the situation in Libya appears to have been afforded far more attention by the Security 
Council. In fact, in 2011 the subject of Libya was tabled as an individual subject for discussion 
twenty-three times506 and of the four Chapter VII resolutions on Libya in 2011507 it took a mere 
four days from the Under-Secretary-General’s briefing on 22nd February 2011 to reach 
unanimous consensus for a Chapter VII resolution508 imposing an arms embargo on the 
country,509 travel ban on key figures of the Gaddafi regime510 and asset freeze on the Gaddafi 
family,511 in addition to referring the situation to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, a previously contentious issue.512 The situation in Syria has been discussed a mere 
seventeen times since the beginning of the conflict in 2011,513 with only six resolutions being 
passed – three substantive514 and three515 relating to military observers and UNSMIS.516 
                                                 
504 As of December, 2014, according to UNHCR figures <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php> 
accessed 16 December 2014. 
505 Although the UN has ceased updating its official figures, other sources point to this number. The exact number is 
extremely divisive. For an excellent analysis, see Adam Taylor, ‘200,000 dead? Why Syria’s rising death toll is so 
divisive’, Washington Post (3 December 2014) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/12 
/03/200000-dead-why-syrias-rising-death-toll-is-so-divisive> accessed 16 December 2014. 
506 UNSC Verbatim Record (22 February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6486; UNSC Verbatim Record (25 February 2011) 
UN Doc S/PV.6490; UNSC Verbatim Record (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6491; UNSC Verbatim Record (17 
March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498; UNSC Verbatim Record (24 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6505; UNSC Verbatim 
Record (28 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6507; UNSC Verbatim Record (4 April 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6509; UNSC 
Verbatim Record (3 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6527; UNSC Verbatim Record (4 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6528; 
UNSC Verbatim Record (9 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6530; UNSC Verbatim Record (31 May 2011) UN Doc  
S/PV.6541; UNSC Verbatim Record (15 June 2011) UN Doc  S/PV.6555; UNSC Verbatim Record (27 June 2011) 
UN Doc  S/PV.6566; UNSC Verbatim Record (28 July 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6595; UNSC Verbatim Record (30 
August 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6606; UNSC Verbatim Record (16 September 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6620; UNSC 
Verbatim Record (26 September 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6622; UNSC Verbatim Record (26 October 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6639; UNSC Verbatim Record (27 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6640; UNSC Verbatim Record (31 October 
2011) UN Doc  S/PV.6644; UNSC Verbatim Record (2 November 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6647; UNSC Verbatim 
Record (2 December 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6673; UNSC Verbatim Record (22 December 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6698. 
507 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973; UNSC Res 2009 (16 September 2011) UN Doc 
S/RES/2009; UNSC Res 2016 (27 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2016. 
508 UNSC Res 1970 (2011), passed with no abstentions. 
509 ibid ¶9. 
510 ibid ¶15. 
511 ibid ¶17. 
512 This was the first referral to the ICC without abstentions; the only other, on March 31st 2005 in UNSC Res 1593 
on Sudan featured abstentions by Algeria, Brazil and, more importantly, China and the US, both of which are P5 
members and neither of which are signatories to the Rome Statute. 
513 UNSC Verbatim Record (27 April 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6524; UNSC Verbatim Record (3 August 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6598; UNSC Verbatim Record (31 January 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6710; UNSC Verbatim Record (4 February 
2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711; UNSC Verbatim Record (12 March 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6734; UNSC Verbatim Record 
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This referral to the ICC in the case of Libya is remarkable for the identification by the 
Council that the “widespread and systematic attacks [that took] place in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity;”517 the far 
more moderately worded resolutions518 than that of UNSC Res 1970 calling for a cessation of 
violence in Syria have been consistently vetoed519 or watered down520 for the purposes of passing 
through the Council. This is despite protestations by members of the Security Council at the 
“especially horrific campaign . . . [of] indiscriminate violence . . . [and] abhorrent brutality”;521 
allegations of war crimes by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,522 the 
Human Rights Council523 and various NGOs;524 the apparent breach of International 
Humanitarian Law;525 and an investigative UN Mission conclusion “that chemical weapons have 
                                                                                                                                                             
(21 March 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6736; UNSC Verbatim Record (14 April 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6751; UNSC 
Verbatim Record (21 April 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6756; UNSC Verbatim Record (30 August 2012) UN Doc 
S/PV.6826; UNSC Verbatim Record (26 September 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6841; UNSC Verbatim Record (18 April 
2013) UN Doc S/PV.6949; UNSC Verbatim Record (16 July 2012) UN Doc S/PV.7000; UNSC Verbatim Record 
(20 August 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7020; UNSC Verbatim Record (25 October 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7049; UNSC 
Verbatim Record (22 February 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7116; UNSC Verbatim Record (22 May 2014) UN Doc 
S/PV.7180; UNSC Verbatim Record (14 July 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7216. 
514 UNSC Res 2118 (27 September 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2118; UNSC Res 2139 (22 February 2014) UN Doc 
S/RES/2139; UNSC Res 2165 (14 July 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2165. 
515 UNSC Res 2042 (14 April 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2042; UNSC Res 2043 (21 April 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2043; 
UNSC Res 2059 (20 July 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2059. 
516 United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria. 
517 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970, preamble. 
518 See the statement by the UK on UNSC Draft Res S/2012/77 (2012) in UNSC Verbatim Record (4 February 
2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711, 7; see also, statement by the US on UNSC Draft Res S/2012/77 (2012), ibid 5. 
519 Both China and Russia voted negatively on UNSC Draft Res S/2011/612 (2011), UNSC Draft Res S/2012/77 
(2012) and UNSC Draft Res S/2012/538 (2012). 
520 Both UNSC Res 2118 (2013) and UNSC Res 2139 (2014) condemn and demand, using terminology of Chapter 
VII, but fail to include the necessary criteria for Chapter VII as discussed previously and do not take action under 
Articles 41 or 42 of the Charter. They were also to results of several rounds of negotiations on the wording. 
521 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711, 5. See also, the condemnation of the 
representatives of the UK, France and others, ibid 3 ff. 
522 ‘Mass executions in Syria may amount to war crimes, senior UN official warns’, UN News Centre (16 January 
2014) <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46939#.VJJDNCsa-mQ> accessed 16 December 2014. 
523 OHCHR, ‘Preliminary report of the High Commissioner on the situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab 
Republic’ (14 June 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/CRP.1, 3ff. 
524 Amnesty International, ‘Deadly Reprisals: Deliberate Killings and Other Abuses by Syria’s Armed Forces’ (June 
2012) <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/deadly_reprials.pdf> accessed 16 December 2014; Human 
Rights Watch, ‘In Cold Blood: Summary Executions by Syrian Security Forces and Pro-Government Militias’ (April 
10 2012) <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria0412webwcover_0.pdf> accessed 16 December 2014. 
525 “According to a cardinal IHL principle, a party to a conflict may direct attacks only against combatants and 
military objectives. Directing attacks against civilians who are not taking a direct part in hostilities, as well as 
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, are prohibited”, OHCHR, ‘Living Under Siege: The Syrian Arab 
Republic’ (19 February 2014) <http://www.ohchr.org/documents/countries/sy/livingundersiege.pdf> accessed 16 
December 2014, referring to Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Vol 1 (CUP 2005) 3, 25, 37-40. 
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been used in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic.”526 Whereas 
concerted efforts were made to resolve the issue and stem the outbreak of a civil war in Libya on 
the scale now seen in Syria, where the UN itself has ceased updating527 its most recent figure in 
July 2013 of over 100,000 deaths528 due to the unfeasibility of UNHCR ground access in 
Syria,529 contrary to the flurry of Council activity on Libya530 even after the end of military 
operations in the country,531 Syria has not enjoyed a great deal of discussion on the Council532 or 
mission assistance.533 Since its initial stalemate over the subject, the Council has moved ever-
slowly and cautiously on the matter of the Syrian civil war, initially hesitant as a political body to 
make any bold statements apart from condemnation of attacks by terrorists or on diplomatic 
premises.534 
 
VI.2.2 Council action in analogous situations 
Efficacy and swiftness is, in general, typical of the behaviour of the Council, as one might expect 
from the powers to act it is granted unrestrained by the necessity of a framework of forward 
                                                 
526 UNGA, ‘United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab 
Republic: Final report’ (December 12 2013) <https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/12/report.pdf> accessed 16 December 2014, ¶108. 
527 John Heilprin, ‘UN Decides to Stop Updating Syria Death Toll’ Associated Press (Geneva, 7 January 2014) 
<http://bigstory.ap.org/article/un-decides-stop-updating-syria-death-toll> accessed 16 December 2014. 
528 Edith M Lederer, ‘UN Chief says over 100,000 people killed in Syria’ Associated Press (United Nations, 25 July 
2013) <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/un-chief-says-over-100000-people-killed-syria> accessed 16 December 2014. 
529 Laura Stampler, ‘UN to Stop Updating Syria Death Toll’ Time World (7 January 2014) 
<http://world.time.com/2014/01/07/un-to-stop-updating-syria-death-toll> accessed 16 December 2014. 
530 23 meetings in 2011, Security Council Report, ‘Security Council Statistics in 2011’ (31 Jan 2012) 
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2012-02/lookup_c_glKWLeMTIsG_b_7966267.php> 
accessed 16 December 2014. 
531 The Council held ten meetings on Libya, adopting one decision (UNSC Res 2040 (2012)) in 2012, Security 
Council Report, ‘Security Council Statistics in 2012’ (31 January 2013) 
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2013-02/security_council_statistics_in_2012.php> 
accessed 16 December 2014; it held another eight in 2013, adopting two decisions (UNSC Res 2095 (2013) and 
UNSC Presidential Statement 21 (2013)), Security Council Report, ‘Security Council Statistics in 2013’ (31 January 
2014) <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-02/security_council_statistics_in_2013.php> 
accessed 16 December 2014. 
532 Four meetings in 2011 (not including meetings pertaining to the UNDOF), Security Council Report (n 530) and 
nine meetings in 2012 (not including meetings pertaining to the UNDOF), leading to five decisions (UNSC Res 
2042 (2012); UNSC Res 2043; UNSC Res 2059; UNSC Presidential Statement 6 (2012); and UNSC Presidential 
Statement 10 (2012)), Security Council Report (2012), ibid. 
533 The UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was established under UNSC Res 2043 and renewed under 
UNSC Res 2059; its mandate was not renewed when it expired on 19th August 2012. 
534 2011 saw three unofficial documents emerge from the Council, all press statements: UN Press Release, ‘Security 
Council Press Statement on Embassy Attacks in Damascus’ (12 July 2011); UN Press Release, ‘Security Council 
Press Statement on Attacks against Diplomatic Premises in Syria’ (15 November 2011); UN Press Release, 
‘Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Damascus, Syria’ (23 December 2011). 
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planning and its self-regulating rules of procedure. In the case of Kosovo, the process from the 
first Chapter VII resolution calling for steps to achieve a peaceful solution and imposing an arms 
embargo535 to authorisation for NATO intervention to secure the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces 
from Kosovo536 took barely over a year; similarly, despite being on the agenda of the Council for 
many years – with the first resolution issued in 1997537 – the Council’s response to the internal 
conflict in the Central African Republic538 intensified even before539 the assessment of the Under 
Secretary-General/Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide that “there [was] a risk of 
genocide in this country”540 when the violence was noted to have intensified. The conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo is arguably the most deadly since World War II;541 the Council 
dedicated the same number of meetings to the situation542 and adopted twelve decisions between 
2011-2014543 and has consistently addressed the threat through no less than forty-three Chapter 
VII544 resolutions since the Great War of Africa broke out in 1998 – more than two a year. 
                                                 
535 UNSC Res 1160 (31 March 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1160. 
536 UNSC Res 1244 (10 June 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1244. 
537 UNSC Res 1125 (6 August 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1125. 
538 Although external forces in the CAR play a role in the conflict, it is technically termed an intra-State dispute, in 
much the same way as there are allegations of neighbouring countries exerting pressure on the internal conflict in 
Syria. 
539 UNSC Res 2088 (24 January 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2088 and UNSC Res 2121 (24 January 2013) UN Doc 
S/RES/2121 both refer to the extension or updating of the mandates of BINUCA; UNSC Res 2127 (5 December 
2013) UN Doc S/RES/2127 is a Chapter VII resolution demanding swift implementation of transitional agreements 
(¶5), deploring the limited progress made (¶6) and authorising French military intervention in the country (¶50). 
540 UNSC Verbatim Record (22 January 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7098, 5. 
541 Approximately 1.69 to 1.80 million women reported having been raped in their lifetime, with between 407,397 
and 433,785 having reported being raped between 2006-7. See Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo and Caryn 
Bredenkamp, ‘Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence Against Women in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo’ (2011) 101 American Journal of Public Health 1060, 1060; an estimated 5.4 million people have died as a 
result of the conflict in the DRC since 1998, 50% of whom have been children, see International Rescue Committee, 
‘Measuring Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2007), 7 
<http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-file/2006-7_congoMortalitySurvey.pdf > accessed 16 December 
2014. 
542 Security Council Report (2013) (n 531): the Council discusses the DRC in 8 meetings each in 2011, 2012 and 
2013. 
543 UNSC Res 1991 (28 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1991; UNSC Res 2021 (29 November 2011) UN Doc 
S/RES/2021; UNSC Presidential Statement 11 (2011) UN Doc S/PRST/2011/11; UNSC Res 2053 (27 June 2012) 
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Presidential Statement 17 (2013) UN Doc S/PRST/2013/17; UNSC Res 2136 (30 January 2014) UN Doc 
S/RES/2136; UNSC Res 2147 (28 March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2147; UNSC Presidential Statement 22 (2014) UN 
Doc S/PRST/2014/22. 
544 UNSC Res 1291 (24 February 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1291; UNSC Res 1484 (30 May 2003) UN Doc 
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VI.3 Council double standards towards nuclear threats 
One of the principal examples of Council double-standard with respect to equality before the law 
is its treatment of the military nuclear capacity of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK). Of the eight known nuclear-weapon States545 and Israel, which maintains ambiguity 
over its possession or lack thereof,546 and the remaining 190 States Parties to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT),547 it is the DPRK that has been singled out by the Council in rounds 
of sanctions.548 Moreover, of the eight nuclear-power States, only the P5 members have signed549 
or ratified550 the treaty, leaving India and Pakistan not only as the sole two known nuclear 
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Doc S/RES/2076; UNSC Res 2078 (28 November 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2078; UNSC Res 2098 (28 March 2013) 
UN Doc S/RES/2098; UNSC Res 2136 (30 January 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2136; UNSC Res 2147 (28 March 2014) 
UN Doc S/RES/2147. 
545 All five P5 members – Russia, China, the US, UK and France – possess nuclear weaponry, in addition to 
Pakistan, India and the DPRK.  
546 Israel was believed to have between 60-85 nuclear weapons with 65-85 predicted in 2020 according to the US 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), ‘A Primer on the Future Threat, The Decades Ahead: 1999-2020’ (1999), 38, 
reproduced in Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander 
(Regnery 2013); the CIA believed as early as 1974 that “Israel already has produced nuclear weapons”, Central 
Intelligence Agency, ‘Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’ (1974), 2 
<http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/snie.pdf> accessed 16 December 2014. See also, eg 
Leonard S Spector and Jacqueline R Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 
(Westview Press 1990); Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project, ‘Nuclear Proliferation Status Report July 1992’ (1992); 
Hans M Kristensen and Robert S Norris, ‘Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2013’ (2013) 69 Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 75. 
547 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970).  
548 UNSC Res 1695 (15 July 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1695; UNSC Res 1718 (14 October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1718; 
UNSC Res 1874 (12 June 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1874; UNSC Res 2087 (22 January 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2087; 
UNSC Res 2094 (7 March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2094.  
549 France and China acceded in 1992. 
550 Russia ratified the treaty in 1970; the UK ratified in 1968; the US ratified in 1970. 
115 
 
powers not to have acceded to or ratified the NPT551 but also one of the few States not to have 
done so.552  
 
IV.3.1  The case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
The DPRK signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty on September 12, 1985, before announcing it 
would withdraw on March 12, 1993 as a result of the resumption of joint US/South Korean 
“Team Spirit” exercises and IAEA demands to open military sites to inspection.553 Almost 
immediately, three P5 members issued a statement declaring that “[s]ince the NPT is an essential 
element of international peace and security, DPRK withdrawal from the NPT would constitute a 
serious threat to regional and international stability”554, prompting the Council to pass UNSC 
Res 825555 “reaffirming the crucial contribution which progress in non-proliferation can make to 
the maintenance of international peace and security”556 and calling upon the DPRK to reconsider 
its announcement. Despite suspending its decision to withdraw from the NPT, over the following 
year there was reluctance on the part of the DPRK to allow intervention in what it deemed 
sovereign affairs557 and it finally withdrew its membership from the IAEA in 1994 and, save for 
a deal brokered with the US,558 would have led to the withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT559 
                                                 
551 The DPRK acceded in 1985 before withdrawing in 2003. 
552 93 States are signatories and 190 States have acceded; see <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt> for a full 
list, accessed 16 December 2014  
553 ‘Letter dated 12 March 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (12 March 1993) UN Doc S/25405, Annex. 
554 ‘Letter dated 1 April 1993 from the Representatives of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (2 
April 1993) UN Doc S/25515, Annex. 
555 UNSC Res 825 (11 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/825. 
556 ibid preamble. 
557 See eg numerous letters from the DPRK: ‘Letter dated 21 February 1994 from the Permanent Representative of 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’ (23 February 
1994) UN Doc S/1994/204; ‘Letter dated 21 March 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’ (21 March 1994) UN Doc 
S/1994/319; ‘Letter dated 22 March 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’ (22 March 1994) UN Doc S/1994/327; ‘Letter 
dated 24 March 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’ (24 March 1994) UN Doc S/1994/337; ‘Letter dated 25 March 
1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General’ (25 March 1994) UN Doc S/1994/344; ‘Letter dated 29 March 1994 from the 
Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General’ (29 March 1994) UN Doc S/1994/358. 
558 Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (21 
October 1994). 
116 
 
had it not been for the moratorium announced in the Agreed Framework. In 2003, however, the 
DPRK decided to withdraw from the NPT560 and has since not re-joined despite concerted efforts 
and significant pressure by the Council and its individual members. 
After the first ballistic missile tests by the DPRK in 2006, although the Council stopped 
short of a Chapter VII resolution, it nonetheless condemned the launch of ballistic missiles and 
demanded that it suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme.561 Three days 
after the DPRK launched its missiles into the Sea of Japan, India undertook its first test562 of its 
Agni-III Intermediate-range ballistic missile with a more than 3,000km range and a payload 
weight of 1.5 tons;563 there was no Council condemnation, or even mention, of this launch at the 
Council meeting of July 15, 2006, despite direct reference during the discussion of UNSC Res 
1540’s prohibition of weapons and their delivery.564 The Council’s first Chapter VII resolution 
on the DPRK565 was issued in response to its decision to carry out an underground nuclear test 
later that year and, in addition to condemning the nuclear test itself566 imposed an obligation on 
the DPRK to rejoin the NPT.567 
UNSC Res 1874,568 following another DPRK nuclear test in 2009, reiterated much of the 
language and demands of its predecessor, again imposing the obligation on the DPRK to accede 
to a treaty it had decided to withdraw from;569 as Joyner has highlighted, “the Council’s demand 
that the DPRK rejoin the NPT is the only example . . . of the Security Council demanding that a 
state re-accede to a treaty from which that state had duly withdrawn according to the treaty’s 
terms.”570 Despite the irregularity of the measure, which has not been seen before or since the 
                                                                                                                                                             
559 UNSC Presidential Statement 64 (1994) UN Doc S/PRST/1994/64: “The Security Council takes note of the 
decision of the DPRK in the Agreed Framework to remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons.” 
560 For the full text of the withdrawal, see ‘The Statement of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea date 10 January 2003’ in ‘Letter dated 24 January 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’ 
(24 January 2003) UN Doc S/2003/91, Annex II. 
561 UNSC Res 1695 (15 July 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1695, ¶1-2. 
562 Indian Ministry of Defence Press Release, ‘Agni III take off successful’ (9 July 2006) Press Information Bureau 
<http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=18775> accessed 16 December 2014. 
563 Indian Ministry of Defence Press Release, ‘Agni III launched successfully’ (12 April 2007) Press Information 
Bureau <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=26817> accessed 16 December 2014. 
564 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (15 July 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5490, 4. 
565 UNSC Res 1718 (14 October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1718. 
566 ibid ¶1. 
567 ibid ¶3. 
568 UNSC Res 1874 (12 June 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1874. 
569 ibid ¶5-6. 
570 Joyner, ‘Legal Hegemon’ (n 51) 250. 
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DPRK example, this call for a return to the NPT has been reiterated against the DPRK as 
recently as 2013.571  
 
VI.3.2 India and Pakistan 
Whilst the Council has been adamant for the DPRK to maintain its adherence to the NPT, there 
has been no such reaction to the nuclear statuses of India and Pakistan. Despite the apparent 
threat highlighted by the IAEA,572 there has been no serious denouncement of India or Pakistan 
for their nuclear possession, attempts to construct a nuclear weapon or proliferation of delivery 
methods through missile and other technology. Notwithstanding the predictable protestations by 
both States,573 UNSC Res 1172,574 issued against India and Pakistan in the wake of their 1998 
nuclear tests, is a relatively weak resolution by comparison to the forceful nature of the Council’s 
reaction to the DPRK: it was not adopted under Chapter VII, it did not call for the dismantling of 
their existing weaponry, it did not impose any obligations or stipulations to join the NPT and 
condemned only the tests themselves, rather than the fact that either State had acquired nuclear 
weaponry. Far from condemning the test in 1974, which took place after the NPT came into 
force, “the United States in June 1974 proceeded to ship an instalment of previously approved 
uranium fuel to India’s Tarapur reactor . . . [concluding] that the Indian test did not violate any 
agreement with the United States”575 and France “through its Atomic Energy Commission, sent a 
congratulatory message to the chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission.”576  
UNSC Res 1540 was passed in response to the threat of illicit procurement of nuclear and 
nuclear delivery weaponry by non-State actors; however, despite a network of Pakistani agents577 
selling clandestine nuclear information and components to numerous States including North 
                                                 
571 UNSC Res 2094 (7 March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2094, ¶3-4. This is particularly irrational when coupled with 
the fact that also in May 2009, India tested its nuclear-capable Agni-II ballistic missile, but once was left off the 
Council agenda despite discussions on the same topic – nuclear non-proliferation – in relation to the DPRK 
572 International Atomic Energy Agency, Illicit Nuclear Trafficking: Collective Experience and the Way Forward 
(IAEA 2008) 265: “The concealed nuclear arms programmes of Pakistan and India have pursued nuclear technology 
and materials abroad for decades through licit and illicit channels . . . [and t]he war-like situation between Pakistan 
and India contributes directly and indirectly to the flourishing of illicit nuclear trafficking in south and south-east 
Asia.” 
573 UNSC Verbatim Record (6 June 1998) UN Doc S/PV/3890, 28f. 
574 UNSC Res 1172 (6 June 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1172. 
575 George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (California UP 2002) 184. 
576 ibid 183. 
577 See, eg IAEA (n 572) 103, where “[a]s far as the A.Q. Khan network is concerned, people from over 20 countries 
are involved.” 
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Korea, Iran and Libya,578 allegedly with the complicity of Pakistani authorities,579 Pakistan has 
continued on its path to nuclear delivery proliferation with tests on nuclear-capable missile 
systems on a regular basis.580 Whilst Pakistan’s two research reactors currently run on low-
enriched uranium, which poses no weapons threat, highly Enriched Uranium does remain in 
Pakistan.581 Civilian nuclear programs, too, have remained unaffected by the leak of information 
by the Khan network, with three currently operating nuclear reactors582 in Pakistan and a further 
two due for completion in 2016, in addition to a recent $6.5bn loan for the construction of twin 
nuclear power stations in Karachi.583 Such deals are in contradiction to the Guidelines584 of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group,585 of which China is a member, which state that suppliers should not 
authorize the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing facilities if the recipient is not Party to the 
NPT”586; Pakistan has never signed the NPT and therefore, although the Guidelines are not 
legally binding, China’s defiance of the “fundamental principles”587 of an organisation created to 
                                                 
578 ibid: “the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan’s network (known as the Khan Network) . . . [was] believed to 
have equipped the Islamic Republic of Iran, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea with centrifuge equipment, as well as blueprints and the technical know-how needed to produce [Highly 
Enriched Uranium].” 
579 Rob Crilly, ‘AQ Khan claims Benazir Bhutto ordered nuclear sale’ The Telegraph (London 17 September 2012) 
< http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9548300/AQ-Khan-claims-Benazir-Bhutto-ordered-
nuclear-sale.html> accessed 16 December 2014: in an interview with the Jang media group, Khan alleges ‘[t]he then 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto summoned me and names two countries which were to be assisted.” James Astill, 
‘Musharraf knew I was selling secrets, says nuclear scientist’ The Guardian (London 4 February 2004) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/feb/04/pakistan.jamesastill> accessed 16 December 2014: Khan also 
stated to government investigators that General Pervez Musharraf had been “aware of everything.” 
580 Pakistan has tested its Babur nuclear capable cruise missile in 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011. Babur (Hatf-VII), 
tested in 2012, is capable of carrying nuclear and conventional weaponry, in addition to possessing stealth 
technology. Hatf IX (Nasr) was last tested in late 2013: Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations Press Release, ‘No. 
PR179/2013-ISPR’ (5 November 2013) < https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/t-
press_release.asp?date=2013/11/5&print=1> accessed 16 December 2014. 
581 See, eg Matthew Bunn, ‘Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All Nuclear Materials in Four Years’ (1 April 2010) 
28 <http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/Securing_The_Bomb_2010.pdf?_=1317159794> accessed 16 December 2014. 
582 The Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (live in 1971) and two at the Chasma Nuclear Power Plant (live in 2000 and 
2011). 
583 Farhan Bokhari and James Crabtree, ‘China strengthens Pakistan ties with $6.5bn loan for nuclear power’ 
Financial Times (London 1 January 2014) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4407fcee-72e9-11e3-b05b-00144feabdc0. 
html> accessed 16 December 2014. 
584 IAEA ‘Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology’ Series, published under IAEA 
Doc INFCIRC/254/Rev.xxx, Part 1. 
585 IAEA ‘The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role and Activities’ (4 December 2012) INFCIRC/539/Rev.5, 
1: “The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to contribute to the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and 
nuclear-related exports.” 
586  IAEA ‘Communication Received from the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Certain Member States' Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear 
Material, Equipment and Technology’ (12 November 2012) INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 1a, ¶6(a)(i). 
587 ibid ¶1. 
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counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons undermines its position when addressing nuclear 
proliferation elsewhere, notably on the Security Council. 
 Neighbouring India has similarly made no efforts to participate in the NPT588 and only 
gradually accepted opening its nuclear facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA).589 Despite over 20 instances of ballistic missile testing since 2006 alone590 there has 
been no equal pressure on India to dismantle its nuclear program, to desist from missile testing or 
to comply with legislative encroachment of the Council on the international legal field by signing 
the NPT.591 Moreover, India has signed nuclear deals with numerous States, including most of 
the P5 members – France,592 the US,593 Russia594 and the UK595, as well as ongoing negotiations 
on a bilateral Civil Nuclear Agreement with others.596 India’s pursuit of increased nuclear 
technology cannot be argued to be purely for pacific reasons;597 not only did Russia deliver its 
                                                 
588 It remains a non-member of the NPT and continues to vote against relevant clauses in General Assembly 
resolutions that stress the need for nuclear States to accede, see eg voting against UNGA Res 67/59 (3 December 
2012) UN Doc A/RES/67/59, ¶2 “calling upon all States not parties to the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear-weapon 
States to the Treaty promptly and without any conditions” (UNGA Verbatim Record (3 December 2012) UN Doc 
A/67/PV.48, 21. 
589 Although six nuclear reactors were brought under safeguards of the IAEA between 1971 and 1994, the 
Agreement Between the Government of India and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear 
Facilities was only approved in 2008 by the IAEA Board of Governors, a decade after the most recent nuclear 
weapons test, and aimed to gradually bring in a total of 14 reactors under Agency safeguards. See, Mohamed 
ElBaradei, ‘Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors’ (Vienna, 1 August 2008) 
<http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/ introductory-statement-board-governors-28> accessed 16 December 
2014. 
590 Agni I was tested October 2007, November 2010, December 2011, July 2012 and November 2013; Agni II was 
tested May 2009, November 2009, May 2010, September 2011, August 2012 and April 2013; Agni III was tested 
July 2006, April 2007, May 2008, February 2010, September 2012 and December 2013; Agni IV was tested 
November 2011, September 2012 and January 2014; Agni V was tested April 2012 and September 2013. 
591 In fact, somewhat contradictorily, the P5 members have furnished India with components, nuclear weaponry and 
even technical knowledge through cooperation on the construction of nuclear technology throughout the period that 
the P5 members have been reducing their nuclear cache. 
592 ‘Nicholas Sarkozy and Manmohan Singh in nuclear deal’ BBC News (London, 6 December 2010) 
<http://www.bbc. co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11923836> accessed 16 December 2014. 
593 ‘US-India: Civil Nuclear Cooperation’, US Department of State <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/c17361.htm> 
accessed 16 December 2014. 
594 Most recently, Russia announced it would build 16 nuclear reactors in India, in addition to the existing 2 in the 
process of construction in Tamil Nadu. See, ‘Russia signs India nuclear reactor deal’ BBC News (London, 12 March 
2010) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8561365.stm> accessed 16 December 2014. 
595 Nicholas Watt, ‘Britain to allow export of civil nuclear technology to India’ The Guardian (London, 28 July 
2010) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/28/britain-nuclear-technology-india> accessed 16 December 
2014. 
596 Including South Korea in 2011, Canada in 2012 and Australia in 2012. 
597 On land, India has test-launched at least two strategic missiles on numerous occasions since the start of the 
decade: the Agni IV was launched three times – in 2011, 2012 and 2013 – and is capable of achieving a range of 
4,000km whilst carrying a nuclear warhead weighing one tonne; the Agni V missile was tested in 2012 and 2013 
and, an intercontinental ballistic missile, is capable of carrying nuclear payloads to a range of more than 5,000km. 
Following the success of the Agni-V missile, the Indian Defence Ministry plans to soon test the more than 6,000km 
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second nuclear-powered submarine to India in 2012,598  the P5 member is alleged to have 
“continued to be the main supplier of technology and equipment to India’s . . . naval nuclear 
propulsion programs.”599 India leads even some P5 Council Members in terms of the breadth of 
their nuclear capabilities.600  
India’s proliferation of weaponry is in direct and blatant conflagration of UNSC Res 
1540601 – a Chapter VII resolution – issued long before its most recent tests were carried out,  
 
[a]ffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well 
as their means of delivery [defined for the purpose of this resolution only as 
missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use] 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security . . . 602 
 
In addition to the Council members of US,603 Russian Federation604 and China605 continuing to 
flout this affirmation and concurrent Pakistani nuclear development, India has been repeatedly 
                                                                                                                                                             
range Agni-VI with the goal of eventually constructing a 10,000km range inter-continental Ballistic missile. These 
tests were and continue to be carried out against the backdrop of India’s air force – the fourth largest in the world – 
containing three nuclear-weapon capable fleets, one of which, designed jointly by France and Britain, was nuclear-
capable when deployed by those countries. 
598 Gardiner Harris, ‘World’s Biggest Arms Importer, India Wants to Buy Local’ The New York Times (New York, 6 
March 2014) <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/business/international/worlds-biggest-arms-importer-india-
wants-to-buy-local.html?hpw&rref=business&_r=0> accessed 16 December 2014. 
599 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to 
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003’ (2003), 9 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/july_dec2003.htm> accessed 16 December 2014. 
600 India has successfully achieved a nuclear triad: air-based, land-based and sea-based nuclear weapon deployment 
capacities. The US, Russia and China are all accepted as current nuclear triad powers; France and the UK, however, 
have phased out certain nuclear capabilities since the end of the Cold War and do not have deployable nuclear 
weaponry on all three fronts.  
601 UNSC Res 1540 (28 April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1540. 
602 ibid. 
603 The US maintained over 5,000 nuclear warheads in 2010, down from over 30,000 in 1967 and has made 
concerted efforts to increase transparency and reduce the number of weapons held in its stockpile. Nonetheless, it 
continues to proliferate its missile systems capable of delivering nuclear payloads- Lockheed Martin Press release, 
‘Lockheed Martin-Built Trident II D5 Missile Achieves a Total of 148 Successful Test Flights Since 1989’ (24 
September 2013) <http://www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/us/news/press-releases/2013/september/924-ss-FBM.html> 
accessed 16 December 2014. 
604 Despite a US-Russian treaty limiting the numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles in their respective fleets, it 
plans to increase its strategic nuclear forces by 100% by 2020. See, ‘Russia to fully renew nuclear forces by 2020’ 
Russia Today (Moscow, 22 September 2014) <rt.com/politics/189604-russia-nuclear-2020-mistral> accessed 16 
December 2014. Moreover, in March 2014, Russia tested its nuclear-capable RS-12M Topol missile in Kazakhstan. 
The US response was simply that they had received proper notice, ‘Russia test-fires ICBM amid tension over 
Ukraine’ Reuters (Moscow, 4 March 2014) <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/04/uk-russia-missile-
idUKBREA2320520140304> accessed 16 December 2014. 
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bolstered by Council Member State support for its pacific nuclear and defensive weapon delivery 
programs.  
 
VI.4 Conclusions 
The Council appears to treat States differently against the same independent standards both with 
respect to conflicts and other threats to the peace such as nuclear proliferation. In some 
situations, it would appear, the Council appears more forthcoming in its efforts to direct attention 
and quell incidents of violence or potential threats to the peace. However, such consensus is not 
immediately forthcoming in all situations and the example of Syria highlights these difficulties 
and those of political motivations that appear to be behind the decision-making process.606 
Whilst there can be no definitive means of measuring equality of the Council’s attention to 
perceived threats to the international peace, a clear indication is the  amount of time expended, 
effort exerted and decisions taken in response to any given issue.  
During a recent discussion on the rule of law at the Council level, emphasis was made on the 
necessity for the Council to hold itself to the same standards it imposes upon States. The Russian 
Federation identified that “in adhering to standards of international law in its activity, [the 
Council] sets an example by complying with the law.”607 However, not only have Council 
members failed to adhere to the same standards they impose on other States, there has been no 
explanation for the seemingly contradictory stances the Council has taken in, on one hand, the 
Indian and Pakistani situations and, on the other, the case of North Korea. It remains unclear in 
what way the aspirations of India and Pakistan to procure and expand both civilian and military 
capacities within the framework or nuclear powers and the very same of the DPRK might differ. 
Nonetheless, the two situations have been approached by the Council in wildly different 
                                                                                                                                                             
605 China has been elusive about its exact nuclear arsenal. However, it last publicly tested its nuclear-capable missile 
capabilities in January 2014 – the Dongfeng-31. See, Minnie Chan, ‘China’s nuclear missile drill seen as warning to 
US not to meddle in region’ South China Morning Post (23 January 2014) <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/ 
article/1411310/chinas-nuclear-missile-drill-seen-warning-us-not-meddle-region> accessed 16 December 2014. 
606 See eg UK representative’s assertion that Russia and China “have chosen to put their national interests ahead of 
the lives of millions of Syrians”, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6810, 3 and the counter-
claim that the “Pharisees [of Western Powers] have been pushing their own geo-political intentions”, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6810, 8. 
607 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (29 June 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6347, 22. See also Liechtenstein, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (29 June 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6347 (Resumption 1), 6, which remained “convinced that the best 
way for the Security Council to promote international law and the rule of law is to lead by example.” 
122 
 
manners. The insistence on continued sanctions against the DPRK,608 its vilification by the 
Council for actions that have been carried out with impunity by other States and the imposition 
of standards upon the DPRK that are not imposed on other States, including Council members 
themselves, surely points towards an unequal application of the law in the decisions taken by the 
Council.  
 
  
                                                 
608 First imposed under UNSC Res 1718 (14 October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1718 and renewed or extended under 
UNSC Res 2087 (22 January 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2087 and UNSC Res 2094 (7 March 2013) UN Doc 
S/RES/2094. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE PREDICTABILITY PARADOX: THE AVOIDANCE OF ARBITRARINESS, SUPREMACY OF THE LAW, 
AND FAIRNESS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW 
 
I cannot believe that the Council, under any circumstances, would not assume its 
responsibility under the Charter of maintaining international peace and security. 
Nor can I believe that the Council would delay acting to put an end to a tragedy 
that endangers the lives of thousands of people and undermines the foundation of 
the edifice constructed by the world in order to avert the recurrence of violence 
and cruel wars.609 
 
VII.1 Introduction 
If it has been shown that equality is the identification and addressing of a threat to the 
international peace by the Council, the corresponding, subsequent component is predictability, 
which dictates that States should be capable of reasonably anticipating the Council’s response to 
any of its given actions or lack thereof. It would logically follow that if there was a consistent 
practice on the part of the Security Council to respond to certain threats in a particular manner – 
for example, certain violations of international human right law – then States may have no basis 
upon which to claim ignorance or amnesty in the event that the Council took action against that 
violating State. Similarly, where certain actions have not historically been seized upon by the 
Council, a State may reasonable presume that such behaviour is acceptable. In short, a clear 
pattern of action should be evident to avoid allegation of arbitrariness610 and the undermining of 
a legal order that equally applies to all Member States. 
Whilst this is a difficult standard to uphold for the Council, it is not excessively so, and 
ties into the component of transparency, where the work of the Council should be clear and 
transparent to all interested parties. A bespoke approach may not immediately necessitate 
different approaches to similar threats; nonetheless, each threat must be taken on its merits. 
Accordingly, there should be an explanation as to why the Council has chosen to follow the same 
course charted previously, or an explanation as to why the situation at hand has dictated a 
                                                 
609 Egypt, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 March 2003) UN Doc S/PV.4726, 13. 
610 The absence of consistency and predictability. 
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departure from precedential norms. Moreover, a clear legal basis must be evident in every 
situation as to why the Council has chosen to take action – or not – and what, if anything, 
differentiates this potential threat from other State actions that have not been perceived as such. 
  
VII.2 A clear pattern of action 
Although in the vast majority of cases consensus is reached on the Council,611 this does not 
immediately equate to impartiality or a lack of bias on the Council; if the fact that P5 members 
“have mostly accompanied the consensus or the enabling majorities adopting the resolutions may 
be a product of their role as the pen holders on most Council agenda items”612 as gatekeepers of 
the Council, the accusation may be levelled that the predictability of Security Council resolutions 
can, at its most basic level, be said to correspond with the foreign policies of the voting States on 
the Council at any given time. States are more likely to vote in favour of resolutions that are 
compatible with their national interests and, conversely, more likely to vote against the passing 
of a resolution that is incompatible with such a trajectory; if only resolutions and discussions that 
conform to these policies are tabled, there is sure to be arbitrary behaviour. With this in mind, it 
is difficult to approach the Council as a monolithic entity that acts in unison on all counts and 
that shares all goals as one; frequently, it can be found that the principles that States defend 
through the use or threat of the veto shift dramatically and can even be interchanged between P5 
members depending on the subject under discussion. 
 
VII.2.1 Respect for national sovereignty 
As far back as 1993, China voiced its opposition to interfering in the domestic affairs of a State 
deeming the measures entailed within Council UNSC Res 841613 on Haiti “warranted only as a 
result of the unique and exceptional situation in Haiti, and therefore should not be regarded as 
constituting any precedent for the future.”614 In fact, it was made quite clear that “[t]he Chinese 
delegation, as its consistent position, does not favour the Security Council’s handling matters 
which are essentially internal affairs of a Member State, nor does it approve of resorting lightly 
                                                 
611 93.5% of resolutions adopted since 2000 have been adopted by consensus. See, Security Council Report, ‘In 
Hindsight: Consensus in the Security Council’ (2013) <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-
forecast/2014-01/in_hindsight_consensus_in_the_security_council.php> accessed 16 December 2014. 
612 ibid. 
613 UNSC Res 841 (16 June 1993) UN Doc S/RES/841. 
614 China, UNSC Verbatim Record (16 June 1993) UN Doc S/PV.3238, 21 (on Resolution 841, ibid). 
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to such mandatory measures as sanctions by the Council.”615 This stance suggests that there are 
principles upheld by the Chinese delegation on a non-arbitrary basis and that, as a rule, 
interference in the domestic situations of States should not be the immediate responsibility of the 
Security Council. This stance certainly appears to be shared by Russia in some respects and both 
Russia and China have displayed strong support for the principle of national sovereignty. Such 
support often determines when each makes use of the veto power to block Security Council 
resolutions and therefore, implicitly, when they acquiesce or agree to intervention under Chapter 
VII of the Charter.  
In the case of Zimbabwe, Russia’s took the view that a draft resolution attempting to 
impose targeted sanctions and an arms embargo on the Mugabe regime in the aftermath of his re-
election in 2008 “represent[ed] nothing but an attempt by the Council to interfere in the internal 
affairs of States, contrary to the Charter.”616 China took a similar tack, stating that it “has always 
believed that negotiation and dialogue are the best approach to solving problems on the 
international level.”617 Similarly, during the debate on draft resolution S/2007/14618 on the 
situation in Myanmar, China noted that the country was “faced with a series of grave challenges 
relating to refugees, child labour, HIV/AIDS, human rights and drugs.”619 For this very reason, it 
found that the matter was one that did not meet its threshold of posing a threat to international 
peace; stating that  no one would dispute that Myanmar was faced with a series of grave 
challenges, China found that similar problems existed in many other countries as well.620  It 
would seem, then – at least in the eyes of the Chinese delegate – that the issues faced by 
Myanmar did not meet the threshold of a threat to peace and security, after having been 
examined within the wider scope of domestic troubles faces by comparable countries across the 
globe. Russia also shared this opinion, finding that Myanmar was not suitable for consideration 
                                                 
615 ibid.  
616 UNSC Verbatim Record (11 July 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5933, 9. 
617 ibid 13. Russia continued to state that “[l]ightly using or threatening to use sanctions is not conducive to solving 
problems . . . [and that b]y adopting a resolution imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe now, the Security Council would 
unavoidably be interfering with the negotiating process. That would lead to a further deterioration of the situation.”  
618 UNSC Draft Res (12 January 2007) UN Doc S/2007/14. 
619 UNSC Verbatim Record (12 January 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5619, 3. 
620 China, ibid 3: “If, because Myanmar is encountering this or that problem . . . it is to be arbitrarily labelled as a 
prominent or potential threat to regional security, . . . then the situations in all other 191 United Nations Member 
States may also need to be considered by the Security Council . . . [which] is obviously neither logical nor 
reasonable.” 
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by the Council.621 This supports the assertion of non-arbitrary behaviour; both the Russian and 
Chinese delegations have examined the facts of the situation in Zimbabwe and Myanmar and 
reached the reasoned conclusion that the situation did not pose a threat to the region.  
This stance was also the reasoning behind both Russia and China’s decisions to veto three 
resolutions622 relating to Syria. Russia, for its part, found that “proposals for wording on the non-
acceptability of foreign military intervention were not taken into account”623 and emphasised that 
it “simply cannot accept a document, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
that would open the way for the pressure of sanctions and later for external military involvement 
in Syrian domestic affairs.”624 China maintained this posture, advocating that the international 
community “fully respect Syria’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity”625 and 
highlighting that “sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries are the basic norms governing inter-State relations enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations.”626 Both Russia and China faulted these resolutions for material omissions or 
generalisations, their “unbalanced content [seeking] to put pressure on only one party”627 and 
ignoring “that the radical opposition no longer hides its extremist bent and is relying on terrorist 
tactics . . .”628; conversely, the US, UK and France advocated “changing the situation on the 
ground for better”629, invoking Chapter VII and threatening “the only party with heavy weapons, 
the Syrian regime, with sanctions if it continued to use those weapons brutally against its own 
cities and citizens.”630 
The views expressed by China and the Russian Federation on the subject of Syria – 
which “consistently maintained that the future and fate of Syria should be independently decided 
by the Syrian people, rather than imposed by outside forces”631 – mirrors the stance held for 
decades that “the United States does not believe that the Security Council or the General 
                                                 
621 Russia, ibid 6. 
622 UNSC Draft Res (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612; UNSC Draft Res (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/2012/77; 
UNSC Draft Res (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/2012/538. 
623 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, 5. 
624 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6810, 8. 
625 China, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, 5; see also, China, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711, 9. 
626 China, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6810, 13. 
627 ibid. 
628 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, 4. 
629 UK, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6810, 2. 
630 US, ibid 10.  
631 China, ibid 13. 
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Assembly should be in the business of inserting themselves into issues that the negotiating 
partners have decided will be addressed . . .”632 This commitment to the sovereignty and right to 
self-defence is, the US claims, at the foundation of its decision to use its veto powers on  
fourteen separate occasions since 1990 alone, all on “The situation in the Middle East, including 
the Palestinian question” or “The situation in the occupied Arab territories”.633 
 The meandering support of the P5 for territorial integrity and sovereignty is thus undermined 
by certain exceptions to the supposedly unshakeable values at the heart not only of the UN 
Charter but of the Council’s self-proclaimed behaviour itself. The capacity of States to transpose 
their values so readily undermines the supremacy of the law and highlights the possibility of a 
double-standard on the Council. It would appear that all three P5 members of the US, China and 
Russia are willing to momentarily overlook the principles of sovereignty when the situation 
encroaches on their interests or the interests of allies, before reverting to an original stance of 
non-intervention. As the following sub-section will examine, humanitarian intervention has also 
been cited as a reason for the suspension of State sovereign rights. 
  
VII.2.2 Humanitarian intervention 
Whilst P5 States purport to be in favour of territorial integrity and sovereignty of States,634 the 
reality is at times starkly different, humanitarian intervention has been cited as a valid reason to 
suspend the associated rights of State sovereignty, as the example of NATO intervention in 
Kosovo clearly highlights. Operation Allied Force proceeded on 24th March 1999 without any 
                                                 
632 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 March 1997) UN Doc S/PV.3756, 5. See also, US, UNSC Verbatim Record (5 
October 2004) UN Doc S/PV.5051, 2, where “[t]he Council ha[d] before it yet another draft resolution regarding the 
Middle East situation, and once again the draft resolution is lopsided and unbalanced. It is dangerously disingenuous 
because of its many material omissions . . . Consider first what the draft resolution says and then what it fails to say . 
. . The draft resolution is totally lacking in balance.” 
633 UNSC Draft Res (31 May 1990) UN Doc S/21326; UNSC Draft Res (17 May 1995) UN Doc S/1995/394; UNSC 
Draft Res (7 March 1997) UN Doc S/1997/199; UNSC Draft Res (21 March 1997) UN Doc S/1997/241; UNSC 
Draft Res (27-8 March 2001) UN Doc S/2001/270; UNSC Draft Res (14-5 December 2001) UN Doc S/2001/1199; 
UNSC Draft Res (20 December 2002) UN Doc S/2002/1385; UNSC Draft Res (16 September 2003) UN Doc 
S/2003/891; UNSC Draft Res (14 October 2003) UN Doc S/2003/980; UNSC Draft Res (25 March 2004) UN Doc 
S/2004/240; UNSC Draft Res (5 October 2004) UN Doc S/2004/783; UNSC Draft Res (13 July 2006) UN Doc 
S/2006/508; UNSC Draft Res (11 November 2006) UN Doc S/2006/878; UNSC Draft Res (18 February 2011) UN 
Doc S/2011/24. 
634 See eg China, UNSC Verbatim Record (15 June 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6143, 5: “China has always maintained that 
all States should abide by the United Nations Charter and the norms of international law. Our position on the 
principle of national sovereignty and territorial integrity has been consistent and clear”; US, ibid: “The United States 
would like to reaffirm once again in this Chamber its commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
Georgia within its internationally recognized borders.” 
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explicit, or implicit, Security Council authorisation, leading to condemnation by the Russian 
Federation of “aggression against a sovereign State . . . which was undertaken in violation of the 
United Nations Charter and in circumvention of the Security Council.”635 Two days later, a 
Council resolution co-sponsored by Belarus and the Russian Federation636 attempting to deem 
the “use of force by NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia . . . a threat to 
international peace and security”637 under Chapter VII failed to be adopted due to a failure to 
reach the required majority in accordance with the Charter;638 the bottom line – there was 
insufficient volition on the part of the Council members to condemn a breach of sovereignty. In 
fact, Council practice went even further; during discussions on the defeated resolution, NATO’s 
unilateral response was deemed to be “completely justified”639 “as an exceptional measure to 
prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe”640 and actions that “respond to Belgrade’s 
violation of its international obligations under the resolutions which the Security Council has 
adopted under Chapter VII.”641 Moreover, the subsequent resolutions that emanated from the 
Council642 urging parties to cease violence passed with no negative votes643 despite failing to 
mention the NATO transgression of the UN Charter.644 The Council had openly accepted the 
military intervention of a third party, in clear contravention of the UN Charter. 
 With the NATO intervention having successfully bypassed the Council, avenues to 
circumvention were open to Council members that could not find support within the Council to 
pursue their own motivations either as a separate alliance or unilaterally. On 20th March 2003, 
                                                 
635 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 June 1999) UN Doc S/PV.4011, 7; see, also China, ibid 8, reiterating the 
same sentiment. 
636 UNSC Draft Res (26 March 1999) UN Doc S/1999/328. 
637 ibid preamble. 
638 UN Charter (1945), art 27(3) states the need for an affirmative vote of 9 members; UNSC Draft Res S/1999/328 
gained 3 votes for and 12 abstentions. 
639 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 March 1999) UN Doc S/PV.3989, 5. 
640 UK, ibid 7. 
641 France, ibid. France’s argument was that since previous resolutions has been adopted under Chapter VII (UNSC 
Res 1160 (1998), UNSC Res 1199 (1998) and UNSC Res 1203 (1998)), NATO intervention was legitimate. 
642 UNSC Res 1239 (14 May 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1239; UNSC Res 1244 (10 June 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1244. 
643 China abstained on both. 
644 There is much authorship on the legality of the NATO intervention in Kosovo that was eventually found by The 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo to be “illegal but legitimate”, Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (OUP 2000) 4. See 
also Bruno Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ (1999) 10 EJIL 1; Noam Chomsky, The 
New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo (Pluto 1999); Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘The UN, NATO, and 
International Law after Kosovo’ (2000) 22(1) Hum Rts Q 57. 
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against strong opposition from the three non-contributing members of the P5645 and other UN 
members646, the US and allied countries, including the UK, intervened militarily in Iraq under 
the pretence of humanitarian reasons. Although an ex post facto Chapter VII resolution647 can be 
argued to have gone some way in legitimising the intervention – if only by acknowledgement 
and omission of its condemnation along the lines of the Kosovo example – and another later 
“recognising the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable 
international law of [the US and UK] as occupying powers under unified command”648, the 
intervention remains one of the most controversial moves in recent Council history, harking back 
to an era during the Cold War stalemate when direct inter-State negotiations overshadowed and 
undermined the Council.649 
 Most recently, with Syria, too, there were ruminations of unilateral action in the aftermath of 
the reports of use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime. The US has consistently maintained 
that the use of these weapons was a “red line” that Syria would not be permitted to cross without 
repercussions.650 As such, it was, by the US government’s own admission, “[i]n part because of 
                                                 
645 Russia called the intervention an “unprovoked military action . . . in violation of international law and in 
circumvention of the Charter” (UNSC Verbatim Record (26 March 2003) UN Doc S/PV.4726 (Resumption 1), 26); 
China saw the action as “a violation of the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international 
law” (ibid 28); France felt that the “conflict will be fraught with consequences for the future” (ibid). 
646 A total of 67 non-Council member States (Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, the Federated 
States of Micronesia, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Palestine, Poland, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-LesteTunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen and 
Zimbabwe) requested to be invited to participate in the first discussion of the Council after the invasion of Iraq; 
criticism of the unilateral action was clear from all speakers. See eg statements by the representatives of Malaysia 
(UNSC Verbatim Record (26 March 2003) UN Doc S/PV.4726, 8), Algeria (ibid 10), Indonesia (ibid 19), South 
Africa (ibid 20) and Brazil (ibid 28). 
647 UNSC Res 1472 (28 March 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1472. 
648 UNSC Res 1483 (22 May 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1483, preamble. UNSC Res 1511 (16 October 2003) UN Doc 
S/RES/1511 further legitimised the occupying powers, reaffirming the temporary Coalition Provisional Authority, 
the interim administration and calling for a political timetable. 
649 For example, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was averted due to an agreement between US President Kennedy 
and USSR leader Khrushchev with the assistance of UN Secretary-General U Thant, not the Council. 
650 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps’ (Washington DC, 20 August 2012): 
“We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we 
start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. 
That would change my equation.” See also, ‘Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Reinfeldt of Sweden 
in Joint Press Conference’ (Rosenbad, 4 September 2013), where President Obama stated that “Congress set a red 
line when it indicated that -- in a piece of legislation titled the Syria Accountability Act -- that some of the 
horrendous things that are happening on the ground there need to be answered for.” 
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the credible threat of U.S. military action, as well as constructive talks that I had with President 
Putin . . . [that t]he Assad regime has now admitted that it has these weapons, and even said 
they’d join the Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits their use”651 – a unilateral show 
of force by the US, in circumvention of the Security Council, in conjunction with inter-State 
diplomacy away from the UN, has lead the way to the most realistic prospects of solving the 
crisis in Syria. Such military action clearly had no basis in the UN Charter and the threat of its 
use by a P5 member of the Security Council, just as with Kosovo and Iraq before it, undermines 
not only the legitimacy of the Council but also its adherence to the international rule of law.  
Three courses of action have been displayed in recent decades on the part of the Security 
Council with respect to humanitarian intervention. The first, exemplified by NATO intervention 
in Kosovo and US/UK-led intervention in Iraq, is unilateral intervention in the absence of 
explicit Chapter VII Council mandates, unequivocally contrary to the UN Charter; the second, 
exemplified by the authorised NATO interventions in the Former Yugoslavia and Libya, is 
intervention for humanitarian reasons with an explicit Chapter VII resolution from the Council, 
acting in accordance with the procedure of the Charter; and the third, typified by the situation in 
Syria, is that of the Council failing to reach any agreement on the course forwards beyond 
rhetoric on the Council652 due to a lack of volition on the part of the Council members at the 
domestic level.653 There cannot be said to exist a pattern of behaviour in the humanitarian 
intervention record of the Council; nor can it be argued that the Council has evolved in its 
approach from one of impunity to one of adherence to the rule of law, or vice versa, since there 
                                                 
651 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria’ (Washington DC, 10 September 
2013). 
652 As previously discussed, resolutions UNSCR Res 2118 (2013) and UNSCR Res 2139 (2014) were not adopted 
under Chapter VII, despite being strongly worded. There is no threat of action to be taken under Articles 40 and 41 
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653 The UK Parliament voted down a motion to respond to the crisis in Syria that “may, if necessary, require military 
action that is legal, proportionate and focused on saving lives” by 285-272, House of Commons Votes and 
Proceedings (London, 29 August 2013) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmvote/130829v01.htm> accessed 16 December 2014; 
although the Congressional vote was postponed by President Barack Obama, according to an NBC News/Wall 
Street Journal poll, 58% of Americans wanted the US Congress to vote against a resolution authorizing military 
action in Syria in late 2013. See NBC News/Wall Street Journal Survey (Hart Research Associates/Public Opinion 
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resources/documents/WSJpoll09052013.pdf> accessed 16 December 2014; 64% of the French population were 
against a military intervention against the Assad regime. See, ‘Sondage. Syrie: 64% de Français sont contre une 
intervention française’ Le Parisien (Paris, 30 Aug 2013) <http://www.leparisien.fr/politique/syrie-64-des-francais-
contre-une-intervention-francaise-30-08-2013-3093841.php> accessed 16 December 2014. 
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is no chronological evidence to support this claim. The Council chose to intervene in 
Bosnia/Herzegovina conflict from 1991 onwards,654 then failed to do so in Rwanda prior to a 
genocide in 1994,655 before acquiescing to NATO intervention in Kosovo without authorisation 
in 1999, legitimising the Iraqi invasion by multinational forces after the fact, intervening in 
Libya in 2011, whilst failing to do so in Syria until today. The Council’s record of intervention 
on humanitarian grounds is seemingly peppered with inconsistencies. 
 
VII.3 Civilian nuclear programs: an arbitrary standard? 
The case of Iran’s nuclear program also highlights an arbitrary and unpredictable response by the 
Council. Iran has always maintained that its pursuit of nuclear technology is entirely for civilian 
purposes and non-militarily motivated due to both treaty and religious obligations.656 To date, 
there has been no conclusive IAEA evidence of any nuclear weapons constructed or possessed 
by Iran; the stance taken by the IAEA, despite credible information that “Iran has carried out 
activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device”657 is one of 
ambiguity – there is no evidence one way or the other.658 Likewise, no intelligence points in that 
                                                 
654 Beginning with UNSC Res 713 (25 September 1991) UN Doc S/RES/713, numerous resolutions emerged from 
the Council authorising and extending NATO’s mandates as well as imposing sanctions. See eg UNSC Res 743 (21 
February 1991) UN Doc S/RES/743; UNSC Res 757 (30 May 1992) UN Doc S/RES/757; UNSC Res 781 (9 
October 1992) UN Doc S/RES/781; UNSC Res 787 (16 November 1992) UN Doc S/RES/787; UNSC Res 816 (31 
March 1993) UN Doc S/RES/816. This ran parallel to the establishment of an international tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia under UNSC Res 827 (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827, established to prosecute the perpetrators of 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws of war, genocide and crimes against humanity. 
655 The ICTR was established after the genocides. The UN Force Commander in Rwanda, Lt. Gen Roméo Dallaire, 
details how, based on an informant he was put in contact with in Rwanda, reliable explicit and detailed knowledge 
of planned genocides and attacks on Belgian-national UN Peacekeepers on the ground emerged, which he then 
immediately relayed to UN Headquarters to no avail, Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil (Arrow 2003) 
142-147. See also, generally Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our 
Families (Picador 2000). Following the massacre at a school on April 6th 1994, Chapter VII intervention was ruled 
out as “not feasible, considering that no such force can be raised immediately” (Nigeria, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(21 April 1994) UN Doc S/PV.3368, 2) and UNSC Res 912 additionally reduced the UN Assistance Mission in 
Rwanda to just 270 men (UNSC Resolution 912 (21 April 1994) UN Doc S/RES/912). Genocide is mentioned in all 
but name for the first time in UNSC Resolution 918 (17 May 1994) UN Doc S/RES/918, at which point the death 
toll was already an estimated 500,000. 
656 See, eg Iran, UNGA Verbatim Record (17 September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.10, 8: ‘Iran stopped nuclear 
weapons program as sinful – Rouhani’ Russia Today (1 March 2014) <http://rt.com/news/iran-banned-nuclear-
weapons-347> accessed 16 December 2014. See also, Iran, UNSC Verbatim Record (23 December 2006) UN Doc 
S/PV.5612, at 9, in response to the adoption of resolution 1737. 
657 IAEA ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council 
resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (20 February 2014) GOV/2014/10, ¶64. 
658 ibid ¶74: “While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear 
facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not in a position to provide 
credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude 
that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.” 
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direction from US,659 Israeli660 and Russian661 sources or factual evidence662 that Iran is in 
pursuit of nuclear weaponry. Nonetheless, since 2006, Iran has been subject to no less than ten663 
Security Council resolutions as a result of its nuclear activities and the US has made no effort to 
hide its conviction that it “would still be a profound national-security interest of the United 
States to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.”664 Iranian attempts to achieve civilian 
nuclear power are not newfound or recent ambitions at all665 and were initially supported by both 
China666 and Russia667 before Beijing’s668 and Washington’s669 suspicions that Iran sought 
nuclear weapons despite the fact that “it appears that the Natanz facility was designed to produce 
low-enriched uranium for nuclear power fuel, rather than weapons-grade uranium for a military 
                                                 
659 See eg ‘Remarks as delivered by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence to the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence’ (Washington DC, 29 January 2014), 5 
<http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/WWTA%20 
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Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov stated that “until now, it had not been clearly proven that Iran intends to develop 
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662 Iran announced that its “Bushehr nuclear power plant joined the national power grid” in September 2011. See, eg 
‘Iran’s Bushehr plant joins national grid’ Press TV (Tehran, 4 September 2011) <http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/ 
197346.html> accessed 16 December 2014. 
663 UNSC Res 1696 (31 July 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1696; UNSC Res 1737 (27 December 2006) UN Doc 
S/RES/1737; UNSC Res 1747 (24 March 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1747; UNSC Res 1803 (3 March 2008) UN Doc 
S/RES/1803; UNSC Res 1835 (27 September 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1835; UNSC Res 1887 (24 September 2009) 
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S/RES/2105. 
664 Jeffery Goldberg, ‘Obama to Iran and Israel: ‘As President of the United States, I Don't Bluff’’ The Atlantic 
(Washington DC, 2 March 2012) <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/obama-to-iran-and-israel-as-
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Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2005) 303. 
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Strategic Weapon Programmes: A Net Assessment (Routledge 2005) 13. 
668 ibid. 
669 ibid 14. 
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programme.”670 Even the 2002 announcement by the National Council of Resistance of Iran 
(NCRI) that Iran had hidden the existence of both the Natanz and Arak facilities671 did not imply 
a violation of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.672  
Undeniably, there was no unequivocal evidence available to the Council itself that 
nuclear weaponry was the aim of the Iranian regime, even prior to the implementation of its first 
resolution on the matter, where “Iran’s nuclear activities and its history of concealment raise[d] 
pressing questions about whether Iran’s programme is, as it claims, solely for civil purposes.”673 
It was this concealment that lay at the root of the adoption of UNSC Res 1696,674 based on “the 
view of the Security Council regarding the need for Iran to . . . clarify outstanding questions 
regarding its nuclear activities”675 and “the establishment of international confidence in the 
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”676 In a departure from the standard 
formula for the adoption of Chapter VII resolutions discussed previously in this thesis, UNSC 
Res 1696 – despite being adopted “under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations in order to make mandatory the suspension required by the IAEA”677 – fails to identify 
the threat to international peace under article 39 and therefore “[c]alls upon Iran without delay to 
take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors . . . [and d]emands, in this context, that 
Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities”678 without legal basis or clarity. 
Even the IAEA indicated in its reports “in November 2004, and again in September 2005, all the 
nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for . . . [and] the Agency has not seen any diversion 
of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”679; yet “the history of 
concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities . . . and resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s 
nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are 
                                                 
670 ibid 14 ff. 
671 ‘Remarks by Alireza Jafarzadeh on New Information on Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime’s Nuclear 
Program’ (Washington DC, 14 August 2002) <http://www.iranwatch.org/library/ncri-new-information-top-secret-
nuclear-projects-8-14-02> accessed 16 December 2014. 
672 Iran was not required to declare the facility until 180 days prior to introduction of any nuclear material to the 
facility under Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. 
673 UK, UNSC Verbatim Record (31 July 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5500, 4.  
674 UNSC Res 1696 (31 July 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1696. 
675 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (31 July 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5500, 5. 
676 China, ibid 6. 
677 UNSC Res 1696 (31 July 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1696, preamble. 
678 ibid ¶1. 
679 IAEA ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (27 February 2006) 
GOV/2006/15, ¶53. See, also, IAEA ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran’ (8 June 2006) GOV/2006/38, ¶18, where environmental samples previously taken from Iranian dual use 
materials were analysed and showed “no indication of the presence of particles of nuclear material.” 
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within the competence of the Security Council”680 and the alleged Iranian matter was referred to 
the Council in February 2006 for “Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply 
with its NPT Safeguards Agreement.”681 
UNSC Res 1696 is also in many ways self-contradictory. The NPT stipulates that 
“[n]othing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to 
the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty”682, a standard that 
is referred to not only explicitly by the IAEA itself in its resolutions on Iran,683 but also by the 
Security Council in its own resolutions684 and discussions.685 Articles I and II relate solely to the 
transfer or receipt of nuclear weapons or information on their construction respectively; there is 
no indication of any IAEA safeguards or criteria to be met, which in turn fall under Article III of 
the NPT.686 Thus, on the one hand, by reaffirming this principle in the preamble of UNSC Res 
1696, the Council is actively supporting the NPT and its underlying aims, goals and allowances; 
on the other hand, the Council then demands that Iran suspend “all enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities, including research and development.”687 This demand is based solely on 
                                                 
680 IAEA ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (2 September 2005) 
GOV/2005/77, ¶2. 
681 IAEA ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (4 February 2006) 
GOV/2006/14, (g). 
682 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970), art 4. 
683 See eg IAEA ‘Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations 
Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (13 September 2012) GOV/2012/50, (f); IAEA 
‘Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council 
resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (18 November 2011) GOV/2011/69, (e); IAEA ‘Implementation of the 
NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 
(2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (27 November 2009) GOV/2009/82, (d); IAEA 
‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (4 February 2006) 
GOV/2006/14, (c); IAEA ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (2 
September 2005) GOV/2005/77, (b); IAEA ‘Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and related Board resolutions’ (11 August 2005) GOV/2005/64, (g); IAEA ‘Implementation of the 
NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (29 November 2004) GOV/2004/90, (i); IAEA 
‘Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council 
resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (18 September 2004) GOV/2004/79, (f). 
684 UNSC Res 1673 (27 April 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1673, preamble; UNSC Res 1696 (31 July 2006) UN Doc 
S/RES/1696, preamble; UNSC Res 1737 (27 December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1737, preamble; UNSC Res 1747 (24 
March 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1747, preamble; UNSC Res 1803 (3 March 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1803, preamble; 
UNSC Res 1929 (9 June 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1929, preamble. 
685 See, eg UNSC Presidential Statement 15 (2006) UN Doc S/PRST/2006/15; the UK representative offered “active 
support in the building of light-water power reactors in Iran . . . and legally binding assurances relating to the supply 
of nuclear material”, UNSC Verbatim Record (31 July 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5500, 4. 
686 Moreover, Article IV of the NPT grants the right to participate in the “fullest possible exchange of equipment, 
materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” 
687 UNSC Res 1696 (31 July 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1696, ¶2. 
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the failure by Iran to comply with the IAEA safeguards – governed by Article III of the NPT – 
and the evaporation of confidence in Iranian sincerity in its declared pursuit of pacific nuclear 
technology – which is entirely subjective, speculative and contradictory to the intelligence of the 
international community; the Council undermines its own authority and interjects itself into the 
sovereign matters of a State as legally governed and permitted by an international treaty – the 
NPT – a matter over which it holds no jurisdiction.  
One might argue that it is not the violation of the NPT itself that is the threat to the peace 
but rather the actions of Iran in allegedly attempting to build and maintain weapons of mass 
destruction and means of their delivery. However, this argument can easily be weakened by the 
allowances granted to both India and Pakistan – which have made no efforts to hide their 
animosity for one another688 and can be argued to pose a risk to the stability of the region, as 
explored in Chapter IV.3.2 of this thesis – and which have had exceptions to international 
treaties made for them by P5 members.689  Therefore, if the pursuit of nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems is a threat to the peace separate from the NPT, which the adoption of the matter 
by the Council suggests, then these States should be held accountable; this has not happened. 
Another argument might be the threat of “break-out” capabilities – namely the capacity of a State 
teetering over the edge of sufficient enrichment to cross over from having only enough for 
civilian purposes to one with weapons-grade enriched uranium. This can also be dispelled based 
on the current status of Japan, one of the main advocates for Council action against the DPRK;690 
                                                 
688 There have been three wars between the two countries since 1947 and the disputed territory of Kashmir remains a 
source of great disharmony between the two; the issue of nuclear war between the two has also never truly been 
discounted and according to the chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board, “the central tenet of [the 
Indian] nuclear doctrine . . . [is] that India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but that if it is attacked with 
such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable 
damage on the adversary”. See Shayam Saran, ‘Lecture at the India Habitat Centre’ (New Delhi, 24 April 2013) 
<http://ris.org.in/publications/reportsbooks/654> accessed 16 December 2014. 
689 The Agreement for the Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of India concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (2005) had support from France, UK and the 
Russia and was a step towards the landmark waiver of exemption for India in the Nuclear Supply Group, since it had 
signed neither the NPT nor the CTBT; China, as discussed previously, contravened the guidelines of the Nuclear 
Supplies Group in supplying Pakistan with nuclear energy in the absence of its acceptance of the NPT. 
690 Japan called for several emergency meetings of the Council in its letters eg ‘Letter dated 4 July 2006 from the 
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (5 July 
2006) UN Doc S/2006/481, that led to a meeting on 14 October 2006 resulting in the adoption of UNSC Res 1718 
(2006); ‘Letter dated 5 April 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to 
the President of the Security Council’ (5 April 2009) UN Doc S/2009/176 leading to UNSC Presidential Statement 
S/PRST/2009/7 (2009); ‘Letter dated 25 May 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (25 May 2009) UN Doc S/2009/271, leading to 
resolution 1874 (2009). Japan has also be extremely critical of the DPRK regime during discussion, eg UNSC 
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at the most recent declaration in 2013, Japan held over nine tonnes of unirradiated separated 
plutonium on its soil691 and a further thirty-five tons in France and the UK,692 in addition to 
going live with the Rokkasho reprocessing facility in late-2014.693 In total, Japan is estimated to 
have enough material to construct 5,000 nuclear bombs694 through weapons-grade plutonium, 
which is increasingly concerning given the fact that Japan’s civilian nuclear program is based 
almost entirely on another source of nuclear power – enriched uranium.  
 
VII.4 Conclusions 
The principle of avoidance of arbitrariness, combined with individuality of State situations, 
requires not only that the Council address the situation but also that it explain the reason for any 
departure from previous behaviour based on factual evidence. There has been no such 
presentation of facts by the Council; Iran poses no apparent threat to the international community 
and yet it has been arbitrarily subjected to sanctions. Japan maintains that its nuclear program is 
for pacific purposes and the international community has shown no considerable doubt over 
this;695 Iran has claimed the same and has been subjected to numerous rounds of sanctions and 
has been the source of discussion at the Council and externally in diplomatic talks. Based upon 
the manner in which the Council has dealt with Japan, it would be realistic to expect that Iran 
may predict that it would be dealt with in the same fashion. There have been no repercussions 
against Japan; accordingly, the Iranian government – in tandem with the provisions of 
international treaties to which it is party – may note that there are no violations of international 
principles in its actions. Moreover, the Council – and constituent member States – have respected 
                                                                                                                                                             
Verbatim Record (15 July 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5490, 2f; it has also taken part in the discussions on the Iranian 
regime actions taken (eg UNSC Verbatim Record (23 December 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5612) and supported the 
passing of resolutions against Iran eg UNSC Res 1737 (2006) and UNSC Res 1874 (2009). 
691 IAEA ‘Communication Received from Japan Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium’ 
(26 September 2013) INFCIRC/549/Add.1/16, Annex B. 
692 ibid; see also, eg Douglas Birch, R Jeffrey Smith and Jake Adelstein, ‘Unarmed Guards, Bogus Terror Drills, and 
96 Tons of Plutonium’ Foreign Policy (Washington DC, 10 March 2014) <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/10/ 
unarmed-guards-bogus-terror-drills-and-96-tons-of-plutonium> accessed 16 December 2014. 
693 This facility is estimated to be capable of nine metric tonnes of plutonium annually, equivalent to 2,000 nuclear 
weapons. See, Jay Solomon and Miho Inada, ‘Japan's Nuclear Plan Unsettles US’ The Wall Street Journal (New 
York, 1 May 2013) <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324582004578456943867189804> accessed 
16 December 2014. 
694 Robert Windrem, ‘Japan Has Nuclear 'Bomb in the Basement,' and China Isn't Happy’ NBC News (New York, 11 
March 2014) <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushima-anniversary/japan-has-nuclear-bomb-basement-china-
isnt-happy-n48976> accessed 16 December 2014. 
695 There have been mild protestations by States such as the US and China, which have nonetheless failed to reach 
the Council. 
137 
 
the sovereignty and rights of Japan to peaceful nuclear progress, whereas in the case of Iran, 
unclear foundation for jurisdiction have given rise to the usurping of powers belonging to the ICJ 
and the trespassing on the rights of States under international law to extend its powers beyond 
the functions and authority granted in the UN Charter. Based upon this research and the notable 
disparity in response to threats around the world, it is seemingly evident that there is arbitrary 
behaviour and unpredictability in the Council’s decision-making process. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONSISTENCY WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS AND STANDARDS 
 
“[I]t is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to 
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected 
by the rule of law . . .”696 
 
VIII.1 Introduction 
The issue of human rights at the Security Council can be interpreted as comprising two elements- 
firstly, there is the consideration of human rights implications as substantive issues that affect the 
maintenance of international peace and security; that is to say that there are threats to the 
international peace and security that arise from human rights violations and concerns perpetrated 
against civilians either by their own governments or another,697 such as ethnic cleansing698 or 
protection of civilians,699 to which the Council must not turn a blind eye and which therefore 
instigate Council action. As UN Secretary General Annan declared in 2000, “no legal principle – 
not even sovereignty – can ever shield crimes against humanity. Where such crimes occur and 
peaceful attempts to halt them have been exhausted, the Security Council has a moral duty to act 
on behalf of the international community.”700 These fall under a straightforward assessment of 
the threat to international peace and may potential instigate Council action under Chapter VII. 
This thesis has discussed intervention for humanitarian reasons in section VII.2.2 and as a result I 
will not enter into a lengthy discussion of Council intervention on humanitarian and human 
rights grounds. 
The second intersection of human rights with the rule of law at the Council level is more 
internalised and comes in the form of the Council’s awareness and efforts to accommodate 
international human rights principles and standards in its own actions – actions that do not focus 
                                                 
696 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 (A(III) (UDHR) preamble. 
697 Such as the right to life, freedom of expression, self-determination of peoples and other commonly acknowledged 
civil, political, cultural and economic rights, many of which have been enshrined in international conventions such 
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.  
698 eg UNSC Res 819 (16 April 1993) UN Doc S/RES/819 and UNSC Res 836 (4 June 1993) UN Doc S/RES/836 
on the humanitarian concerns of the Council in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. 
699 See, UNSC Res 1894 (11 November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1894 on compliance with international humanitarian, 
human rights and refugee law. 
700 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century’ 
(2000) UN Doc A/54/2000, ¶219. 
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primarily on responding to a human rights abuse per se. This component of the rule of law – 
compliance with international human rights norms – addresses whether the Security Council 
firstly, should be and, secondly, feels itself bound by the principles of international human rights 
law in its decision-making process; this Chapter attempts to identify what measures, if any, the 
Council takes  to accommodate human rights concerns when taking a decision. Although it might 
be argued that many threats to the international peace touch on human rights issues – such as the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons,701 international terrorism702 or piracy703 – this component of 
the rule of law examines whether the Council’s response to such threats itself incorporates an 
alertness to human rights concerns. Such “non-substantive” human rights issues may come 
about, for example, in situations where the Council imposes country-wide economic or targeted 
sanctions and where it decides to authorise military intervention or peacekeeping missions are 
established.704   
In contrast to a response to a human rights violation by the Council – which requires a 
pro-active response using legal and political machinery at its disposal under the Charter to 
violations of human rights perpetrated by governments and non-State actors – consistency with 
international human rights norms and standards is an intrinsic obligation that the Council must 
comply with international human rights norms in the passing of resolutions. Human rights are 
therefore useful as a component of the international rule of law as both a catalyst for action and 
as parameters to the actions of the Security Council; consequently, it is important to examine to 
what extent the Council allows itself to be limited by human rights as a consideration prior to or 
during its decision-making process and I intend to examine whether the Council shows 
compulsion to abide by international human rights law in its Chapter VII resolutions, evidenced 
by explicit statements either by States themselves in verbatim records or by the text of 
resolutions that are passed by the Council. Moreover, this component questions whether there is 
                                                 
701 eg UNSC Res 984 (11 April 1995) UN Doc S/RES/984, adopting the stance that everything must be done to 
avoid nuclear war and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weaponry. 
702 See, eg UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267 establishing the Al-Qaida and Taliban 
Committee. 
703 See eg S/RES/1816 (2008) authorising action against piracy in Somalia. 
704 For a general introduction and discussion of the difference between Human Rights as substantive and incidental 
concerns of the Council, see eg Bardo Fassbender, ‘The Role for Human Rights in the Decision-making Process’, in 
Bardo Fassbender (ed), Securing Human Rights?: Achievements and Challenges of the UN Security Council (OUP 
2010) 88, where there are five tentative types of Council action that intersect with human rights. See also, Sidney D 
Bailey, The UN Security Council and Human Rights (Macmillan 1994); Jared Genser and Bruno Stagno Ugarte 
(eds), The United Nations Security Council in the Age of Human Rights (CUP 2014). 
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a pattern of compliance, or, in the event that human rights have not historically been considered 
by the Council in its decision-making process, a movement towards reform in its attitude and the 
gradual inclusion of human rights considerations when reaching a decision. 
This component also links somewhat to that of the predictability paradox in Chapter VII 
of this thesis insofar as the risk of a double-standard emerging; the Council has been vociferous 
in advocating the promotion of human rights both in the peacekeeping and observer missions that 
it has mandated705 and in the course of other resolutions adopted706 since the 1990s and it would 
undoubtedly attract allegations that the Council sees itself as superior to the law should it not 
comply internally with the same principles that it advocates externally.  
 
VIII.2 The case for applicability of human rights and humanitarian law to the Council 
Although it would instinctively appear to exemplify a double standard should the Council fail to 
incorporate the very same standards to its own decision-making process that it advocates on a 
global basis through its Chapter VII powers in situations and areas where human rights concerns 
are deemed to exist, there are also compelling legal arguments that support the implementation 
of human rights considerations upon the Council’s behaviour. In general, since its establishment 
in 1945, the UN has dedicated a large part of its work to human rights issues, not least with the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 and various international treaties and 
covenants,707 the enshrined principles of which have since passed into customary international 
law. It would therefore be remiss to argue that there is no basis upon which to argue that the 
Council should be held to maintain a standard of human rights in both its substantive and non-
substantive human rights decisions.708  
                                                 
705 See eg UNSC Res 925 (8 June 1994) UN Doc S/RES/925 on Rwanda; UNSC Res 976 (8 February 1995) UN 
Doc S/RES/976 on Angola; UNSC Res 993 (12 May 1995) UN Doc S/RES/993 on Georgia; UNSC Res 1001 (10 
June 1995) UN Doc S/RES/1001 on Liberia. 
706 See eg UNSC Res 1034 (21 December 1995) UN Doc S/RES/1034 on Yugoslavia; UNSC Res 1076 (22 October 
1996) UN Doc S/RES/1076 on Afghanistan; UNSC Res 1199 (23 September 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1199 on 
Kosovo; UNSC Res 1265 (17 September 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1265 on the protection of civilians in armed 
conflicts. 
707 eg Convention on the Rights of the Child, The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
The Convention against Torture, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
708 See Mariano J Aznar-Gomez ‘A Decade of Human Rights Protection by the UN Security Council: A Sketch of 
Deregulation?’ (2002) 13(1) EJIL 221. 
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Orakhelashvili sets the standard for testing the Council’s actions against those of jus 
cogens norms,709 in contrast to this research which will expand this standard to include wider 
human rights issues. Jus cogens norms relate to the most heinous of crimes that can be 
committed and are norms upon which all States are able to agree upon, having the widest base of 
support but an inverse-proportionately narrow scope; that is to say, to gain the widest acceptance 
from States, it is only the highest-ranking, and least number of, crimes that can be outlawed. 
Furthermore, these are agreed upon by States in a customary manner – insofar as they are not 
enshrined in any text – and thus jus cogens is an insufficient code of conduct for two reasons: 
firstly, there is no concrete definition of what constitutes a jus cogens norm and, secondly, even 
those touted as being peremptory norms are a handful at best, continuing to grant the Council all 
but free-reign in its actions and defeating the purpose of this research. As such, there are myriad 
violations of human rights law that can be perpetrated outside of the narrow scope of jus cogens.  
However, the absence of extensive human rights protections in the Charter is a result of 
the lack of consideration they were granted in the mid-20th Century; for as valuable and integral 
as human rights are widely accepted to be both nationally and internationally today, “when the 
UN Charter was drafted, human rights were at the international level still moral postulates and 
political principles only.”710 This stance is supported by the non-binding nature of the UDHR 
and the fact that it would be a further twenty years before legally binding treaties – the ICCPR 
and ICESR – would be adopted by States and thirty years before they would come into force, in 
1976. Moreover, the UN is excluded from both the ICCPR and ICESCR, which focus on the 
actions and obligations of States rather than international organisations711 and the UN is not party 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocols or any other human rights 
treaties due, officially, to the fact that the UN is not “substantively in a position to become party 
to the 1949 Conventions, which contain many obligations that can only be discharged by the 
exercise of juridical and administrative powers which the Organization does not possess . . .”712 
A differentiation must also be made between the accession of States to treaties relating to 
international human rights law or the imposition of customary international norms upon States 
                                                 
709 Orakhelashvili (n 53) 178 
710 Fassbender (n 704) 79. 
711 Art 48 of the ICCPR allows only States to accede to the treaty and even the language used in the texts, referring 
to ‘State Parties’, excludes entities that do not fit such a description. 
712 ‘Legal Opinion of the Secretariat of the United Nations, Question of the Possible Accession of Intergovernmental 
Organizations to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims’ [1972] UN Jurid Ybk 153, ¶3. 
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and the exercise of power by those very same States through the Council as a UN organ; it may 
be argued that States have obligations both domestically and internationally under international 
law that do not exist as an organ when deliberating or passing resolutions in their respective 
Council seats.713 
This does not immediately preclude the Council from an obligation to respect human 
rights law in its decision-making process. The applicability of rule of law components generally, 
which include the respect for human rights, has explicitly been highlighted by Secretaries-
General not only in Annan’s original 2004 enumeration of rule of law components,714 but again 
in 2008, by Ban Ki-Moon, who reiterated that “rules of international law apply mutatis mutandis 
to the Organization as they do to States.”715 As is the case with other components of the rule of 
law, the first point of reference when examining the duties and responsibilities of the Council 
itself should be the Charter; “[t]he United Nations is a creation of international law, established 
by treaty, and its activities are governed by the rules set out in its Charter.”716 The Council is 
bound under the Charter to act “in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations,”717 of which both “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms”718 and the maintenance of peace and security “in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law”719 both feature. Overarching both these principles, 
and the Charter itself, are the goals of the United Nations as an organisation, one of which is “to 
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and 
other sources of international law can be maintained.”720 It would be illogical and undermine the 
core principles of the UN as an organisation if the Council were to ignore international law in the 
decision-making process. It has even been postulated that, according to principles of venire 
                                                 
713 For a more lengthy discussion of this issue, see eg Fassbender (n 704) 80-2. 
714 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict 
Societies’ (2004) UN Doc S/2004/616, ¶6. 
715 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations rule of law activities’ (6 
August 2008) UN Doc A/63/226, ¶27. 
716 ibid. 
717 UN Charter (1945) art 24(2) 
718 ibid art 1(3). 
719 ibid art 1(1). 
720 ibid preamble. 
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contra factum proprium721 the Council is bound by estoppel to abide by the same human rights 
standards that it advocates.722 
In Council-mandated operations too, there have been developments in the applicability of 
human rights and humanitarian law; where individuals have been affected directly by Council-
mandated action, there have been standards imposed upon UN personnel on the ground. In 1999, 
the Secretary-General emphasised the need for “fundamental principles and rules of international 
humanitarian law applicable to United Nations forces conducting operations under United 
Nations command and control.”723 In the post-conflict environment of East Timor, the UN 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) – “endowed [under Council resolution 
1272 (1999)] with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor empowered to 
exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice”724 – 
imposed upon “all persons undertaking public duties or holding public office in East Timor . . .  
internationally recognized human rights standards”725 of a wide variety, from the non-derogable 
to the non-legally binding;726 in Kosovo, too, the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) was under obligation to observe the same “internationally recognized human rights 
standards.”727 These standards are wide-ranging, comprehensive and based on legally binding 
                                                 
721 “No one may set himself in contradiction to his own previous conduct”. See, Bryan A Garner (ed), Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th edn, Thomson West 1990) 1039. Fassbender has argued that this maxim “is a general principle of 
law as defined by Art 38(1)(c) ICJ Statute . . . [and i]n accordance with that concept, it may be said that the 
development of international human rights law since 1945, to which the work of the United Nations has decisively 
contributed, has given grounds for legitimate expectations that the United Nations itself, when its action has a direct 
impact on the rights and freedoms of an individual, strictly observes human rights and fundamental freedoms”, see 
Bardo Fassbender, ‘Human Rights Obligations and the UN Security Council’ in Pieter H F Bekker, Rudolf Dolzer & 
Michael Waibel (eds), Making Transitional Law Work in the Global Economy: Essays in Honour of Detlev Vagts 
(CUP 2010) 82. 
722 See Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (CUP 2003) 439. See also, Reinisch (n 49). 
723 ‘Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law’ 
(6 August 1999) ST/SGB/1999/13. 
724 UNTAET ‘Regulation No 1999/1 on the Authority of the Transitional Administration in East Timor’ (27 
November 1999) UNTAET/REG/1991/1, preamble. 
725 ibid s 8. 
726 ibid: “The Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 10 December 1948; The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 and its Protocols; The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966; The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 
21 December 1965; The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 17 
December 1979; The Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment of 17 December 1984; The International Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989.” 
727 UNMIK ‘Regulation No 2000/59 Amending UNMIK Regulation No 1999/24 on the Law Applicable in Kosovo’ 
(27 October 2000) UNMIK/REG/2000/59, ¶1.3. These standards were: “The Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights of 10 December 1948; The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of 4 November 1950 and the Protocols thereto; The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
of 16 December 1966 and the Protocols thereto; The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
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international treaties; it would seem contradictory for peacekeeping operations to be required to 
comply with human rights law and principles when the organ that legitimises and authorises 
them itself fails to do so. 
Extending, therefore, the thesis that the Council must be bound by the rule of law, UN 
organs must be held to the same standards that they attempt to promote, of which human rights is 
surely one. Indeed, the increased preponderance of international human rights law works in 
favour of the assertion that the Council should be held to the same standards as States; as human 
rights instruments have increased in number and scope – to which, of course, the UN itself has 
contributed in no small part – so too the expectation that where the Council’s decisions impact 
upon the rights and freedoms protected by those instruments, for example through the imposition 
of sanction regimes or military intervention, has grown more acute. As early as 1950, this 
argument was being promoted by Lauterpacht.728 The Council, then, as an organ of the United 
Nations, has certain legal obligations to ensure that human rights are respected when making 
decisions. In a departure from the early 20th Century where human rights were an afterthought or 
optional consideration in the decision-making process for the Council, there has been growing 
support for the non-derogability of human rights in the Council procedure where individuals are 
concerned. Brownlie goes even further to suggest that human rights are as integral a 
consideration as any other element: 
 
Even if the political organs have a wide margin of appreciation in determining 
that they have competence by virtue of Chapter VI or Chapter VII, and further, in 
making dispositions to maintain or restore international peace and security, it does 
not follow that the selection of the modalities of implementation is unconstrained 
by legality. Indeed when the rights of individuals are involved, the application of 
human rights standards is a legal necessity. Human rights now form part of the 
concept of the international public order.729 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rights of 16 December 1966; The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21 
December 1965.” 
728 Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (Stephens & Sons 1950) 159: “[t]he provisions of the 
Charter on the subject [of human rights] impose legal obligations not only upon the Members of the United Nations . 
. . [but also] a comprehensive legal obligation upon the United Nations as a whole.” 
729 Ian Brownlie, ‘The Decisions of Political Organs of the United Nations and the Rule of Law’ in Ronald St John 
Macdonald (ed), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (Nijhoff 1993) 102 [emphasis added]. 
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Moreover, it would appear there is a longstanding acceptance amongst scholars that 
international organisations are bound by customary international law;730 thus, the UDHR and 
treaties governed by the Charter-based and Treaty-based organs of the UN should also be 
incorporated into the human rights standards of the Council. These binding and non-binding 
documents, some of which – such as the ICCPR – have passed into customary international law, 
reflect the purposes, intentions, goals and objectives of the UN Charter and, by extension, the 
organs of the UN itself, including the Council. Therefore, by extension, a wide array of standards 
should be applicable to the Council in its decision-making process, including not only jus cogens 
norms such as the prohibition on torture, but also the full ambit of treaty and customary 
international human rights law that has evolved over the years from the non-binding UDHR.731 It 
would seem conclusive that the Council should be obliged to act with respect and due attention 
to human rights considerations; however, it remains to be established whether the Council sees 
this itself and whether it has taken step to ensure that it complies with this element of the rule of 
law. 
 
VIII.3 Human rights violations as a threat to the international peace 
The Council itself has conceded that the rule of law should apply internally to the United Nations 
in a Council presidential statement from 2010, where it “expressed its commitment to ensure that 
all UN efforts to restore peace and security themselves respect and promote the rule of law.”732 
Respect for human rights, as examined in Chapter II, has generally been accepted to form part of 
the rule of law both domestically and internationally; it would, therefore, appear that a more 
explicit commitment and admission of the applicability of the rule of law to the Council, by 
extension from the UN, in its responsibility to maintain and restore the international peace 
cannot be made. However, the Council has not always granted such accord to the principles of 
human rights either as an issue that falls within its jurisdiction or as a concept that applies to it 
internally. 
                                                 
730 Henry G Schermers and Niels M Blokker, International Institutional Law:Unity Within Diversity (Nijhoff 2011) 
824; Derek W Bowett, The Law of International Institutions (Stevens & Sons 1982) 366; Pierre-Marie Dupuy and 
Yann Kerbat, Droit International Public 143 (Dalloz 2014). 
731 For further discussion, see eg Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (OUP 2008) 
37-8. 
732 UNSC Presidential Statement 11 (2010) UN Doc S/PRST/2010/11, 2. 
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Although discussions at the Council level about human rights as an issue have 
undoubtedly grown in number and scope since the end of the Cold War, prior to 1990 it would 
appear that human rights was a topic seldom broached as a result of the deadlock between the 
superpowers.733 UNSC Res 161 on the situation in the Congo appears to be the first instance of 
the explicit mention of human rights as a consideration of the Council; in it, the Council noted 
“with deep regret and concern the systematic violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the general absence of the rule of law in the Congo.”734 However, despite the early 
acknowledgement of the concept and the potential threat that it might pose, tackling human 
rights issues was not seen as the primary concern of the Council in the mid-twentieth century and 
the permanent Council members were split over how to react to human rights concerns; in 1961 
– the same year as the seminal Congo resolution – when discussing the situation in Angola, some 
P5 members appeared to turn away from elevating human rights to the level of importance it 
holds today. France warned against expanding the definition of peace and security for fear of 
“attributing to any dispute or incident which occurs in a country, however regrettable and 
distressing it may be, a meaning and significance which it does not have”735, whereas the UK 
argued outright against the inclusion of human rights within the definition of peace and security: 
 
[A]cting as we must in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, it is not, in the 
first place, to deal with a crisis or to prevent abuses of human rights that the 
Security Council has primary responsibility, but to maintain international peace 
and security. All the rest may flow from this. But, without a situation likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, this Council has 
no power, whatever other features any supposed crisis may have or whatever may 
be the extent of any abuse of human rights.736 
 
In the early years of the Council, there was a strong sentiment by some States that human 
rights and the welfare of individuals was a matter that was “essentially within the domestic 
                                                 
733 As discussed previously, the effect of the end of the Cold War on the work and potential of the Council was a 
monumental shift from sluggish progress to a flurry of movement and activity. There do exist some resolutions that 
may have links to human rights issues, such as those relating to terrorism eg UNSC Res 286 (9 September 1970) UN 
Doc S/RES/286 appealing for an end to the hijacking of commercial aircraft and UNSC Res 579 (18 December 
1985) UN Doc S/RES/579 condemning acts of hostage-taking and abduction – but these are wholly overwhelmed by 
the sheer volume and scope of resolutions and statements adopted by the Council from 1992 onwards. 
734 UNSC Res 161 (21 February 1961) UN Doc S/RES/161, B preamble. 
735 UNSC Verbatim Record (10 March 1961) UN Doc S/PV.944, 4. 
736 ibid 3 [emphasis added]. 
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jurisdiction of any State”737 and that Article 2(7) of the Charter cast “serious doubts regarding 
the legal merits of [human rights cases] submitted to the Council . . . and regarding the 
competence of the Council to deal with [questions of human rights].”738 As the representative 
from Chile noted, “there are other United Nations organs with specific competence in the 
promotion of human rights and they are clearly the ones to deal with this matter.”739 However, 
not all States agreed with an interpretation of article 2(7) that excluded the intervention of the 
Council in human rights affairs; whilst France and the UK were hesitant to intervene in the racial 
discrimination policies of South Africa and analogous situations, other P5 members such as the 
then-USSR740 and the US held the belief that “when a question such as [apartheid in South 
Africa] is involved, Article 2, paragraph 7, must be read in the light of Articles 55 and 56.”741 
Indeed, twenty-eight UN Member States – over a third of its membership at the time – petitioned 
the Council for “an urgent meeting . . . to consider the situation arising out of the large-scale 
killings of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators against racial discrimination and segregation in 
the Union of South Africa”742, highlighting the importance of human rights to a large section of 
the UN’s membership and the need for the Council to consider human rights issues to fall within 
its remit. Many States took the view that “the Charter insistently proclaims respect for human 
rights, so that an absolute and rigid interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, 
resulting in the defence of a situation which flagrantly violates that respect for human rights 
proclaimed. . . would be illogical.”743 China, though silent on the question of Angola in 1961,744 
soon afterwards adopted a general stance that “there can be no genuine peace and security if 
                                                 
737 UK, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 March 1960) UN Doc S/PV.851, 2. 
738 ibid 3. See also, eg the Italian stance, ibid: “Obviously, there appears to exist some internal contradiction within 
the Charter itself between the need to give practical expression to the provisions of the Charter concerning human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and those provisions aimed at protecting States from interference in their internal 
affairs. Both provisions are of fundamental importance in the present structure of the United Nations”;  
739 UNSC Verbatim Record (10 March 1961) UN Doc S/PV.944, 2. 
740 ibid 4: “[T]he discriminatory policy of the Union authorities not only results in a gross violation of fundamental 
human rights but also endangers the maintenance of peace in the African continent. Thus it is the duty of the 
Security Council, which bears the main responsibility for maintaining the peace, to . . . thoroughly examine the 
newly arisen situation in Africa. 
741 ibid 5. 
742 ‘Letter dated 25 March 1960 from the representatives of Afghanistan. Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon. Ethiopia, 
Federation of Malaya, Ghana. Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan. Laos. Lebanon. Liberia, Libya. 
Morocco. Nepal, Pakistan. Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic and 
Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (25 March 1960) UN Doc S/4279. 
743 Venezuela, UNSC Verbatim Record (5 August 1963) UN Doc S/PV.1053(OR), 16. 
744 UNSC Verbatim Record (10 March 1961) UN Doc S/PV.944, 1: “Frankly, my delegation knows very little about 
conditions in Angola as my country has not had direct relations with that region. We are, therefore, not in a position 
to pass judgement on the nature of the problem presented or on the proper forum to have a discussion.” 
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human rights and the fundamental freedoms are not respected”745 and accordingly, that “on 
questions involving human rights and fundamental freedoms, the competence of the United 
Nations is overriding . . . [and] has long since been settled by an impressive number of 
precedents”746 Despite this, explicit acknowledgement of human rights issues mainly remained 
embedded within the subtext of Council resolutions and decisions747 until the later 20th Century, 
although this was more of a gradual recognition of human rights issues than a sharp and sudden 
awakening of the Council to human rights concerns in the immediate aftermath of the seismic 
political shift of the fall of the USSR.748 Nonetheless, until the 1990s, although human rights 
were referenced as subsidiary issues of concern to situations posing a threat to the international 
peace, heinous human rights violations such as the Khmer Rouge massacres in the 1970s were 
not only ignored but indirectly actively rewarded.749 
The increased attention paid to human rights reached new heights in the early 1990s; in 
1992 alone there are three instances of the Council inviting Special Rapporteurs on human rights 
situations – in Iraq750 and the former Yugoslavia751 – which were the first examples of the 
Council inviting such rapporteurs. Since then, the focus of the Council on human rights issues 
has expanded to include a plethora of resolutions on issues such as the protection of civilians,752 
                                                 
745 UNSC Verbatim Record (5 August 1963) UN Doc S/PV.1053(OR), 13. 
746 ibid. 
747 See eg references to “grave events” in the Dominican Republic in UNSC Res 203 (14 May 1965) UN Doc 
S/RES/203 and UNSC Res 205 (22 May 1965) UN Doc S/RES/205. 
748 The Council first acknowledged the existence of the UN Commission of Human Rights in 1971 (UNSC Res 294 
(15 July 1971) UN Doc S/RES/294) and mentioned human rights concerns even in the 1960s in such resolutions as 
UNSC Res 237 (14 June 1967) UN Doc S/RES/237 following the Six Day War, UNSC Res 253 (29 May 1968) UN 
Doc S/RES/253 in Southern Rhodesia, UNSC Res 245 (25 January 1968) UN Doc S/RES/245, and UNSC Res 256 
(16 August 1968) UN Doc S/RES/256 against the actions of South Africa. 
749 Despite killing thousands of soldiers, military officers, civil servants and civilians, as well as operating detention 
camps, perpetrating torture and executing innocent citizens of the Khmer Republic, the Council did not discuss the 
actions of the Khmer Rouge for decades afterwards. Moreover, the UN voted to recognise Democratic Kampuchea – 
an exiled resistance movement in Cambodia which included the Khmer Rouge – as the only legitimate 
representative of Cambodia from 1979 to 1990 at the General Assembly. In UNGA Res 34/2 (21 September 1979) 
UN Doc A/RES/34/2, the Assembly voted to approve the reports of the Credentials Committee, which “[h]aving 
examined the credentials of the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea to the thirty-fourth session of the General 
Assembly [a]ccept[ed] the credentials of the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea" by 6 votes to 3 in UNGA ‘First 
report of the Credentials Committee’ (20 September 1979) UN Doc A/34/500, ¶23. 
750 See, UNSC Verbatim Record (11 August 1992) UN Doc S/PV.3105 and UNSC Verbatim Record (23 November 
1992) UN Doc S/PV.3139, where Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Iraq Max Van der Stoel 
addressed the Council on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. 
751 See, UNSC Verbatim Record (13 November 1992) UN Doc S/PV.3134, where Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights on the former Yugoslavia Tadeusz Mazowiecki addressed the Council on the 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
752 See UNSC Res 918 (17 May 1994) UN Doc S/RES/918; UNSC Res 1019 (9 November 1995) UN Doc 
S/RES/1019; UNSC Res 1034 (21 December 1995) UN Doc S/RES/1034; UNSC Res 1080 (15 November 1996) 
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women, peace and security753 and children in armed conflict.754 The establishment of 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia755 and Rwanda,756 the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone757 and the insertion of a “backdoor” clause in the Rome Statute allowing the 
Council to refer situations to the International Criminal Court758 all highlight the Council’s 
intensifying focus on human rights issues; through these mechanisms, the Council has 
empowered itself to tackle human rights violations such as crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and genocide.   
Notwithstanding, despite some advances in the Council’s recognition of human rights as 
central to the maintenance of peace and security and the correlation between international peace 
and human rights, there are numerous occasions where their responses have been delayed or 
lacking entirely. Throughout the late 20th century and even more recently, progress made in 
bringing human rights concerns to the fore have been undermined by lack of action. In addition 
                                                                                                                                                             
UN Doc S/RES/1080; UNSC Res 1208 (19 November 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1208; UNSC Res 1261 (30 August 
1999) UN Doc S/RES/1261; UNSC Res 1265 (17 September 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1265; UNSC Res 1289 (7 
February 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1289; UNSC Res 1296 (19 April 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1296; UNSC Res 1422 (12 
July 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1422; UNSC Res 1494 (30 July 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1494; UNSC Res 1502 (26 
August 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1502; UNSC Res 1547 (11 June 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1547; UNSC Res 1554 (29 
July 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1554; UNSC Res 1573 (16 November 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1573; UNSC Res 1577 (1 
December 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1577; UNSC Res 1582 (28 January 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1582; UNSC Res 1592 
(30 March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1592; UNSC Res 1674 (28 April 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1674; UNSC Res 1738 
(23 December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1738; UNSC Res 1833 (22 September 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1833; UNSC Res 
1836 (29 September 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1836; UNSC Res 1894 (11 November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1894; 
UNSC Res 1998 (12 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1998; UNSC Res 2016 (27 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2016. 
753 See UNSC Res 1325 (31 October 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1325; UNSC Res 1327 (13 November 2000) UN Doc 
S/RES/1327; UNSC Res 1366 (30 August 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1366; UNSC Res 1408 (6 May 2002) UN Doc 
S/RES/1408; UNSC Res 1820 (19 June 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1820; UNSC Res 1888 (30 September 2009) UN Doc 
S/RES/1888; UNSC Res 1889 (5 October 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1889; UNSC Res 1960 (16 December 2010) UN 
Doc S/RES/1960; UNSC Res 2106 (24 June 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2106; UNSC Res 2122 (18 October 2013) UN 
Doc S/RES/2122. 
754 See UNSC Res 1261 (30 August 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1261; UNSC Res 1314 (11 August 2000) UN Doc 
S/RES/1314; UNSC Res 1379 (20 November 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1379; UNSC Res 1460 (30 January 2003) UN 
Doc S/RES/1460; UNSC Res 1493 (28 July 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1493; UNSC Res 1539 (22 April 2004) UN Doc 
S/RES/1539; UNSC Res 1542 (30 April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1542; UNSC Res 1612 (26 July 2005) UN Doc 
S/RES/1612; UNSC Res 1649 (21 December 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1649; UNSC Res 1698 (31 July 2006) UN Doc 
S/RES/1698; UNSC Res 1704 (25 August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1704; UNSC Res 1706 (31 August 2006) UN Doc 
S/RES/1706; UNSC Res 1719 (25 October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1719; UNSC Res 1756 (15 May 2007) UN Doc 
S/RES/1756; UNSC Res 1768 (31 July 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1768; UNSC Res 1769 (31 July 2007) UN Doc 
S/RES/1769; UNSC Res 1771 (10 August 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1771; UNSC Res 1780 (15 October 2007) UN Doc 
S/RES/1780; UNSC Res 1794 (21 December 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1794; UNSC Res 1820 (19 June 2008) UN Doc 
S/RES/1820; UNSC Res 1882 (4 August 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1882; UNSC Res 1998 (12 July 2011) UN Doc 
S/RES/1998; UNSC Res 2143 (7 March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2143. 
755 Established directly through UNSC Res 827 (1993). 
756 Established directly through UNSC Res 955 (1994). 
757 Established in part through a request by the Council to the Secretary-General in UNSC Res 1315 (14 August 
2000) UN Doc S/RES/1315. 
758 Rome Statute (n 72) art 16. 
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to the massacres perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea759 between 1975 - 1979, the 
Council also neglected human rights violations in Congo in 1960, Burundi in 1972 and 1993, 
Bosnia Herzegovina in 1992, Rwanda in 1994, Kosovo in 1999, Sudan in 2004 – 2007, Sri 
Lanka in 2009, Syria from 2011 onwards and, most recently, both the situation in Ukraine and 
the renewed sectarian violence in Iraq in 2014. Most damningly, perhaps, is the explanation of 
this absence; as two scholars phrased it, “the lack of political will, not lack of information, is at 
the core of the failures of the Security Council to address these and other abhorrent situations 
both timely and appropriately, or even to consider them at all.”760  
This is not to say that the Council has not made grand efforts to promote different 
elements and facets of human rights both on its agenda and beyond. Numerous thematic agenda 
items have been added to its work that centres around human rights concerns;761 opposition to 
coup d’états in Liberia,762 Burundi,763 Sierra Leone,764 Guinea Bissau765 and Mauritania766 and 
highlight the support for democratically elected leadership through elections;767 other than the 
tribunals on the FRY and Rwanda, the Council has condemned or otherwise reacted to a plethora 
of human rights violations since the early 1990s, including Georgia,768 Armenia,769 
Afghanistan,770 Angola,771 Liberia,772 Burundi,773 Cote d’Ivoire,774 Sudan775 and the DRC.776 
                                                 
759 Now Cambodia. 
760 Bruno Stagno Ugarte and Jared Genser, ‘Evolution of the Security Council’ in Genser and Stagno Ugarte (n 704) 
27. 
761 eg Children and Armed Conflict, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Women and Peace and Security. 
762 UNSC Res 788 (19 November 1992) UN Doc S/RES/788; UNSC Res 1497 (1 August 2003) UN Doc 
S/RES/1497. 
763 UNSC Presidential Statement 32 (1996) UN Doc S/PRST/1996/32; UNSC Res 1072 (30 August 1996) UN Doc 
S/RES/1072. 
764 UNSC Presidential Statement 29 (1997) UN Doc S/PRST/1997/29; UNSC Presidential Statement 36 (1997) UN 
Doc S/PRST/1997/36; UNSC Res 1132 (8 October 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1132. 
765 UNSC Presidential Statement 2 (2009) UN Doc S/PRST/2009/2; UNSC Res 1876 (26 June 2009) UN Doc 
S/RES/1876. 
766 UNSC Presidential Statement 30 (2009) UN Doc S/PRST/2009/30. 
767 This is a right under human rights instruments such as the UDHR, art 21 and the ICCPR, art 2. See, generally, 
Thomas M Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 AJIL 46. 
768 UNSC Res 1036 (12 January 1996) UN Doc S/RES/1036. 
769 UNSC Res 822 (30 April 1993) UN Doc S/RES/822. 
770 UNSC Res 1333 (19 December 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1333; UNSC Presidential Statement 2 (2000) UN Doc 
S/PRST/2000/2. 
771 UNSC Res 834 (1 June 1993) UN Doc S/RES/834; UNSC Presidential Statement 26 (1999) UN Doc 
S/PRST/1999/26. 
772 UNSC Res 1509 (19 September 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1509; UNSC Presidential Statement 34 (1997) UN Doc 
S/PRST/1997/34; UNSC Presidential Statement 38 (1997) UN Doc S/PRST/1997/38. 
773 UNSC Res 1791 (19 December 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1791; UNSC Res 1902 (17 December 2009) UN Doc 
S/RES/1902; UNSC Presidential Statement 31 (1996) UN Doc S/PRST/1996/31. 
774 UNSC Res 1933 (30 June 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1933. 
151 
 
Nonetheless, the Council’s human rights record has been selective and there remain instances, as 
discussed earlier, where glaring omissions in practice and pattern can be distinguished. 
 
VIII.4 Applying human rights to Council decisions 
Consequently, the protection of human rights externally by the Council cannot be said to have 
been exhaustive but the Council does acknowledge the need for consideration of the human 
rights effects of its decisions. In the post-Cold War landscape, there has been an increased 
applicability of human rights law to the actions of peacekeepers, missions and other entities 
mandated by the Council to operate on the ground;777 yet the Council has never acknowledged 
that human rights should guide its response to a threat to the international peace. That is to say, 
whilst the Council has shown that human rights – at least in certain cases – warrant a response by 
the Council,778 and the groups and entities that direct these responses are bound by human rights 
                                                                                                                                                             
775 UNSC Res 1547 (11 June 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1547; UNSC Res 1769 (31 July 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1769. 
776 UNSC Res 1341 (22 February 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1341; UNSC Res 1355 (15 June 2001) UN Doc 
S/RES/1355; UNSC Res 1468 (20 March 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1468; UNSC Res 1794 (21 December 2007) UN 
Doc S/RES/1794; UNSC Res 1856 (22 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1856; UNSC Res 1906 (23 December 
2009) UN Doc S/RES/1906; UNSC Res 1925 (28 May 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1925; UNSC Presidential Statement 
26 (1998) UN Doc S/PRST/1998/26. 
777 The human rights component of the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), established under UNSC 
Res 693 (1991) was first of its kind to be deployed; the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 
established under UNSC Res 745 (1992) also featured a human rights component; Memorandums of Understanding 
(MoUs) such as that between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in November 1999 can enumerate how human rights elements within 
peacekeeping operations operate; human rights components of peacekeeping missions are viewed on a par with all 
other components, including internal policy-making; the integration of human rights experts in an Integrated 
Mission Task Force (IMTF), established at the UN Headquarters in New York, is a prerequisite; there are usually 
express mandates by the Council requesting all parties, including peacekeepers, to protect and promote human 
rights; and the human rights obligations of a contributing State Party to a mission apply to their citizens and staff 
extraterritorially. 
778 UNSC Res 827 (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827 established the ICTY “for the sole purpose of prosecuting 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law”, at ¶2; UNSC Res 955 (8 November 
1994) UN Doc S/RES/955 established the ICTR “for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for 
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law”, at ¶1; UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) 
UN Doc S/RES/1973 authorised military intervention in Libya “to protect civilians and civilian populated areas 
under threat of attack”, at ¶4; UNSC Res 1975 (30 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1975 on the Cote d’Ivoire included 
a decision by the Council to “adopt targeted sanctions against those individuals . . . [who] commit serious violations 
of human rights and international humanitarian law”, at ¶12; UNSC Res 2127 (5 December 2013) UN Doc 
S/RES/2127 on the Central African Republic condemned “widespread human rights violations and abuses”, at ¶17, 
and requested the establishment of “an international commission of inquiry . . . to investigate reports of violations of 
international humanitarian law, international human rights law and abuses of human rights in CAR”, at ¶24. 
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law, there has been no explicit statement that such a response itself must be guided by principles 
of human rights.779  
This section focuses primarily on instances of the imposition of sanctions or 
embargoes780 and the authorisation or delegation of authority by the Council under Chapter VII 
to intervene militarily781 in response to perceived threats to the peace. As such, the examination 
of integration of human rights standards into Council decisions will be examined within the 
framework of these two elements. Indeed, prior to 1990 there is no evidence that the Council 
considered human rights within the framework of its decision-making process, which is 
unsurprising giving the debate discussed in the preceding pages that raged over whether human 
rights even fell within the scope of the Council’s mandate at all. There is no mention of human 
rights in the Council’s Rules of Procedure and, notwithstanding Article 24(2) of the Charter, nor 
is there an obligation inherent in the text of any Chapter VII article that implies the Council must 
ensure that the effects of action taken under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter adheres to human 
rights norms. As with the rise of the importance of human rights generally in the minds of UN 
Members and on the agendas of the Council and other UN organs, human rights appear to have 
been introduced by informal and organic means. 
 
VIII.4.1 Article 41: coercive measures not amounting to the use of force 
As human rights began to take centre stage on the agenda of the Council after 1990, many 
commentators both inside the UN782 and externally783 criticised what appeared to be a ‘human 
rights paradox’ – namely that the reasons for imposition of sanctions have increasingly been the 
                                                 
779 The Council has expressed its “commitment to ensure that all UN efforts to restore peace and security themselves 
respect and promote the rule of law” (UNSC Presidential Statement 11 (2010) UN Doc S/PRST/2010/11, ¶9) and 
the Representative of Lichtenstein has argued that the Council “is legally bound by the applicable rules of the 
Charter and of international law” (UNSC Verbatim Record (29 June 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6347 (Resumption 1), 6) 
but the applicability of human rights to the Council decision-making process itself has never been put forward. 
780 UN Charter (1945) art 41. 
781 UN Charter (1945) art 42. 
782 UNGA ‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations’ (25 January 1995) UN Doc A/50/60 – S/1995/1, ¶70: “Sanctions, as is 
generally recognized, are a blunt instrument. They raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on 
vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose 
behaviour is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects. Sanctions also always have unintended or 
unwanted effects.” See also, Secretary-General’s Report (n 700) 50.  
783 See eg Joy K Fausey, ‘Does the United Nations' Use of Collective Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate Its 
Own Human Rights Standards?’ (1994) 10 Conn J Intl L 193; Nico Schrijver, ‘The Use of Economic Sanctions by 
the UN Security Council: An International Law Perspective’ in Harry HG Post (ed), International Economic Law 
and Armed Conflict (Martinus Nijhoff 1994) 156. 
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protection of human rights, when the imposition of sanctions themselves often have a detrimental 
effect: 
 
Sanctions can complicate the work of humanitarian agencies by denying them 
certain categories of supplies and by obliging them to go through arduous 
procedures to obtain the necessary exemptions.  They can conflict with the 
development objectives of the Organization and do long-term damage to the 
productive capacity of the target country.  They can have a severe effect on other 
countries that are neighbours or major economic partners of the target country.  
They can also defeat their own purpose by provoking a patriotic response against 
the international community, symbolized by the United Nations, and by rallying 
the population behind the leaders whose behaviour the sanctions are intended to 
modify.784 
 
The perils of hastily adopted and ill-planned sanction regimes were exemplified in 1990 with the 
imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq785 as a result of its failure to comply with resolution 
660 (1990),786 ordering it to withdraw from the territory of Kuwait. These comprehensive 
sanctions resulted in a spike in infant mortality and morbidity,787 child malnutrition and a 
deterioration in the standard of living, nutrition and health for the Iraqi people, especially with 
respect to access to drinking water, agriculture and the supply of electricity;788 one Council 
member estimated that in 1995, “[s]even per cent of Iraq’s population – about 1,300,000 people 
– [was] at risk, being hardest hit by the consequences of the sanctions regime.”789 In fact, far 
from exerting pressure “to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 
(1990)”790, the sanction policy inhibited “the importation of spare parts, chemicals, reagents, and 
the means of transportation required to provide water and sanitation services to the civilian 
population of Iraq”791, thereby consolidating the Iraqi regime’s power through its capacity to 
                                                 
784 ‘Agenda for Peace Supplement’ (n 782) ¶70. 
785 UNSC Res 661 (6 August 1990) UN Doc S/RES/661. 
786 UNSC Res 660 (2 August 1990) UN Doc S/RES/660. 
787 See, UNSC ‘Report of the Second Panel established pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council 
of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100) concerning the current humanitarian situation in Iraq’ (30 March 1999) UN Doc 
S/1999/356, Annex II; UNICEF ‘Iraq Child and Maternal Mortality Surveys’ (July 1999) <http://fas.org/news/iraq/ 
1999/08/irqscont.pdf > accessed 16 December 2014. 
788 See eg UNCHR Subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights ‘Humanitarian Situation of 
the Iraqi Population, Sub-Commission on Human Rights Decision 2000/112’ (18 August 2000) 
E/N.4/2000/L.11/Add.2.  
789 Honduras, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 April 1995) UN Doc S/PV.3519, 4. 
790 UNSC Res 661 (6 August 1990) UN Doc S/RES/661, ¶2. 
791 UNICEF ‘The Status of Children and Women in Iraq: A Situation Report’ (September 1995), 4. 
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control distribution of bare necessities through a rationing system, granting the authorities further 
control over anti-government insurgence and expanding the existing corruption in the country.792  
The impact of sanctions was a divisive issue amongst the Council members throughout 
the 1990s. Some, including Russia, China and France, argued that the humanitarian concerns 
raised by sanctions demanded they be reviewed,793 whilst others, such as the UK and US, 
maintained that “Iraq will remain subject to a regime of sanctions imposed under Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter until it complies fully with all the Security Council’s relevant 
resolutions”794 and that sanctions should even be augmented so long as the Iraqi authorities 
continued to refuse compliance with the numerous Council resolutions passed on the subject.795 
In fact, due to the open-ended nature of resolutions such as 660 (1990), 661 (1990), and 678 
(1990) and the fact that they were not rescinded subsequently, permanent members of the 
Council benefited from what has been referred to as a “reverse veto”796 over the termination of 
sanctions797 – the capacity to use or threaten the use of the veto on any resolution that would put 
                                                 
792 See, UNGA ‘Situation of human rights in Iraq- note by the Secretary-General’ (14 October 1999) UN Doc 
A/54/466, ¶33: “While the Government of Iraq has failed to use its existing resources well or to cooperate fully to 
take advantage of other available resources, the Government of Iraq has used some resources to enrich itself.” 
793 Although UNSC Res 986 (1995) temporarily lifting the embargo on Iraqi oil exports passed unanimously, several 
States took the opportunity to make their views on the sanctions regime known, including China, the representative 
of which believed that “the Council should proceed to discuss, at an early date, the lifting of the oil embargo against 
Iraq, on the basis of humanitarian considerations and in the light of Iraq’s implementation of the resolutions, so as to 
truly and effectively ease the humanitarian situation in Iraq and alleviate the suffering inflicted on the Iraqi people 
by sanctions”, China, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 April 1995) UN Doc S/PV.3519, 3. Later, in 1997, it was only 
through negotiations at the Council that China agreed to vote for UNSC Res 1115 (1997): “[the Council] should 
consider gradually lifting sanctions against Iraq in order to alleviate its humanitarian difficulties. However, the 
resolution before us decides to suspect the review of sanctions against Iraq by the Council . . . and threatens to 
impose further sanctions. This is not fair . . . We have noted that considerable changes have been incorporated in the 
current resolution, with the deletion of new sanctions . . . For these reasons, the Chinese delegation voted in favour 
of the resolution before us”, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 1997) UN Doc S/PV.3792, 6. See also, the 
explanation of vote by the Russia on UNSC Res 1129 (1997) in UNSC Verbatim Record (12 September 1997) UN 
Doc S/PV.3817, 4: “while noting that both sides bear responsibility for the ongoing situation, we believe that it is 
exceedingly important to remedy the situation in the Committee on sanctions as regards the delivery of humanitarian 
goods to Iraq. Unfortunately . . . this aspect is not reflected in the draft resolution, and for this reason we shall 
abstain in the voting.” China, France, Egypt, Kenya and Russia all abstained from voting on UNSC Res 1134 
(1997), which set the stage for further sanctions. 
794 UNSC Verbatim Record (14 April 1995) UN Doc S/PV.3519, 11. 
795 UNSC Verbatim Record (23 October 1997) UN Doc S/PV.3826, 12: The US representative wished in UNSC Res 
1129 (1997) to “start the process [of further sanctions] by beginning the compilation of names, so if sanctions are 
imposed there will be no administrative delay . . . [and make] very clear to the Iraqi authorities that the next time 
they try to block UNSCOM’s work the Council will impose sanctions against those individuals responsible for Iraqi 
failure to cooperate with UNSCOM.” 
796 David D Caron, ‘The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council’ (1993) 87 AJIL 552. 
797 This open-endedness also formed the US legal basis, at least for a short period of time, behind the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003: “Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes the use of all necessary 
means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to 
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an end to existing sanctions. By 1994, deep into the sanctions regime that had been imposed on 
Iraq, it was clear that sanctions were not operating as intended: “Iraqi authorities [had] enough 
money to maintain one of the largest armies and enough money to pay for military operations, 
whether to suppress the Marsh Arabs or to threaten Kuwait.”798 
The Council members themselves had already recognised by the mid-1990s that 
sanctions could not be imposed in isolation of consideration for human rights and humanitarian 
concerns; 799 references to ensuring that humanitarian concerns were addressed prior to the 
imposition of sanctions were already emerging during discussions. The Russian Federation 
appears to have been the first to make mention, as early as 1994, that  
 
thought must be given to the question how sanctions may be aimed at political 
elites, thereby reducing to a minimum the sufferings of broad strata of the 
population, including its most vulnerable categories . . . In other words, thought 
should be given to the fact that sanctions should not punish the most those who 
are perhaps least of all capable of righting the situation . . . and to laying down 
clear humanitarian limits in determining sanctions. 800  
 
Concrete efforts were made to assess and mitigate the humanitarian repercussions of the 
Council’s sanctions regimes in 1995, with the commissioning of a report on the effect of 
sanctions on humanitarian conditions by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)801 
                                                                                                                                                             
compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security, including the development of 
weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), repression of its civilian population in violation of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), and threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq 
in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949 (1994) . . . The President is authorized to use the 
Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to . . . enforce all 
relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq”, ‘Authorization for Use of Military Force 
Against Iraq Resolution of 2002’ 107th Congress (2001-2002) H.J.RES.114.ENR. 
798 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (15 October 1994) UN Doc S/PV.3438, at 5; the UK voted in favour of both UNSC 
Res 1115 (1997) and UNSC Res 1134 (1997). 
799 Although the 1990s saw the imposition of sanctions against Haiti and Yugoslavia, both of these were unique in 
their own way and pre-dated the review of sanctions regimes that began in the mid-1990s; for instance, sanctions on 
Haiti under UNSC Res 841 (16 June 1993) UN Doc S/RES/841 were imposed as a result of a coup, in the absence of 
existing post-conflict damage in the same vein as that of Iraq and rapidly followed by a military intervention in a 
year later. 
800 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (17 October 1994) UN Doc S/PV.3439, 5 [emphasis added]. 
801 Claudia von Braunmühl and Manfred Kulessa, ‘The Impact of UN Sanctions on Humanitarian Assistance 
Activities: Report on a Study Commissioned by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs’ (Berlin: 
Gesellschaft für Communication Management Interkultur Training, December 1995). 
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and a study802 conducted for the DHA with the objective of developing methods and indicators 
for assessment of humanitarian impact of sanctions. Nonetheless, it was not until the end of the 
decade that the Council abandoned paying lip service to the humanitarian situation in Iraq803 and 
truly took stock of the failures resulting from its sanctions regime there.804 A panel on 
humanitarian issues was established to “assess the current humanitarian situation in Iraq and 
make recommendations to the Security Council regarding measures to improve the humanitarian 
situation in Iraq.”805 The subsequent findings confirmed the protestations of agencies, States, 
NGOs and humanitarian groups which the Council already knew four years earlier806 and 
arguably even as early as 1991:807 “[e]ven if not all suffering in Iraq can be imputed to external 
factors, especially sanctions, the Iraqi people would not be undergoing such deprivations in the 
                                                 
802 Larry Minear and others, ‘Towards More Humane and Effective Sanctions Management: Enhancing the Capacity 
of the United Nations System’ (1998) Thomas J Watson Jr Institute for International Studies Occasional Paper No 
31 <https://sanctionsandsecurity.nd.edu/assets/ 110294/toward_more_humane_.pdf > accessed on 16 December 
2014. 
803 Discussions throughout the 1990s focused on the need for increased awareness and deference to humanitarian 
priorities; Italy voted in favour of UNSC Res 986 (1995), but made it clear that while “sanctions are, and remain, 
one of the most effective tools provided by the Charter of the United Nations to enforce compliance with 
international law, they should not lead to the extreme consequence of inflicting untold misery and starvation on an 
entire civilian population”, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 April 1995) UN Doc S/PV.3519, 2; the US “shared the 
concern expressed by so many here that sanctions not strike an unintended target” and the UK “Government has 
been concerned about the humanitarian situation in Iraq since 1991,” ibid 11. Identification of a worsening 
humanitarian situation in Iraq was made clearly; see eg Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (12 September 1997) UN 
Doc S/PV.3817, 3: “The situation has in fact become very serious. By the end of August, the medicine and other 
medical supplies being delivered to Iraq amounted only to 9.5 per cent of the target amount. In the areas of 
agricultural products, water supplies, electrical energy and education, when the Secretary-General’s report was 
submitted, no supplies at all had reached the country. All of this is causing a worsening deterioration of the 
humanitarian situation in Iraq.”  
804 Yet no definitive action was taken and even temporary measures were insufficient. See, eg UNSC Verbatim 
Record (4 December 1997) UN Doc S/PV.3840, 2, where “despite the implementation of [S/RES986 (1995) and 
S/RES/1111 (1997)], the humanitarian situation in Iraq is continuing to worsen . . . The quantity of oil sales 
stipulated in resolution 1111 (1997) is far from being able to satisfy Iraq’s basic humanitarian needs.” 
805 UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (30 January 1999) UN Doc S/1999/100, ¶5. 
806 France, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 April 1995) UN Doc S/PV.3519, 12:“We are all aware that the humanitarian 
situation in Iraq has worsened over the past few years. Nevertheless, we do not possess an exhaustive analysis 
enabling us to determine precisely the extent of the needs. There is no doubt, however, that they are great. The 
testimony of non-governmental organizations and the reports of the United Nations institutions that are now working 
in that country have amply shown this” [emphasis added].  
807 Under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, a team to assess the humanitarian situation was sent to Iraq. See 
‘Report to the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the immediate post-crisis environment 
by a mission to the area led by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, 
dated 20 March 1991’ in UNSC ‘Letter dated 20 March 1991 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President 
of the Security Council’ (20 March 1991) UN Doc S/22366, Annex: “Iraq [had], for some time to come, been 
relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of 
energy and technology” (¶8) and recommended that “ in these circumstances of present severe hardship and in view 
of the bleak prognosis, sanctions in respect of food supplies should be immediately removed as should those relating 
to the import of agricultural equipment and supplies” (¶18). 
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absence of prolonged measures imposed by the Security Council and the effects of the war.”808 
The Council was found, by its own established panel no less, to have verged on complicity with 
the regime in intensifying the horrific humanitarian situations in Iraq during the 1990s.  
By 1995, the realisation was more widespread that the absence of human rights 
considerations can result in the detrimental outcome or by-product of a Council response such as 
sanctions, particularly in relation to vulnerable sections of society. In a letter to the President of 
the Security Council, the P5 members grouped together to support the proposal that “further 
collective actions in the Security Council within the context of any future sanctions regimes 
should be directed to minimize unintended adverse side-effects of sanctions on the most 
vulnerable segments of targeted countries.” 809 Nonetheless, it took several years for the Council 
to implement this concept into practice. It was not until 1997, when debating the means of 
dealing with the situation in Sudan, that a note from the DHA810 warning against the 
implementation of air sanctions under UNSC Res 1054811 was heeded and the 90 day grace 
period given in the resolution elapsed without consequence. Both China and the Russian 
Federation were extremely hesitant to resort to the use of sanctions again in light of the concerns 
raised in Iraq and Haiti, with the latter noting that “[t]he rash use of the sanctions instrument is 
not only destructive for the people of Sudan and the countries of the region, but creates a 
precedent which could do real damage to the Security Council’s authority by giving the 
impression that the Council is not able to draw conclusions from past lessons.”812 A report by the 
                                                 
808 UNSC ‘Report of the Second Panel established pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council of 
30 January 1999 (S/1999/100) concerning the current humanitarian situation in Iraq’ (30 March 1999) UN Doc 
S/1999/356, Annex II, ¶45. 
809 ‘Letter dated 13 April 199 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, Russia, The United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Island and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President 
of the Security Council’ (13 April 1995) UN Doc S/1995/300, 2. 
810 UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs ‘Note from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs Concerning the 
Possible Humanitarian Impact of the International Flight Ban Decided in Security Council Resolution 1070 (1996)’ 
(20 February 1997). 
811 UNSC Res 1054 (26 April 1996) UN Doc S/RES/1054. 
812 UNSC Verbatim Record (16 August 1996) UN Doc S/PV.3690, 10. See also, China, ibid 12: “China’s position of 
principle on sanctions is a consistent one. We do not consider sanctions a panacea because sanctions, or the 
tightening of sanctions, cannot solve a problem; they may, on the contrary, further aggravate the problem. 
Restrictions on Sudan Airways constitute an escalation in the sanctions regime on the Sudan. Although the draft 
resolution before us does not determine the date of entry into force of its provisions, it represents a clear decision on 
imposing such sanctions. This question concerning the Sudan is already quite complicated. We are concerned that 
tightening sanctions against the Sudan might further compound the problem.” Although France voted in favour of 
suspended sanctions under UNSC Res 1070 (1996), it highlighted at 16 that “the Council must think about how they 
should be applied, and in particular about their duration. In our view, these measures should not penalize the people 
of Sudan by making them suffer additional restrictions that could have serious humanitarian consequences.” 
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Secretary-General two months later highlighted “the likely negative humanitarian effects of the 
possible ban envisaged in UNSC Res 1070 (1996) and . . . the potential negative impact on the 
health situation.”813 Whether as a result of humanitarian concerns or – more cynically – the threat 
of the use of a veto by the Russian Federation due to economic concerns,814 the flight ban on 
Sudan Airlines was not enforced. Similar investigations took place prior to the implementation of 
sanctions in Afghanistan,815 Liberia816 and Sierra Leone.817 
The balance between human rights concerns and effective sanctions regimes was not 
perfected overnight and, despite the humanitarian crises that were risked as a result of the 
sanctions regime imposed by the Council, the frustration and disappointment that followed the 
failure of the Council to soften its stance even in the late 1990s was highlighted by the 
representative of France, which 
 
had hoped also that the Council, in the future exercise of its prerogatives, would 
continue to use very precise wording in its work in order to avoid situations in 
which people who are not directly responsible for the problems encountered 
                                                 
813 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1070 (1996)’ (14 November 
1996) UN Doc S/1996/940, ¶18. 
814 ‘Letter dated 19 December 1996 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’ (29 January 1996) UN Doc A/51/60, Annex, 2: the Russian Federation 
State Duma recommended that Russia should “take measures precluding the possibility of the use by the Security 
Council of sanctions causing serious damage to the economic interests of the Russian Federation, unless at the same 
time an effective international mechanism is set up to compensate for economic losses incurred by the Russian side 
as a result of participation in the sanctions.” 
815 Office of the UN Coordinator for Afghanistan ‘Vulnerability and Humanitarian Implications of UN Security 
Council Sanctions in Afghanistan’ (December 2000), s 5, 36: the study found that “the direct impact of sanctions on 
the humanitarian situation are limited, but the indirect impacts are potentially more serious.” 
816 UNSC Res 1343 (7 March 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1343 imposed limited and targeted sanctions upon specific 
individuals; prior to expanding the sanctions, the Secretary-General was asked to draft a report into the humanitarian 
impact, which found that “[a] tightening of the existing sanctions regime [was likely] to have further negative effects 
on the financial environment, with worsening exchange rates, increasing prices for essential commodities, decreased 
savings and more capital flight. These additional aggravating factors and their implications would particularly affect 
the most vulnerable of Liberia’s population given that their resilience and coping capacities are next to exhausted”, 
UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of paragraph 13 (a) of resolution 1343 (2001) concerning 
Liberia’ (5 October 2001) UN Doc S/2001/939, ¶47. 
817 UNSC Res 1132 (8 October 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1132 was passed only after the “ECOWAS Committee of 
Five [had] given the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs assurances that in implementing the 
current ECOWAS regional sanctions regime it does not intend to constrain humanitarian relief operations in Sierra 
Leone”, UNSC Verbatim Record (8 October 1997) UN Doc S/PV.3822, 8. Once introduced, an inter-agency 
mission comprising UN OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WO, WFP and OSESG were tasked with the assessment of “the 
humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone and measuring to what extent this situation has deteriorated under the UN 
sanctions and ECOWAS embargo, particularly in terms of the delivery of humanitarian assistance”, Office of the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ‘Inter-Agency Assessment Mission to Sierra Leone: Interim Report’ (17 
February 1998), ¶1. 
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might find themselves facing sanctions . . . but deem[ed] it unfortunate that this 
suggestion was not taken into account.818 
 
Indeed, criticism continued even to the turn of the century and the Council has been accused of 
adopting a policy where “getting sanctions right has [often] been a less compelling goal than 
getting sanctions adopted.”819 Such criticism of the human rights impact of comprehensive 
sanctions regimes and a drive to incorporate new techniques to make sanctions more effective at 
their goals to ensure compliance with its resolutions through non-military means led to several 
rounds of sanction reform reviews: in the years 1998-1999, the Interlaken Process focused on 
targeting financial sanctions;820 in 1999-2000, the Bonn/Berlin Process tackled sanctions related 
to arms embargoes, travel and aviation;821 in 2001-2003, the Stockholm Process822 discussed UN 
Policy Options; and in 2007, Greece sponsored a symposium on ‘Enhancing the Implementation 
of UN Security Council Sanctions’.823  
 
VIII.4.1.1 A lesson learnt? 
In addition to these four rounds of sanctions review, the Council has also implemented its own 
reform efforts in the form of The Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions – a 
temporary body established in 2000824 – which was created to explore the sanctions process and 
propose amendments to the Council in how best to impose sanctions. When, in 2006, it 
submitted its recommendations, amendments to the design,825 implementation,826 monitoring,827 
and working methods,828 the Council significantly amended its approach to and content of 
                                                 
818 UNSC Verbatim Record (23 October 1997) UN Doc S/PV.3826, 10. 
819 Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy. See David Cortright and George A Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: 
Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (Lynne Rienner 2000) 7. 
820 See, the Thomas J Watson Jr Institute for International Studies, ‘Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for 
Design and Implementation. Contributions from the Interlaken Process’ (2001). 
821 Michael Brzoska (ed), ‘Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related 
Sanctions: Results of the ‘Bonn-Berlin Process’ (BICC 2001) 
822 Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano and Mikael Eriksson (eds), ‘Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: 
Guidelines for the Implementation of UN Policy Options. Results from the Stokholm Process on the Implementation 
of Targeted Sanctions’ (Uppsala U 2003). 
823 ‘Letter dated 12 December 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed 
to the President of the Security Council’ (13 December 2007) UN Doc S/2007/734, Annex. 
824 UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (17 April 2000) UN Doc S/2000/319, later extended by 
UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (29 December 2005) S/2005/841. 
825 UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (22 December 2006) UN Doc S/2006/997, Annex, 4. 
826 ibid 5, 7. 
827 ibid 6. 
828 ibid 7, 9.  
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sanctions, introducing targeted and smart sanctions to replace the blanket comprehensive 
sanctions employed in Haiti, Yugoslavia and Iraq. These newer forms of sanctions were also 
more bespoke to the countries upon which they were imposed; this new approach reflects 
positively on another component of the rule of law: the Predictability Paradox.  
Rather than adopting a one size fits all model of sanction regime, as the Council had 
previously been inclined to do, newer sanctions regimes integrated almost pinpoint-accurate 
measures such as commodity-specific sanctions pertinent to the country of sanction,829 sanctions 
targeted to individuals830 and segmented sanction elements831 that could be selected individually 
and tailored more accurately to ensure lower negative humanitarian and human rights impact 
upon civilians and increased pressure on the powerful elite that were the true targets of Council 
action. The ability of the Council to mix and match different components of sanctions allowed it 
to focus its sanctions regime on the sources of income for those in power or for those individuals 
that it wished to isolate, rather than effecting collateral damage on the scale of the Iraqi sanctions 
regime. Moreover, in various sanction regimes, assets that were deemed to be “necessary for 
basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical 
treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges”832 were exempt in a clear 
lesson learnt from the Iraq sanctions experience, which itself was overhauled833 to account for 
                                                 
829 In additional to traditional oil embargos in Iraq and Haiti, for example, a charcoal embargo was imposed on 
Eritrea and Somalia in UNSC Res 2036 (22 February 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2036 and UNSC Res 2093 (6 March 
2013) UN Doc S/RES/2093; timber embargoes were imposed on Liberia in UNSC Res 1521 (22 December 2003) 
UN Doc S/RES/1521 and UNSC Res 1532 (12 March 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1532; and diamond embargoes were 
introduced against UNITA in Angola (UNSC Res 1173 (12 June 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1173, the Revolutionary 
United Front in Angola (UNSC Res 1306 (5 July 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1306) and Liberia (UNSC Res 1343 (7 
March 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1343. 
830 In contrast to the sanctions against Iraq and Yugoslavia, where financial sanctions were imposed upon 
government assets, the Council began to focus in on individuals and entities. 
831 There are four central categories of sanctions: Travel bans, Asset Freezes, Arms Embargos and Commodity 
Interdictions. Sanctions regimes may incorporate between one and all of the categories, as well as other measures 
such as judicial referral and diplomatic sanctions. The first three categories are almost invariably part of a sanction 
regime; of the 15 current sanctions regimes, arms embargoes are included in 13, travel bans in 14 and asset freezes 
in 14. 
832 UNSC Res 1591 (29 March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1591, ¶3(g). The same principle is repeated in numerous 
resolutions relating to sanctions regimes, see eg UNSC Res 1718 (14 October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1718, ¶9(a), 
UNSC Res 1737 (27 December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1737, ¶13(a) and UNSC Res 1844 (20 November 2008) UN 
Doc S/RES/1844, ¶4(a). Sanctions in Sierra Leone, for example, did not limit shipments of food or medicines or 
other basic goods, contained regular review of implementation and were “designed to have maximum impact against 
the illegal junta of Sierra Leone, while imposing a minimum burden on the civilian population”,  UNSC Verbatim 
Record (8 October 1997) UN Doc S/PV.3822, 16. 
833 UNSC Res 1472 (28 March 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1472. 
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the humanitarian situation following the second Gulf War and finally replaced834 in 2003 with a 
committee-led sanctions regime.  
This practice of creating committees, panels or groups of experts and monitoring groups 
for all sanctions imposed is also a step towards increased transparency, fairness and institutional 
strength on the part of the Council. Eritrea and Somalia were subject to a simple sanction regime 
under UNSC Res 733835 before the adoption of UNSC Res 751836 created a committee to monitor 
the situation; the DRC’s sanctions were also amended in 2003 from a simple arms embargo837 to 
one under the supervision of both a committee and a group of experts;838 Sudan’s simple arms 
embargo839 transitioned to sanctions under the watch of a committee and panel of experts;840 and 
UNSC Res 1695841 imposing non-proliferation sanctions on the DPRK was swiftly augmented to 
an arms embargo, asset freeze, non-proliferation and travel ban under the auspices of a 
committee in 2006.842 In fact, since 2006 the Council has not imposed a sanctions regime 
without a corresponding committee at the very least.843 Although these committees are 
established to monitor compliance with the sanctions regimes, their existence provides a much 
needed link between the situation on the ground and the Council through country reports that are 
filed.  
Notwithstanding the implementation of this measure, which may have added a degree of 
transparency and independence to the listing of individuals to be targeted, there remained human 
rights concerns with respect to the lists of individuals compiled. Due process rights are 
jeopardised by the procedure of the Council and the inability of individuals to contest their 
insertion on asset freeze and financial sanctions lists; under article 25 of the Charter, States 
“agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council”844  and, in contrast to 
domestic jurisdictions where legal recourse may be available through domestic judicial channels 
                                                 
834 UNSC Res 1483 (22 May 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1483. 
835 UNSC Res 733 (23 January 1992) UN Doc S/RES/733. 
836 UNSC Res 751 (24 April 1992) UN Doc S/RES/751. 
837 UNSC Res 1493 (28 July 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1493. 
838 UNSC Res 1533 (12 March 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1533 
839 UNSC Res 1556 (30 July 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1556. 
840 UNSC Res 1591 (29 March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1591. 
841 UNSC Res 1695 (15 July 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1695. 
842 UNSC Res 1718 (14 October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1718. 
843 Of the fifteen current sanctions regimes, all have a committee established to oversee the stipulations of the 
relevant resolutions and sanction elements. These function to ensure that sanctions are carried out adequately and 
appropriately. 
844 UN Charter (1945) art 25. 
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in the event of an alleged breach of justice, there was initially no means of arguing one’s 
innocence to the Council. In essence, once placed on the list, it was impossible to be removed 
without the express consent of the Council or the overseeing Committee, a request for which had 
to come through the State of nationality or residency of the petitioner. 
It was this “resolve to ensure that sanctions are carefully targeted in support of clear 
objectives. . . [and that] fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on 
sanctions lists and for removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions”845 that 
led to the establishment of a Focal Point for Delisting requests, which is undoubtedly a step 
forward for the due process rights that may have been initially overlooked by the Council in their 
sanction regimes. Although the grandiose title belies the fact that this role is essentially a single 
UN staff member, the mechanism allows direct access to the individual in question,846 rather than 
the arduous path of applying through the State. The Council also created the Office of the 
Ombudsperson – an independent and impartial review mechanism for de-listing from the Al-
Qaida sanctions list – in an effort to welcome “improvements to the Committee’s procedures and 
the quality of the Consolidated List and expressing its intent to continue efforts to ensure that 
procedures are fair and clear.”847 The Ombudsman should “perform [their] tasks in an 
independent and impartial manner and . . . neither seek nor receive instructions from any 
government.”848 The sanctions regime was first established in 1999849 and has been subsequently 
amended numerous times since850 but it was the concern over due rights process of individuals 
placed on the sanctions list that spurred the Council into action. Individuals who found 
themselves on the list were not subject to any judicial standards of trial prior to their inclusion851 
                                                 
845 UNSC Presidential Statement 28 (2006) UN Doc S/PRST/2006/28, 2. UNSC Res 1730 (19 December 2006) UN 
Doc S/RES/1730, preamble. 
846 The basic procedures for the operation of the delisting request are publically available UNSC Res 1370 (18 
September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1370, Annex. 
847 UNSC Res 1904 (17 December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1904, preamble [emphasis in original]. 
848 ibid ¶20. 
849 UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267. 
850 eg UNSC Res 1333 (19 December 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1333; UNSC Res 1390 (16 January 2002) UN Doc 
S/RES/1390; UNSC Res 1455 (17 January 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1455; UNSC Res 1526 (30 January 2004) UN 
Doc S/RES/1526; UNSC Res 1617 (29 July 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1617; UNSC Res 1735 (22 December 2006) UN 
Doc S/RES/1735; UNSC Res 1822 (30 June 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1822; UNSC Res 1904 (17 December 2009) UN 
Doc S/RES/1904; UNSC Res 1989 (17 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1989; UNSC Res 2082 (17 December 2012) UN 
Doc S/RES/2082; UNSC Res 2083 (17 December 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2083. 
851 The Committee of the Security Council dealing with sanctions against the Taliban established by UNSC Res 
1267 was authorised to freeze funds and other financial resources in accordance with UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 
1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267, ¶4(b) without oversight and “to designate the aircraft and funds or other financial 
resources referred to in paragraph 4”, ibid ¶6(e). 
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and there was no justification offered by the Council or other body for listing these individuals 
on the sanctions list, contrary to principles of habeas corpus, transparency and avoidance of 
arbitrariness.  
Thus, there is still work to be done to ensure that the Council complies with human rights 
fully in the process of establishing its sanctions regimes; in an apparent conflict of interest, the 
same committee entrusted with compiling and monitoring the sanctions list was the only body 
empowered to “consider requests for exemptions from the measure imposed”852 with no 
oversight. The inability of individuals to appeal their inclusion to the committee is what, in part, 
led to the landmark – and controversial – Kadi II,853Kadi III854 and Nada855 judgments at the EU 
courts. The fundamental rights of Kadi – specifically the “right to be heard, the right to respect 
for property and the principle of proportionality, and also the right to effective judicial review”856 
were found to have been violated by his inclusion on the sanctions list.857 As recently as 2013 it 
was found by the ECJ that despite the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson, “the 
procedure for delisting and ex-officio re-examination at UN level . . . do not provide to the person 
whose name is listed on the Sanctions Committee Consolidated List … the guarantee of effective 
judicial protection.”858 Although the European Court of Human Rights has previously held that 
“in interpreting its resolutions, there must be a presumption that the Security Council does not 
intend to impose any obligation on Member States to breach fundamental principles of human 
rights”859, in the Nada case it soon after made it quite clear that “Resolution 1390 (2002) . . . 
[imposed] an obligation to take measures capable of breaching human rights.”860 The legal 
interpretation, then, is that the Council does not deliberately breach human rights, but that it is 
capable of doing so nonetheless. 
This interpretation is befitting to summarise the Council’s approach to human rights; the 
Council’s intentions and results are at times mismatched. Whilst there may have been varying 
objectives of efforts towards reform, including strengthening capacities to administer the 
                                                 
852 ibid. 
853 Case T-85/09, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v European Commission and Others [2010] ECR I-06351 (Kadi II). 
854 Joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi 
[2013] (CFI, 23 July 2013) (Kadi III). 
855 Nada v Switzerland App no 10593/08 (ECtHR, 12 September 2012). 
856 Kadi III (n 854) ¶18. 
857 This was later overturned in the Kadi II case. 
858 Kadi III (n 854) ¶133. 
859, Al-Jedda v The United Kingdom App no 27021/08 (ECtHR 7 July 2011) ¶102. 
860 Nada (n 855) ¶172. 
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sanctions, increasing compliance and streamlining the design and implementation of embargoes 
and sanctions, the human rights impact of sanctions was undoubtedly one of the core elements 
for reflection; however, as respect for human rights increased in Council resolutions on 
sanctions, new challenges have arisen that have taken time for the Council to come to terms with. 
Moreover, efficacy appears at times have declined. The subsequent shift in the Council’s 
response – as a result of the implementation of some of the many recommendations and the 
increased concern for human rights and humanitarian issues in sanctioned countries – may have 
resulted in tamer results on the ground; it is not clear that sanctions have succeeded alone in 
altering the trajectory of troubled countries. In the Sudan,861 Ivory Coast862 and Libya,863 for 
example, sanctions were always coupled with the mobilisation of troops either in a protection or 
monitoring force864 or military intervention capacity.865 However, this may be a necessary forfeit 
on the part of the Council. It is worth noting that sanctions are one of a number of tools at the 
disposition of the Council and, just as there are various types of sanctions that can be applied to a 
situation threatening the peace, so too the Council is not barred in any form from implementing 
sanctions in tandem with one or more other tools at its disposal either under Chapter VII, as was 
the case in Libya recently, or through international diplomacy, as is the case with Iran currently. 
Ultimately, the Council has correctly identified the necessity of ensuring that sanction measures 
take stock of human rights and humanitarian concerns; however, this does not mean that they are 
limited as to what course of action outside of a sanctions regime they may pursue. 
 
 
 
                                                 
861 UNSC Res 1556 (30 July 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1556; UNSC Res 1591 (29 March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1591; 
UNSC Res 1593 (7 April 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1593; UNSC Res 1945 (14 October 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1945. 
862 UNSC Res 1572 (5 November 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1572; UNSC Res 1584 (1 February 2005) UN Doc 
S/RES/1584; UNSC Res 1643 (15 December 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1643; UNSC Res 1975 (30 March 2011) UN 
Doc S/RES/1975; UNSC Res 2153 (29 April 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2153. 
863 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970; UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc 
S/RES/1973; UNSC Res 2009 (16 September 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2009; UNSC Res 2146 (19 March 2014) UN 
Doc S/RES/2146. 
864 The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established by UNSC Res 1590 and was mandated to “contribute 
towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan”, ¶4(d); the UN Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was mandated by UNSC Res 1584 (2005) to “monitor the implementation of the [sanctions] 
measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 1572 (2004)”, UNSC Res 1590 (24 March 2005) UN Doc 
S/RES/1590, ¶2(a). 
865 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973, whilst authorising all necessary measures to protect 
civilians – thereby authorising military intervention – also strengthened the sanctions regime, imposed a no-fly zone 
and extended the arms embargo. 
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VIII.4.2 Article 42 
Indeed, sanctions regimes are quite frequently supported with troops on the ground, either in the 
form of military intervention or a peacekeeping force. The authorisation of the use of military 
force is troublesome for the Council from a human rights perspective – the extent to which the 
Council is able to control the actions of authorised military forces is low and, should violations 
of human rights occur during a military operation or even the administration of a country post-
conflict by an authorised force, the reach of the Council is limited.866 In the wake of scandals of 
human rights abuses perpetrated by UN staff themselves in locations where they were dispatched 
to assist in rebuilding nations,867 the conduct of peacekeepers has increasingly been regulated 
through various internal guidelines, rules and policy;868 the conduct of military troops 
contributed to UN-mandated interventions is governed not only by international humanitarian 
law instruments,869 but also the domestic jurisdictions of the contributing States themselves, 
which have an obligation to pursue prosecution for violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law.870  Accordingly, the Council itself has a responsibility to ensure that human rights protection 
                                                 
866 Various human rights groups expressed concern over the treatment of detainees in Iraq by the Multi-National 
Force-Iraq (MNF-I), who were deprived of liberty and without judicial review processes under an expansive reading 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention. See eg Human Rights Watch, ‘Letter to the Security Council on MNF Detention 
Practices in Iraq’ (25 April 2008) <http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/24/letter-security-council-mnf-detention-
practices-iraq> accessed 16 December 2014; Amnesty International, ‘Beyond Abu Ghraib: detention and torture in 
Iraq’ (6 March 2006) Amnesty International 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/001/2006/en/a2b9a7ed-d46e-11dd-8743-d305bea2b 
2c7/mde140012006en.pdf> accessed 16 December 2014. 
867 UNGA ‘Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the investigation into sexual exploitation of 
refugees by aid workers in West Africa’ (11 October 2002) UN Doc A/57/465 details numerous allegations against 
UN staff; despite concluding in ¶42 that “the impression given in the consultants’ report that sexual exploitation by 
aid workers, in particular sex for services, was widespread is misleading and untrue” the damage to the image of the 
UN was grave and resulted in numerous reforms. 
868 See, principally, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
Principles and Guidelines’ (March 2008) (‘Capstone Doctrine’) See, also UNGA ‘Overview of the financing of the 
United Nations peacekeeping operations: budget performance for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 and 
budget for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007’ (24 February 2006) UN Doc A/60/696, ¶6-21 (‘Peace 
Operations 2010’ reform Strategy); UNGA ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’ (21 August 
2000) UN Doc A/55/305-S/2000/809 [hereinafter ‘The Brahimi report’]. 
869 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v United States of America) (Provisional Measures) [1999] ICJ Rep 1999 
916, ¶31: The ICJ established the principle that “whether or not States accept the jurisdiction of the Court, they 
remain in any event responsible for acts attributable to them that violate international law, including humanitarian 
law.” 
870 This principle has been echoed in the criminal and military trials against soldiers perpetrating crimes against 
civilians in Kosovo (see US v Frank J Ronghi, 60 MJ 83 (ACMR, 2004), where US Staff Sergeant Frank Ronghi 
was sentenced to life imprisonment for the rape and murder of an 11 year old ethnic Albanian in Kosovo in 2000,), 
Afghanistan (see R v Alexander Wayne Blackman and Secretary of State for Defence [2014] EWCA Crim 1029, 
where Blackman (formerly ‘Marine A’ was jailed for a minimum of 10 years in 2013 for murdering a wounded 
Afghan detainee); conversely, in the wake of serious violations of prisoner rights by US soldiers at Abu Ghraib 
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is enshrined in its own resolutions and decisions authorising troops to act; the fact that the degree 
of effective control over events on the ground by the Council is so little serves to underline the 
importance of clear mandates for action by the Council that incorporate both non-derogable 
human rights protections and derogable human rights protections, as well as the limitation of 
their derogability, into resolutions. A delegation or authority by the Council imparts with it not 
only permission or encouragement to act, but also the Council’s obligation to respect human 
rights throughout. Moreover, if as discussed in relation to sanctions the Council has grown 
increasingly aware of the need to include human rights and humanitarian protections in the 
imposition and monitoring processes of sanctions, it should surely incorporate similar safeguards 
in decisions to authorise intervention of troops both as peacekeepers and in military 
interventions. 
 
VIII.4.2.1 Military interventions 
Historically, the authorisation to military intervene under Chapter VII did not make note of any 
human rights implications: UNSC Res 83 in 1950 was the model of succinctness and 
“[r]ecommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic 
of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and 
security in the area”;871 the limited authority given to the United Kingdom to bring to an end the 
rebellion in Southern Rhodesia under UNSC Res 253 in 1968, though emerging from the need to 
“enable the people to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United 
Nations”872 placed no explicit human rights safeguards or parameters upon the troops; and in 
1990, the authority given to Member States to “use all necessary means to uphold and implement 
resolution 660 (1990)”873 in Iraq featured no mention of the scope of applicability of 
international human rights or humanitarian law. Even as recently as 2011, the authorisation in 
UNSC Res 1973 to Member States “to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”874 did so without a 
human rights framework; the only mention of humanitarian considerations is the exemption of 
                                                                                                                                                             
prison, minor sentences were handed down to the perpetrators in Court martials, see ‘Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal Fast 
Facts’ CNN Library (7 November 2014) <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse-scandal-
fast-facts> accessed 16 December 2014. 
871 UNSC Res 83 (27 June 1950) UN Doc S/RES/83. 
872 UNSC Res 253 (29 May 1968) UN Doc S/RES/253, ¶2. 
873 UNSC Res 678 (29 November 1990) UN Doc S/RES/678, ¶2. 
874 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973, ¶4. 
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the No Fly Zone to “flights whose sole purpose is humanitarian, such as delivering or facilitating 
the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related 
assistance, or evacuating foreign nationals from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.”875 
 It could easily be argued that there is no need for explicit reference to the obligations of States 
and their troops to comply with international human rights and humanitarian law when taking 
part in military interventions authorised by the Council; many international human rights and 
humanitarian treaties govern the practices of troop-contributing nations,876 so as to ensure they 
are bound to abide by international norms when carrying out their duties under the authorisation 
of the Council. Although unlikely, such obligations would be suspended in the event of conflict 
with a Council resolution under Article 103 of the Charter; this principle has been established in 
numerous legal precedents. Even were such an unlikely situation to occur, both customary 
international and jus cogens norms would govern the actions of troops, including distinctions 
between civilians and combatants, treatment of civilians, protected persons and permitted 
weaponry to be used877 as well as the prohibition of torture,  genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and other peremptory norms. France recently highlighted the point that 
“Security Council mandates for the protection of civilians do not take the place of sovereign 
responsibilities. The protection of civilians is, and will continue to be, primarily the 
responsibility of the host Government.”878 As recently as August 2014, the Council has 
emphasised that “that the primary responsibility under international law for the security and 
protection of humanitarian personnel and United Nations and associated personnel lies with the 
Government hosting a United Nations operation.”879 Nonetheless, the Council has also taken 
                                                 
875 ibid ¶7. 
876 eg there are 168 parties to the ICCPR, 162 parties to the ICESCR, 146 signatories to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1949), 188 parties to the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), 155 parties to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), 194 parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989). 
877 See, eg Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (n 525). 
878 France, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531, 5. See also, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 
May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531, 14 (2011) “Colombia concurs with other Council members that the primary 
responsibility for the protection of civilians belongs to each State.” 
879 UNSC Res 2175 (29 August 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2175, preamble. 
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active steps to bolster the Protection of Civilians where necessary by mandating an increase in 
peacekeepers.880 
 However, this does not entirely negate the need for a specific and precise mandate issued by 
the Council. The military intervention into Libya underscores this reality and emphasised the 
need for a tighter and clearer framework to be created by the Council as well as increased 
involvement in the management and oversight of operations by the Council for two principle 
reasons: firstly, the authorisation granted by UNSC Res 1973 was vague to the point of 
permitting the regional organisation that responded to the call – NATO – the liberty of 
interpreting it as it saw fit and leading to the violation of sovereignty through regime change; 
secondly, allegations of international human rights and humanitarian law contraventions 
perpetrated by NATO forces, as well as the reluctance of its officials to investigate these 
allegations, emerged in an alarmingly reliable manner soon after. In the aftermath of the military 
intervention of Libya by NATO forces, Brazil was quick to bring perspective to the role of the 
Council: 
 
When the Council does authorize the use of force, such as in the case of Libya, we 
must hold ourselves to a high standard. The Council has a responsibility to ensure 
the appropriate implementation of its resolutions. Force must be used carefully, 
with due regard for the principle of proportionality and in strict accordance with 
the terms of the authorization. The use of force to protect civilians does not 
abrogate international law, but underlines the need for strict adherence to it.881  
 
UNSC Res 1973 barely passed in the Council with five abstentions, two of which were from P5 
Members China and Russia; Council Members noted that “the text of resolution 1973 (2011) 
contemplates measures that go far beyond [the call of the League of Arab States for strong 
measures to stop the violence through a no-fly zone]”.882 There were protestations that the 
Council did “not have clarity about details of enforcement measures, including who will 
participate and with what assets, and how these measures will exactly be carried out”883 as well 
                                                 
880 See, eg South Sudan, where in UNSC Res 2132 (24 December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2132, ¶3, the Council 
endorsed “the recommendation made by the Secretary-General to temporarily increase the overall force levels of 
UNMISS to support its protection of civilians and provision of humanitarian assistance.” 
881 UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531, 11. 
882 Brazil, UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498, 6. 
883 India, ibid. 
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as both Russian and Chinese disappointment that their queries had been left unanswered.884 This 
disappointment soon turned into condemnation and accusations that NATO had ventured further 
than the two mandates issued in UNSC Res 1973, namely the use of force to protect civilians and 
to enforce the No Fly Zone.885 Moreover, just as Russia, China and others had feared at the time 
of its passing, as a result of UNSC Res 1973’s broad authorisation, some commentators have 
remarked that NATO “had effectively become the air force of the opposition”886 risking the goal 
of the Council that “all efforts to protect civilians be strictly in keeping with the Charter and 
based on a rigorous and non-selective application of international humanitarian law.”887 In 
response to the widening scope of NATO intervention, the Russian Federation underlined that 
“[t]he noble goal of protecting civilians should not be compromised by attempts to resolve in 
parallel any unrelated issues.”888 Against this backdrop, any intended regime change, though 
denied at national level by nations advocating intervention in Libya such as the UK,889 was 
stringently avoided by both the Council890 and the Secretariat, which reiterated the necessity that 
“[i]n addition to complying scrupulously with international humanitarian law, the 
                                                 
884 Russia, ibid 8: “In essence, a whole range of questions raised by Russia and other members of the Council 
remained unanswered. Those questions were concrete and legitimate and touched on how the no-fly zone would be 
enforced, what the rules of engagement would be and what limits on the use of force there would be.” See also, ibid 
10, where the Chinese representative “asked specific questions. However, regrettably, many of those questions 
failed to be clarified or answered. China has serious difficulty with parts of the resolution.” 
885 See, Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6528, 9: “We emphasize once again that any 
use of force by the coalition in Libya should be carried out in strict compliance with resolution 1973 (2011).  
Any act going beyond the mandate established by that resolution in any way or any disproportionate use of force is 
unacceptable”; ibid 10, “China calls for the complete and strict implementation of the relevant resolutions of the 
Security Council. The international community must respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya. The internal affairs and fate of Libya must be left up to the Libyan people to decide. We are not 
in favour of any arbitrary interpretation of the Council’s resolutions or of any actions going beyond those mandated 
by the Council.” 
886 Thomas G Weiss and others, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Westview Press 2012) 118; see, 
also Alex J Bellamy and Paul D Williams, ‘The New Politics of Protection?’ (2011) 87 International Affairs 4, who 
note that “NATO and several key allies, including Qatar and Jordan, interpreted the mandate as providing the basis 
for a wide range of military activities including the suppression of Libya’s air defences, air force and other aviation 
capacities, as well as the use of force against Libya’s fielded forces, its capacity to sustain fielded forces, and its 
command and control capacities, on the basis that Libya’s armed forces constituted a threat to civilians.” 
887 Brazil, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531, 11. 
888 Russia, ibid 9. 
889 ‘Libya: Removing Gaddafi not allowed, says David Cameron’, BBC News (London, 21 March 2011) 
<http://www. bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12802749> accessed 16 December 2014. 
890 UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531, 20: China stated that “[t]here must be no attempt at 
regime change or involvement in civil war by any party under the guise of protecting civilians”; India noted that 
“Any decision to intervene that is associated with political motives detracts from that noble principle [to protect 
civilians] and needs to be avoided”, ibid 10; Brazil reiterated this sentiment, ibid 11, “We must avoid excessively 
broad interpretations of the protection of civilians, which could link it to the exacerbation of conflict, compromise 
the impartiality of the United Nations or create the perception that it is being used as a smokescreen for intervention 
or regime change.” 
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implementation of the Council’s decision must be exclusively limited to promoting and ensuring 
the protection of civilians.”891  
 Nonetheless, despite assertions by Council Members that “the future of Libya should be 
decided by the people of Libya”892, it would appear that Council-authorised intervention was 
central to the removal of Gaddafi, displaying a clear bias for one side of the conflict and 
undermining the protection of all civilians in Libya; an inclusion of specific humanitarian and 
human rights standards as well as limitations on the scope of actions permitted by a Council 
mandate would contribute to ensuring that future military interventions are not misinterpreted 
and do not lead to a similarly biased approach.  
 Increased details on the scope of authorised action and binding inclusions of human rights and 
humanitarian principles in the text of a resolution would also go far in minimising the damage to 
civilian populations in conflict zones as it would impose the precise parameters upon which the 
Council Members decide upon the forces carrying out military intervention. Although military 
intervention is explicitly provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter,893 the Council has 
increasingly opted for the authorisation of the use of force by Member States894 rather than the 
centralised Military Staff Committee planned for by the drafters of the UN Charter in article 46. 
The safeguards and regulations that are enshrined in articles 43 to 50 of the Charter, including 
the existence of a Military Staff Committee consisting of “the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent 
members of the Security Council . . . [and] responsible under the Security Council for the 
strategic direction of any armed forces”895 are replaced by the strategic command of organisation 
of States, predominantly NATO in recent years.896 Hesitation and consternation by Member 
States over this lack of direct Council control highlights the split that exist on the Council over 
                                                 
891 Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531, 
4. 
892 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498, 5; see also, UK, ibid 4, “The central purpose 
of the resolution is clear: to end the violence, to protect civilians and to allow the people of Libya to determine their 
own future, free from the tyranny of the Al-Qadhafi regime.” 
893 UN Charter (1945) art 46-7. 
894 There is debate over the legality of this in the light of art 2(4) of the UN Charter. See eg Sarooshi (n 11); Niels M 
Blokker, ‘Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of 
Force by ‘Coalitions of the Able and Willing’’ (2000) 11 EJIL 541. 
895 UN Charter (1945) art 47(2)-(3). 
896 NATO intervened in Yugoslavia following the adoption of UNSC Res 1199 (1998), Afghanistan even prior to 
the creation of the International Security Assistance Force in 2001 and Libya following UNSC Res 1973 (2011). 
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the use of force by a third party with the consent of the Council; India,897 China,898 Zimbabwe,899 
Brazil,900 Mexico,901 New Zealand,902 Pakistan,903 India,904 Nigeria905 and Belgium906 are but 
some of the nations having expressed discontent over the lack of “a purely United Nations 
operation.”907 Due to allegations of human rights violations by troops of Member State armed 
forces, it is not difficult to perceive the reasoning behind this. 
                                                 
897 UNSC Verbatim Record (13 August 1992) UN Doc S/PV.3106, 12: “in the present instance, it would be highly 
advisable – indeed imperative – that the operation, which could involve the use of force, should be and should 
always remain under the command and control of the United Nations.” 
898 ibid 51: “the broad authorization given to all States by the resolution to take all necessary measures is tantamount 
to issuing a blank check. It may lead to the loss of control of the situation, with serious consequences for which the 
United Nations and the Security Council will be held responsible, and the reputation of the United Nations may 
suffer as a result.”; UNSC Verbatim Record (31 July 1994) UN Doc S/PV.3413, 10: The practice of the Council’s 
authorizing certain Member States to use force is even more disconcerting because this would obviously create a 
dangerous precedent.”; UNSC Verbatim Record (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/PV.3145, 17: “we wish to point out 
that, in spite of the fact that the Secretary-General has been given some authorization, the draft resolution has taken 
the form of authorizing certain countries to take military action , which may adversely affect the collective role of 
the United Nations. We hereby express our reservations on this.” 
899 UNSC Verbatim Record (13 August 1992) UN Doc S/PV.3106, 16: “Zimbabwe is of the view that any necessary 
measures taken or arrangements made to deal with this crisis have to be undertaken as a collective enforcement 
measure under the full control of and with full accountability to the United Nations through the Security Council, as 
provided for by the Charter of the United Nations.”; Zimbabwe also voted in favour of S/RES/794 (1992) 
specifically because the resolution placed “the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the controlling centre of 
the operation.”, UNSC Verbatim Record (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/PV.3145, 7. 
900 UNSC Verbatim Record (31 July 1994) UN Doc S/PV.3413, 9-10: “the issue of the immediate establishment of a 
multinational force with the purpose of intervening in Haiti . . . constitute[s] a worrisome departure from the 
principles and customary practices adopted by the United Nations as regards peace-keeping.” 
901 ibid 5: “a kind of carte blanche has been awarded to an undefined multinational force to act when it deems it to 
be appropriate. This seems to us an extremely dangerous practice in the field of international relations.” 
902 ibid 21: “New Zealand’s preference has always been and will always be for collective security to be undertaken 
by the United Nations itself. That provides the reassurance that small countries seek from the United Nations when 
Chapter VII is being invoked.” 
903 ibid 25: “We regret that, for well-understood reasons, the Secretary-General could not recommend the option one 
contained in his report in document S/1994/828 of 15 July 1994. Had it been possible to implement that option, it 
would have been a preferred course of action, in my delegation’s view”; UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on 
the United Nations Mission in Haiti’ (15 July 1994) UN Doc S/1994/828, ¶16: “The first option would be for the 
Security Council to expand the existing force (UNMIH) and give it a revised mandate covering the additional tasks 
envisaged in resolution 933 (1994).” 
904 UNSC Verbatim Record (31 July 1994) UN Doc S/PV.3413, 50: “Consistent with the position that the Indian 
delegation has had the opportunity to express on several occasions in the Council, my delegation favoured . . . a 
country-wide enforcement operation in Somalia with the aim of creating conditions in which relief supplied can be 
effectively delivered to those in need, an operation carried out under United Nations command and control.” 
905 UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 1994) UN Doc S/PV.3392, 10: “The current situation in Rwanda constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security. Under these circumstances, the United Nations, through the Security 
Council, retains a primary responsibility. Therefore, any effort - be it unilateral, bilateral or multilateral - is best 
subsumed within it.” 
906 UNSC Verbatim Record (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/PV.3145, 24: “The operation in Somalia will be under 
the political control of the United Nations. The coordinating machinery to be set up between the States participating 
in the operation and the Secretary-General, and the decision-making powers granted to the Council concerning the 
duration of the operation, are, in my delegation’s opinion, ley elements in this draft resolution.” 
907 ibid. 
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Such a purely UN operation has not materialised, or perhaps such an opportunity has not 
arisen due in unison to the gravity of negative experiences during NATO intervention and the 
recent nature of such intervention in Libya – “the UN itself can no more conduct military 
operations on a large scale on its own than a trade association of hospitals can conduct 
surgery.”908 The detrimental impact of intervention was foreseen by several States during debates 
on UNSC Res 1973, if only due to the loose terminology used; Russia – abstaining in the vote – 
argued that “[r]esponsibility for the inevitable humanitarian consequences of the excessive use of 
outside force in Libya will fall fair and square on the shoulders of those who might undertake 
such action”909 and later indirectly accused the Council of complicity through its statement that 
“actions by the NATO-led coalition forces are also resulting in civilian casualties.”910 In the 
wake of these casualties, reports surfaced of NATO’s reluctance to investigate civilian deaths,911 
simply stating that although it “did everything possible to minimize the risk to civilians, in a 
complex military operation that risk cannot be reduced to zero.”912 There is no access to justice 
for survivors; in contrast to the Council’s efforts to deal with human rights violations by 
establishing the ad hoc courts of the ICTY and ICTR and referrals twice to the ICC913 of 
situations involving breaches of human rights, no tribunals have been set up by the Council nor 
have efforts been made to investigate alleged contraventions of international human rights and 
humanitarian law by NATO forces under the authority of the Council. Indeed, although the 
situation in Libya has been referred to the International Criminal Court,914 the jurisdiction of the 
Court over military and civilian staff from outside Libya was limited,915 which might be 
                                                 
908 Michael Mandelbaum, ‘The Reluctance to Intervene’ (1994) 95 Foreign Policy 3, 11. 
909 UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498, 7. 
910 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6528. China more mutedly simply stated its 
official position – that it “is always against the use of force in international relations”, ibid 10. 
911 Amnesty International, ‘Libya: The forgotten victims of NATO strikes’ (March 2012), 18 <http://www.amnesty 
.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/003/2012/en/8982a094-60ff-4783-8aa8-8c80a4fd0b14/mde190032012en.pdf> 
accessed 16 December 2014: “NATO appeared to suggest that it had limited means and responsibility to conduct 
investigations into reports of civilian casualties caused in NATO strikes . . . [and] did not take any steps to conduct 
on site investigations into reports of death and injury of civilians resulting from its strikes in areas which had come 
under the control of the new Libyan authorities (the NTC) prior to 31 October 2011 and which were thus safely 
accessible. All the survivors and relatives of those killed in NATO strikes interviewed by Amnesty International said 
that they had never been contacted either by NATO or by the Libyan NTC.” 
912 ibid. 
913 First for alleged breaches in Sudan (UNSC Res 1593 (7 April 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1593) then again in Libya 
(UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970). 
914 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970, ¶4. 
915 ibid ¶5: “nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a State outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the S/RES/1970 
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interpreted as suggesting that the ends justify the means and that potential breaches of human 
rights by military and civilian staff working under authorisation by the Council were above the 
law.916 The immunity of nationals and officials from non-Rome Statute Party Members was 
certainly alluded to in the discussions of UNSC Res 1970,917 and would have figured heavily in 
the minds of Council members such as the United States, who had vehemently advocated the 
immunity – albeit temporary918 and more diplomatically worded919 – of its peacekeepers from 
ICC jurisdiction almost a decade earlier920 and indeed vetoed drafted resolution S/2002/712.921 
From this perspective too, the Council does not appear to feel obliged to incorporate human 
rights protections into its resolutions, nor to provide affected citizens with access to justice 
thereafter; to the contrary, it holds to account the actions of the parties it targets in its resolutions 
whilst refusing to hold its own delegated forces to the same standard – “an unacceptable double 
standard in international law.”922 
There have also been no efforts by the Council to learn lessons from the experience in 
Libya and other conflicts, much less incorporate them into future resolutions. Save for the 
reluctance of Russia and China to intervene similarly in Syria, the Council may have repeated the 
same model and once again authorised NATO intervention under the pretence of humanitarian 
intervention, couched in a loosely termed mandate that evolved into regime change of leadership 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2011) Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been 
expressly waived by the State.” 
916 See Canada’s objections to immunity for peacekeepers from prosecution by the ICC in UNSC Verbatim Record  
(10 July 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4568, 3. 
917 India, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6491, 2-3: India is not a member of the 
International Criminal Court. Of the 192 Members of the United Nations, only 114 are members of the International 
Criminal Court. Five of the 15 members of the Council, including three permanent members, are not parties to the 
Rome Statute . . . In this context, we draw attention to paragraph 6f the resolution, concerning national [sic] from 
countries not parties to the Rome Statute.; however, Brazil argued against such exemption at ibid 7, “initiatives 
aimed at establishing exemptions of certain categories of individuals from the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court are not helpful to advancing the cause of justice and accountability and will not contribute to 
strengthening the role of the Court.” 
918 UNSC Res 1422 (12 July 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1422, ¶1 requests that the ICC defer any investigations or 
prosecutions of “current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute 
over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or authorized operation,” for a period of 12 months 
from 1 July 2002. The phrasing of the immunity in resolution 1970 echoes the terminology of resolution 1422. 
919 Canada, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 July 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4568, 4: “The proposed draft resolutions 
circulating avoid the word ‘immunity’ but in fact have precisely the same effect as the proposal that the Security 
Council would not entertain on 30 June.” 
920 United States, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 June 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4563, 2-3. 
921 ibid 3. 
922 Canada, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 July 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4568, 4. 
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in Syria.923 From this perspective, the Council as a body does appear to have gained an increased 
awareness of the need for specificity and respect for human rights in its military interventions, 
albeit that the same cannot be claimed for all its constituent Members. In voting against a draft 
resolution924 that was itself watered down to remove even references to suspended sanctions,925 
much less military intervention, both China and the Russian Federation attempted to transform 
what it saw as a negative experience into a didactic opportunity for Council course correction.926 
This divide between the two camps of France, US and UK on one side and Russia and 
China on the other remains the norm to this day,927 reflecting the fact that human rights are still 
seen by the latter two P5 members as falling within the domestic jurisdiction. Indeed, one might 
go so far as to point to the situation in Libya as being a principal reason for Council inaction on 
Syria; indirectly, through the inefficient management of the intervention in Libya, the human 
rights situation in Syria appears to have been negatively impacted. Criticism from both Russia 
and China on the deviation from the initial mandate given to NATO in Libya has scarred the 
Council’s unity in the face of human rights abuses thereafter. The Russian Federation has not 
hesitated to make mention of the Libyan experience when voting against draft resolutions on the 
Syrian conflict928 and China has stood firm in its stance that “the Council should continue 
                                                 
923 See, UNSC Draft Res (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/2012/538; UNSC Draft Res (4 February 2012) UN Doc 
S/2012/77; UNSC Draft Res (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612. 
924 UNSC Draft Res (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612. 
925 UK, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, 7: “We removed the sanctions. Still, it was 
unacceptable to the minority. We called on all sides to reject violence and extremism. Still it was unacceptable. We 
removed any sense that sanctions would automatically follow in 30 days if the regime failed to comply, and still it 
was unacceptable. By including reference to Article 41 of the United Nations Charter we made it clear that any 
further steps would be non-military in nature. Still it was unacceptable.” 
926 Russia, ibid 4: “For us, Members of the United Nations, including in terms of a precedent, it is very important to 
know how the resolution was implemented and how a Security Council resolution turned into its opposite. The 
demand for a quick ceasefire turned into a full-fledged civil war, the humanitarian, social, economic and military 
consequences of which transcend Libyan borders. The situation in connection with the no-fly zone has morphed into 
the bombing of oil refineries, television stations and other civilian sites. The arms embargo has morphed into a naval 
blockade in western Libya, including a blockade of humanitarian goods . . .These types of models should be 
excluded from global practices once and for all” [emphasis added]. See also, ibid 5, where “China believes that, 
under the current circumstances, sanctions or the threat thereof does not help to resolve the question of Syria and, 
instead, may further complicate the situation.” 
927 Further to UNSC Draft Res S/2011/612 (2012), UNSC Draft Res S/2012/77 (2012), UNSC Draft Res S/2012/538 
(2012) and UNSC Draft Res S/2014/348 (2014) were all vetoed by Russia and China. 
928 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7180, 13, discussing UNSC Draft Res S/2014/348 
(2014): “One cannot ignore the fact that the last time the Security Council referred a case to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) — the Libyan dossier, through resolution 1970 (2011) — it did not help resolve the crisis, but 
instead added fuel to the flames of conflict . . . The deaths of civilians as a result of NATO bombardments was 
somehow left outside its scope. Our colleagues from NATO countries arrogantly refused to address that issue 
altogether. They even refuse to apologize, even as they waxed eloquent about shame. They advocate fighting 
impunity but are themselves practicing a policy of all-permissiveness.” 
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holding consultations, rather than forcing a vote on the draft resolution, in order to avoid 
undermining Council unity or obstructing coordination and cooperation.”929 
The lack of intervention in Syria also raises questions about the responsibility to protect 
doctrine (R2P)930 that can trump established principles of international law such as State 
sovereignty and was arguably at the heart of the decision to intervene in Libya:931 
 
In its abstract, R2P clearly suggests that state sovereignty is not absolute but 
contingent on responsible governmental behavior. If a government egregiously 
violates international law, and in particular if it allows atrocities or is the 
perpetrator of abuse, its claims to sovereignty will be reviewed and maybe 
restricted or even overturned by the Security Council.932 
 
In light of the atrocities that have taken place in Syria and the absence of an imperative to 
intervene under the R2P doctrine, it appears that the Sino-Russia stance has halted the full 
emergence of this principle.933 The controversial nature of overriding such an integral foundation 
of the international legal order where heinous crimes have been committed by the State or their 
actors may also contribute to the reticence shown in its acceptance and highlights the difficulty 
of such a reconceptualisation of the principle.934 Weiss and others argue that the R2P doctrine 
will garner an inconsistent approach: “In terms applying the emerging norm, Syria is not Libya, 
and Sri Lanka is not Cote d’Ivoire. Political interest and will vary from case to case.”935 R2P, 
                                                 
929 UNSC Verbatim Record (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7180, 14. 
930 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (IDRC 2001). This principle was later endorsed by 
both UNGA ‘Note by the Secretary-General: Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes, A 
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’ (2 December 2004) UN Doc A/59/565 and UNGA ‘Report of the 
Secretary-General: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’ (21 March 
2005) UN Doc A/59/2005. 
931 See, Daphna Shraga, ‘The Security Council and Human Rights – from discretion to Promote to Obligation to 
Protect’, in Fassbender (ed) (n 704): “Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) was the Council’s first ‘R2P reaction’ 
to an ‘R2P situation’. It reiterated the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population, and 
qualified the wide-spread and systematice attacks against civilians as crimes against humanity – one of the three 
‘R2P crimes’.” 
932 Weiss and others (n 886) 122. 
933 Thomas G Weiss, ‘Reinserting ‘Never’ into ‘Never Again’: Political Innovations and the Responsibility to 
Protect’ in David Hollenbach (ed), Driven from Home: Protecting the Rights of Forced Migrants (Geo UP 2010) 
207-228; see also, eg Rama Mani and Thomas G Weiss (eds), The Responsibility to Protect: Cultural Perspectives 
from the Global South (Routledge 2011). 
934 Edward C Luck, ‘The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect’ (The Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis 
Brief, August 2008) 8: “Like most infants, R2P will need to walk before it can run.” 
935 Weiss and others (n 886) 122. See, also Martha Hall Findlay, Can R2P Survive Libya and Syria (Strategic 
Studies Working Group Papers, 2011). 
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then, is yet another tool at the discretion of the Council that is open to arbitrary implementation 
and national interests of the authorising States, even at the expense of the human rights of 
individuals affected by the atrocities on the ground. 
 This lack of authorization for military intervention in Syria by the Council, rather than 
suggesting an absence of care towards human rights and the humanitarian situation, may be 
indicative of a renewed attention to the impact of its resolutions on the individuals affected;936 
certainly in eyes of Russia and China it would appear that peace and security, as well as an 
improved human rights situation on the ground, is no longer synonymous with military 
intervention, or even a sanctions regime.937 The Council was, however, unanimous in its 
adoption of UNSC Res 2043, establishing a team of 300 unarmed military observers938 and 
calling for “the urgent, comprehensive, and immediate implementation of all elements of the 
Envoy’s six-point proposal.”939 Increasingly diplomatic methods are being explored as the 
Council moves away from military intervention, in part at least due to the human rights and 
humanitarian implications of such broad mandates as have been given in the past; in much the 
same way as sanctions have been deconstructed to focus on specific issues, individuals and 
bespoke areas of a nation’s key industry or trade, piecemeal approaches are also being explored 
with numerous resolutions targeting individual aspects of a conflict rather than the more blunt 
instrument of military intervention being paraded as a panacea to cure all facets and causes of 
conflict.940 Whilst the value of this approach towards an improvement of human rights on the 
ground has been debated,941 what is certain is that human rights and humanitarian concerns, at 
                                                 
936 See Caitlin Alyce Buckley, ‘Learning from Libya, Acting in Syria’ (2012) 5(2) J Strategic Security 81 for a 
discussion of alternative means of reaching a solution to the situation in Syria. 
937 See eg UNSC Verbatim Record (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6810, 8, where in voting against UNSC Draft Res 
S/2012/538 (2012), the “Russian delegation had very clearly and consistently explained that we simply cannot 
accept a document, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that would open the way for the pressure 
of sanctions and later for external military involvement in Syrian domestic affairs.” 
938 UNSC Res 2043 (21 April 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2043, ¶5. 
939 ibid ¶1. 
940 eg UNSC Res 2118 (27 September 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2118 tackled the issue of the Syrian chemical 
stockpile; UNSC Res 2139 (22 February 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2139 dealt with the humanitarian situation. 
941 United Kingdom, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7180, 7: “It is to Russia and China’s 
shame that they have chosen to block efforts to achieve justice for the Syrian people. It is disgraceful that they have 
yet again vetoed the Security Council’s efforts to take action in response to the appalling human rights violations 
being committed every day in Syria”; US, ibid 5:“Those who would behead civilians and attack religious minorities 
will not be soon held accountable at the ICC either, for today’s vetoes by Russia and China protect not only Al-
Assad and his henchmen but also the radical Islamic terrorists who continue a fundamentalist assault on the Syrian 
people that knows no decency or humanity. Such vetoes have aided impunity not just for Al-Assad but for terrorist 
groups, as well”; France, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6810, 3: “I had hoped not to have to 
go through this ghastly list. By 4 October 2011, repression in Syria had already claimed 3,000 lives and Russia and 
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least on the surface, are at the centre of the decision not to mire Syria in a Libya-esque military 
intervention and aftermath.942 
 
VIII.4.2.2 Peacekeeping Operations 
A similar quagmire is found in the case of peacekeeping, although Council efforts with respect to 
the integration of human rights elements into these mandates have been clearer and, moreover, 
concretely supported by other organs and agencies in recent years. Certainly, in comparison with 
peacekeeping efforts in the Congo where the impartiality of the United Nations Operation in the 
Congo (ONUC) failed to maintain its mandate to “not be a party to or in any way intervene in or 
be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise”,943 
peacekeeping is vastly different from its original incarnation. This is not surprising given its 
origins; peacekeeping “can rightly be called the invention of the United Nations.”944 Indeed, 
peacekeeping was not originally envisioned by the Charter drafters at San Francisco and one 
would not find any explicit reference to it in the Charter; ironically, however, it has grown to 
become the central tool in the Council’s fulfilment of maintaining and restoring international 
peace945 and “the United Nations has continued to serve as the universal forum for advancing 
consensus and as a coordinating mechanism among the many organizations active in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
China vetoed the Council’s action for the first time (see S/PV.6627). By 4 February, 6,000 Syrians had been cut 
down by the regime, and Russia and China exercised their second veto on the Council’s action (see S/PV.6711). 
Today, 19 July, we now count 17,000 men, women and children dead. We mourn their memory alongside the Syrian 
people, and Russia and China have just exercised their veto of the Council’s action for the third time.” 
942 China, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 August 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6826, 33: “The politicization of humanitarian 
issues must be avoided. Humanitarian relief efforts should never be militarized. We should especially guard against 
and oppose any act of interference in Syria’s internal affairs or military intervention under the pretext of 
humanitarianism.”  
943 UNSC Res 146 (9 August 1960) UN Doc S/RES/146, ¶4. For a discussion of the partisanship of UN forces in 
favour of the Congolese cenral government, see Weiss and others (n 886) 51-53. 
944 UNGA ‘An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping: Report of the Secretary-
General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992’ (17 
June 1992) UN Doc A/47/277 – S/24111, ¶46. 
945 Thirteen peacekeeping missions were established between 1948 and 1988 – UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNEF I, 
UNOGIL, ONUC, UNSF, UNYOM, UNFICYP, UNIPOM, DOMREP, UNEFII, UNDOF, UNIFIL, UNGOMAP, 
UNIIMOG, UNTAG, UNAVEM I and ONUCA – some of which remain to this day; between 1998-2000, a total of 
thirty-six missions were established or follow-up missions to previous situations– UNGOMAP, UNIIMOG, 
UNTAG, UNAVEMI, ONUCA, UNAMIC, ONUSAL, UNAVEM II, UNIKOM, MINURSO, UNTAC, UNOSOM 
I, UNOMOZ, UNPROFOR, UNOMUR, UNOSOM II, UNMIH, UNAMIR, UNOMIL, UNOMIG, UNASOG, 
UNMOT, UNCRO, UNAVEM III, UNPREDEP, UNMIBH, UNSMIH, UNTAES, UNMOP, MUNGUA, UNTMIH, 
MONUA, MIPONUH, UNCPSG, UNOMSIL and MINURCA; and since 2000, nineteen missions have been created 
– UNTAET, UNAMSIL, MONUC, UNMIK, UNMEE, UNMISET, UNMIL, UNOCI, MINUSTAH, ONUB, 
UNMIS, UNMIT, UNIFIL, MINURCAT, UNAMID, UNIPSIL, MONUSCO, UNMISS and UNISFA. In total, 
sixty-eight missions have been created, an average of one per year that the UN has existed. See Siobhan Wills, 
Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers (OUP 2009). 
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field.”946 Coupled with the increased recognition of human rights concerns on the Council over 
the decades since its creation, it is little surprise that in 1996 the Secretary-General noted that the 
“United Nations . . . has moved to integrate, to the extent possible, its human rights and 
humanitarian efforts with its peace efforts.”947 
 However, as with other responses to threats to the peace historically, human rights concerns 
and protection of civilians were not always included in the primary objectives of peacekeeping 
missions. This situation changed in 1999, when the Council authorised the UN Assistance 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to “take the necessary action to ensure the security and 
freedom of movement of its personnel and . . . to afford protection to civilians under imminent 
threat of physical violence”;948 alongside this mandate the Council “[u]nderline[d] the 
importance of including in UNAMSIL personnel with appropriate training in international 
humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, including child and gender-related provisions, 
negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness and civilian-military coordination.”949 
Even more specific than this was the Council’s recognition of country-specific human rights 
violations in Sierra Leone, emphasising that “that the plight of children is among the most 
pressing challenges facing Sierra Leone.”950 The Council has also began integrating specific 
human rights standards into the mandates of its peacekeeping authorisations: in the wake of the 
allegation of sexual abuse by peacekeeping troops on civilians, a zero-tolerance policy on sexual 
exploitation towards UN personnel was incorporated into mandates authorised by the Council in 
Haiti951 and Sudan,952 although the same paragraphs are missing in later mission mandates; 
                                                 
946 UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization: August 1996’ (20 August 1996) UN 
Doc A/51/1, ¶1132. 
947 ibid. 
948 UNSC Res 1270 (22 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1270, ¶14. 
949 ibid ¶15. 
950 ibid ¶18. 
951 In UNSC Res 1608 (22 June 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1608, ¶17, the Council “[w]elcomes efforts undertaken by 
MINUSTAH to implement the Secretary- General’s zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, and to 
ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to 
continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing 
countries to take appropriate preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and 
punished in cases involving their personnel.” 
952 In UNSC Res 1590 (24 March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1590, ¶14, the Council “[r]equests the Secretary-General to 
take the necessary measures to achieve actual compliance in UNMIS with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy 
on sexual exploitation and abuse, including the development of strategies and appropriate mechanisms to prevent, 
identify and respond to all forms of misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse, and the enhancement of 
training for personnel to prevent misconduct and ensure full compliance with the United Nations code of conduct, 
requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary action in accordance with the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on 
special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13) and to keep the 
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resolutions authorising missions began including specific reference to human rights issues such 
as gender in peacekeeping953 and vulnerable groups;954 and increased coordination with human 
rights and humanitarian agencies are explicitly included in the work of the missions 
authorised.955  
Furthermore, many multi-dimensional peace operations have a human rights team to 
assist in the implementation of human rights-related steps directly derived from the Council: the 
UNJHRO956 comprises the MONUSCO957 Human Rights Division – the mandate for which 
branched from UNSC Res 1291958 – and the former OHCHR/DRC;959 the UNMIL960 Human 
Rights and Protection Section’s mandate is derived from UNSC Res 1509;961 UNOCI’s Human 
Rights Division derives its mandate from UNSC Res 1528962 and UNSC Res 1609.963 This 
creates a nexus between the allegations of war crimes and other criminal activities perpetrated by 
UN field personnel in Council-mandated missions and the Council itself; accordingly, the 
Council has attempted to take a strong stance against them.964 
                                                                                                                                                             
Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including the 
conduct of pre-deployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full 
accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel.” 
953 UNSC Res 1590 (24 March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1590, at ¶15; UNOCI is mandated to “contribute to the 
promotion and protection of human rights in Côte d’Ivoire, with special attention to grave violations and abuses 
committed against children and women, notably sexual-and gender-based violence”; UNSC Res 2162 (25 June 
2014) UN Doc S/RES/2162, ¶19(g). 
954 In UNSC Res 1545 (21 May 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1545, ¶6, the United Nations in Burundi (ONUB) was 
mandated to “provide advice and assistance . . . to the transitional Government and authorities to contribute to their 
efforts . . . to ensure, in close liaison with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the promotion 
and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children and vulnerable persons, and investigate 
human rights violations to put an end to impunity”; MONUC was mandated “to facilitate humanitarian assistance 
and human rights monitoring, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including women, children and 
demobilized child soldiers” in UNSC Res 1291 (24 February 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1291, ¶7; part of the mandate of 
UNMIS was to “coordinate international efforts towards the protection of civilians with particular attention to 
vulnerable groups including internally displaced persons, returning refugees, and women and children”, UNSC Res 
1590 (24 March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1590, ¶4(d). 
955 UNOCI’s mandate included working “closely with humanitarian agencies, particularly in relation to areas of 
tensions and with respect to the return of displaced persons, to collect information on and identify potential threats 
against the civilian population, and bring them to the attention of the Ivorian authorities as appropriate”, UNSC Res 
2162 (25 June 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2162, ¶19(a). 
956 United Nations Joint Human Rights Office. 
957 The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
958 UNSC Res 1291 (24 February 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1291, ¶4. 
959 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in the DRC 
960 UN Mission in Liberia. 
961 UNSC Res 1509 (19 September 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1509, ¶3 (l)-(m). 
962 UNSC Res 1528 (27 February 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1528, ¶4 (n). 
963 UNSC Res 1609 (24 June 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1609, ¶2 (t). 
964 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security’ (13 October 2004) UN Doc 
S/2004/814, ¶99: “Sexual exploitation and abuse are forms of gender-based violence that can be perpetrated by 
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These efforts have been bolstered by reform efforts of other agencies: the Brahimi 
report965 highlighted the “pivotal importance of clear, credible and adequately resourced Security 
Council mandates”966 and emboldened peacekeepers to stop any “violence against civilians . . . 
in support of basic United Nations principles”;967 the Capstone Doctrine968 is a lengthy document 
outlining the role and responsibilities of peacekeepers and framing peacekeeping operations 
within human rights parameters; the Zeid report969 focused on rules of conduct of peacekeepers, 
heir management control and individual accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse by 
peacekeeping personnel; and the New Partnership Agenda,970 as well its two progress reports,971 
seeks to contribute to the dialogue of strengthening peacekeeping and ensuring that human rights 
standards are maintained by its personnel, as well as driven by mandates from the Council. 
Nevertheless, the Council at times takes strong measures that clearly stand in stark 
contrast to measures of ensuring human rights are maintained by its representative personnel, 
such as the insistence of their immunity from prosecution under international law. The passing of 
UNSC Res 1422, as well as the discussions that led to its adoption, cannot instil human rights 
advocates with a great deal of confidence; nor is this an area that the Council has been able to 
resolve or ameliorate since 2002 – in fact, the temporary immunity from prosecution at the ICC 
in UNSC Res 1422972 was repeated permanently in 2011 in UNSC Res 1970 on Libya973 and 
would have been once more in a failed draft resolution of May 2014,974  had it not been for the 
                                                                                                                                                             
anyone in a position of power or trust. The involvement of United Nations personnel, whether civilian or uniformed, 
in sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of local populations is particularly abhorrent and unacceptable and a serious 
impediment to the achievement of the goals of resolution 1325 (2000) on the protection of women and girls. In May 
2004, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) uncovered allegations of 
sexual exploitation and abuse, including of minors, by civilian and military personnel in Bunia. Such abuses must be 
prevented and the perpetrators must be held accountable.” See also, UNSC Presidential Statement 21 (2005) UN 
Doc S/PRST/2005/21 and UNSC Presidential Statement 52 (2005) UN Doc S/PRST/2005/52. 
965 The Brahimi Report (n 868). 
966 ibid ¶6(b). 
967 ibid x. 
968 The Capstone Doctrine (n 868). 
969 ‘A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations’ in UNGA ‘Letter dated 24 March 2005 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General 
Assembly’ (24 March 2005) UN Doc A/59/710. 
970 DPKO ‘A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping’ (New York, July 2009). 
971 DPKO ‘The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No.1- October 2010’ (New York, October 2010); DPKO 
‘The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No.2- December 2011’ (New York, December 2011). 
972 UNSC Res 1422 (12 July 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1422, ¶1. 
973 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970, ¶6. 
974 UNSC Draft Res (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/2014/348, ¶7. The resolution was proposed by a large host of 
countries: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, 
Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Estonia, 
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negative votes of Russia and China. The double standards alluded to in 2002 by Canada975 were 
reiterated in discussions on S/2014/34: 
 
In todays’s [sic] draft resolution, the United States insisted on an exemption for 
itself and its citizens. Great Britain is a party to the ICC, but for some reason is 
unenthusiastic about the exploration in the Court of crimes committed by British 
nationals during the Iraq war. If the United States and the United Kingdom were 
to together refer the Iraqi dossier to the ICC, the world would see that they are 
truly against impunity.976  
 
Nonetheless, despite both the numerous options977 short of ending the mandate of the United 
Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina that would have eliminated the risk of US 
peacekeepers being brought before the ICC and the assurances by other Council members,978 the 
Secretary-General979 and under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,980 the US decided 
to vote against the resolution and prohibit any peacekeepers from continuing under Council 
authorisation. Accordingly, as lamented by the Secretary-General, “the mandate of the United 
Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) [came] to an abrupt end for reasons that 
are unrelated to the vitally important work that it is performing to implement the Dayton Peace 
                                                                                                                                                             
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Libya, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San 
Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and United States of America. 
975 UNSC Verbatim Record (10 July 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4568, 3-4. 
976 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7180, 13. 
977 France suggested that the US withdraw its troops or use the article 16 provisions of the Rome Statute to postpone 
prosecution (which it soon did), UNSC Verbatim Record (30 June 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4563, 5; Canada also 
highlighted that the US could withdraw its forces, but added that they had the option of declining participation in 
future missions or negotiating bilateral agreements consistent with article 98 of the Rome Statute, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (10 July 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4568, 4. 
978 United Kingdom, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 June 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4563, 5: “the risk of peacekeeping 
personnel appearing before the Court is extremely small. Under the so-called complementarity principle, the ICC 
will take over only if States are unwilling or unable to investigate. Allegations of crimes will thus, in most cases, 
continue to be investigated by the authorities of the State with jurisdiction.” 
979 Letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to US Secretary of State Colin Powell (3 July 2002): “I 
think that I can state confidently that in the history of the United Nations, and certainly during the period that I have 
worked for the Organization, no peacekeeper or any other mission personnel have been anywhere near the kind of 
crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. The issue that the United States is raising in the Council is 
therefore highly improbable with respect to United Nations peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the whole 
system of United Nations peacekeeping operations is being put at risk.” 
980 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), 1155 
UNTS 331, art 34: “A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.” Since 
the Rome Statute is a treaty and the ICC is a treaty body, it does not have jurisdiction over non-State Parties. 
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Agreement.”981 Soon afterwards, in an effort to appease the US, which threatened not only to 
veto resolutions on peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the issue of ICC 
jurisdiction but also future peacekeeping missions, UNSC Res 1422 was passed unanimously but 
begrudgingly,982 granting a renewable suspension of any potential prosecution against non-States 
Party to the Rome Statute; in the words ironically spoken by Syria many years before discussion 
of the referral of its own situation was tabled and rejected at the Council, “[p]eacekeeping forces 
and their mandates should not be held hostage to arguments that do not concern them 
directly.”983 The reluctance by Russia and China, who were silent in 2002 in the face of what 
some States claimed was abuse of Council authority under article 16 of the Rome Statute,984 to 
follow the same course of action in 2014 may suggest that the Council as an organ is 
acknowledging that human rights and peacekeeping cannot be held separate from each other. 
Finally, the role and responsibility of the Council does not end at the point that it 
delegates the role of intervention to third parties; a frequent, regular re-evaluation of the 
situation, with detailed updates and seizure of the matters on the ground is necessary to ensure 
not only that the Council maintains overall control over the threat to the peace – such as the 
revocation of authority to intervene – but also to ensure that it can reassess the needs of the 
                                                 
981 UNSC Verbatim Record (30 June 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4563, 3. 
982 In the run-up to the proposition and subsequent adoption of resolution 1422, numerous States expressed their 
discontent at the US’s stance and attempts to manipulate article 16 of the Rome Statute for its own benefit: New 
Zealand, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 July 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4568, 5-6: “To purport to provide a blanket 
immunity in advance in this way would in fact amount to an attempt to amend the Rome Statute without the 
approval of its States parties. It would represent an attempt by the Council to change the negotiated terms of a treaty 
in a way unrecognized in international law or in international treaty-making processes”; France, ibid 11, “made a 
specific proposal regarding article 16 and is ready to discuss that within the limits authorized by law — I repeat, 
within the limits authorized by law. However, it cannot accept modification, by means of a Security Council 
resolution, of a provision of the Treaty”; Costa Rica, ibid 14, “We are therefore concerned at any initiative 
attempting to substantially modify the provisions of the Statute by means of a Council resolution. To adopt this kind 
of proposal would exceed the competence of the Security Council and would have a serious impact on the Council’s 
credibility and legitimacy.” Strikingly, the use of article 16 was, in fact, a suggestion put forward by some these 
States themselves during the discussions on UNSC Draft Res S/2002/712, extending the mandate of UNMIBH: 
France, ibid 5, “The second solution would be, as France and the United Kingdom proposed, to use article 16 of the 
Rome Statute in order to enable the Security Council to request the International Criminal Court on a case-by-case 
basis, through a resolution, to not be seized for a one-year renewable period, in the case of an ongoing investigation 
on a member of a force who is a citizen of a State that is not a party to the Rome Statute”; United States, ibid 10, 
“Our latest proposal uses article 16 of the Rome Statute — as we were urged to do by other Council members — to 
address our concerns about the implications of the Rome Statute for nations that are not parties to it, but which want 
to continue to contribute peacekeepers to United Nations missions.” 
983 Syria, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 July 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4568 (Resumption 1), 10. 
984 See eg, Samoa, ibid 7: “There is clearly no ground for a determination in advance, and then in perpetuity. Our 
contention, therefore, is that the purported use of article 16 would be plainly ultra vires.” 
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troops on the ground in the pursuit of successful achievement of the legally certain goals of the 
resolution.  
 
It is vitally important that negotiators, the Security Council, Secretariat mission 
planners, and mission participants alike understand which of these political-
military environments they are entering, how the environment may change under 
their feet once they arrive, and what they realistically plan to do if and when it 
does change. Each of these must be factored into an operation’s entry strategy 
and, indeed, into the basic decision about whether an operation is feasible and 
should even be attempted.985 
 
Moreover, if circumstances change on the ground, the Council should be well-placed to re-
evaluate the scope of the mandate given to ensure that intervention does not negatively 
contribute to the situation; a need for increased troops to complete the goals of intervention once 
the military have engaged, for example, cannot be denied if this would result in a deterioration in 
the human rights or humanitarian situation. Failing this, the Council could be accused of 
intervening in a situation with the intention of reinstating peace and security, but with the 
outcome of having contributed to its further absence. 
 
VIII.5 Conclusions 
What emerges from this study is that, at least over the past two decades, the Council appears to 
have actively searched to improve the human rights considerations in its decision-making 
process. The Council’s record on sanctions appears to have improved more than that of military 
intervention and peacekeeping mandates; it is clear that the Council and its constituent members 
see an obligation to ensure that sanctions do not adversely affect the innocent individuals of a 
State subject to sanctions or embargoes. From refusing the assertion that human rights fell within 
under the responsibilities of the Council to maintain peace and security to a realisation and 
admission, not simply verbally in the course of resolutions debates, but through actions of the 
Council in establishing safeguards, committees and bodies to monitor and implement sanctions, 
the Council has moved a considerable distance in the space of several decades. UNSC Res 
2083986 introduced the necessity for increased transparency as to how sanction lists are compiled; 
the Al-Qaida list now includes a narrative summary of reasons for the listing of individuals, 
                                                 
985 The Brahimi Report (n 868) ¶26. 
986 UNSC Res 2083 (17 December 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2083, ¶17. 
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groups, undertakings and entities included in the Al-Qaida Sanctions List.987 The Office of the 
Ombudsman must also adhere to a strict timeframe for dealing with all de-listing requests988 and 
the Committee is obliged to decide within a sixty day window whether to de-list the individual or 
entity.989 Similarly, the use of committees, panels of experts and other subsidiary bodies of the 
Council not only allow the Council members to receive more accurate and reliable information, 
but also display an increased willingness to achieve transparency and avoid arbitrariness in their 
actions. Whilst the Council has perhaps not yet fully achieved this component of incorporating 
human rights fully into its decision-making process, in charting the course that it has taken over 
the past decades, it is clear that significant steps are being taken in the appropriate direction. 
However, there is still a great deal of headway to be made before total compliance with 
human rights by the Council can be claimed in its process. The Council’s human rights and 
humanitarian intervention record is selective, as seen in Chapter VII.2.2 of this thesis, and with 
respect to its efforts to tackle the peripheral issues of human rights in post-conflict States it also 
lacks full engagement. Military and peacekeeping operations require additional Security Council 
integration; this can take place through a number of means. Vague references to “all necessary 
measures” that are found in Council resolutions should be tightened to specify exact parameters 
for action, time-frames and exit strategies in addition to the creation of a bespoke supervisory 
committee to report to the Council about progress in implementing its mandates and the methods 
to which peacekeeping and military forces can be answerable; this oversight would go some way 
in addressing both inconsistencies in approaches and potential violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law by State and non-State parties authorised under Chapter VII resolutions. 
Moreover, as a result of inconsistencies between the official stances promulgated during 
meetings and the resulting action taken under its authority or delegation of powers, the Council 
risks losing moral authority and integrity. For instance, the Chinese stance for decades has been 
that “the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms is a paramount purpose of the 
United Nations, no less important than the maintenance of international peace and security”;990 
nonetheless, this did not prevent its recent vetoes, along with Russia, on issues that dealt with 
                                                 
987 <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/AQList.pdf> accessed 16 December 2014. 
988 The mandate of the Ombudsman is outlined in UNSC Res 2083 (17 December 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2083, 
Annex II: information gathering (four months), dialogue (two months) and committee discussion (forty five days). 
989 ibid ¶13. 
990 UNSC Verbatim Record (5 August 1963) UN Doc S/PV.1053(OR), 13. 
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human rights in Zimbabwe,991 Myanmar992 or Syria.993 Nor indeed did the respect for human 
rights shown by the US in pursuit of referrals to the ICC of the situations in Libya and Syria 
hinder its veto of resolutions condemning Israel for human rights issues994 or Russian advocacy 
for human rights hinder its veto on the extension of an investigative mission to Georgia995 and 
matters concerning minority rights in Ukraine.996 Even amidst calls by France997 and Canada998 
to abolish the use of the veto when dealing with human rights issues, the Council continues to 
proceed on a selective basis with respect to both intervening in situations that involve violations 
of human rights and ensuring that human rights safeguards are enshrined in the documents 
resulting from its deliberations. Overall, the Council must seek to balance more effectively its 
duties as a UN organ in protecting and promoting human rights with the national political 
interests of the Members of which it is comprised, for the human rights of the peoples who rely 
on the Council for assistance and rescue should supersede all other concerns. 
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UNSC Draft Res (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/2012/538; UNSC ‘Letter dated 16 January 2013 from the Permanent 
Representative of Guatemala to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (21 January 
2013) UN Doc S/2013/38. 
994 UNSC Draft Res (13 July 2006) UN Doc S/2006/508; UNSC Draft Res (11 November 2006) UN Doc 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ACTING ULTRA VIRES 
 
The Council should stop encroaching on subjects falling squarely within the core 
competence of the Organization’s other main organs, particularly the General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, under the pretext of dealing with 
the security aspects of those subjects or by attempting to give a false impression 
that the subject matter under consideration gives rise to a threat to international 
peace and security. This issue stresses the importance of revisiting the relationship 
between the Security Council and the other principal organs of the Organization 
for the purposes of restoring the institutional balance between them that is clearly 
outlined in the Charter. In this regard, the International Court of Justice has a 
major role to play in settling any dispute that might arise between organs with 
respect to their mandates.999 
 
IX.1 Introduction 
The separation of powers between branches of domestic governments – principally the 
executive, legislature and judiciary – cannot be directly transposed from constitutions the world 
over to the United Nations system; as discussed in Chapter II of this thesis, the United Nations 
Charter, whilst bearing many similarities to a constitution, does not function as one par 
excellence. Although there are critics of imposing a separation of powers to the UN system,1000 it 
is clear from the Charter itself in the mandates given to each of the constituent organs of the UN 
that each serves a distinct and deliberate purpose. The functions and powers of each of the UN 
organs are explicitly delineated in respective Chapters of the UN Charter; whilst each of the 
General Assembly,1001 Security Council1002 and Economic and Social Council1003 has the 
competence to adopt its own rules of procedure, there is a delicate balance of responsibilities that 
are distributed amongst the organs that form the United Nations: the ICJ is “the principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations”1004, the General Assembly “may discuss any questions or any 
                                                 
999 Egypt, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 3. 
1000 See, eg de Wet (n 34) 112. 
1001 UN Charter (1945) art 21. 
1002 ibid art 30. 
1003 ibid art 72(1). 
1004 ibid art 92. 
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matters within the scope of [the Charter]”,1005 and the Council, as already established,  has 
“primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.1006  
  
IX.2 Sources of support for the separation of powers 
The Charter also expressly works towards avoiding the duplication of efforts and discussions by 
separate organs: Charter article 12, for example, states that “[w]hile the Security Council is 
exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present 
Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or 
situation unless the Security Council so requests.”1007 The different mandates of the organs are 
reflected also in the extent to which they interact; although the Charter recognises five 
organs,1008 only the “General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International 
Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question”1009, reflecting the added value 
that coordination between the Assembly or the Council and the ICJ would impart. Juxtaposed 
with this, the Secretary-General, as the “chief administrative officer of the Organisation”1010 may 
“bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the 
maintenance of international peace and security”1011 but has no such direct power to refer to the 
ICJ for advisory opinions.1012  
Similarly, there is division of labour even within the field of peaceful settlement of 
disputes between States; both the Council and the ICJ are authorised to deal with issues relating 
to inter-State disputes under the respective mandates of the Charter. However, whereas the 
Council is a political organ and deals with peaceful settlement of inter-State disputes within the 
                                                 
1005 ibid art 11. 
1006 ibid art 24. 
1007 ibid art 12. 
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1009 ibid art 96. 
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framework of peace and security under Chapter VI,1013 the ICJ is “the principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations”1014 and has jurisdiction over both advisory opinions and contentious cases – 
“all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the 
United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.”1015 The dissection of inter-State disputes 
into political and judicial matters is highlighted not only implicitly by these pithy mandates of 
each organ, but also explicitly in the Charter, which cautions the Council to “take into 
consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the 
International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.”1016 
Any deviation from this general norm would require compelling reasoning on the part of the 
Council.  
The separation of powers within the United Nations has also been explicitly referred to 
by the ICJ itself in numerous cases including Nicaragua,1017 Hostages,1018 Aegean Continental 
Shelf,1019 Armed Activities in the Congo1020 and Application of Genocide Convention.1021 In these 
                                                 
1013 See eg UN Charter (1945) art 33(2) where the Council shall “call upon the parties to settle their dispute [by 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
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dealt with by the Court and that both proceedings could be pursued pari pussu”, Military and Paramilitary Activities 
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1018 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (Judgment) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, ¶40: “[T]he Security 
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Order of 11 September 1976) [1976] ICJ Rep 3, ¶37: “[t]he Court has cognizance of the fact that, simultaneously 
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Security Council also has been seized of the dispute between Greece and Turkey regarding the Aegean Sea 
continental shelf . . . [and] adopted by consensus a resolution (resolution 395 (1976).” 
1020 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) (Request for the 
Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 1 July 2000) [2000] ICJ Rep 111 , at ¶36 “Security Council resolution 
1304 (2000) and the measures taken in its implementation, do not preclude the Court from acting in accordance with 
its Statute and with the Rules of Court . . . [and] in the present case the Security Council has taken no decision which 
would prima facie preclude the rights claimed by the Congo from ‘be[ing] regarded as appropriate for protection by 
the indication of provisional measures’ (Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom), Provisional 
Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, p. 15, para. 40).” 
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cases it was shown that the seizure of a matter by the Council does not preclude its discussion 
within the court of the ICJ ; indeed, “[t]he Council has functions of a political nature assigned to 
it, whereas the Court exercises purely judicial functions. Both organs can therefore perform their 
separate but complementary functions with respect to the same events.”1022 The ICJ took the 
same view when assessing whether to exercise jurisdiction in the Advisory Opinion sought by 
the General Assembly on the independence of Kosovo.1023 Each organ of the UN is bestowed 
with limited functions, as well as specific powers and it would be as absurd and illegitimate for 
the ICJ to enter into political discussions of a situation as it would for the Council to enter into 
judgments of legality of actions by States. The ICJ’s Namibia Advisory Opinion clearly affirmed 
the principle that the Security Council powers are bound by the standards of the Charter,1024 a 
stance later reiterated by the ICTY.1025 The ICJ detailed even further its special relationship with 
the Council in the Hostages case, emphasising the distinct fields in which each must operate.1026 
Restrictions and explicit mandates such as these on the work of UN organs demonstrate 
the intentions of the drafters of the UN Charter to ring-fence powers and responsibilities to 
ensure not only an effective and efficient path towards achieving the goals, principles and 
                                                                                                                                                             
1021 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) Provisional Measures [1993] ICJ Rep 3, ¶33: “Yugoslavia contend[ed] that 
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1022 Nicaragua (n 1017) ¶95. 
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law).” For further discussion, see Orakhelashvili (n 53). 
1026 US v Iran (n 1018) ¶40: “Whereas Article 12 of the Charter expressly forbids the General Assembly to make any 
recommendation with regard to a dispute or situation while the Security Council is exercising its functions in respect 
of that dispute or situation, no such restriction is placed on the functioning of the Court by any provision of either 
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United Nations, to resolve any legal questions that may be in issue between parties to the dispute; and the resolution 
of such legal questions by the Court may be an important, and sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful 
settlement of the dispute.” 
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purposes of the Charter, but also to avoid contradictory findings by UN organs that would 
undermine the integrity and authority of one of more of the organs; this inherent lis alibi 
pendens1027 element of the mandates given to organs under the UN Charter avoids the 
duplication of inconsistent decisions. Moreover, there is evidence from the statements of UN 
Member States themselves during discussions on Council reform that there exists strong support 
for imposing boundaries to Council action both internally to the UN system and with respect to 
the extent of the existing powers it is mandated to exercise under the Charter.1028  
Bedjaoui proposes that the San Francisco conference resulted in the creation of a UN 
system that is governed by four overarching principles,1029 each of which supports the assertion 
that the separation of powers at the UN was fully intended from its earliest days: the 
specialisation principle, where each organ is endowed with a particular mission or set of tasks; a 
non-subordination principle, “insomuch as each organ’s special mission calls for an autonomy of 
conduct incompatible with dependence on another organ specializing in a different area”1030; 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, reflecting the autonomy and self-proclaimed interpretation of Charter 
provisions;  and a coordination principle that binds the work of the organs together. 
Accordingly, this principle of the separation of powers within the UN, can be easily extended to 
form the root of this component of the rule of law at the Council level. However, the Charter is 
deliberately broad in the discretion permitted to UN organs in the interpretation of its provisions; 
whilst there is a clear separation of both powers and responsibilities in the Charter, there is little 
in the way of ensuring their continued separation and avoiding the activities of one bleeding into 
the mandate of another. Proposals made by the Belgian delegation for UN organs to submit any 
interpretative disagreements to the ICJ1031 or the General Assembly1032 for analysis were rejected 
in 1945 and the UN was created with no specific mechanism for interpreting the provisions of 
the Charter1033 and the recognition that UN organs would interpret the respective applicable 
Charter provisions themselves.1034 Notwithstanding the ruling of the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons 
                                                 
1027 “Dispute elsewhere pending”. 
1028 See eg Iran, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 12 (2008); Russia, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (12 January 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5619, 6. 
1029 Bedjaoui (n 229). 
1030 ibid 13. 
1031 United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), Vol 13 (1945), 657. 
1032 United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), Vol 8 (1945), 394. 
1033 United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), Vol 3 (1945), 709-710. 
1034 ibid. 
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in Armed Conflict case, this “absence of [any specific legality-test clause] not only fails to offer 
protection against any excess of Charter powers but is conducive to it.”1035 
  
IX.3 The Council’s norm-setting 
At the outset, it is key to establish the stark division between the capacity of the Council to create 
legal obligations upon UN Member States through UN Charter article 251036 and its foray into 
commenting upon or even ruling on the legality of actions by States unrelated to the Charter. 
Whereas the former grants the Council the unrivalled power to immediately and spontaneously 
alter the landscape of international law both by forcing States to abide by its resolutions and by 
establishing a precedent for future action, the latter would place the Security Council – a political 
organ – squarely in the judicial role of weighing the actions of States against the international 
legal standard. Whilst the first is not only acceptable but forms part of the role of the Council, the 
latter would be a drastic change in the role of the Council for which it neither was designed not is 
competent to carry out; the Council may create and measure the actions of States against its own 
legal norms through its binding resolutions, but only incidental to its role in maintaining 
international peace and security – the “progressive development of international law and its 
codification”1037 is a task for the General Assembly. Moreover, it may not rule on the legality or 
compliance of States with existing norms or principles of international law – this is the role of 
the ICJ.1038 This differentiation is exemplified by the fact that the both the Council and the ICJ 
may address the same matters simultaneously – as with the dispute between the US and 
Nicaragua – but divergently within their respective frameworks of responsibilities. The Council, 
however, has gradually begun encroaching on the territory of both the Assembly and the ICJ. 
                                                 
1035 Bedjaoui (n 229) 9. 
1036 “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with the present Charter.” 
1037 UN Charter (1945) art 13. 
1038 See eg Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v 
Colombia) (Application instituting Proceedings) General List No 155 [2013], 22, where Nicaragua alleges that 
Colombia is in breach of UN Charter art 2(4), Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction and rights under the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea; Case concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the 
Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v Sweden), (Judgment) [1958] ICJ Rep 55, 67, where the Court was “asked to 
say whether the measure taken and impugned is or is not compatible with the obligations binding upon Sweden by 
virtue of the 1902 Convention.” 
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It cannot be disputed that the Council is empowered to make legislative decisions in 
response to threats to the international peace through the adoption of legally binding resolutions; 
Joyner proposes that 
 
the Council is empowered not only to act as an executive body, but rather also to 
act as a legislative body crafting proactive and permanent legal edicts covering 
important areas of international relations including terrorism (UNSC Resolution 
1373) and weapons of mass destruction proliferation (UNSC Resolution 1540), 
and even further to act as a judicial body determining the legal rights and 
obligations of UN members.1039 
 
Indeed, the imposition of sanction regimes, authority for military intervention and the 
establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals are all examples of legislative powers at 
the disposal of the Council in response to specific threats. However, these are not examples of 
normative legislation but rather must be specific, as highlighted earlier with regard to the need 
for legal certainty and the determination of the threat to the peace under article 39 of the Charter, 
and in support of this specificity, they must have timeframes for action. As a result, legislative 
action can only legitimately emerge from the Council once, firstly, a specific to the threat to the 
peace has been determined by the Council and, secondly, the resolution is temporally limited to 
encompass exclusively the period of time required for addressing this threat. Laws of a general 
nature with indefinite durations are decidedly outside of the remit of the Council; the separation 
of powers, then, with respect to the Security Council, concerns not its capacity to legislate per se, 
but rather its adherence to the parameters of legislative power it has been granted by the Charter 
and ensuring that responding to threats of the international peace is not used as a gateway to 
effect permanent change in the norms of international law or domestic legislation. 
 
IX.3.1 The advancement of international law by proxy 
The Council has always made full use of its kompetenz kompetenz, but has grown considerably 
bolder after 1990: for example, as mentioned in Chapter VIII of this thesis the Council initially 
saw human rights as falling outside of its mandate; today it is central to its activities in peace and 
security; the use of Chapter VII in the creation of the ICTY and ICTR, as well as the referral to 
the ICC of situations in the Sudan and Libya are further examples. However, there still exists the 
                                                 
1039 Joyner, ‘Legal Hegemon’ (n 51) 226. 
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risk that this self-interpretative mandate of the UN Charter may encroach on the mandates of 
sibling UN organs and that it has also shirked its responsibilities in some cases. This potential for 
a blurring in the separation of powers and excess of the Council’s mandate under the Charter was 
hinted at early on the history of the United Nations; in 1947, the General Assembly was already 
recommending that “organs of the United Nations . . . should, from time to time, review the 
difficult and important points of law within the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice . 
. . including points of law relating to the interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations”.1040 
Nonetheless, the Council has not chosen to refer to the ICJ in interpreting its mandate or in 
deciding whether a matter falls within its remit, despite both the designated mandate of the ICJ to 
tackle issues of a judicial and legal nature and practical instances where the Court has over the 
course of the years exercised its right upon request of authorised UN organs to interpret the 
Charter on specific articles1041 and in general questions of law.1042 The lack of referral to the ICJ 
of questions relating to clarification of the limits of the Council cannot, then, be due to a lack of 
jurisdiction or experience, but due to other factors.1043 In defence of the Council, it can be 
evidenced that in the earliest stages of the UN’s history, the Council had no need to seek 
clarification from the ICJ on the limits of its jurisdiction, as it originally abided by the 
demarcated Charter boundaries, recommending where appropriate that States “immediately refer 
the dispute to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute 
of the Court.”1044 However, over the decades, the Council has increasingly deviated from this 
formula. 
Since the mid-1960s the Council has grown increasingly bolder in its pronouncements on 
international legal matters, declaring governments and occupations illegal1045 and assigning legal 
                                                 
1040 UNGA Res 171 (II) (1947) UN Doc A/RES/2/171, preamble. 
1041 eg Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) [1962] 
ICJ Rep 151; Admission of a State the United Nations (Charter, Art 4) (Advisory Opinion) [1948] ICJ Rep 57. 
1042 eg Namibia (n 102); Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 
[1942] ICJ Rep 174. 
1043 Bedjaoui excellently highlights some of the concerns of States at the initial stages of drafting the Council’s 
mandate in the Charter at San Francisco in 1945. See, Bedjaoui (n 229) 15-21 for discussion. Further discussion of 
the ICJ and its capacity to review the Council can be found in Chapter XI of this thesis. 
1044 UN Doc S/RES/22 (1947) referred to the UK-Albanian dispute over damage to UK shops in the Straits of Corfu, 
which was settled at the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case (Judgment) [1949] ICJ Rep 4. 
1045 UNSC Res 216 (12 November 1965) UN Doc S/RES/216, ¶2 called on States “not to recognize this illegal racist 
minority regime in Southern Rhodesia” [emphasis added]; UNSC Res 276 (30 January 1970) UN Doc S/RES/276, 
¶2 declared “the continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia . . . illegal and . . . consequently all 
acts taken by the Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the 
Mandate are illegal and invalid” [emphasis added]. 
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liability to Parties1046 in some situations. Indeed, in a precursor the ICTY, the ICTR and the 
Rome Statute, the Council advocated for the individual responsibility for war crimes in UNSC 
Res 7941047 affirming, in relation to Somalia, that “those who commit or order the commission of 
such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts.”1048 In so doing, the 
Council established a legal principle that had otherwise never been formally recognised and 
which later formed one of the bases for the Prosecutor of the ICTY to present evidence of opinio 
juris in the Tadic case1049 – individual responsibility for breaches of humanitarian law. The 
Council here clearly stumbles into the territory of other organs in developing international law, 
which has been of concern to States.1050 
More than advancing the development of international law and creating international 
legal principles, which may well be argued as a by-product of the Council’s work in promoting 
the international peace, the Council has in recent years stepped up its work as legislator. 
Concerns over the quasi-legislative resolutions of the Council risk undermining the legitimacy of 
the decisions of the Council.1051 Whereas the Council throughout the years has continued to 
encourage States to enact legislation and enforcement mechanisms themselves as means to 
counter certain threats, such as the illicit flow of arms in Africa,1052 the creation of the ICTY and 
ICTR as subsidiary bodies under Chapter VII may have marked the start of a new era in which 
                                                 
1046 UNSC Res 687 (3 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/687. 
1047 UNSC Res 794 (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/RES/794. 
1048 ibid 5. 
1049 Tadic Appeal (n 1025) ¶133: “Of great relevance to the formation of opinio juris to the effect that violations of 
general international humanitarian law governing internal armed conflicts entail the criminal responsibility of those 
committing or ordering those violations are certain resolutions unanimously adopted by the Security Council. Thus, 
for instance, in two resolutions on Somalia, where a civil strife was under way, the Security Council unanimously 
condemned breaches of humanitarian law and stated that the authors of such breaches or those who had ordered their 
commission would be held “individually responsible” for them. (See S.C. Res. 794 (3 December 1992); S.C. Res. 
814 (26 March 1993).)” [emphasis in original]. 
1050 Iran, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 12: “The Security 
Council’s norm-setting and law-making are also part of another increasing trend that runs counter to the letter and 
the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. In accordance with the Charter, the General Assembly, as the chief 
deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations, is primarily entrusted with the task of 
the progressive development and codification of international law. As stated by the representative of Cuba in her 
statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, to which we subscribe, the Security Council’s increasing 
encroachment on the prerogatives of other main organs of the United Nations — in particular those of the General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council and their subsidiary bodies . . . — is also of particular concern to 
Member States.” See also Ecuador, ibid 13, which felt that some Council “decisions go beyond discussions on the 
political or security issues, and lead us to reflect on the legal implications, within the context of international law”. 
1051 See, eg Austria, ibid 17. 
1052 UNSC Res 1209 (19 November 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1209, ¶2 encouraged “African States to enact legislation 
on the domestic possession and use of arms, including the establishment of national legal and judicial mechanisms 
for the effective implementation of such laws.” 
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the Council consolidated its role in norm-setting. The establishment itself of the tribunals may 
have been legally sound, but the Council’s cavalier attitude towards its mandate and the knock-
on effect this has had on principles of international law cannot be underestimated. 
Orakhelashvili, relying on a statement of the ICTY itself,1053 argues that in creating 
 
the ad hoc criminal tribunals, the Council did not derogate from customary law, 
and the fact that the concept of crimes against humanity was linked to an armed 
conflict in Tadíc and to a discriminatory intent in Akayesu was due not to the 
intention of the Council to change or otherwise affect the composition of these 
crimes as recognized under general international law, but just to provide the ICTY 
and ICTR with the jurisdiction limited accordingly.1054 
 
Certainly, the ICTY was not intended to be “empowered with – nor would the Council be 
assuming – the ability to set down norms of international law or legislate with respect to those 
rights”;1055 the codification of customary law was therefore illegitimate. Nonetheless, the 
international humanitarian law that was thought to be “impressively codified, well understood, 
agreed upon and enforceable”1056 was in fact significantly augmented by sources of law outside 
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,1057 including “international customary law which is not laid 
down in conventions”:1058 the principle of individual criminal responsibility is included in part 
due to the self-referential, circular reasoning that “the Security Council has reaffirmed in a 
number of resolutions that persons committing serious violations of international humanitarian 
law . . . are individually responsible for such violations”;1059 crimes against humanity had no 
written legal basis prior to the ICTY and were included due to its recognition almost 50 years 
previously “in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, as well as in Law No. 10 of 
                                                 
1053 Tadic Appeal (n 1025) ¶ 296: “It is open to the Security Council – subject to peremptory norms of international 
law (jus cogens) – to adopt definitions of crimes in the Statute which deviate from customary international law. 
Nevertheless, as a general principle, provisions of the Statute defining the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal should always be interpreted as reflecting customary international law, unless an intention to depart from 
customary international law is expressed in the Statute, or from other authoritative sources.” 
1054 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions’ 16(1) EJIL 59-88, 80. 
1055 Venezuela, UNSC Verbatim Record (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/PV.3217, 7. 
1056 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 February 1993) UN Doc S/PV.3175, 11. 
1057 This is explicitly mentioned as the basis for article 2 of the ICTY Statute, but no other codified international law 
is referred to in the Statute. 
1058 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993)’ (3 
May 1993) UN Doc S/25704, ¶33. Such sources of law include the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto and the 1948 Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
1059 ibid ¶53.  
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the Control Council for Germany”;1060 and immunity from prosecution was removed from 
alleged perpetrators of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the court based on “comments 
received by the Secretary-General . . . [and] suggestions draw[ing] upon the precedents following 
the Second World War.”1061 The creation or codification of hitherto unwritten law by the Council 
through its subsidiary organ of the ad hoc court was a rapid endeavour1062 that led some to reflect 
on whether “[p]erhaps more extensive legal studies could have been undertaken on various 
aspects of the Statute, such as the question of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege . . .”1063 
This was reiterated by Schabas, who noted “an absence of any real guidance on the subject [of 
mens rea] in the applicable law of the [ICTY].”1064  
The establishment of the ICTY was also groundbreaking in numerous respects. Primarily, 
it appears to be the first time that the expediency of action was explicitly acknowledged to trump 
the many benefits of a more inclusive process for the creation of an international criminal court. 
The Secretary-General highlighted at the outset of his report that  
 
[t]he approach which, in the normal course of events, would be followed in 
establishing an international tribunal would be the conclusion of a treaty by which 
the States parties would establish a tribunal and approve its statute . . . [which] 
would have the advantage of allowing a detailed examination and elaboration of 
all issues pertaining to the establishment of the international tribunal. It also 
would allow the States participating in the negotiation and conclusion of the treaty 
fully to exercise their sovereign will . . .1065 
 
                                                 
1060 ibid ¶47.  
1061 ibid ¶55. See also, Ivan Simonvic, ‘The Role of the ICTY in the Development of International Criminal 
Adjudication’ (1999-2000) 23 Fordham Intl L J 440, 457-8, where “[t]he practice of the Tribunal already is, and will 
continue to be, very important for the interpretation of international humanitarian law . . . Systematic rape has been 
added to the list of war crimes through the practice of the Tribunal. The recognition of a new gender related crime – 
that of rape and the incitement to rape that has been used to achieve political goals, such as ethnic cleansing – is new 
and important.” Whilst these are excellent advances in the field of international humanitarian law it is arguable 
whether the role of the Council to create such norms is legitimate. 
1062 France, UNSC Verbatim Record (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/PV.3217, 11: “The Statute was worked out at the 
request of the Security Council . . . in a very short period of time.” 
1063 Japan, UNSC Verbatim Record (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/PV.3217, 24. See also, Brazil, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (22 February 1993) UN Doc S/PV.3175, 6-7, where “[t]he Security Council can and should play a strong 
and positive role in promoting the implementation of the various elements that would contribute to the peace efforts 
developed by the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, That role, however, can and should remain within the 
scope of the powers expressly granted to the Security Council in accordance with the United Nations Charter.” 
1064 William Schabas, ‘Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2002-3) 37 
New Eng L Rev 1015, 1017. 
1065 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993)’ (3 
May 1993) UN Doc S/25704, ¶19. 
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The establishment of the ICTY was, then, a departure from the traditional method of establishing 
a legal entity that held States accountable for their behaviour; with the exception of the ICJ, to 
which all UN Member States are automatically party, there had never been a legal body 
established to preside over the behaviour of States without an accorded treaty to which accession 
is voluntary.1066 The Secretary-General also made reference to fact that the General Assembly 
“as the most representative organ of the United Nations, should have a role in the establishment 
of the international tribunal.”1067 However, due to the fact that some States may choose not to 
ratify any treaty establishing the ICTY, thereby circumventing its jurisdiction – as indeed, has 
happened with the ICC – and the considerable time that a treaty or Assembly deliberation would 
take – which “would not be reconcilable with the urgency expressed by the Security Council in 
resolution 808 (1993)”1068 – a Chapter VII resolution was recommended: “[t]his approach would 
have the advantage of being expeditious and of being immediately effective as all States would 
be under a binding obligation to take whatsoever action is required to carry out a decision taken 
as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII.”1069 Kirgis also notes the legislative element of 
the ICTY Statute, referring to them as “directives to national governments.”1070 
 The Tadic trial highlighted the impossibility of the ICTY reviewing its own establishment; at 
both the Trial1071 and Appelate1072 stages, the Court was found to have “no authority to 
                                                 
1066 eg The Human Rights Committee (CCPR) monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966) and its optional protocols; the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) monitors implementation of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965); the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) monitors implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) and its optional protocol (1999); the Committee against 
Torture (CAT) monitors implementation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment (1984); the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) monitors implementation of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (1989) and its optional protocols (2000); Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) monitors 
implementation of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (1990). 
1067 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993)’ (3 
May 1993) UN Doc S/25704, ¶21. 
1068 ibid. 
1069 ibid ¶23. See also, Ralph Zacklin, ‘Some Major Problems in the Drafting of the ICTY Statute’ (2004) 2 JICJ 
361: “even if the negotiation and signature stages [of the treaty-making process] could be compressed into a 
relatively short span of time - say, 12 months - ratification to bring the treaty into force could take many years.” 
1070 Kirgis (n 58) 524. 
1071 Tadic Trial (Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction) IT-94-I-T (10 August 1995). 
1072 Tadic Appeal (n 1025) ¶20: “There is no question, of course, of the International Tribunal acting as a 
constitutional tribunal, reviewing the acts of the other organs of the United Nations, particularly those of the 
Security Council, its own "creator." It was not established for that purpose, as is clear from the definition of the 
ambit of its "primary" or "substantive" jurisdiction in Articles 1 to 5 of its Statute.” 
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investigate the legality of its creation by the Security Council.”1073 Therefore, rather than 
referring to the ICJ to rule on the legality of the establishment of the ICTY, as originally 
suggested by the General Assembly in 1947 in relation to the interpretation of Charter 
provisions, it was left to the Secretary-General to declare that the “establishment of the 
International Tribunal by means of a Chapter VII decision would be legally justified.”1074 
Despite the Secretary-General’s correct assertion that a Council “determination of the existence 
of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression”1075 would be required for the 
establishment of the ICTY, it is the Secretary-General who contradictorily declares in his report 
that “[s]uch a decision would constitute a measure to maintain or restore international peace and 
security”1076 – a task clearly within the remit of the Council as primary maintainer of peace and 
security. Whilst the Council may delegate the “action required to carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security”1077, it is for the 
Council alone to “decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed 
to give effect to its decisions.”1078 To delegate this task to the Secretary-General, who is ill-
equipped to decipher the legal intricacies of Charter interpretation1079 – particularly in relation to 
the ICJ – is a gross blurring of the lines between organs and an ultra vires delegation of powers 
by the Council. 
Furthermore, despite assurances from the Secretary-General that “in assigning to the 
International Tribunal the task of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of the 
international humanitarian law, the Security Council would not be creating or purporting to 
‘legislate’ that law”1080, this was not borne out in reality. The principles created for the ICTY 
were replicated in the ICTR and the ICC statutes; Sadat notes that it “is probably fair to say that 
the Court would not have existed but for the successful creation and operation of the ICTY and 
                                                 
1073 Tadic Trial (n 11711071) ¶5. 
1074 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993)’ (3 
May 1993) UN Doc S/25704, ¶24. 
1075 ibid ¶22. 
1076 ibid. 
1077 UN Charter (1945) art 48 [emphasis added]. 
1078 ibid art 41. 
1079 Whilst the legal analysis may have come from the Office of Legal Counsel, the most appropriate forum for the 
discussion of the legality of the establishment of international tribunals is the ICJ. 
1080 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993)’ (3 
May 1993) UN Doc S/25704, ¶29. 
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ICTR.”1081 The Assistant-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs has also noted that “[t]he 
contribution of the ICTY to the development of international criminal law has been 
significant”1082, a fact that is highlighted by ICTY decisions even forming part of the 
jurisprudence relied upon by the ICJ in the 2000 Congo v. Belgium case.1083 The Council has set 
precedents of international law under the guise of addressing threats to the international peace; as 
a result, the Council has created legal principles, which have been adopted by international 
courts as reliable evidence of opinio juris, and accordingly are now relied upon in international 
legal establishments such as the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. As Weiss et al have noted, “in a narrow 
sense [the ICTY and ICTR] have been successful not only in convicting and incarcerating a 
number of criminal defendants but also in engaging in a major rewriting of modern international 
criminal law.”1084 
 
IX.3.2 The Council as direct legislator 
The international criminal tribunals may have been the Council’s introduction to legislating by 
proxy, but emboldened by this new-found power to legislate, it began towards the turn of the 
century to impose obligations of a generally applicable legal nature on States directly through 
Chapter VII resolutions, without the existence or determination of a specific threat to the 
international peace and with no temporal parameters. This direct legislation by the Council falls 
under what many commentators have termed “ultra vires action”1085; however, I have chosen to 
approach this differently bringing it under the umbrella of the separation of powers.  The role of 
the Council as legislator runs contrary to the Charter for two principal reasons: firstly, as 
mentioned previously, the role of advancing international law falls within the remit of the 
Assembly. In addition to UNGA Res 67/1 on the rule of law, numerous Assembly resolutions 
                                                 
1081 Leila Nadya Sadat, ‘The Legacy of the ICTY: The International Criminal Court’ (2002-3) 37 New Eng L Rev 
1073, 1074 [emphasis in original]. 
1082 Ralph Zacklin, ‘The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals’ (2004) 2 JICJ 541, 542. 
1083 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 3, 
¶58: “The Court has also examined the rules concerning the immunity or criminal responsibility of persons having 
an officia1 capacity contained in the legal instruments creating international criminal tribunals, and which are 
specifically applicable to the latter (see Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, Art. 7; Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal of Tokyo, Art. 6; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, Art. 7, para. 2; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 6, para. 2; Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Art. 27). It finds that these rules likewise do not enable it to conclude that any such an 
exception exists in customary international law in regard to national courts” [emphasis added]. 
1084 Weiss and others (n 886) 198. 
1085 See Rosand (n 48); Elberling (n 3). 
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developing international law have been adopted without vote, such as the 1970 Declaration on 
Friendly Relations1086 and the 1974 Definition of Aggression.1087 Secondly, it undermines the 
purposes and foundations of the Charter itself. When taken in isolation, legislative action by the 
Council may indeed be deemed ultra vires of its powers under the Charter; however, within the 
framework of the international rule of law and the international legal order against which the 
Council operates the Council encroaches upon other elements of the Charter, which flout the 
traditions and customs of international law – namely, the sovereign rights of States. Operating 
within the sphere of international law, States have obligations and rights outside of those 
imposed by their adherence to the UN Charter;1088 that is to say that membership to the United 
Nations by States is itself an exercise in the sovereignty that underscores international law1089 
and the sole jurisdiction over their domestic affairs.1090 One may traditionally approach the 
separation of powers within the Charter, in much the same way as that of the domestic sphere, as 
comprising the core organs of the UN: functionally relevantly to this thesis the ICJ, the 
Assembly and the Council, which are loose transpositions of judiciary, legislative and executive 
branches. However, this omits an additional branch of power in the Charter that is uniquely 
idiosyncratic to the Charter: that of the sovereign State. Naturally, due to the differences between 
domestic and international law – the vertical versus the horizontal– one would not find this 
additional branch of powers in national constitutions. Nonetheless, it lies at the foundation of the 
Charter. 
This branch of sovereign States, the powers of which are sanctified on a par with the 
powers of the Council, the Assembly and the ICJ, is explicitly referred to in the Charter as being 
inviolable; with the exception of the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII, 
“[n]othing contained in the [UN] Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
                                                 
1086 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625. 
1087 Definition of Aggression, UNGA Res 3314 (14 December 1974). 
1088 For example, States’ obligations under international customary law, treaties entered into, and jus cogens are 
outside of the scope of the UN Charter. Similarly, the principle of State sovereignty, whilst mentioned in the 
Charter, predates the United Nations significantly. 
1089 UN Charter (1945) art 2(1): “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members.” States exercise their sovereign rights by choosing to join the United Nations, as opposed to customary 
international law which is imposed upon States without their active ratification or signature. 
1090 ibid art 2(7): “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII.” 
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Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”1091 The only legitimate 
means for the Council to legislate, therefore, by virtue of a Chapter VII resolution authorising 
such enforcement mechanisms, which in turn as discussed in Chapter V of this thesis must 
comply with the principles of legal certainty. Consequently, an illegitimate use of power by the 
Council in legislating outside of this narrow window1092 would be a violation not only of its 
powers under the Charter but of the rule of law itself. 
Against this backdrop, for the Council to adopt the role of international legislator outside 
of the enforcement mechanisms of Chapter VII is, therefore, to encroach upon the sphere of 
international law itself – well outside of the UN Charter altogether – for not even the Assembly 
that is tasked with the advancement of international law under the Charter may obligate States to 
abide by non-customary norms of international law in the absence of general consent. This 
would be a disregard in the separation of powers outlined in the Charter, imposing legal 
obligations upon States that either regulate the domestic sphere of nations or binding their hands 
against action under their domestic constitutions.  
 
IX.3.2.1 International terrorism 
Following the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 – claimed to have been 
perpetrated by operatives of Osama Bin Laden – the US began its crackdown against the Taliban 
in Afghanistan, who continued to “provide bin Laden with safe haven and security, allowing him 
the necessary freedom to operate, despite repeated efforts by the United States to persuade the 
Taliban to turn over or expel him.”1093 Whilst condemnation of international terrorism by the 
Council prior to 1999 was not unheard of, the Council had hitherto taken a piecemeal approach 
that was fairly rare;1094 in fact, Weiss and others note that until “the 1990s terrorism was dealt 
with almost entirely by the General Assembly, which approached the issue as a general problem 
of international law.”1095 In the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001, the 
                                                 
1091 ibid. 
1092 See also, ibid art 25, where “Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” 
1093 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (15 October 1999) UN Doc S/PV.4051, 3. 
1094 Few instances of Council discussion on terrorism prior to 1999 could be found eg UNSC Res 286 (9 September 
1970) UN Doc S/RES/286 appealed for an end to hijacking of commercial aircraft and release of passengers held; 
UNSC Res 457 (4 December 1979) UN Doc S/RES/457 condemned Iranian taking of US hostages in Tehran; UNSC 
Res 579 (18 December 1985) UN Doc S/RES/579 condemned acts of hostage-taking and abduction; UNSC 
Presidential Statement 3 (1995) UN Doc S/PRST/1995/3 condemned a terrorist attack in Israel. 
1095 Weiss and others (n 886) 130. 
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Council paid far more acute attention to the threat of international terrorism which was deemed 
to “constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-
first century.”1096 With indirect legislation on the front of human rights and humanitarian law 
having succeeded at the international tribunals, a further leap was taken in 2001 in imposing on 
States specifically outlined, but abstractly supported, legal obligations. Beginning with a general 
condemnation the day after the attacks, the Council called “on the international community to 
redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation 
and full implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions and Security 
Council resolutions.”1097 
However, less than a month later, the Council emerged with detailed, legally binding, 
wide-reaching stipulations that, under Chapter VII, States were bound to comply with. In 
contrast to the resolutions that established the ICTY and ICTR and other resolutions targeting the 
specific threats,1098 UNSC Res 13731099 was extremely general in its scope, a hallmark of 
international treaties rather than the specific determination of a threat to the peace one might 
expect under Article 39 of the Charter:1100 the resolution lacked temporal limitation on the 
validity of the impositions, neglected to specify the exact situation that it aimed to address in an 
effort to reinstate peace and security1101 and failed to identify any subjects who were causing the 
threat to the international peace.1102 Indeed, despite numerous discussions prior to and in the 
                                                 
1096 UNSC Res 1377 (12 November 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1377, Annex. 
1097 UNSC Res 1368 (12 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1368, ¶4. 
1098 eg UNSC Res 1390 (16 January 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1390, ¶2(a), which imposed the obligation that “all States 
shall . . . [f]reeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources” of Osama bin Laden, 
members of Al Qaeda, and the Taliban, and other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with 
them”. See also, eg UNSC Res 1333 (19 December 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1333, ¶8(c); UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 
1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267, ¶4(b). 
1099 UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373. 
1100 See, eg Simon Chesterman, Thomas M Franck and David M Malone, Law and Practice of the United Nations 
(OUP 2008) 110, where resolutions in which the Council legislates are characterised by “obligations [that] are 
phrased in neutral language, apply to an indefinite number of cases, and are not usually limited in time”; Stefan A. 
Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (2005) 99 AJIL 175. 
1101 UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373, preamble: “Reaffirming the need to combat by all 
means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by 
terrorist acts.” 
1102 The resolution is phrased extremely vaguely and in the passive eg ibid 1, where “States shall prevent and 
suppress the financing of terrorist acts . . . [and] prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their 
territories from making any funds . . . available for the benefit of persons who commit . . . the commission of 
terrorist acts . . .” 
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wake of UNSC Res 13731103 and one Assembly definition1104 there was no strictly agreed 
definition of terrorism, which was later to lead to some frustration on the part of several 
representatives.1105 UNSC Res 1373 made no mention of the Assembly definition of terrorism 
and it was not until 2004 that the Council made any attempt to define the act1106 despite the 
existence of twelve international conventions on the subject of terrorism at the time.1107 
Drawing heavily on the language and definition of the Assembly almost a decade earlier, 
no nexus is made between the two and the Council appears to ignore the seizure of the matter by 
the Assembly. Moreover, despite the lack of definition by the ICJ1108 or the Assembly,1109 either 
                                                 
1103 eg The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997); the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999); the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts 
of Nuclear Terrorism (2005); High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004). 
1104 UNGA Res 51/210 (16 January 1997) UN Doc A/RES/51/210, ¶2: “criminal acts intended or calculated to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in 
any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them.” 
1105 See, eg Syria, UNSC Verbatim Record (15 April 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4512, 10: “We believe that the 
international community is today more duty-bound than ever to put an end to the deliberate confusion and ambiguity 
regarding the definition of terrorism, with which we are all struggling”; Malaysia, ibid (Resumption), 10: “[Foreign 
Ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference] underlined the urgent need for an internationally agreed 
definition of terrorism that differentiates such legitimate struggles from acts of terrorism”; Pakistan, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (18 January 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4453, 30: “A crisis has been provoked in our region, for the sake 
of political opportunism, by confusing and obfuscating the issue and by fudging the very definition of terrorism . . . 
It is driven only by political ambitions for regional hegemony, not by the fight against terrorism.” 
1106 UNSC Res 1566 (8 October 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1566, ¶3: “criminal acts, including against civilians, 
committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke 
a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or 
compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute 
offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are 
under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious 
or other similar nature.” 
1107 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (“Tokyo Convention"); 
1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (“Hague Convention”); 1971 Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (“Montreal Convention”); 1973 Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons; 1979 International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages (“Hostages Convention”); 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Material (“Nuclear Materials Convention”); 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation; 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf; 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the 
Purpose of Detection; 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; 1999 International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 
1108 The ICJ has not defined terrorism. See, eg Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The General International Law of Terrorism’ in 
Rosalyn Higgins and Maurice Flory (eds), Terrorism and International Law (Routledge 1997) 28: Former President 
Rosalyn Higgins has stated that “[t]errorism is a term without any legal significance. It is merely a convenient way 
of alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals widely disapproved of and in which wither the methods 
used are unlawful, or the targets protected or both.” 
1109 UK, UNGA Verbatim Record (1 October 2001) UN Doc A/56/PV.12, 18-19: At the discussion on Measures to 
eliminate international terrorism, defining terrorism was "one controversial area where this Assembly has a job to do 
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of which would arguably be better suited to the establishment of international legal definitions, 
UNSC Res 1373 was adopted without a definition of the act that it criminalised.1110 Accordingly, 
a blanket imposition of broad obligations1111 upon States and the requirement to report the steps 
taken1112 by States in compliance with these obligations were outlined in a manner reminiscent of 
the expansive sanctions regimes of the early 1990s.  
Remarkably, not only did the resolution pass unanimously,1113 despite anticipation of 
opposition1114 to the far-reaching and overtly legislative nature of the content, but there was great 
praise for what was seen as “one of the most important resolutions of [the Council’s] history.”1115 
Indeed, the “unprecedented step of bringing into force legislation binding all States on the issue 
of combatting terrorism”1116 was seen in a positive light and, as a result, “[a]ll States now [had] 
the legal, as well as political and moral, obligation to act against it”1117 despite the fact that, 
firstly, there was no unanimously agreed definition of terrorism and, secondly, there was 
otherwise no legally binding obligation upon States to do so. On the one hand, the fact that the 
CTC did not intend to “trespass onto the areas of competence of other parts of the United 
                                                                                                                                                             
. . . In following up the implementation of Friday’s Security Council resolution, the 1373 Committee must focus on 
what we all agree is terrorism without subjective interpretation, and filter out prejudice and unilateralism.”  
1110 ibid 18: The loose definition of the term in 2001 did not appear to phase the head of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee (CTC), who acknowledged that it “is a highly controversial and subjective area, on which, because of the 
legitimate spectrum of viewpoints within the United Nations membership, we will never reach full consensus. See 
also, ibid for the hazy definition of terrorism: “Increasingly, questions are being raised about the problem of the 
definition of a terrorist. Let us be wise and focused about this. Terrorism is terrorism. It uses violence to kill and 
damage indiscriminately to make a political or cultural point and to influence legitimate Governments or public 
opinion unfairly and amorally. There is common ground among all of us on what constitutes terrorism. What looks, 
smells and kills like terrorism is terrorism.” 
1111 ibid. See also, ibid 2 ff: “States shall refrain from providing any form of support active or passive to entities or 
persons involved in terrorist acts . . . Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts . . . Deny 
safe haven . . . [and] Prevent the movement of terrorists.” 
1112 ibid ¶6. 
1113 President, UNSC Verbatim Record (12 November 2001) UN Doc S/PV.4413, 19: “There were 15 votes in 
favour”. 
1114 UK, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 November 2001) UN Doc S/PV.4432, 5: Member States “have come to the 
meetings that we have had on [counter-terrorism] items, not with complaints about the Security Council — which 
they might well have had, given the unique nature, I think, of resolution 1373 (2001) — but in order to bring out the 
questions they have in their minds about the substance of what we are doing.” 
1115 France, UNSC Verbatim Record (18 January 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4453, 7. See also, eg UK, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (12 November 2001) UN Doc S/PV.4413, 15; Singapore, UNSC Verbatim Record (15 October 2001) UN 
Doc A/56/PV.25, 10; Turkey, UNSC Verbatim Record (12 November 2001) UN Doc A/56/PV.48, 9; UNGA ‘Letter 
dated 20 December 2001 from the Representatives of Belgium and India to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General’ (26 December 2001) UN Doc A/56/757, 4 and UNSC Verbatim Record (18 January 2002) UN 
Doc S/PV.4453, 21; Kazakhstan, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 November 2001) UN Doc A/56/PV.59, 34; 
Guatemala, UNSC Verbatim Record (31 October 2001) UN Doc A/56/PV.34, 13. 
1116 Angola, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 April 2004) UN Doc S/PV.4950, 9-10. 
1117 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (18 January 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4453, 6. 
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Nations system . . . [or] define terrorism in a legal sense”1118 was no more than mere lip service; 
in fact its imposition of legally binding obligations without a clear framework of action of 
definition meant a distinct lack of legal clarity. On the other hand, the resolution imposed the 
obligation that “[n]ational efforts must . . . be welded into a global framework.”1119 Moreover, 
although “[r]esolution 1373 (2001) drew on the language negotiated by all United Nations 
Members in the 12 conventions against terrorism”,1120 the elimination of terrorism had not yet 
approached any level of legal obligation outside the Council: there were still calls after the 
passing of UNSC Res 1373 that “every State should ratify the existing 12 United Nations and 
international conventions against terrorism”1121; there were varying interpretations as to how 
exactly to tackle the issue of terrorism;1122 and accusations were levelled that “fudging the 
definition of terrorism . . . is driven only by political ambitions for regional hegemony.”1123 At 
the time of the adoption of UNSC Res 1373, there was little agreement even on the definition of 
terrorism, much less any legal obligations on States to act in response to it; yet the Council 
maintained its right to press ahead with the Chapter VII resolution nonetheless, setting a 
dangerous precedent that was only later opposed by States. UNSC Res 1566 continued the 
legacy of legislating both in attempting to define terrorist acts1124 and in attempting to bind States 
under a Chapter VII resolution to general international law without temporal limitation.1125 
Most recently, in response to the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the 
Council has passed another legislative decision on terrorism under Chapter VII – UNSC Res 
21781126 – recalling UNSC Res 13731127 and once more imposing legally binding obligations on 
States of a general nature and with indefinite duration. Perhaps most concerning about this 
resolution is reaffirmation “that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the 
most serious threats to international peace and security”1128; whereas UNSC Res 1373’s focus 
                                                 
1118 UK, ibid 5. 
1119 UK, UNGA Verbatim Record (1 October 2001) UN Doc A/56/PV.12, 18. 
1120 UK, UNSC Verbatim Record (18 January 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4453, 4. 
1121 UK, UNGA Verbatim Record (1 October 2001) UN Doc A/56/PV.12, 18. 
1122 See, eg Syria, UNSC Verbatim Record (18 January 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4453, 9: “Since the resolution did not 
define terrorism, Syria has based its report on its obligations under the 1998 Arab Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism, which clearly distinguished between terrorism and legitimate struggle against foreign occupation.” 
1123 Pakistan, ibid 31. 
1124 UNSC Res 1566 (8 October 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1566, ¶3. 
1125 ibid ¶2. 
1126 UNSC Res 2178 (24 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2178. 
1127 ibid ¶6. 
1128 ibid preamble [emphasis added]. 
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was confined to international terrorism, UNSC Res 2178 expands an already poorly-defined 
term even further, including the abstract notion of “violent extremism.”1129 The Council’s failure 
to define these terms, coupled with the obligation upon States to implement national legislation 
against their own citizens and individuals transiting through their territory, opens the door to an 
indefinite and arbitrary violation of individuals’ rights. The omission of the international element 
also potentially allows for State crackdowns on internal dissidents and opposition to the 
government under the pretence of abidance by Council decisions to enforce the maintenance of 
international peace. 
 
IX.3.2.2 Nuclear Non-proliferation 
UNSC Res 1540 unequivocally built upon the legacy of UNSC Res 1373; the latter is recognised 
as paving the way for the 2004 resolution “binding Security Council resolution on weapons of 
mass destruction, addressing non-State actors and terrorists”1130 and even “to be part of what 
began with resolution 1373 (2001).”1131 Although this resolution also passed unanimously, there 
was far more opposition by UN Member States. On the most basic level, there was rejection of 
the “justification for the adoption of this resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter”1132 and 
discussion over the duplication of work – that is to say that some States took the view that 
“existing treaties . . . already prescribe most of the legislation that would cover proliferation by 
both State and non-State actors . . . [and] can be improved, if and where necessary, through 
negotiations among sovereign and equal States.”1133 Indeed, it could be argued that UNSC Res 
1540 was superfluous in many respects, imposing “obligations on United Nations Member States 
and attempts to legislate on behalf of States . . . [even] where States have already accepted non-
proliferation obligations under international treaties and other legal instruments.”1134  
Joyner is deeply critical of the Council for such actions, finding that “the Security 
Council appears now to consider itself to possess ultimate and essentially unlimited legal 
                                                 
1129 ibid ¶1. 
1130 Chile, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 April 2004) UN Doc S/PV.4950, 10. Resolution 1373 is referred to 
numerous times in the discussions on UNSC Res 1540 (2004). See eg, France, ibid 9; Russia, ibid 16 (2004); 
Germany, ibid 19; India, ibid 23. 
1131 Spain, ibid 7. See also, Angola, ibid 10, where UNSC Res 1540 (2004) was “in accord with the objectives stated 
in resolution 1373 (2001).” 
1132 Pakistan, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 April 2004) UN Doc S/PV.4950, 15. 
1133 ibid. 
1134 South Africa, ibid 22. 
207 
 
authority – i.e. to represent something of a legal hegemon – by virtue of its UN Charter mandate 
to maintain and restore international peace and security.”1135 Particularly with respect to UNSC 
Res 1540, he argues that  
 
the Security Council has confused the proper scope of its enforcement powers 
under Chapter VII, with the proper scope of its long unused, limited lawmaking 
powers under Article 26, and has taken to itself by unilateral exercise of its 
Chapter VII powers a role which, under the Charter system, it is to share both 
with the General Assembly in the exercise of its Article 11(1) powers, as well as 
with the general membership of the United Nations1136 
 
His assertion that the Council “is simply not an international legislator, nor can it be . . . [and] is 
ill-equipped institutionally, in terms of its membership structure and tenuous claim to any 
principle of representation of U.N. members, to assume such a role of law-giver to the 
international community”1137 is one that has already been shown to be supported by UN Member 
States. Indeed, he finds that resolutions 1373 and 1540 were “calculated, proactive forward-
looking normative creations. In both cases the Security Council simply determined that an entire 
class of actions, which have been and which may be in the future committed potentially by any 
state, constitute a threat to international peace and security.”1138 This is the act of legislation that 
has been argued to exceed the mandate of the Council: general, temporally unlimited, legally 
binding rules for States. Joyner finds that “[i]n short, it acted as a legal hegemon, unbound by the 
fundamental rules and principles of international law, and the limited nature of its own authority 
under the Charter”1139 and that “by trampling upon a right of states recognized in a broadly 
subscribed treaty to be an ‘inalienable right’, the Security Council in UNSC Res 1737 and 
subsequent related resolutions on Iran overstepped the bounds of its Chapter VII authority.”1140  
Of particular concern to States was the use of UNSC Res 1540 to fill in gaps of 
international law and “remedy lacunae existing in the existing apparatus of multilateral legal 
instruments on disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”1141 
                                                 
1135 Joyner, ‘Legal Hegemon’ (n 51) 227. 
1136 Joyner, International Law (n 51) 189. 
1137 ibid 192. 
1138 Joyner, ‘Legal Hegemon’ (n 51) 231. 
1139 ibid 237. 
1140 ibid 246. 
1141 Mexico, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 April 2004) UN Doc S/PV.4950 (Resumption 1), 4. See, also Chile, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (28 April 2004) UN Doc S/PV.4956, 6: “a vacuum exists in the international system with 
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This “increasing tendency of the Council . . . to assume new and wider powers of legislation on 
behalf of the international community, with its resolutions binding on all States”1142 was 
interpreted by many States to be unequivocally outside of the scope of the Council and led to 
concerns that “the exercise of legislative functions by the Council, combined with recourse to 
Chapter VII mandates, could disrupt the balance of power between the General Assembly and 
the Security Council, as enshrined in the Charter.”1143 Further than this, States questioned 
“whether the Security Council has the right to assume the role of prescribing legislative action by 
Member States”1144 at all. Perhaps too late given the adoption of UNSC Res 1373 three years 
earlier, these questions of international law and the “far-reaching legal and practical 
implications”1145 of UNSC Res 1540 on the international legal landscape caused consternation to 
the Mexican delegation: 
 
[The] delegation is concerned about the precedent that this draft resolution could 
set for the handling of other new issues on the world agenda. We are not only 
concerned about the proliferation of parallel regimes to those already established, 
using channels outside the norms of existing treaties, but also about the growing 
trend that the Security Council seeks to legislate, particularly with regard to issues 
that have their own regime of rights and obligations, even if incomplete when it 
comes to non-State actors.1146 
  
Undeterred, despite a “general view expressed in the Council’s open debate that the Security 
Council cannot legislate for the world”1147 the Council – and its members – ignored accusations 
of excess of its Charter powers that were raised previously and any contravention of the Charter-
assigned separation of powers. The Council is not tasked under the Charter with addressing gaps 
in international law- this is the role of the Assembly and, on a wider scale, the role of customary 
international law; nor indeed is it the role of the Council to bolster existing international treaties 
                                                                                                                                                             
respect to the proliferation and control of weapons of mass destruction in relation to their possible terrorist use by 
non-State actors. It therefore devolves to the Security Council to act in a prompt and timely manner by taking 
appropriate steps within the framework of the powers entrusted to it by the Charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, as this initiative is, indeed, doing”; Pakistan, ibid 3: “The sponsors have assured the 
Council that this resolution is designed to address a gap in international law to address the risk of terrorists and non-
State actors acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction.” 
1142 India, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 April 2004) UN Doc S/PV.4950, 23. 
1143 ibid. 
1144 Pakistan, ibid 15. 
1145 South Africa, ibid 22. 
1146 Mexico, ibid (Resumption 1), 5 [emphasis added]. 
1147 Pakistan, UNSC Verbatim Record (28 April 2004) UN Doc S/PV.4956, 2. 
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and conventions;1148 and the Council’s use of Chapter VII simply to “make [a resolution] legally 
binding in an unequivocal way and to send a strong political message”1149 is in clear 
contravention of its intended purpose under the Charter.1150 Nonetheless, as a result of UNSC 
Res 1540 each Member State would “need to review its laws and to determine what laws or 
regulations will be necessary to meet the resolution’s requirements.”1151 National legislation of 
measures bringing States into compliance with the Council’s resolution were obligatory, yet the 
Council members “believe[d] that the resolution is not intrusive because it enables States to 
translate the obligations conferred by it into domestic law as they wish.”1152 
Moreover, despite the fact that UNSC Res 1540 was recognised as “contain[ing] 
provisions whose implementation would not include enforcement action”1153, it was nonetheless 
deemed “appropriate to act under Chapter VII of the Charter”1154; this, of course, is entirely 
opposed to the Council’s powers under the Charter, which permit the imposition of legislation 
upon the domestic sphere of States only in “the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII.”1155 These landmark resolutions imposed a new legal order with respect to 
international terrorism, which – for better or worse and aside from any moral arguments that 
might have neutralised the adoption of UNSC Res 1540 from a political standpoint – imposed 
obligations upon States illegitimately and outside of the Charter’s delineation of powers to the 
appropriate parties. It is this type of resolution “not in response to a particular fact situation, and 
on an ongoing basis”1156 that caused consternation during debates in the run-up to resolutions 
                                                 
1148 See, Brazil, ibid 8: “We sought to safeguard the integrity of the existing international treaties and conventions – 
including the Non-Proliferation Treaty – and the balance of rights and duties contained therein.” 
1149 Spain, ibid 8.  
1150 Under art 39 of the Charter, Chapter VII must include the determination of a threat to the peace. The US 
attempted this in the discussions on resolution 1540: ibid 5 “The Security Council today is responding unanimously 
to a threat to international peace and security: the uncontrolled spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, 
their means of delivery and related materials by non-State actors, including terrorists seeking to exploit weak export-
control laws and security measures in a variety of countries.” Nonetheless, the general nature of the threat 
undermines the authority of the resolution and is precisely what Pakistan alluded to as “fudging” definition of 
terrorism for hegemonic political interests. Moreover, the Council does not clearly state what gaps exist in existing 
international treaties and conventions that spurred it into action for the purposes of a threat to the international 
peace. 
1151 US, ibid 5. 
1152 Spain, ibid 8. 
1153 Chile, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 April 2004) UN Doc S/PV.4950, 11. 
1154 ibid. 
1155 UN Charter (1945) art 2(7). 
1156 New Zealand, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 July 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4568, 5. 
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1422 and 1487 on the “very questionable legal foundations”1157 of temporary immunity of 
peacekeepers from ICC prosecution.1158  
Both Elberling and de Wet reach similar conclusions in their respective works.1159 
Elberling, like Joyner, takes the stance that “[t]he discharge of legislative powers  by the Security 
Council violates the UN Charter . . . [and] marks an important step on the way to fully realised 
legalised hegemony . . .”1160 Elberling’s principal arguments that the Great Powers1161 have 
“achieved an impressive broadening of the powers granted to them in San Francisco”1162 and that 
they are using the Council to establish a legalised hegemony1163 is both a reflection of previous 
UN Member States resentment and predictive of its continuation after his writing, particularly in 
light of views expressed by UN Member States themselves. De Wet proposes that “Security 
Council practice that consistently remains within the norms of ius cogens and the purposes and 
principles of the Charter is long and arduous . . . [but] the only way by means of which the 
                                                 
1157 Uruguay, UNSC Verbatim Record (12 June 2003) UN Doc S/PV.4772, 11.  
1158 See eg Canada, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 July 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4568, 3 (2002): “the proposed draft 
resolutions currently circulating would set a negative precedent under which the Security Council could change the 
negotiated terms of any treaty it wished — for example, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty — through a Security 
Council resolution. The proposed draft resolution would thereby undermine the treaty-making process”; Samoa, ibid 
(Resumption 1), 7: “So, too, in the absence of a situation threatening or breaching international peace and security, 
would we question the vires in the purported use of Chapter VII of the Charter. In our view, it seems very doubtful 
that the requisite circumstances exist in this case to bring into play Article 39 of the Charter and Chapter VII”; 
Germany, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 July 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4568, 9, “Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter requires the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression – none of which, 
in our view, is present in this case. The Security Council would thus be running the risk of undermining its own 
authority and credibility”; Canada, UNSC Verbatim Record (12 June 2003) UN Doc S/PV.4772, 5-6: UNSC Res 
1422 (2002) “touched directly on the obligations assumed by States parties under the Rome Statute, without their 
consent. Such an approach, to say the very least, stretched the legitimate limits of the role and responsibility 
entrusted to the Council under the Charter”; Liechtenstein, ibid 7-8: “Resolution 1422 (2002) invokes Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations without making a determination of a threat to international peace and security . . . 
[and] leads to the broader question of the undermining of the international treaty-making system. The Security 
Council does not have the competence to adopt and interpret international treaties, and by attempting to do so, it 
weakens the system established by the Charter”; Trinidad and Tobago, ibid 15: “we consider [resolution 1422’s] 
initial adoption — as we do its proposed renewal at this time — to be contrary to the United Nations Charter in that 
the Security Council did not make then — nor has it made now — a determination regarding the existence of a 
threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, which would constitute the basis for invoking 
Chapter VII of the Charter.” 
1159 Elberling (n 3) 337; de Wet (n 34). 
1160 Elberling (n 3) 337. 
1161 Elberling uses this phrase to refer to the five permanent members of the Council, as they were the Great Powers 
in the wake of WWII.  
1162 Elberling (n 3) 356-357. 
1163 ibid 359. 
211 
 
Security Council can achieve the legitimacy necessary for the efficient restoration and 
maintenance of international peace and security in the long term . . .”1164  
Resoultion 1696 is also ultra vires in its imposition. When taken in isolation as a right 
under the NTP, there is a convincing argument that the Council is within its powers to declare a 
threat to the international peace and force abidance by a Chapter VII resolution. The UN Charter 
outlines two articles that unambiguously place States in a position to follow the decrees of the 
Council: Article 25 delineates the obligation upon States to “accept and carry out the decisions of 
the Security Council”1165; Article 103 imposes the hierarchical structure that Council resolutions 
‘trump’ any State obligations under an international treaty.1166 However, in this particular case, it 
can be argued that the enshrined rights of the NPT of enrichment of nuclear material for peaceful 
means is a fundamental right of States separate to its codification in the NPT, having been 
successfully recognised by 190 nations.1167 Once this position is established, Article 103 of the 
Charter no longer remains relevant, since it relates exclusively to obligations upon States, rather 
than rights of States and the pursuit of a peaceful nuclear program is distinctly the latter. The 
Council has, therefore, set a precedent for the violation of international law, placing itself above 
the inalienable right of Iran to pursue nuclear power peacefully. 
However, the hegemony of which the Council is accused by both scholars and UN 
Member States are resultant from the composition of the Council itself; in an example of the 
interconnectivity of rule of law components, the lack of equitable participation allows for a 
violation of the separation of powers and a Council acting legibus solitus. A hegemony of the P5 
is, as Chapter X will examine, in theory proportionally representative of a third of all UN 
Members, when in reality as this section has examined there is great opposition to the decisions 
of the Council from the States Parties purportedly represented. Such skewed representations of 
the will of the wider UN membership are perhaps the central flaw ripe for exploitation by the P5 
and allow for the continuation of the criticised hegemony, encroachment upon the roles of other 
organs and ever-extension of Council power into the domestic sphere. 
 
                                                 
1164 de Wet (n 34) 386. 
1165 UN Charter (1945) art 25. 
1166 ibid art 103: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail.” 
1167 For further discussion of this argument, see generally, Daniel Joyner, Interpreting the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (OUP 2011). 
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IX.4 Conclusions 
Throughout the course of its existence, there have been numerous voices criticising and warning 
the Council for its transgression beyond its Charter powers and “dangerous tendency to 
undermine international law and erode [its] credibility.”1168 Nonetheless, the Council has 
persevered in its trajectory, despite internal criticism from Council Members and criticism from 
other UN Member States. Sibling organs of the UN have been silent on the subject of 
encroachment and there has been no condemnation by the Assembly or the ICJ for Council 
actions conceivably within their jurisdiction. Legislation by the Council would have been 
inconceivable in the 1990’s1169 yet was accepted almost without question in the aftermath of the 
highly emotional terrorist attacks in 2001 in response to the “plague of the twenty-first 
century.”1170 The unanimous adoption of both resolutions 1373 and 1540 may be seen to 
constitute State practice with respect to the interpretation of the Charter and the Council’s 
powers thereunder;1171 however, it is key to note that notwithstanding the representative nature of 
the Council – which itself is to be discussed in Chapter X of this thesis and can be argued to fail 
the test of being truly representative – the Council is formed of a mere 15 States out of almost 
200 and that initial widespread State acceptance or acquiescence of the Council’s legislative 
resolution in 2001 gradually shifted to stark warnings over the limits of Council powers with 
respect to the separation of powers: States were “convinced that the starting point in reforming 
the Council’s working methods is for the Council to refrain from exceeding the mandates 
entrusted to it under the Charter of the United Nations.”1172  
 Nonetheless, with the exception perhaps of the renewal of UNSC Res 1422, these warnings 
have not borne fruit and the Council appears to have made little effort to move towards a less 
legislative role; rather, it has built upon its precedent by adopting resolutions such as 17371173 
and 1929,1174 both on the nuclear programs in Iran and imposing legal obligations upon Iran to 
cooperate with the IAEA. The Council has also taken it upon itself to bind a States to a treaty 
                                                 
1168 Iran, UNSC Verbatim Record (12 June 2003) UN Doc S/PV.4772. 
1169 eg Tadic Appeal (n 1025) ¶43, where “there exists no corporate organ formally empowered to enact laws 
directly binding on international legal subjects.” See also, Wood (n 36); Derek W Bowett, ‘Judicial and Political 
Functions of the Security Council and the International Court of Justice’ in Fox (n 56) 79-80. 
1170 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (12 September 2001) UN Doc S/PV.4370, 5. 
1171 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), 1155 
UNTS 331, art 31(3.b). 
1172 Egypt, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 3. 
1173 UNSC Res 1737 (27 December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1737. 
1174 UNSC Res 1929 (9 June 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1929. 
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under the guise of a threat to the international peace,1175 contrary to the principles of State 
sovereignty and the stipulations of the Vienna Convention on the obligations of third party 
States.1176 Bedjaoui opines that “[t]he fact that there is no mechanism for sanctioning the 
Security Council if it breaches the Charter . . . in no way weakens the principle that the Council 
is subjected to the Charter”1177, a sentiment that appears to be shared by numerous Member 
States of the UN.  
The theory, however, belies the reality of affairs on the Council, which as an organ of the 
UN has not made any coherent efforts to move towards the symbiosis of powers within its parent 
system that the San Francisco drafters undoubtedly intended in the Charter; rather, it has chosen 
to itself increasingly fill gaps in international law rather than turn to the Assembly, create legal 
principles and precedent in the stead of the ICJ and encroach dramatically on the powers of UN 
Member States, in direct confrontation with the underlying principles not only of the United 
Nations but of international law itself – State sovereignty. The Council does not believe that it 
acts ultra vires in legislating general international norms, which have no temporal boundaries. 
Indeed, in a similar political environment to that over a decade ago in 2001, where foreign 
terrorist organisations today pose a threat to the citizens and interests of Western States, the 
Council has not hesitated to pass a legacy of UNSC Res 1373 in UNSC Res 2178, placing legally 
binding obligations upon States that are general, poorly-defined and temporally indefinite. 
Moreover, in an even more concerning expansion of the powers seized under UNSC Res 1373, 
the Council has unequivocally crossed the boundaries set by article 2(7) of the Charter in 
interfering in the domestic realm of sovereign States, namely terrorism on a domestic level. 
  
  
                                                 
1175 UNSC Res 1718 (14 October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1718, ¶3 “[d]emands that the DPRK immediately retract its 
announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”. 
1176 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), 1155 
UNTS 331, art 34 “A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.” At the 
core of the Convention, in its preamble, is “free consent” and the Convention also provides for the “withdrawal of a 
party . . . in conformity with the provisions of the treaty”, as the DPRK did. Moreover, the use of coercion or threat 
of force in resolution 1718 may have invalidated any subsequent accession by the DPRK under article 52 of the 
Vienna Convention. 
1177 Bedjaoui (n 229) 28. 
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CHAPTER X 
THE EQUITABLE PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
 
“The Council remains a closed club. Informal consultations apart, the Council’s 
real work and decision-making transpires often in smaller and more secretive 
conclaves, which in some cases exclude even some members of the Council.”1178 
 
X.1 Introduction 
Equitable participation in the decision-making process of the Council is one of the central 
reasons for the validity of imposing a rule of law framework upon the Council; as discussed in 
Chapter III.7 of this thesis, the Council’s composition of fifteen State Members, as well as the 
existence of permanent seats on the Council, underline the need for an equitable and fair 
decision-making process. However, perhaps the most common criticism of the Council in 
relation to equitable participation in decision-making processes is that the Council operates 
within a framework wherein five permanent Member States are capable of overruling the 
decisions of the entire Council on non-procedural matters by use of the veto power.1179 Whilst 
the veto is undoubtedly a contentious issue and will be addressed in Chapter X.3 of this thesis, 
there are other examples within the Charter where the equitable participation of Member States 
should take place. As a primarily political organ, the composition of the Council should arguably 
effectively reflect the modern political landscape as opposed to that of post-World War II at the 
time of its creation; moreover, elements of the UN Charter relating to how the Council exercises 
its function to “act on [UN Member States’] behalf”1180 should be carried out to the letter. 
 
X.2 Voting, composition and consultation 
Aside from the existence and use of the veto, three central themes exhibit the extent to which the 
Council allows for the equitable participation of Member States in the decision-making process. 
As the UN organ vested with the responsibility to act on behalf of UN Member States1181 and 
power to command Member States to comply with its resolutions,1182 it is not necessary for all 
Member States to contribute to the decision-making process in the same manner as that of the 
                                                 
1178 Pakistan, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 24. 
1179 UN Charter (1945) art 27(3). 
1180 ibid art 24(1). 
1181 ibid. 
1182 ibid art 25. 
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General Assembly; with one vote to each Council Member State as opposed to one vote to each 
UN Member State, “prompt and effective action by the United Nations”1183 is more likely to take 
place. However, it is nonetheless inherent in the voting structure of the Council – which requires 
an affirmative vote of nine members1184 – that matters are discussed openly, fully and 
extensively on the Council itself and not purely between a sub-section of the fifteen Member 
States. This matter has already been discussed, and established, in Chapter IV of this thesis under 
Transparency of Council Procedure; as concluded, the Council has yet to reform itself to 
adequately include all Member States in so far as the openness of its meetings is concerned. 
Equitability of participation extends further than simply the transparency of meetings and 
the inclusion of all relevant parties to a discussion; the composition of the Council should also 
reflect an effort to establish equitable participation. The ten non-permanent State Members of the 
Council should also be representative of the wider UN community, as evidenced by the necessity 
for “equitable geographical distribution” in article 23(1) of the Charter; this must be balanced 
with their contribution “to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other 
purposes of the Organization”1185 but the composition and number of Council members should 
reflect the wider community of the UN that the Council was designed to represent. Moreover, 
State Members affected by matters1186 or party to a dispute1187 under consideration by the 
Council should be included in any relevant discussions, not only in the interests of equality but 
also those of transparency; similarly, there is the implicit expectation that such inclusion in 
discussions would not simply be formality but rather that the Council would accommodate any 
issues, concerns or comments raised during the course of debate. 
 
X.2.1 Arguing the expansion of the Council 
The only reform of the Security Council in history has been the expansion of the number of 
Members from eleven to fifteen, under UNGA Res 1991 (1963),1188 later ratified by the Council 
in 1965. The same document assigned to the now ten non-permanent seats five members from 
African and Asian States, one from Eastern European States, two from Latin American States 
                                                 
1183 ibid art 24(1). 
1184 ibid art 27 (2). 
1185 ibid art 23(1). 
1186 ibid art 31. 
1187 ibid art 32. 
1188 UNGA Res 1991A (1963) UN Doc A/RES/17/1991A, ¶1(a)-(d). 
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and two from Western European and other States.1189 This decision was taken as a result of the 
increase in the membership of the United Nations, which swelled from the original fifty-one 
nations in 1945 to one hundred and thirteen in 1963.1190 With over half the UN membership 
consisting of recently decolonised African and Asian countries, the Council was amended to 
reflect not only numbers but also issues and priorities represented within the UN system. 
 Both the reasoning behind the decision to expand the Council and the subsequent action itself 
are worth examining within the context of today’s geo-political landscape. One way to look at 
the ballooning of UN membership in the first two decades of its existence would be that numbers 
more than doubled; another would be that membership increased by sixty-two States. Since 1965 
– when the Council ratified the GA resolution – membership of the UN has expanded by a 
further eighty nations, most recently with South Sudan in 2011. In fact, in the decade of 1990-
2000, thirty States1191 declared independence or sought to be recognised by the UN, many of 
which was due to the end of the Cold War; the independence of so many former USSR territories 
and declared independence of smaller island States are analogous to the decolonisation of nations 
in the mid-20th Century.  
 However, over a decade later, reform of the Council through expanding its number of seats 
has not materialised; the current assignment of non-permanent seats on the Council has remained 
the same for almost half a century whilst the geographical groups have expanded in number – in 
comparison to 1965, there are now five seats to be divided between an African group of fifty-
four States and Asia-Pacific group of fifty-five, totalling one hundred and nine States. This figure 
equates to over 56% of the total UN membership;1192 including the permanent seat of China, this 
equates to six seats out of fifteen, a total of 40% of Council seats1193 or one seat per eighteen 
States. The Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) has no permanent seats assigned 
to it and thirty-two States – or 17% of UN Member States – to be represented by only two non-
permanent seats; this is one seat per fifteen States, of which neither has the power to block 
                                                 
1189 ibid. 
1190 ‘Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present’ <http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml> 
accessed 16 December 2014. 
1191 Lichtenstein, Namibia, the DPRK, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Republic of Korea, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, 
San Marino, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Andorra, Czech Republic, Eritrea, Monaco, Slovakia, 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Palau, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Tuvalu. 
1192 109 States from 193 is 56.5%. 
1193 6 out of 15 seats on the Council. 
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Council resolutions in the interests of the region, as most other groups do.1194 Conversely, the 
Western European and Other Group consists of twenty-nine States and is assigned three 
permanent seats1195 in addition to two non-permanent seats – a total of five seats or one third of 
all Council seats – for a mere 15% of UN membership: one seat per six States. In between these 
two poles lies the smallest of the groups – the Eastern European Group – with one seat per 
twelve States: Russia’s permanent seat in addition to another non-permanent rotating seat to 
represent twenty-three UN Members, or 12% of the UN membership. There is clearly an extreme 
disparity in the composition of the Council that does not reflect equitable participation by or 
representation of UN Member States and calls for reform to expand it appear entirely 
warranted.1196 
This position is further amplified by two elements: firstly, the difficulty with which States 
Member of a large groups, such as Africa or the Asia-Pacific, will have to actually achieve the 
goal of sitting on the Council due to the wider pool and therefore smaller chance of succeeding; 
and, secondly, the discriminate nature of the selection of States to fill these limited non-
permanent seats, which at times appear to be given to the same candidates on repeat occasions – 
sixty-nine States1197 – over a third of UN members – have never served on the UN Security 
Council in its history, whereas other nations have served up to ten times.1198 Although many of 
these States are newly-declared independent and perhaps understandably have not had the 
opportunity to sit on the Council, other States like the Dominican Republic and Haiti joined in 
the UN in 1945 – the same time as Argentina1199 and Colombia1200 - but neither have represented 
                                                 
1194 The WEOG has France, UK and US; the Eastern European Group has Russia; and the Asia-Pacific group (and 
arguably the African Group) has China. 
1195 France, UK, US. 
1196 Iran, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 11: “[i]n accordance with 
Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council should act on behalf of all Member States; but 
in reality, if there is one thing missing in the exercise of many of the Council’s functions and the taking of its 
decisions, it is that very principle.” 
1197 Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Brunei, 
Cambodia, Central African Republic, Comoros Islands, Cyprus, DPRK, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Georgia, Grenada, Haiti, Iceland, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, 
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Malawi, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Federated States 
of Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nauru, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and 
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Switzerland, 
Tajikistan, East Timor, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan and Vanuatu. 
1198 Brazil represented the GRULAC on a non-permanent seat in 1946/7, 1951/2, 1954/5, 1963/4, 1967/8, 1988/9, 
1993/4, 1998/9, 2004/5 and 2010/11; Japan represented Asia-Pacific in a non-permanent seat in 1958/9, 1966/7, 
1971/2, 1975/6, 1981/2, 1987/88, 1992/3, 1997/8, 2005/6 and 2009/10. 
1199 Which finishes its ninth rotation on the Council in December 2014. 
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the Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC) at the Council; even the comparable 
nations of Panama1201 and Cuba1202 have fared better. In Asia, while Pakistan has sat in the Asia-
Pacific seat seven times, Afghanistan been overlooked entirely, despite having joined a year 
before; in Africa, South Africa – a frontrunner for a permanent seat within the African Group 
plan – has sat only twice, both within the last decade, despite joining in 1945, whereas Egypt was 
one of the first to represent the African Group and has done so five times. This disparity affects 
not only the perspectives of the issues discussed at the Council level, but also the nature of issues 
brought to light to the Council. A stark example of this is climate change, which affects more 
than any other group that of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) – a coalition of forty-
four States that is at greatest risk of rising sea levels; as the Prime Minister of Tuvalu noted 
during his address to the General Assembly in 2008, climate change is “without doubt, the most 
serious threat to the global security and survival of mankind . . . [and] an issue of enormous 
concern to a highly vulnerable small island State like Tuvalu.”1203 Yet of the forty-four members 
of the AOSIS, only eight States1204 have had the opportunity to sit on the Council where they 
might highlight such issues. 
 The stagnation of reform flies in the face not only of all States’ resolution in the UN 
Millennium Declaration to intensify efforts “to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security 
Council in all its aspects”1205 but also of many States’ support for an enlarged Security Council, 
including the P5 members themselves,1206 who recognise the need for “a Security Council that 
better represents twenty-first-century realities and is maximally capable of carrying out its 
mandate and effectively meeting the global challenges of this century.”1207  
                                                                                                                                                             
1200 Which has sat eight times on the Council. 
1201 Which has sat five times. 
1202 Which as has three times. 
1203 ‘Statement delivered by Honourable Apisai Ielemia, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tuvalu, 
at the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly Open Debate’ (26 September 2008). 
1204 Cape Verde, Cuba, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Jamaica, Mauritius, Singapore and Trinidad and Tobago. In total, 
they have sat thirteen times. 
1205 UNGA Res 55/2 (18 September 2000) UN Doc A/RES/55/2, ¶30. 
1206 There is broad support from the P5 for Council reform on the question of enlargement: France calls for the 
inclusion of the so-called ‘G4’ of “Germany, Brazil, India and Japan as permanent members of the Security Council 
and an increased presence of African countries”, France, UNGA Verbatim Record (7 November 2013) UN Doc 
A/68/PV.46, 28; the UK (ibid 20) and China (ibid 26) support this proposal; Russia is “in favour of keeping the 
Council as it is, namely, compact. Its optimal number should not exceed 20 members” (ibid 18);  and the US “is open 
to modest expansion of the Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories”(ibid 22). 
1207 US, UNGA Verbatim Record (7 November 2013) UN Doc A/68/PV.46. 
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From the wider community, too, there is heavy support for Council reform through 
enlargement; at least three major initiatives external to the P5 members have been put forward. 
In 2005, former Secretary-General Annan proposed his In Larger Freedom report1208 with an aim 
to “make it more broadly representative of the international community as a whole, as well as of 
the geopolitical realities of today, and thereby more legitimate in the eyes of the world”1209 ; in 
this he advocated1210 an enlarged council of twenty-four members under one of two plans,1211 
either of which he believed would allow the Council to become more “broadly representative of 
the realities of power in today’s world.”1212 The Secretary-General urged a vote prior to the 
summit in September 20051213 – none took place. Also in 2005, the G4 – comprising Brazil, 
Germany, India and Japan – proposed1214 ten new members to the Council, of which six seats 
would be permanent and held by them in addition to two African States. Perhaps unsurprisingly 
there is opposition from numerous angles to each of these bids,1215 most notably the larger 
Uniting for Consensus group – containing Argentina, Italy, Canada, Colombia and Pakistan – 
which opposed this proposal and countered with a plan to bolster the existing fifteen seats with 
an additional ten non-permanent seats and granting all members the right to re-election.1216 
Finally, African States have not stayed silent; they also submitted a draft plan expanding the 
Council. 1217 The common denominator in all proposals was, ironically, the lack of coherency 
from Member States in finding a suitable compromise. Nonetheless, in 2008, efforts were 
redoubled by the UN and multiple rounds1218 of negotiations on a suitable text were conducted 
during which caucuses such as the African Group1219 and L691220 emerged and the Uniting for 
                                                 
1208 UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
Rights for All’ (21 March 2005) UN Doc A/59/2005. 
1209 ibid 60. 
1210 ibid ¶170. 
1211 ibid 43 (Box 5): “Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-
year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas . . . [whilst] Model B provides for no new 
permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-
permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas.” 
1212 ibid ¶169. 
1213 ibid ¶170. 
1214 UNGA Draft Res (6 July 2005) UN Doc A/59/L.64. 
1215 eg Argentina, Colombia and Mexico oppose Brazil’s bid; China and South Korea oppose the appointment of 
Japan; Pakistan opposes giving a seat to India. 
1216 UNGA Draft Res (21 July 2005), UN Doc A/59/L.68. 
1217 UNGA Draft Res (14 December 2005), UN Doc A/60/L.41. 
1218 March/April 2009; May 2009; September 2009; November 2009; June – November 2010; December 2010; 
March 2011; January – May 2012. 
1219 54 Member States from Africa, coordinated by the C10 – Algeria, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Libya, 
Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia. 
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Consensus group gained momentum;1221 however, even at the 10th round of Intergovernmental 
Negotiations on Security Council reform (IGN) talks in March 2014, “[t]he positions of the 
various groups remained unchanged, pointing to the manifest deadlock in terms of what should 
be the specific way ahead.”1222 
Notwithstanding the efforts and official stances of States to expand the Council as part of 
wider reform, it is key also to examine the real impact of enlargement and whether it will achieve 
the purported goals of ensuring a more equitable participation experience for those included. 
Whilst there appears to be a general consensus over the notion that the Council should expand to 
reflect more accurately the landscape of the modern political world, there are two major flaws to 
the implementation. Primarily, since the Council is a political organ, is the issue of whether 
expansion would actually reflect not only the number of countries in the world and how 
mathematically well represented they are but also the distribution of power. It can be argued that 
France certainly, and potentially the UK along with it, are no longer the powerhouses that they 
were in 1945 with a sprawling colonial empire at their discretion; others would point at the 
economic rise of countries such as Brazil, India and South Africa. Secondly, the logistics of 
expansion should be measured against the potential impact on the efficiency and potency of the 
Council; it would be counterproductive if an expansion were to have a negative impact on the 
work of the Council. 
On the first point, it is unclear that any Group’s reform proposals attempt to address the 
de facto imbalance between seats granted on the Council and the military, economic and political 
potency outside of it; it is perhaps unsurprising that all P5 members are among the top eight 
countries in terms of GDP,1223 top six countries in terms of both military firepower1224 and 
                                                                                                                                                             
1220 A group of developing countries active from 2007 onwards, including Brazil, India and approximately another 
40 States. 
1221 With Italy as a focal point and core members of Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain, and Turkey. China and Indonesia, support for the group likely 
totals around 40 UN Members. 
1222 UNGA ‘Remarks at the Informal General Assembly Meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security 
Council Reform’ (New York, 27 June 2013) <http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/67/statements/statements/June/ 
sc_reform27062013.shtml> accessed 16 December 2014. 
1223 ‘GDP and its breakdown at current prices in US Dollars’, UN Statistics Division (2013) <http://unstats.un.org/ 
unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp> accessed 16 December 2014. 
1224 ‘Countries Ranked by Military Strength’ (3 April 2014) Global Firepower <http://www.globalfirepower.com/ 
countries-listing.asp> accessed 16 December 2014. 
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expenditure1225 and all possess nuclear weaponry. To extend these trends, however, is difficult; 
India, Brazil, Japan and Germany are nations that are often touted as likely potential candidates 
for permanent seats on the Council, but it is up for debate whether any bring a rounded package 
in the same form as the existing P5 members.1226  
With respect to the logistics of Council expansion, as has been shown, there is general 
consensus that the Council should be expanded. However, whilst much of the focus has been 
directed towards suitable candidates for permanent or non-permanent seats,1227 precisely how 
many seats the Council should be expanded by1228 or what rights any new seats would confer on 
Council Members that occupied them – especially the veto – little prudent debate has been had 
over the wisdom of actually expanding the Council and what impact this will have on the 
decision-making process. The Secretary-General emphasised in his report In Larger Freedom 
that reforms of the Council “should not impair the effectiveness of the Security Council;”1229 to 
ignore this advice simply to achieve adherence to standards of the rule of law might be 
considered short-sighted since, if by expanding the number of Council members one also 
undermines the work of the principal organ entrusted with maintenance of the international 
peace, a great blow would be struck to the UN as a whole and the wider community that relies on 
the actions of the Council.  
An expanded Council of twenty-four States might more easily contribute towards the 
highlighting of a wider range of issues that are prioritised by the newer members; however, it 
may also serve to dilute the efficacy and potency of the Council. The resources at the disposal of 
                                                 
1225 Sam Perlo-Freeman and Carina Solmirano, ‘Trends in world military expenditure, 2013’ (April 2013) Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, Table 1 <http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1404.pdf> accessed 16 
December 2014; International Institute of Strategic Studies, ‘The Military Balance: 2014’ (Routledge 2014), 3. 
1226 For instance, India has the tenth largest nominal GDP in the world (‘GDP and its breakdown at current prices in 
US Dollars’ (n 1223)), is ahead of both the UK and France in terms of global firepower (‘Countries Ranked by 
Military Strength’(n 1224)); nonetheless, India has a Human Development Index (HDI) score of only 0.554, (UNDP 
‘Statistical Tables from the 2013 Human Development Report’, Table 1) placing it 136th from a potential 186 
nations, and a GDP per capita of $4077 (World Bank ‘World Economic Outlook Database, July 2014: Report for 
Selected Countries and Subjects’ (2014)) placing it 133rd from 187 nations according to the World Bank. Similarly, 
Brazil has failed to gain the recognition at the Council it covets, despite leading the UN stabilisation mission in Haiti 
for a decade and intervening in neighbouring Colombia to assist in rescue missions against the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) – both clear indicators of its willingness to reinstate regional stability within 
the framework of “peace and security”.  
1227 In addition to Japan, Germany, India and Brazil vying for permanent seats, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa all 
feel they have strong reasons to sit on an “African seat”. 
1228 The smallest expansion remains that of the Secretary-General, advocating an expansion to 24 seats in both plans. 
1229 UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
Rights for All’ (21 March 2005) UN Doc A/59/2005.¶169(c). 
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the Council would need to be spread wider; consequently, larger States may well be more 
reluctant to contribute towards causes that are not high on their agenda and therefore at least one 
of the purposes of enlarging the Council – widening the horizons of Council action – would have 
failed. Moreover, in expanding the Council, the voting system would need to be changed, 
requiring a greater majority of votes in order to pass a resolution; given the lengthy closed door 
and informal discussions referred to in Chapter IV of this work on Clarity of Action and 
accounting for divergent views based on regional affiliation, the discussions at the Council 
would not only be more lengthy but may also inevitably result in an increase in stalemates or 
failures of resolution to be adopted. Finally, it would still be debateable whether an increased 
Council would represent the Council as a whole; whilst at first glance the Council would move 
towards the democratic representation of the General Assembly, the fact remains that enlarging 
the group too much – even if the number of seats proportionally reflected the number of States in 
each group – would hinder serious negotiations whilst still leaving the veto within the hands of at 
least five Member States. Moreover, issues of which States would fill the seats and the selection 
process would open an entirely new avenue of debate. 
A question emerges, then, whether expanding the Council to include these States would 
weaken the image of the Council, which is primarily tasked with maintaining peace and security 
worldwide. The P5 members have global reach not only in terms of sheer numbers on paper – 
such as military expenditure, armed forces strength or GDP – or their geographical location, 
distributed around the world almost evenly, but also in terms of political influence. The answer 
to this question would extend tangentially from the thesis of this work, which focuses on the 
compatibility of Council action with the established rule of law principles. If expanding the 
Council would cripple its work, such moves towards equality under the rule of law would be 
self-defeating for the rule of law can only operate within a robust system that works efficiently. 
 
It is . . . imperative to find a balance between the need for swift and effective 
decision-making and the need to give all Member States concerned the 
opportunity to make themselves heard at an appropriate time, thus ensuring that 
their opinions are taken into account by the Security Council when decisions are 
formulated and taken.1230 
 
                                                 
1230 Austria, UNSC Verbatim Record (16 December 2014) UN Doc S/PV.3483, 19. 
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 As such, strictly from a legal perspective, the lack of Council expansion contravenes the 
principle of the equitable participation; however, in reality, this may be a necessary departure 
from the letter of the law in an effort to maintain the power of the Council to act quickly, 
efficiently and decisively in the event of a threat to the international peace. As contrasting as it 
may appear to advocate practicality over equality and fairness, it may be that the Council – as a 
political organ that must be necessarily rapid in its responses – requires such a compromise. 
 
X.2.2 Consultation of relevant parties to a situation or matter of discussion 
In accordance with its Rules of Procedure,1231 the Council should meet in public; however, as 
already established, it has become common practice for the Council to meet in private where a 
great deal of the discussion and decisions themselves take place, away from the eye not only of 
the general public and wider UN community, but also from other Council Members. Any opacity 
of decision-making on the Council is even more acutely felt when the discussions are around a 
topic to which an affected or involved party is not privy; where article 31 of the Charter grants 
the Council discretion over inviting a UN Member to the discussion, article 32 imposes an 
obligation on the Council to include relevant Parties in the discussion. 1232   However, in practice, 
the liberty granted to the Council in article 31 is relied upon more heavily than that of article 32; 
the Council may be more inclined to deem a situation to “specially affect” a Member State than 
it may be to consider that State a party to a dispute in order to avoid the necessity of including 
that State in discussions. This appears to have been the case with South Africa during discussions 
over the question in Namibia; in this case the ICJ found that South Africa was not entitled to 
demand inclusion in discussions due to the classification of the Namibia question as a situation 
rather than a dispute,1233 meaning that the Council was permitted discretion over which States 
could be invited under article 31, rather than the more restrictive language of article 32. 
Moreover, there is little room for States to object to such classification.1234 
                                                 
1231 UNSC Rules of Procedure (n 287) r 48. 
1232 UN Charter (1945) arts 31-2: “Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security 
Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council 
whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected. Any Member of the United 
Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if 
it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in 
the discussion relating to the dispute” [emphasis added]. 
1233 Namibia (n 102) ¶22. 
1234 Under article 25 of the Charter, States are bound to comply with the decisions of the Council. There is no 
mechanism for review of Council decision; in the case of Namibia ibid, South Africa was found to have been 
224 
 
 Council practice shows that States that should logically be party to a discussion are often side-
lined in a variety of ways. Firstly, there is the possibility that articles 31 and 32 will be 
overlooked altogether and States that are clearly relevant and even central to the discussion are 
left out of the Council when it broaches topics. In 1998, when both Pakistan1235 and India1236 
conducted nuclear tests in their respective territories, the Council met to discuss their action in 
the absence of both parties. Presidential statements condemning the actions of both nations1237 – 
emerging from meetings1238 that neither India nor Pakistan were invited to attend – were 
followed by UNSC Res 1172,1239 to which in addition to the fifteen Council members of the 
time, the nations of Argentina, Australia, Canada, Egypt, Iran, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates were invited to 
participate in the discussion.1240 India was not invited to participate in the discussion, nor did any 
State remark on its absence in the discussions of UNSC Res 1172, despite a letter circulated by 
the Permanent Representative of India to the Council two days prior to the Council meeting on 
the resolution1241 regretting “that the Council has disregarded this Charter provision [of article 
31] by not giving India an opportunity to participate in the discussions on this draft.”1242 India 
raises a valid and awkward point for the Council, raising questions of bias that the Council 
would find difficult to respond to, given that the other party to the dispute – Pakistan – was 
granted the opportunity to publicly respond to both Council members and non-Council members 
alike during discussion in a lengthy and defensive speech.1243 A decade later, the matter was still 
the subject of criticism at the Council.1244 This is precisely the scenario that India objected to in 
                                                                                                                                                             
required to object to the classification of the question at the beginning and the matter could not be reclassified on the 
fly. 
1235 28 May 1998. 
1236 11 and 13 May 1998. 
1237 UNSC Presidential Statement 12 (1998) UN Doc S/PRST/1998/12 condemned India; UNSC Presidential 
Statement 17 (1998) UN Doc S/PRST/1998/17 condemned Pakistan. 
1238 UNSC Verbatim Record (14 May 1998) UN Doc S/PV.3881 and UNSC Verbatim Record (29 May 1998) UN 
Doc S/PV.3888 note no additional attendees beyond the 15 Council members. 
1239 UNSC Res 1172 (6 June 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1172. 
1240 UNSC Verbatim Record (6 June 1998) UN Doc S/PV/3890, 2. 
1241 UNSC ‘Letter dated 4 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to 
the President of the Security Council’ (4 June 1998) UN Doc S/1998/464 was sent 2 days prior to the Council’s 
3890th meeting on 6th June 1998, discussing the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.  
1242 ibid ¶2. 
1243 UNSC Verbatim Record (6 June 1998) UN Doc S/PV/3890, 28-32. 
1244 Philippines, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 9: “[D]ue process 
and the rule of law demand that Member States that are not members of the Security Council but are the subjects of 
the Council’s scrutiny should have the right to appear before the Council at all stages of the proceedings concerning 
them to state or defend their positions on the issues that are the subjects of or are related to that scrutiny. At present, 
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the aftermath of its nuclear testing, having not been given the opportunity to represent or defend 
itself publically to the Council prior to its condemnation by the organ. 
Secondly, even when States are invited to take part in proceedings, there are no 
safeguards in place to ensure that their contributions take place prior to the decision being 
taken;1245 for example, in the discussion on UNSC Res 1172, Canada took the opportunity to 
“express [its] regret that the views of Member States not members of the Security Council are 
being heard only after consideration and after adoption of such a resolution, dealing as it does 
with matters of such vital concern to all Member States”1246; a view reiterated almost a decade 
later by Iran.1247 The denial of representation prior to a vote undermines the concept of 
transparency and openness on the Council; in the same way as private meetings can be construed 
as eliciting a “clique” mentality between certain members of the Council – most notably the P5 
members – so too giving the floor to representatives to speak only after a vote has taken place 
gives the impression that their contributions are neither valued nor have impact on the Council 
members. To relegate speeches in such a way devalues the input of these States, suggests that 
their arguments are mere afterthoughts to a process that includes neither their perspective nor 
their, often, political stances. The components of transparency, fairness and equitable 
participation are all challenged when the Council adopts “a presidential statement and a 
resolution without even allowing the views of the concerned party to be heard.”1248  
There is also the possibility that States may be overruled in the discussions by more 
powerful members, even when matters primarily affect their own sovereignty, with no clear 
                                                                                                                                                             
such participation is unfairly limited by rules 37 and 38 of the provisional rules of procedure. Under rule 37, a State 
Member of the United Nations that is not a member of the Security Council may be invited to participate only as a 
result of a decision of the Council and only when the Council considers that the interests of that non-member are 
specially affected or when that non-member brings a matter to the attention of the Council in accordance with 
Article 35(1) of the Charter. That is a denial of due process, which is a violation of the basic principle of the rule of 
law. Due process and the rule of law require that a party must be heard before it is condemned.” 
1245 The representative of Belarus succinctly and accurately stated the crux of the matter in 2008: “When working 
out and adopting decisions, it is important that they be genuine and not just words, and that they take into account 
the views and concerns of all Member States, be they rank-and-file members of the General Assembly or permanent 
members of the Council, and particularly Members whose interests are directly affected”, Belarus, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 5. 
1246 UNSC Verbatim Record (6 June 1998) UN Doc S/PV/3890, 18. 
1247 Iran, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 12: “[A]lthough paragraph 
29 of [UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Council’ (19 July) 2006 UN Doc S/2006/507] stipulates that ‘when non-
members are invited to speak to the Council, those who have a direct interest in the outcome of the matter under 
consideration may speak prior to Council members’, on many occasions the Council has denied an opportunity to 
countries concerned to speak before a vote is taken, instead allowing them to speak only after the Council had taken 
a decision and is members had made their statements.” 
1248 Iran, UNSC Verbatim Record (31 July 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5500, 7. 
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explanation for the decision; this can be argued to have been the case with Iran and the DPRK in 
resolutions relating to the proliferation of nuclear activities, particularly in light of the double 
standards established in Chapters VII.3 and IX.3.2 of this thesis. This was also the case for 
Rwanda, which initially approached the Council for assistance after the Rwandan genocide in 
1994 and requested the Council to set up “as soon as possible an international tribunal to try the 
criminals”1249 for four principal reasons.1250 However, less than two months later, they voted 
against UNSC Res 9551251 establishing the ICTR; Rwanda was the only State to have voted 
against the tribunal, with China abstaining. Put simply, Rwanda was excluded from input into 
redressing “genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international 
humanitarian law”1252 that had taken place on its own territory, not only – as flippantly claimed 
by New Zealand1253 – due to the avoidance of the death penalty, but as a result of seven serious 
concerns1254  that Rwanda found unacceptable. Rwanda is a prime example of a nation that has 
                                                 
1249 ‘Letter dated 28 September 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed 
to the President of the Security Council’ (29 September 1994) UN Doc S/1994/1115. 
1250 UNSC Verbatim Record (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/PV. 3453, 14:“First, by asking for the establishment of 
such a tribunal, the Rwandese Government wanted to involve the international community, which was also harmed 
by the genocide and by the grave and massive violations of international humanitarian law, and it wanted to enhance 
the exemplary nature of a justice that would be seen to be completely neutral and fair. Secondly, the Government 
appealed for an international presence in order to avoid any suspicion of its wanting to organize speedy, vengeful 
justice. Thirdly, the Rwandese Government requested and firmly supports the establishment of an international 
tribunal to make it easier to get at those criminals who have found refuge in foreign countries. Fourthly, the 
genocide committed in Rwanda is a crime against humankind and should be suppressed by the international 
community as a whole.” 
1251 UNSC Res 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/RES/955. 
1252 ibid preamble. 
1253 UNSC Verbatim Record (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/PV. 3453, 5: “We recall that the Government of 
Rwanda requested the Tribunal. That is a fact. We are disappointed that it has not supported this resolution. We 
understand that this is principally because of its desire that those convicted of genocide should be executed.” 
1254 ibid 14 ff: “First, my delegation regards the dates set for the ratione temporis competence of the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda from 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1994 as inadequate . . . Secondly, my delegation finds 
that the composition and structure of the International Tribunal for Rwanda inappropriate and ineffective . . . 
Thirdly, in view of all this, my delegation was surprised to see in the draft statute that the International Tribunal, 
instead of devoting its meagre human resources, and probably equally meagre financial ones, to trying the crime of 
crimes, genocide, intends to disperse its energy by prosecuting crimes that come under the jurisdiction of internal 
tribunals . . . Fourthly, certain countries, which need not be named here, took a very active part in the civil war in 
Rwanda. My Government hopes that everyone will understand its concern at seeing those countries propose 
candidates for judges and participate in their election. The fifth reason is that my delegation finds it hard to accept 
that the draft statute of the International Tribunal proposes that those condemned be imprisoned outside Rwanda and 
that those countries be given the authority to reach decisions about the detainees . . . The sixth reason is that the 
International Tribunal as designed in the resolution, establishes a disparity in sentences since it rules out capital 
punishment, which is nevertheless provided for in the Rwandese penal code . . . The seventh reason is that my 
Government called for the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute those guilty of genocide because 
the international community is deeply concerned in this respect, but also and above all we requested the 
establishment of this Tribunal to teach the Rwandese people a lesson . . . It therefore seems clear that the seat of the 
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suffered grave, catastrophic conflict that has stemmed from and caused even further ethnic 
division amongst its peoples, which it attempted to highlight in the first of its objections to the 
Council on ratione temporis.1255 Even after the vote, the Rwandan representative believed that 
“[t]he changes proposed by the Rwandese Government, with all good will, could very well have 
been accommodated by international law and do not run counter to the idea of international 
jurisdiction . . . [and] that an international tribunal for Rwanda, taking into account Rwandese 
realities, [was] possible and feasible”1256; nonetheless, all seven of its objections- including the 
inclusion of candidates and judges for the ICTR from States with nationals alleged to have 
perpetrated the very crimes they intended to try – were ignored by the Council, which is 
unsurprising given that Rwanda was permitted to give its speech only after the vote had been 
taken in a manner that suited more an explanation of its vote than a coherent attempt by the 
Council to expand its base of information upon which to take a balanced decision.  
 These omissions and acts are coupled with miscellaneous errors in the procedure and 
implementation of Council rules that also have the result of undermining equitable participation 
in the decision-making process for States – invitations to participate are sometimes late1257 and 
the draft resolutions and statements that are circulated to Council members 
 
are often trimmed and edited before reaching informal consultations. Such a 
practice makes it hard for non-members to be readily informed of the work of the 
Council. It also makes it difficult for non-members to provide meaningful input 
into the process, even in rare opportunities such as open debates.1258 
 
Overall, the Council appears to have undermined the equitable participation of States in the 
decision-making process, not only overall by failing to expand appropriately or redress the geo-
political imbalance of its composition, but also through various methods of exclusion of States 
from debates, discussions and decisions. Insofar as Council practice in the field of equitable 
representation, it has not shown a willingness for meaningful reform, nor has it displayed any 
                                                                                                                                                             
International Tribunal should be set in Rwanda; it will have to deal with Rwandese suspects, responsible for crimes 
committed in Rwanda against the Rwandese.” 
1255 ibid 14. 
1256 ibid 16. 
1257 Libya, UNSC Verbatim Record (16 September 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7031, 6. 
1258 Tonga, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 21. 
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pattern or comprehensive future plan of action for ameliorating the shortfalls in which its 
behaviour hitherto has resulted. 
 
X.3 The Veto 
The most contentious issue on the Council when any discussion on reform or equitable 
participation in the decision-making process is broached is undoubtedly the existence, and use 
of, the veto by the P5 members. The veto, however, is enshrined1259 in the foundations of the 
Charter: 
 
The veto had been meticulously inserted into every nook and cranny of the 
Charter. No important decision could be taken by the Organization without their 
approval. Any Great Power, if it chose, could block the admission of new 
members. It could prevent the expulsion of a member or the suspension of 
membership rights. It could hold up the appointment of the Secretary-General. It 
could block the admission of a state to the International Court of Justice. More 
important still, it could prevent the adoption of an amendment to the Charter. 
Thus the veto power was imbedded with what seemed to be eternal finality in the 
fundamental law of the United Nations.1260 
 
To suggest that any debate on the value of the existence, or indeed abolition, of the veto or its 
usage is anything but strictly academic would be asinine; the UN Charter requires the consent of 
the very same P5 members1261 that would not even consider relinquishing the control it grants 
them and it is likely that a moratorium or informal agreement to prohibit its use by the P5 would 
fail for the same reasons. Accordingly, this thesis examines the Council’s behaviour within the 
existing framework of the UN Charter, which clearly allows for the use of the veto in its article 
27(3). 
 
X.3.1 The intended purpose of the veto 
 
[D]ecisions of the Council on procedural matters require an affirmative vote of 
any seven members of the Council. Other decisions, which we might call 
decisions on matters of substance, require not merely a majority of seven 
                                                 
1259 UN Charter (1945) art 27(3): “Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an 
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members.” 
1260 Francis O Wilcox, ‘The Rule of Unanimity in the Security Council’ (1946) 40 ASIL Proc 51, 54. 
1261 UN Charter (1945) art 109(2). 
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members, but the concurring votes of all the permanent members of the Council. 
That means, of course, that each of the five permanent members of the Council 
possesses the right to prevent any decision of the Council being reached. And that 
is why the right implied in this formula has been called the “veto”. Some 
objection was taken to using the name “veto”, but the name is quite an accurate 
description of the right itself.1262 
 
The veto was “the most controversial, perhaps, of all the problems with which the Conference 
[was] faced”1263 at San Francisco in 1945; strong opposition to the notion of permanent seats on 
the Council coupled with the power to unilaterally block the adoption of non-procedural 
resolutions was rife amongst delegates.1264 Indeed, so irregular, perhaps, was the notion of the 
veto that confusion as to its applicability led to the first veto, exercised by Russia, being 
discounted in 1946.1265 Nonetheless, the veto was a non-negotiable element of the Council for 
the major powers of the time – the UK, Russia, US and China.1266 Nonetheless, the veto was 
initially due to be afforded to every Council Member under the principle of unanimity, but was 
removed from all but the P5 – a decision that, to the UK delegate, “may be considered to be 
unequal treatment . . . [and] undesirable, but . . . not entirely unreasonable.”1267  
 From the perspective of the Member States, the veto represented the utmost confidence 
and trust instilled in the Great Powers to use the veto not only selflessly, but invariably sparingly, 
and only due to the debt owed to them in the aftermath of World War II: 
 
We believe that it is necessary that on every occasion when the veto power be 
applied by any one of the great powers it should be recalled that the great 
majority of this Conference has granted them such a tremendous amount of 
confidence in the certainty that the veto shall not be applied except in exceptional 
                                                 
1262 Australia, United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), Vol 11 (1945), 19-20 [emphasis 
added]. 
1263 Egypt, ibid 5. 
1264 See eg, ibid 20, where the Australian view, “supported by many other delegations, has been that the scope of the 
veto power should be as restricted as possible so that no one great power could by its individual action block 
Council decisions”; Norway, United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), Vol 12 (1945), 2: 
“in our opinion, the right of veto of the permanent members of the Security Council has been given far too wide a 
scope” 
1265 UNSC Verbatim Record (16 February 1946) UN Doc S/PV.23, 367. 
1266 UK, United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), Vol 11 (1945), 5: “The unanimity of 
the Great Powers was a hard fact but an inescapable one. The veto power was a means of preserving that unanimity, 
and far from being a menace to the small Powers, it was their essential safeguard. Without that unanimity, all 
countries, large and small, would fall victims to the establishment of gigantic rival blocs which might clash in some 
future Armageddon.” 
1267 UK, ibid 1. 
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cases* and then only when the exercise of that faculty may contribute to 
consolidate the. peace and to maintain security in the world--in other words that 
the Conference being as it is opposed to the proposed system has given its 
approval to it only because it believes that the great powers which have carried 
this war to a victorious culmination deserve such an exorbitant proof of 
confidence from the other countries associated in the United Nations 
Organization.1268 
 
Following a great deal of compromise, the right of a veto for the Great Powers was semantically 
altered to reflect a “categoric imperative of unanimity”1269  –   a shift took place from the right of 
the P5 members to a permanent seat and veto power, to the necessity for unanimity on the 
Council. In short, the veto was designed to ensure that the P5 Members acted in perpetual unison 
with respect to any non-procedural action taken under the aegis of the Council. As a result, the 
veto was seen “not as a question of privileges, but of using the present distribution of military 
and industrial power in the world for the maintenance of peace”1270 without which “the [United 
Nations] would break down in the event that enforcement action were undertaken against a 
Permanent Member.”1271 It was seen as imperative that the P5 Members with their sheer strength 
of military and populations, moved in a coordinated effort at every step; moreover, the P5 at the 
time represented “probably more than half the population of the world, and account has to be 
taken of that fact.”1272 Ultimately, the acceptance of the existence of the veto was not smooth, 
but pragmatically accepted;1273 the reality of the situation was that “if the veto . . . was removed 
the Powers responsible for Dumbarton Oaks Proposals would say they couldn't accept the 
decision and the inevitable alternative would be to drop the Proposals altogether”1274 meaning 
that the United Nations would never have come into existence. In the words of one commentator, 
“[t]he veto was the price we had to pay for the Charter. It was the price we had to pay for the 
cooperation of the Great Powers.”1275  
                                                 
1268 Colombia, United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), Vol 12 (1945), 3 [emphasis 
added]. 
1269 Peru, ibid 5. 
1270 US Secretary of State, quoted in Kanhaya R Gupta, Reform of the United Nations, Vol. 1 (Atlantic Publishers 
2007) 26. 
1271 P-5 statement, ibid. 
1272 UK, United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), Vol 11 (1945), 4  
1273 New Zealand, ibid 2, where discussions “start from the basis of the inevitability of the veto . . . We have to 
accept the veto in some form or there will be no international organisations, I regret that . . . We have to accept the 
decisions that have been made and which have clearly indicated time and time again the inevitability of the veto” 
1274 New Zealand, ibid 1.  
1275 Wilcox (n 1260) 55. 
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The veto was unabashedly part of a flawed system1276 and remains thus to this day. 
However, it is clear that the reason for the creation of the veto for the Council was not to ensure 
that the Great Powers were exalted or given a position further up a hierarchy or seen as senior 
board members, but to reflect the political, military and demographic realities of the world at the 
time of the establishment of the UN. Clearly, the geo-political landscape has changed drastically 
in the decades that have passed;1277 nonetheless, the reasoning and purpose behind the veto 
remains the same: to ensure that the P5 Members moved in unison towards the goal of 
maintaining international peace and security. Certainly, the veto was never intended to be “used 
capriciously and . . . the Soviet Delegate had told the press that the five great powers would 
rarely exercise the veto.”1278 
 
X.3.2 The veto record of the Council 
History, however, recounts a different story and since the creation of the United Nations, 191 
draft Council resolutions have been subject to veto;1279 of these, the vast preponderance overall 
have been cast by the USSR/Russian Federation1280, the very same P5 member that granted the 
above assurances. With the exception of two vetoes used by France and the UK in 1956,1281 no 
other State used its veto until 1970.1282 In fact, throughout the Cold War, the veto was frequently 
resorted to, almost exclusively by the USSR and the US in “a story of the pursuit of national 
                                                 
1276 UK, ibid 6: “If we tried to draft, in pure theory, a perfect Charter, perfectly logical, perfectly complete there is 
no doubt that many Delegates here would draft a better one than the one you are now asked to consider. The 
question is, what do we want to do? Do we want to draft here something which, at the end of our labors, I hope will 
be taken solemnly for signature to the plenary session- do we want them to sign something which is on paper 
theoretically satisfying, about the operation of which we must have some doubt - or do we want to sign something 
which we honestly believe will work within its limitations?” 
1277 eg the P5 members no longer represent half the world’s population; UN membership has grown from the 
original 51 States to 193; the P5 no longer represent the world’s largest economies or militaries. 
1278 United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), Vol 11 (1945), 5.  
1279 ‘Security Council Veto List, prepared and maintained by the Dag Hammarskjold Library’ <http://www.un.org/ 
depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml> accessed 16 December 2014. 
1280 90 vetoes cast as USSR, 11 as Russian Federation. 
1281 UNSC ‘Letter dated 29 October 1956 from the Representative of the United States of America, addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, concerning: ‘The Palestine Question: Steps for the Immediate Cessation of the 
Military Action of Israel in Egypt’ (30 October 1956) UN Doc S/3710; Letter dated 29 October 1956 from the 
Representative of the United States of America, addressed to the President of the Security Council, concerning: ‘The 
Palestine Question: Steps for the Immediate Cessation of the Military Action of Israel in Egypt’ (30 October 1956) 
UN Doc S/3713/Rev.1. 
1282 UNSC Draft Res (11 March 1970) UN Doc S/9696. 
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interests - even in the face of contrary world opinion and reasoned judicial decisions”1283 In the 
years 1945-1989, a total of 646 resolutions were adopted whilst the veto was exercised a total of 
162 times – therefore, almost one in five resolutions debated at the Council failed. This surely 
falls short of the standard expected by the delegates at San Francisco, who believed that 
 
the great powers can perform, a great service to the world if they demonstrate in 
practice that the special power of veto given to each and every one of them 
individually under this Charter will be used with restraint and in the interest of the 
United Nations as a whole. It might be put in a phrase with which most of us are 
familiar, “It is excellent to have a giant's strength but it is tyrannous to use it as a 
giant.”1284 
 
Deeper inspection of the use of veto relates unequivocally to interests unaffiliated with 
international peace and security, and in many cases central to the national interests of States : 
both the USA1285 and USSR1286 alike exercised their veto in the admission of numerous States to 
the UN “for no better reason than that . . . [a P5 Member] sees them as pawns in the cold 
war”;1287 the USSR used its veto to avoid action over its invasion of Afghanistan1288 and 
Czechoslovakia;1289 the US blocked resolutions against its own actions in Grenada1290 and 
Nicaragua;1291 and the UK blocked numerous resolutions criticising or threatening sanctions on 
South Africa.1292 Although the UN “was not meant to be a club in which [veto-holders] 
competed to admit [their] friends and to blackball candidates supported by [their] opponents,”1293 
                                                 
1283 Emma McClean, ‘Hard Evidence: who uses veto in the UN Security Council most often – and for what?” The 
Conversation (31 July 2014) <http://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-who-uses-veto-in-the-un-security-council-
most-often-and-for-what-29907> accessed 16 December 2014. 
1284 Australia, United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), Vol 11 (1945), 19-20  
1285 Vietnam (1975 and 1976), Angola (1976). 
1286 Italy (1952 and 1955), Libya (1952), Japan (1952 and 1955), Vietnam (1952, 1957 and 1958), Laos (1952), 
Cambodia (1952), Portugal (1955), Ireland (1955), Jordan (1955), Guatemala (1954) and Korea (1957 and 1958) 
amongst others. 
1287 UK, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 November 1961) UN Doc S/PV.985, ¶52. 
1288 UNSC Draft Res (6 January 1980) UN Doc S/13729. 
1289 UNSC Draft Res (22 August 1968) UN Doc S/8761. 
1290 UNSC Draft Res (27 October 1983) UN Doc S/16077/Rev.1. 
1291 UNSC Draft Res (28 October 1986) UN Doc S/18428; UNSC Draft Res (31 July 1986) UN Doc S/18250. 
1292 UNSC Draft Res (7 March 1988) UN Doc S/19585; UNSC Verbatim Record (8 March 1988) UN Doc 
S/PV.2797; UNSC Draft Res (19 February 1987) UN Doc S/18705; UNSC Draft Res (17 June 1986) UN Doc 
S/18163; UNSC Draft Res (23 May 1986) UN Doc S/18087/Rev.1; UNSC Draft Res (26 July 1985) UN Doc 
S/17354/Rev.1; UNSC Draft Res (31 August 1981) UN Doc 5558S/14664/Rev.2; UNSC Draft Res (26 October 
1977) UN Doc S/12312/Rev.1; UNSC Draft Res (26 October 1977) UN Doc S/12311/Rev.1; UNSC Draft Res (26 
October 1977) UN Doc S/12310/Rev.1; UNSC Draft Res (24 October 1974) UN Doc S/11543. 
1293 UK, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 November 1961) UN Doc S/PV.985, ¶52. 
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political and strategic alliances became central to the decisions of the Council when to use their 
veto. Violating the authority and entrusted guardianship upon which the veto was established, the 
Council’s veto record between the years 1945 and 1990 is a damning tale of the superiority of 
domestic foreign policy above the interests of international peace and security.  
Whilst the end of the Cold War heralded a new era in cooperation at the Council and a 
distinct decline in the number of vetoes used can be noted throughout the 1990s,1294 the number 
of vetoes being exercised have crept up since the turn of the century.1295 France and the UK last 
used their vetoes in 1989, prior to the post-Cold War period I am examining and France has even 
been active in its pursuit of less frequent recourse to the veto, advocating a return to the original 
principles underlying the purpose of the veto and calling for “the five permanent members of the 
Security Council voluntarily and collectively suspending their right to exercise the veto when 
mass atrocities are under consideration.”1296 As such, the sole users of the veto since 1990 have 
been the US, the Russian Federation and China; moreover, when the subjects of their veto usage 
is examined, it is highly evident that national interests lie at the heart of their objections.  
 
X.3.2.1 The US 
By far the subject of the most vetoes at the Council is the Palestinian Question, on which the US 
has exercised its veto rights no less than thirty times; almost half of these have taken place since 
1990.1297 Despite the recognition that the Palestinian Question poses a threat to the international 
peace by fellow P5 Members1298 the US most recently took the stance that a draft resolution 
                                                 
1294 Less vetoes were exercised in the entire decade 1990-1999 as in the two years 1989-9 alone: 9 vetoes versus 12, 
1 per year versus 6 per year. 
1295 In the 14 years since 2000 there have been 20 vetoes, an average of 1.5 per year. 
1296 France, UNGA Verbatim Record (7 November 2013) UN Doc A/68/PV.46, 28. 
1297 UNSC Draft Res (18 February 2011) UN Doc S/2011/24; UNSC Draft Res (14 June 2009) UN Doc S/2009/310; 
UNSC Draft Res (11 July 2008) UN Doc S/2008/447; UNSC Draft Res (12 January 2007) UN Doc S/2007/14; 
UNSC Draft Res (11 November 2006) UN Doc S/2006/878; UNSC Draft Res (13 July 2006) UN Doc S/2006/508; 
UNSC Draft Res (5 October 2004) UN Doc S/2004/783; UNSC Draft Res (21 April 2004) UN Doc S/2004/313; 
UNSC Draft Res (25 March 2004) UN Doc S/2004/240; UNSC Draft Res (14 October 2003) UN Doc S/2003/980; 
UNSC Draft Res (16 September 2003) UN Doc S/2003/891; UNSC Draft Res (20 December 2002) UN Doc 
S/2002/1385; UNSC Draft Res (30 June 2002) UN Doc S/2002/712; UNSC Draft Res (14-5 December 2001) UN 
Doc S/2001/1199; UNSC Draft Res (27-8 March 2001) UN Doc S/2001/270; UNSC Draft Res (25 February 1999) 
UN Doc S/1999/201; UNSC Draft Res (21 March 1997); UN Doc S/1997/241; UNSC Draft Res (7 March 1997) 
UN Doc S/1997/199; UNSC Draft Res (9 January 1997) UN Doc S/1997/18; UNSC Draft Res (17 May 1995) UN 
Doc S/1995/394; UNSC Draft Res (2 December 1994) UN Doc S/1994/1358; UNSC Draft Res (29 April 1993) UN 
Doc S/25693; UNSC Draft Res (31 May 1990) UN Doc S/21326. 
1298 UK, UNSC Verbatim Record (18 February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6484, 5: “The United Kingdom, France and 
Germany are seriously concerned about the current stalemate in the Middle East peace process. We each voted in 
favour of the draft Security Council resolution because our views on settlements, including in East Jerusalem, are 
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condemning settlements that they themselves recognise to be illegal under international law1299 
risks hardening the positions of both sides . . . could encourage the parties to stay out of 
negotiations and, if and when they did resume, to return to the Security Council whenever they 
reached an impasse”;1300 yet when discussing the situation in Syria, the US adamantly imposed 
the prerogative upon the Council that “[i]t is the Council’s responsibility to stop atrocities if we 
can and, at a minimum, to ensure that the perpetrators of atrocities are held accountable.”1301 
Indeed, one P5 Member has gone on record to state that “[a]s the principal organ responsible for 
the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council can and should 
continue to play an important role in resolving the question of Palestine, in promoting the Middle 
East peace process and in safeguarding the peace and security of that region.”1302 Moreover, it 
seemed hypocritical to cite as a reason for the use of its veto to block the adoption of S/2006/878 
a “characterization of Israeli military actions as excessive and disproportionate [which] 
constitutes a legal judgement [sic] that the Security Council would be ill-advised to make”1303 in 
light of the legislative role and norm-setting that the Council engaged in recently before in 
resolutions 1373, 1422 and 1540. The Council’s failure to adopt resolutions condemning the 
disproportionate violence perpetrated by Israeli forces “conveyed to Israel that it can continue to 
behave as though it were above international law . . . [and] conveyed to the Palestinian people 
that, with regard to their issue, the Security Council is not dealing with justice in the proper 
way.” 
 The intense and mutually beneficial relationship between Israel and the US is difficult to 
deny: for decades, the US leadership has highlighted the importance of Israel to the nation.1304 
                                                                                                                                                             
clear: they are illegal under international law, are an obstacle to peace and constitute a threat to a two-State 
solution.” 
1299 US, ibid 4. 
1300 ibid 4-5. 
1301 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7180, 4. 
1302 China, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 March 2001) UN Doc S/PV.4305, 4-5. 
1303 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (11 November 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5565, 2. 
1304 See eg Gerald Ford, ‘Remarks welcoming PM Rabin to USA’ (September 10 1974) <http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4701&st=Israel&st1=3> accessed 16 December 2014: “America must and will pursue 
friendship with all nations. But, this will never be done at the expense of America's commitment to Israel”; Jimmy 
Carter, ‘The President's News Conference’ (May 12 1977) <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7495> 
accessed 16 December 2014: “We have a special relationship with Israel. It's absolutely crucial that no one in our 
country or around the world ever doubt that our number one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right 
of Israel to exist, to exist permanently, and to exist in peace”; George Bush Sr., Address to the 46th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly (September 23 1991) <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20012> 
accessed 16 December 2014: “The friendship, the alliance between the United States and Israel is strong and solid, 
built upon a foundation of shared democratic values, of shared history and heritage, that sustains the life of our two 
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Israel also provides key strategic importance that, whilst historically providing a bastion against 
the USSR during the Cold War, 1305 remains integral to strategic cooperation and mutual security 
to this day. In fact, so close are the US and Israel, that the concept of damaging Israel or siding 
against it has been likened at the highest echelons of US government as tantamount to political 
suicide.1306 As a result, despite the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict repeatedly features on 
the agenda of the Council – which in itself underscores the importance, acuteness and urgency of 
the situation – only thirteen resolutions have been passed on the subject of the Israeli/Palestine 
conflict since 1990,1307 the last of which was in 2009; the US has vetoed more resolutions on the 
Palestine Question since 1990 than it has allowed to pass. At the root of the vetoes are claims 
that the resolutions are “lopsided and unbalanced”1308 despite assertions from fellow Council 
Members to the contrary1309 and the US’s own biased analysis of the situation in 2014. 1310 This 
                                                                                                                                                             
countries”; Barack Obama, ‘Remarks at the 2011 AIPAC Policy Conference’, (May 22 2011) 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/22/remarks-president-aipac-policy-conference-2011> 
accessed 16 December 2014: “I and my administration have made the security of Israel a priority. It’s why we’ve 
increased cooperation between our militaries to unprecedented levels. It’s why we’re making our most advanced 
technologies available to our Israeli allies. It’s why, despite tough fiscal times, we’ve increased foreign military 
financing to record levels. And that includes additional support –- beyond regular military aid -– for the Iron Dome 
anti-rocket system ... So make no mistake, we will maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge” [emphasis added]. 
1305 Stephen Wenne, ‘It has one of world’s best armies, but US may expect too much help in case of Soviet attack’ 
Christian Science Monitor (31 July 1981) <http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0731/073136.html> accessed 16 
December 2014: Ronald Reagan has stated that “only by full appreciation of the critical role the State of Israel plays 
in our strategic calculus . . . can we build the foundation for thwarting Moscow's designs on territories and resources 
vital to our security and our national well-being.” 
1306 Jimmy Carter, ‘Los Angeles, California Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Fundraising Dinner’ 
(October 22 1977) < http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6837> accessed 16 December 2014: “If I should ever 
hurt Israel, which I won't, I think a political suicide would almost automatically result, because it's not only our 
Jewish citizens who have this deep commitment to Israel but there's an overwhelming support throughout the Nation 
. . . [for] an unshakable partnership with Israel, an unshakable support of Israel--the only staunch and dependable 
major ally on which Israel can depend.” 
1307 UNSC Res 904 (23 September 1994) UN Doc S/RES/904; UNSC Res 1322 (7 October 2000) UN Doc 
S/RES/1322; UNSC Res 1397 (12 March 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1397; UNSC Res 1402 (29-30 March 2002) UN 
Doc S/RES/1402; UNSC Res 1403 (4 April 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1403; UNSC Res 1405 (19 April 2002) UN Doc 
S/RES/1405; UNSC Res 1435 (24 September 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1435; UNSC Res 1450 (13 December 2002) 
UN Doc S/RES/1450; UNSC Res 1515 (19 November 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1515; UNSC Res 1544 (19 May 2004) 
UN Doc S/RES/1544; UNSC Res 1624 (14 September 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1624; UNSC Res 1850 (16 December 
2008) UN Doc S/RES/1850; UNSC Res 1860 (8 January 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1860. 
1308 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (5 October 2004) UN Doc S/PV.5051, 2. See also, eg US, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(11 November 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5565, 2; US, UNSC Verbatim Record (25 March 2004) UN Doc S/PV.4934, 2; 
US, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 March 2001) UN Doc S/PV.4305, 5. 
1309 See, eg France, UNSC Verbatim Record (5 October 2004) UN Doc S/PV.5051, 4; Algeria, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (25 March 2004) UN Doc S/PV.4934, 4. 
1310 A seemingly one-sided condemnation of Gazan aggression was issued in January 2014. See, US, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (20 January 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7096, 17: “We condemn rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel and 
the attempt to kill civilians by placing a bomb on a public bus in Tel Aviv. We are also seriously concerned about 
the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, and urge all parties to cooperate in expanding access for people, goods 
and humanitarian supplies.” 
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is an unprecedented situation on the Council – never has a situation been the subject of so many 
vetoes by one State. 
The US – and the wider Council too – was eerily silent throughout the Israeli bombings 
in Gaza Strip in 2014, despite the “appalling”1311 toll, including the bombing of UNRWA 
schools “on six occasions”, where “almost 2,000 Palestinians have been killed, of whom 459 are 
children and 239 are women.”1312 The Council met no less than thirteen times in 2014 to discuss 
or remain seized of the situation in the Gaza Strip; nonetheless, only one Presidential Statement 
emerged. As the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has noted, “[s]hort-term geopolitical 
considerations and national interests, narrowly defined, have repeatedly taken precedence over 
intolerable human suffering and grave breaches of and long-term threats to international peace 
and security.”1313 
This was certainly true of the veto used by the US that led to the adoption of UNSC Res 
1422.1314 In its original incarnation of S/2002/712, the resolution extending the mandate of the 
UN Mission was blocked by the US due to “concerns on the question of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), in particular the need to ensure [their] national jurisdiction over [their] 
personnel and officials involved in United Nations peacekeeping and in coalition-of-the-willing 
operations.”1315 Despite lamentation by New Zealand that “[t]he fact that any permanent member 
can unilaterally decide to exercise its veto privilege to defeat the efforts of the other 14 members 
to extend the mandate of an agreed United Nations peacekeeping mission holds disturbing 
implications for the other 174 Members of the United Nations and for the entire world in 
general”,1316 UNSC Res 1422, accommodating the US demands for postponement of any 
investigation of peacekeeper personnel from a non-signatory State to the Rome Statute before the 
ICC was adopted unilaterally. Gone, too, were charades that the use of the veto was for anything 
other than national interests, contrary to the intended purpose of the veto: 
 
                                                 
1311 Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (18 August 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7243, 2. 
1312 ibid: “Civilians represent more than two thirds of that total. Some 10,000 – again, roughly a third of them 
children – have been injured. Sixty-four Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers, two Israeli civilians and one foreign 
national have reportedly been killed. A few dozen Israelis have been directly injured by rockets or shrapnel.” 
1313 Navi Pillay, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 August 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7247, 4. 
1314 UNSC Res 1422 (12 July 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1422. 
1315 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 June 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4563, 2. 
1316 New Zealand, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 July 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4568, 7. 
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it is clear that our veto of the draft resolution on the United Nations Mission in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) did not reflect rejection of peacekeeping in 
Bosnia. But it did reflect our frustration at our inability to convince our colleagues 
on the Security Council to take seriously our concerns about the legal exposure of 
our peacekeepers under the Rome Statute.1317 
 
The reason, then, for the US veto – far from the wholesome purposes of the principle of 
unanimity in the advancement or maintenance of peace and security – was, by its own admission, 
entirely one of self-preservation and non-subordination to the ICC. Simply put, as non-
signatories to the Rome Statute, they did not wish to have their “decisions second-guessed by a 
court whose jurisdiction [they] do not recognize.”1318 Whilst in domestic foreign policy national 
interest can be argued as paramount, the Council P5 are entrusted with responsibilities that 
extend beyond their domestic spheres and immediate situations of focus. As was noted by Cuba, 
the veto exercised against renewal of the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina had potentially far 
reaching consequences and “[t]he threat of the veto jeopardize[d] not only the existence of the 
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina; it also threaten[ed] the other 14 operations 
[at the time] deployed.”1319 Nonetheless, in the face of criticism and pressure from other P51320 
and non-permanent1321 Members, the US maintained its stance until the remainder of the Council 
acquiesced. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the US has not once exercised its veto in a manner 
consistent with the principles and spirit of the veto power granted by the Charter drafters at San 
Francisco. In fact, the use of the veto by the US has been exclusively in the pursuit of either its 
own national interests or the interests of arguably its closest ally, from which it “has never 
flinched from its commitment [towards] – a commitment which remains unshakeable.”1322 
Regrettably, the US appears to exemplify the criticism of veto by other States Member: “its use 
and the threat of its use operate as a procedural device when permanent members pursue their 
                                                 
1317 US, ibid 9. 
1318 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 June 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4563, 2. 
1319 Cuba, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 July 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4568 (Resumption 1), 15. 
1320 France, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 July 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4568, 11. 
1321 Iran, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 July 2002) UN Doc S/PV.4568, 15; Canada, ibid 3-4; New Zealand, ibid 7; 
Cuba, ibid (Resumption 1), 15. 
1322 Wenne (n 1305).  
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national interests, a process that affects both the working methods and the effectiveness of the 
Council in achieving its objective of enforcing international peace and security.”1323 
 
X.3.2.2 The Russian Federation and China 
Following the flurry of vetoes during the Cold War when the overwhelming number of vetoes 
exercised came from the USSR, the Russian Federation has exercised the veto eleven times since 
1990.1324 Whilst their first veto of financing for the mission in Cyprus had “no political basis of 
any kind . . . [and was] dictated solely by practical considerations of the Government of the 
Russian Federation concerning the way to develop further the expanding United Nations peace-
keeping operations and concerning, approaches to financing the expenditures for such 
operations”,1325 later uses of the veto were due to situations that were deemed “politically 
inadmissible.”1326 In fact both of these stances are incompatible with the intended purpose of the 
veto and a Russian veto over funding of a peacekeeping mission can be argued to embody the 
same national interests as the protection of peacekeepers, albeit without the international legal 
ramifications and potential abuse of an international treaty. Even more brazenly, as a party to the 
conflict in Georgia, the Russian Federation did not hesitate to use its veto to block the adoption 
of S/2009/310 on the subject, due to “its continued insistence on removing all references to 
Georgia’s territorial integrity in the draft resolution.”1327 As a result, UNMIG, established in 
1993, ceased to exist in 2009 – a prime example of the derogatory effect of national interests on 
the maintenance of international peace and security. 
 Of the three P5 members to have used the veto power since 1990, China has been the most 
sparing, having exercised its right to the veto a total of eight times since 1990.1328 More telling, 
                                                 
1323 Argentina, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 16. 
1324 UNSC Draft Res (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/2014/348; UNSC Draft Res (15 March 2014) UN Doc S/2014/189; 
UNSC Draft Res (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/2012/538; UNSC Draft Res (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/2012/77; 
UNSC Draft Res (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612; UNSC Draft Res (14 June 2009) UN Doc S/2009/310; 
UNSC Draft Res (11 July 2008) UN Doc S/2008/447; UNSC Draft Res (12 January 2007) UN Doc S/2007/14; 
UNSC Draft Res (21 April 2004) UN Doc S/2004/313; UNSC Draft Res (2 December 1994) UN Doc S/1994/1358; 
UNSC Draft Res (29 April 1993) UN Doc S/25693. 
1325 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (11 May 1993) UN Doc S/PV.3211, 4-5. This is supported by the passing of 
UNSC Res 831 (1993), which resolved the funding issue that Russia objected to earlier. 
1326 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (2 December 1994) UN Doc S/PV.3475, 10. 
1327 UK, UNSC Verbatim Record (15 June 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6143, 6. 
1328 UNSC Draft Res (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/2014/348; UNSC Draft Res (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/2012/538; 
UNSC Draft Res (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/2012/77.; UNSC Draft Res (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612; 
UNSC Draft Res (11 July 2008) UN Doc S/2008/447; UNSC Draft Res (12 January 2007) UN Doc S/2007/14; 
UNSC Draft Res (25 February 1999) UN Doc S/1999/201; UNSC Draft Res (9 January 1997) UN Doc S/1997/18. 
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perhaps, is the Sino-Russian regional cooperation on the Council that becomes evident upon 
examination of voting records. China has used its veto alongside Russia in six of these eight draft 
resolutions,1329 has abstained in one of Russia’s other vetoed draft resolutions1330 and has been 
supported by Russian abstention in another of its own,1331 suggesting that – in contrast to 
Western P5 Members of the Council – China and Russia appear far more closely aligned and 
willing to openly provide mutual support on the Council.1332 This is not, however, to say that 
national interest has not underscored some Chinese decisions at the Council: the Chinese veto of 
a 1999 draft resolution1333 that would have authorised “the attachment to MINUGUA of a group 
of 155 military observers”1334 was the direct result of Guatemalan recognition of Taiwanese 
independence and support for their readmission to the General Assembly,1335 a stance that China 
interpreted as “actions to infringe upon China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”1336 The 
observer attachment was later endorsed by the Council,1337 but not before Guatemala severely 
toned down its support for and interaction with Taiwan,1338 “thereby removing the obstacles to 
                                                 
1329 UNSC Draft Res (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/2014/348; UNSC Draft Res (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/2012/538; 
UNSC Draft Res (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/2012/77; UNSC Draft Res (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612; 
UNSC Draft Res (11 July 2008) UN Doc S/2008/447; UNSC Draft Res (12 January 2007) UN Doc S/2007/14. 
1330 UNSC Draft Res (2 December 1994) UN Doc S/1994/1358. 
1331 UNSC Draft Res (25 February 1999) UN Doc S/1999/201. 
1332 The UK has abstained on several resolutions concerning the Palestinian Question, objecting to the language or 
lean of the text, but has never used its veto to block their adoption. See eg UNSC Draft Res (5 October 2004) UN 
Doc S/2004/783; UNSC Draft Res (11 November 2006) UN Doc S/2006/878; UNSC Draft Res (27-8 March 2001) 
UN Doc S/2001/270. 
1333 UNSC Draft Res (7 March 1997) UN Doc S/1997/199. 
1334 ibid ¶1. 
1335 On December 29, 1996, a Taiwanese envoy attended the signing of peace accords in Guatemala City. Guatemala 
also voted consistently for the adoption of Taiwan as an item on the agenda of the General Assembly. See, eg 
UNGA ‘Provisional Agenda of the Fifty-first regular session of the General Assembly’ (19 July 1996) UN Doc 
A/51/150, ¶159. 
1336 China, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 January 1997) UN Doc S/PV.3730, 20. 
1337 UNSC Res 1094 (20 January 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1094. 
1338 Guatemala, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 January 1997) UN Doc S/PV.3732, 4: “the necessary measures to be 
taken to pursue the peace process with United Nations participation have been overcome.” 
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China’s support for the draft resolution.”1339 Similar situations have also befallen Macedonia1340 
and Haiti1341 over their links with the island. 
What is most interesting, however – particularly in contrast with the use of the veto by 
the US, which overwhelmingly seeks to protect the interests of the one State of Israel – is the 
self-declaration of Russia and China as protectors of State sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Whereas the US is highly partisan in its use of the veto towards a State, Sino-Russian voting 
records on the Council suggest that they use the veto in pursuit of the principle of non-
intervention. It is no coincidence that both P5 Members vote in unison against resolutions 
involving intervention in what they consider to be the domestic affairs of States, since both have 
proclaimed themselves quasi-guardians not only of the sovereignty of non-Council States 
Member of the UN but also of the purity of the meaning of the Charter. Certainly this appears to 
be the central theme that runs through the vast majority of the resolutions blocked by Russia and 
China in recent years on Myanmar,1342 Zimbabwe1343 and Syria.1344  
Both Russia and China have made clear their opposition to the abuse of power and 
derogation from the strict verse of the Charter. During discussions on draft resolution S/2008/447 
(2008), Russia was unequivocal in its condemnation of what it saw to be the expanding scope of 
Council action: 
 
                                                 
1339 China, ibid 3. 
1340 Although not explicitly stated in the records as forming the reason for the use of the veto by China, Macedonia’s 
agreement with Taiwan for direct economic aid and investments were alluded to in the Canadian representative’s 
speech. See, UNSC Verbatim Record (25 February 1999) UN Doc S/PV.3982, 7: “We believe that China’s decision, 
seemingly compelled by bilateral concerns unrelated to UNPREDEP, constitutes an unfortunate and inappropriate 
use of the veto. In this same light, we deeply regret that actions taken by the Government of the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia precipitated the bilateral dispute leading to the present situation.” These accusations were 
denied by China as “totally groundless”, ibid 9. 
1341 In both 1996 and 2007, resolutions relating to Haiti were jeopardised by links to Taiwan. Following an invitation 
to Taiwanese Vice-President Li Yuan-zu to attend the inauguration of former President René Préval on February 7 
1996, the Chinese only voted in favour of UNSC Res 1048 (1996) “[i]n view of the fact that the draft resolution 
before us has basically incorporated the amendments by the Chinese delegation”, China, UNSC Verbatim Record(29 
February 1996) UN Doc S/PV.3638, 12. In response to Haitian diplomatic ties with Taiwan, in adopting UNSC Res 
1743 (15 February 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1743, China agreed only to “an extension for a reasonable period, as an ad 
hoc arrangement, beyond the original six months”, UNSC Verbatim Record (15 February 2007) UN Doc 
S/PV.5631, at 3. 
1342 UNSC Draft Res (12 January 2007) UN Doc S/2007/14. 
1343 UNSC Draft Res (11 July 2008) UN Doc S/2008/447. 
1344 UNSC Draft Res (18 February 2011) UN Doc S/2011/24; UNSC Draft Res (4 October 2011) UN Doc 
S/2011/612; UNSC Draft Res (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/2012/77; UNSC Draft Res (19 July 2012) UN Doc 
S/2012/538; UNSC Draft Res (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/2014/348. 
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In the positions of a number of Council members, we have of late seen an 
increasingly obvious attempt to take the Council beyond its Charter prerogatives 
and beyond the maintenance of international peace and security. We believe such 
practices to be illegitimate and dangerous and apt to lead to a realignment of the 
entire United Nations system. The Russian Federation intends to continue to 
counter such trends, so that all States without exception will firmly comply with 
the Charter of the Organization.1345 
 
The situation in Myanmar, too, was deemed to be “mainly the internal affair of a sovereign State 
. . . [and did] not constitute a threat to international or regional peace and security”;1346 
accordingly, any Council involvement in the situation would “not only exceed the mandates of 
the Council, but also hinder discussions by other relevant agencies.”1347 Russia concurred, stating 
that it “believe[d] that the situation in that country does not pose any threat to international or 
regional peace. . . . [and] deem[ed] unacceptable any attempt to use the Security Council to 
discuss issues outside its purview.”1348 
 The situation in Syria, however, has been the crux of Sino-Russian veto cooperation in recent 
times, with a total of four draft resolutions “double-vetoed” in as many years.1349 In the aftermath 
of Council authority for military action in Libya1350 – from which Russia and China abstained – 
both disapproved of the manner and results of Council-mandated NATO action,1351 rendering 
them hesitant to support any similar authorization of action in Syria:1352 Yet the situation in Syria 
                                                 
1345 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (11 July 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5933. See, also, China, ibid 13: “the development 
of the situation in Zimbabwe to date has not gone beyond the realm of internal affairs. It does not constitute a threat 
to the world’s peace and security.” 
1346 China, UNSC Verbatim Record (12 January 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5619, 3. Thus, “China [held] that there is no 
need for the Security Council to get involved. Nor should it take action on the issue of Myanmar”, ibid  
1347 ibid. 
1348 Russia, ibid 6. 
1349 UNSC Draft Res (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/2014/348; UNSC Draft Res (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/2012/538; 
UNSC Draft Res (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/2012/77; UNSC Draft Res (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612. 
1350 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970. 
1351 See, eg Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, 4: “The situation in Syria cannot 
be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan experience. The international community is alarmed by 
statements that compliance with Security Council resolutions on Libya in the NATO interpretation is a model for the 
future actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility to protect. It is easy to see that today’s “Unified 
Protector” model could happen in Syria.”  
1352 Russia, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6810, 8: “The Russian delegation had very 
clearly and consistently explained that we simply cannot accept a document, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, that would open the way for the pressure of sanctions and later for external military involvement in 
Syrian domestic affairs”. See, also, China, ibid 13: “[S]overeign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs 
of other countries are the basic norms governing inter-State relations enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. 
China has no self-interest in the Syrian issue. We have consistently maintained that the future and fate of Syria 
should be independently decided by the Syrian people, rather than imposed by outside forces. We believe that the 
Syrian issue must be resolved through political means and that military means would achieve nothing” 
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continues to pose great suffering and danger to the people of Syria, lending credibility to charges 
made by other Council Members that “they have chosen to block efforts to achieve justice for the 
Syrian people.”1353 These allegations are difficult to negate when Syrian orders for weaponry 
from Russia are said to amount to $3.5bn1354 and Russia maintains a naval station in the Syrian 
port of Tartus; as such, Russian vetoes on Syria may not be as entirely morally based or 
defensive of international legal principles as they may first appear. 
Moreover, territorial integrity has not barred Russia from annexing Crimea in 2014, in a 
series of events that most recently culminated at the Council in a Russian veto of draft resolution 
S/2014/189 declaring illegal the contested shotgun referendum of March 16, 2014, and has led to 
several rounds of sanctions imposed by Japan, Canada, the EU and US.1355 At the core of the 
vetoed draft resolution was the “commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and 
territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.”1356 Numerous 
representatives pointed to the inviolable and non-derogable elements of the principles at its core,  
 
the fundamental principles and norms governing relations between States in the 
post-1945 world — obligations that form the core of the Charter of the United 
Nations — respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, the 
obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any State, the illegality of the acquisition of territory 
through the threat or use of force and the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful 
means.1357    
 
Nevertheless, despite the Council meeting no less than fourteen times1358 since the beginning of 
2014 to discuss the situation in the Ukraine, one resolution has been successfully passed 
                                                 
1353 UK, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7180, 7. See, also, Luxembourg, ibid 8; France, ibid 
15; US, ibid 4. 
1354 ‘Why Russia is standing by Syria’s Assad’, BBC News (London, 15 June 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-europe-18462813> accessed 16 December 2014. 
1355 Both the EU and the US have blacklisted individuals, businesses, and the State’s finance, energy and arms 
sectors. France recently cancelled an arms deal with Russia. See, eg, ‘How far do EU-US sanctions go?’ BBC News 
(5 September 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28400218> accessed 16 December 2014; Dan 
Lamothe, ‘France backs off sending Minstral warship to Russia in $1.7 billion deal’ Washington Post (Washington 
DC, 3 September 2014) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/09/03/france-backs-off-
sending-mistral-warship-to-russia-in-1-7-billion-deal> accessed 16 December 2014. 
1356 UNSC Draft Res (15 March 2014) UN Doc S/2014/189. 
1357 Australia, UNSC Verbatim Record (15 March 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7138, 9. See, also, Nigeria, ibid 
1358 UNSC Verbatim Record (28 August 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7253; UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August 2014) UN 
Doc S/PV.7239; UNSC Verbatim Record (21 July 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7221; UNSC Verbatim Record (18 July 
2014) UN Doc S/PV.7219; UNSC Verbatim Record (24 June 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7205; UNSC Verbatim Record 
(28 May 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7185; UNSC Verbatim Record (29 April 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7165; UNSC Verbatim 
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condemning the downing of flight MH370 in Ukrainian territory,1359 while the other has been 
vetoed by Russia. Meanwhile, a pro-Russian Prime Minister has been installed, a Treaty signed 
on March 18 to initiate Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation and Ukrainian Armed 
Forces have been evicted from their bases. Furthermore, the recognition of the Republic of 
Crimea and Sevastopol as federal subjects of Russia by Syria1360 only serves to fuel allegations 
of national interests at the heart of the use of the veto in the Syrian conflict. Nonetheless, whist 
this reflects poorly on Russia at the international level, it has not impacted as greatly on its work 
at the Council as the US stance towards Israel; whilst not an ideal role model of a Council 
Member, Russia’s disparity between its stance on the Council and its political impact outside of 
the UN is perhaps an example of the dual roles that P5 members are required to play and 
highlights that there should be a disconnect between the role of a P5 Member when dealing with 
Council business and when dealing as a sovereign State in its domestic and foreign policy. 
 China and Russia maintain that their interest in using the veto strictly complies with the letter 
of the Charter provisions; their insistence on the territorial integrity of States and the prohibition 
of extending the scope of the Council to include elements within the definition of peace and 
security is an admirable principle to maintain, which supports other components of the rule of 
law, such as Separation of Powers and Transparency. However, their actions do not always 
comply with the standards that they set out to maintain; accusations of political bias have been 
exchanged from both pro-interventionist1361 and pro-sovereignty1362 camps, but Russia and China 
remain – on paper and at the Council, at least – firm in their resolve to ensure territorial integrity 
and sovereignty in the majority of their uses of the veto. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Record (16 April 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7157; UNSC Verbatim Record (19 March 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7144; UNSC 
Verbatim Record (15 March 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7138; UNSC Verbatim Record (13 March 2014) UN Doc 
S/PV.7134; UNSC Verbatim Record (10 March 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7131; UNSC Verbatim Record (3 March 
2014) UN Doc S/PV.7125; UNSC Verbatim Record (1 March 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7124; UNSC Verbatim Record 
(28 February 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7123. 
1359 UNSC Res 2166 (21 July 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2166. 
1360 Matthew Rosenburg, ‘Breaking With the West, Afghan Leader Supports Russia’s Annexation of Crimea’, New 
York Times (New York, 23 March 2014) < http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/world/asia/breaking-with-the-west-
afghan-leader-supports-russias-annexation-of-crimea.html?_r=0> accessed 16 December 2014. 
1361 France, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6810, 3: It is now clear that Russia merely wants 
to win time for the Syrian regime to crush the opposition”; UK, ibid 3: China and Russia “have chosen to put their 
national interests ahead of the lives of millions of Syrians.” 
1362 Russia, ibid 8: “These Pharisees have been pushing their own geopolitical intentions, which have nothing in 
common with the legitimate interests of the Syrian people.” 
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X.3.2.3 Efforts to reform the use of the veto 
 
The veto power, which guarantees the dominance of the five permanent members, 
has to be re-examined. It is our view that the veto power has now become 
untenable and anachronistic. If we need to accept some kind of weighting in terms 
of asymmetries within the Council, we cannot accept a situation in which one, 
two or three in the Council are more powerful than the rest of the membership of 
the United Nations.1363 
 
Efforts to regulate the use of the veto have traditionally fallen within the framework of the 
general reform of the Council.1364 Throughout discussions “the veto continued to come under 
criticism, with many delegations emphasizing the need to either abolish it or limit its use.”1365 In 
the aftermath of the Cold War, the veto was not exercised for several years, leading to its 
designation as a “power . . . instituted in response to realities and situations that no longer 
obtain.”1366 Proposals by UN Member States for veto reform included subjects of debate where 
the veto could be prohibited, such as the voluntary abolition of the veto when dealing with the 
election of the Secretary-General of the UN1367 and matters of reform.1368 There were numerous 
ideas, also, with respect to amendments to the practice of veto-usage, in essence to avoid the 
                                                 
1363 Malaysia, UNGA Verbatim Record (23 November 1993) UN Doc A/48/PV.61, 10. 
1364 See, eg UNGA ‘Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and 
Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council’ (1 January 
2004) UN Doc A/58/47, ¶14: “Members of the Working Group also agreed to use as a basis for their exchange of 
views specific topics proposed by the Bureau. Those topics were the size of an enlarged Security Council; the 
question of regional representation; criteria for membership; the relationship between the General Assembly and the 
Security Council; accountability; and the use of the veto” [emphasis added]. 
1365 ibid ¶12. See, eg Canada, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 11: 
“The Security Council would also benefit from a serious consideration of the use of the veto. We all know the 
inhibiting effect that the veto — or even the threat of the veto — can have on Council deliberations”; Vietnam, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968, 11: “My delegation and the majority of Member 
States believe that, pending their eventual elimination, vetoes should be confined to matters truly appropriate for 
consideration under [Chapter VII]” [emphasis added]; Cuba, ibid 33: “The Movement also reiterates the need to 
reform and democratize the decision-making processes of the Council, including limiting and curtailing the use of 
the veto, with a view to its eventual elimination” [emphasis added]; Egypt, ibid (Resumption 1), 3: “The working 
methods of the Council will not be reformed unless we effectively address the misuse of the right of veto and take 
the necessary measures to restrict and rationalize its use until it is eliminated altogether” [emphasis added]; Syria, 
UNGA Verbatim Record (23 November 1993) UN Doc A/48/PV.61, 2, “we must abolish the right of veto if 
possible or, at least, restrict its use.” 
1366 Syria, UNGA Verbatim Record (23 November 1993) UN Doc A/48/PV.61, 2. See also, Iran, UNGA Verbatim 
Record (24 November 1993) UN Doc A/48/PV.64, 2 (1993): “This procedure, introduced by the victorious Powers 
in 1945, has lost its raison d’être as a consequence of the dramatic changes in international relations. The veto 
power, therefore, should be abolished and replaced by a democratic decision-making procedure.” 
1367 Chile, ibid 4. 
1368 New Zealand, UNGA Verbatim Record (24 November 1993) UN Doc A/48/PV.64, 9: “We are opposed to the 
idea of vetoes in the Council, and we are equally opposed to vetoes on reform.” 
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maintenance of international peace and security from being held “hostage to the dictates of one 
State that has the power to veto its resolutions whenever it has to”;1369 proposals included the 
requirement of two P5 members for the exercise of the veto1370 or the “granting to the General 
Assembly or to the enlarged Security Council, specially expanded for such cases, of the right to 
overrule the veto by qualified majority if the veto is invoked by only one permanent member of 
the Security Council.”1371 States generally took the view that, although “each Member State has 
to protect its national objectives and interests, this approach needs to include an appreciation for 
the broader interests of the United Nations and of the general membership”1372 and that equitable 
participation was central to reform of the veto.1373 
 Nonetheless, the situation today remains the same as over two decades ago: “reform of 
the veto power is not viable.”1374 There has been recognition on the part of States as early as 
1993 during General Assembly debates that “[t]he cases in which recourse was made to the veto 
have demonstrated that it has been used, in most cases, not in the service of principles, but in the 
service of special interests.”1375 This is as true today as it was in 1993, as shown in the analysis 
of the veto usage by Russia, China and the US. The establishment of an Open-ended Working 
Group on Equitable participation1376 has done little in the way of improving the situation; despite 
annual reports for a decade,1377 the Working Group’s functions and efforts have trailed off with 
                                                 
1369 Libya, UNGA Verbatim Record (23 November 1993) UN Doc A/48/PV.62, 10. 
1370 Belize, UNGA Verbatim Record (24 November 1993) UN Doc A/48/PV.64, 12: “the suggestion that at least two 
permanent members must agree to the exercise of the veto has some merit.” 
1371 Ukraine, ibid 16. 
1372 Singapore, UNGA Verbatim Record (23 November 1993) UN Doc A/48/PV.61, 6. 
1373 See, eg Vietnam, UNGA Verbatim Record (23 November 1993) UN Doc A/48/PV.62, 2; Indonesia, ibid 4; 
Argentina, ibid 15; Portugal, UNGA Verbatim Record (24 November 1993) UN Doc A/48/PV.64, 19; Nigeria, ibid 
19; Spain, ibid 27. 
1374 Chile, UNGA Verbatim Record (23 November 1993) UN Doc A/48/PV.61, 3. 
1375 Libya, UNGA Verbatim Record (23 November 1993) UN Doc A/48/PV.62, 10. 
1376 UNGA Res 48/26 (3 December 1993) UN Doc A/RES/48/26, ¶1 established the Open-ended Working Group on 
the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other 
Matters related to the Security Council. 
1377 UNGA ‘Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase 
in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council’ (2 September 1994) 
UN Doc A/48/47; UNGA ‘Letter dated 15 September 1995 from the Permanent Representatives of Finland and 
Thailand to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly’ (18 September 1995) UN Doc 
A/49/965, Annex; UNGA ‘Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation 
on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council’ (13 
September 1996) UN Doc A/50/47; UNGA ‘Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable 
Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security 
Council’ (8 January 1997) UN Doc A/51/47; UNGA ‘Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of 
Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to 
the Security Council’ (24 August 1998) UN Doc A/52/47; UNGA ‘Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the 
246 
 
the last report in 2008.1378 The question of equitable representation on and increase in the 
membership of the Council has been included on every Assembly agenda since well before the 
establishment of the Working Group,1379 yet any change on the Council composition has yet to 
be achieved. Despite forming a key element of UN reform, the Council has been a 
disappointingly stationary subject of discussion with no action having been taken. This should 
come as no surprise, however, against the backdrop of the inclusion of the veto itself in 1945, 
when the entire organisation of the United Nations risked being derailed as a result of the 
loggerheads reached over the inclusion of the veto,1380 with the P5 adamant on its inclusion and a 
number of States opposing it, as discussed previously. 
 
X.4 Conclusions 
This section has shown that there has been a clear pattern of inequitable participation in the 
decision-making process on the Council, from the apparent ostracism of States that hold 
entitlement to participate in discussions and debates to the use of the veto in denying the passing 
of resolutions for national interests of the P5 members; contrastingly, there has been little 
                                                                                                                                                             
Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters 
related to the Security Council’ (5 August 1999) UN Doc A/53/47; UNGA ‘Report of the Open-ended Working 
Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and 
Other Matters related to the Security Council’ (25 July 2000) UN Doc A/54/47; UNGA ‘Report of the Open-ended 
Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security 
Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council’ (March 15 2001) UN Doc A/55/47; UNGA ‘Report of 
the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of 
the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council’ (March 18 2002) UN Doc A/56/47; UNGA 
‘Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the 
Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council’ (July 3 2003) UN Doc 
A/57/47; UNGA ‘Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and 
Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council’ (1  January 
2004) UN Doc A/58/47; UNGA ‘Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable 
Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security 
Council’ (September 2007) UN Doc A/61/47 ; UNGA ‘Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question 
of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to 
the Security Council’ (9 October 2008) UN Doc A/62/47. 
1378 A/62/47 (2008) ibid. 
1379 Eg UNGA ‘Agenda of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly’ (18 September 1992) UN Doc 
A/47/251, ¶40; UNGA ‘Agenda of the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly’ (20 September 1991) UN Doc 
A/46/251, ¶38; UNGA ‘Agenda of the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly’ (21 September 1990) UN Doc 
A/45/251, ¶41. 
1380 Tom Connally, My Name is Tom Connally (Thomas Y Crowell 1954) 282-3: “You may go home from San 
Francisco – if you wish . . . and report that you have defeated the veto . . . But you can also say, ‘We tore up the 
Charter.’ At that point, I sweepingly ripped the Charter draft in my hands to shreds and flung the scraps upon the 
table.” See also, Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s insistence that the US “Government would not remain there a day 
without retaining its veto power” in Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the UN 
(Yale UP 1997) 126. 
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activity in the way of reform of the Council due to a combination of confusion as to the correct 
path towards reform, failure to follow verbal acknowledgements and pledges with action and the 
inevitable impact of domestic interests of the P5 members on the reform process. As a result, this 
component of the rule of law is one of the poorest complied with by the Council and, moreover, 
there seems to be little appetite for or signs of improvement on the horizon. In direct opposition 
to the intended purpose of the veto, domestic interests continue to reign supreme for the US, 
Russia and China, which have exercised their right of veto six times since 2010 alone.1381 
France’s proposal that the veto be voluntarily suspended by P5 members when the Council is 
debating humanitarian matters has not been adopted and despite grave situations in Syria and the 
Occupied Arab Territories, there have been numerous vetoes cast by China and the Russian 
Federation, and the US respectively. The efforts on the part of the UK and France to move away 
or limit the use of vetoes have been undermined by the continued abuse of the power by the US, 
Russia and China. 
 Expansion of the Council has also stagnated. Despite several rounds of reform talks and 
numerous plans put forward by groups of States and individual States, none have come to 
fruition. Although the P5, which ultimately must decide to endorse the expansion of the Council 
through a Charter amendment as per article 108,1382 appears to support the expansion of the 
Council in word but not in deed; stumbling blocks of the extent of power to be granted as well as 
the number of new seats to be created have meant that the Council has remained as unchanged 
on paper as 1965, when the number of non-permanent seats were last expanded,1383 and in 
practice since 1991, when the USSR notified the UN that the Russian Federation was its 
designated successor.1384 As the world has changed around the Council, the constituent 
                                                 
1381 UNSC Draft Res (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/2014/348; UNSC Draft Res (15 March 2014) UN Doc S/2014/189; 
UNSC Draft Res (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/2012/538; UNSC Draft Res (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/2012/77; 
UNSC Draft Res (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612; UNSC Draft Res (18 February 2011) UN Doc S/2011/24. 
1382 Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have 
been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent 
members of the Security Council. 
1383 UNGA Res 1991A (XVIII) (1963) UN Doc A/RES/17/1991A 
1384 President of the Russian Federation, Letter to the Secretary-General from the President of the Russian 
Federation (24 December 1991) UN Doc 1991/RUSSIA, 1: “the membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics in the United Nations, including the Security Council and all other organs and organizations of the United 
Nations system is being continued by the Russian Federation (RSFSR) with the support of the countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. In this connection, I request that the name ‘Russian Federation’ should be 
used in the United Nations in place of the name [‘USSR’]. The Russian Federation maintains full responsibility for 
all the rights and obligations of the USSR under the Charter of the United Nations, including financial obligations.” 
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permanent members have remained the same, undermining the legitimacy and relevance of the 
Council in the modern world.  
Security Council reform will, once again, be on the agenda during the 69th General 
Assembly Session of 2014-15,1385 since the “need to reform the Security Council is urgent, as 
reflected in the 2005 World Summit Outcome.”1386 Indeed, as referred to by the President of the 
General Assembly, urgent reform of the Council has been highlighted almost a decade ago1387 
and the Open-Ended Working Group considering Council reform has been in operation since 
1993;1388 yet little, if anything, has been done. In over 20 years, despite reports by the Open-
ended working group,1389 an Austrian Initiative,1390 the 2005 World Summit1391 and numerous 
Member State groups in support of expansion or reform of the veto and other elements of 
equitable participation,1392 there has been no reform of the Council on this front. In fact, in 
contrast to the environment under which reform of the Council was initially tabled in 1993, 
where the veto had not been used for 3 years, for several years the veto has been regularly made 
use of in relation, as shown, to overtly national interest matters. 
Similarly, Member States’ criticism in 1993 is as relevant today with respect to the make-
up of the Council. “It is . . . essential that the Security Council, which acts on behalf of all the 
Members of the Organization, pursuant to Article 24 of the Charter, should have a membership 
that reflects adequately the increase in the membership of the Organization, and also its regional, 
political, cultural and religious diversity”;1393 the current Council reflected none of these in 1993 
and presents an even more skewed representation of the geo-political situation today. The 
Council – and more importantly, the P5 Members – have acknowledged that reform of the 
composition of the Council is necessary; the General Assembly has also identified that the 
                                                 
1385 UNGA ‘Provisional agenda of the sixty-ninth regular session of the General Assembly’ (18 July 2014) UN Doc 
A/69/150, ¶122. UN reform is an agenda item that has been carried over from previous years to little avail. 
1386 UNGA ‘Opening address by the President at the opening of the 69th session’ (16 September 2014) 
<http://www.un.org/pga/statements/opening-69th-session> accessed 16 December 2014. 
1387 UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, ¶153. 
1388 UNGA Res 48/26 (3 December 1993) UN Doc A/RES/48/26, ¶1. 
1389 2004-2008 (n 1377) 
1390 Chesterman (n 3). 
1391 UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1. 
1392 South Africa, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 November 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6870, 16: “The past few years have 
seen greater demands by the global community for democracy, transparency and accountability. That has translated 
into positive changes in many Member States. The Security Council cannot remain immune to such complexities of 
a changing international environment. To remain relevant, the reform of the Council in both its composition and its 
working methods remain one of the key priorities of the United Nations.” 
1393 Chile, UNGA Verbatim Record (23 November 1993) UN Doc A/48/PV.61, 3. 
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situation should be resolved urgently. Nonetheless, these oral intentions have not translated into 
action by either party and the Council remains, even omitting the existence of the veto as an 
inherent element of the UN Charter, an imbalanced and inequitable decision-making forum that 
has a great way to go before reaching any adequate standard of the rule of law. 
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CHAPTER XI 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
XI.1 Introduction 
Accountability was identified by the Secretary-General as one of the integral components of the 
rule law1394 and provides mechanisms for safeguarding all standards of the rule of law. It requires 
detailed reporting and explanation1395 as well as a mechanism to which the Council is 
answerable. Where Council decisions are poorly explained, arbitrarily taken, obscured behind 
closed door meetings or otherwise taken in contravention of the rule of law, there can be no 
accountability; similarly, where the Council appears to be acting legibus solitus, there is an even 
greater need for an oversight body for the Council to bring it in line with its obligations to abide 
by the rule of law. Accountability for the Council would, therefore, involve the existence of a 
structure or entity to combat impunity and deliver consequences for transgressions and violations 
of the Charter and its meaning. 
As the overarching document that governs the behaviour of the Council and sibling 
organs, the Charter is the appropriate starting point when searching for measures of 
accountability for the Council; however, the Charter is vague in its stipulations for this. Sparse 
reference to examples of accountability include Article 24(3) of the UN Charter, which specifies 
that the Council is to “submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General 
Assembly for its consideration”;1396 these reports “shall include an account of the measures that 
the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.”1397 
Whilst the Assembly is obliged to “receive and consider”1398 these reports, the Charter is unclear 
on the precise reasoning behind this practice and gives no indication of any Assembly capacity 
                                                 
1394 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict 
Societies’ (2004) UN Doc S/2004/616, ¶6. 
1395 See eg Argentina, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 16: “[A]n 
assessment should be included in the annual report prepared by the Council and submitted to the General Assembly. 
That report, which is currently of a narrative character, must be made more analytical and explanatory as regards 
positions on the various issues being dealt with by the Council. It must also include the reasons for the Council’s 
refraining from certain actions and for its inability to take decisive action in certain situations, in particular those 
related to the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, the report must include explanations for 
the Council’s various responses vis-à-vis its resolutions, presidential and press statements and reports, including the 
criteria followed by the Council in deciding how to respond.” 
1396 UN Charter (1945) art 24(3). 
1397 ibid art 15(1). 
1398 ibid. 
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or obligation to monitor the Council’s behaviour. In fact, the Charter makes explicit reference to 
the capacity of the Council to “adopt its own rules of procedure”,1399 including the method and 
content of the reports to the Assembly. In the absence of Charter guidance on accountability, it is 
necessary to examine the powers of other internal organs to review the Council decision-making 
process, including the Council itself. 
 
XI.2 Self-regulation 
Whilst the Council has shown an increased willingness to promote accountability in its work 
promoting the rule of law at the domestic level,1400 there has been much less discussion on 
turning the focus inwards and the Council itself abiding by any mechanisms for accountability 
for its actions. Discussions have taken place sporadically1401 but despite the recognition that “it is 
high time to enhance the Security Council’s accountability to the wider membership”1402 no 
progress has been made in recent years. Of the seven meetings in 2013 on Presidential Note 
S/2010/507 providing guidance in “efforts to enhance the efficiency and transparency of the 
Council’s work”1403 six have been closed meetings1404 to which the wider UN audience and 
global population are not privy; similarly, in 2014, there have been almost as many closed 
meetings as open – four of ten.1405 Incongruously, one of the matters contained in the document 
discussed behind closed doors was the Council’s “commitment to increase recourse to open 
meetings,”1406 a matter that four years later the organ has trouble implementing even as the 
                                                 
1399 ibid art 30. 
1400 See, eg UNSC ‘Letter dated 7 June 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General’ (7 June 2006) UN Doc S/2006/367; UNSC Presidential Statement 28 (2006) UN 
Doc S/PRST/2006/28; UNSC Presidential Statement 11 (2010) UN Doc S/PRST/2010/11; USA, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (19 January 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6705, 9: “We have supported those international accountability 
mechanisms across the globe, from the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to commissions of 
inquiry in places like Kyrgyzstan, Côte d’Ivoire and Libya.” 
1401 eg UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (26 July 2010) UN Doc S/2010/507; UNSC Verbatim 
Record (26 November 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6870; UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (5 June 
2012) UN Doc S/2012/402. 
1402 Netherlands, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 November 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6870 (Resumption 1), 5. 
1403 UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (26 July 2010) UN Doc S/2010/507, ¶1. 
1404 UNSC Official Communiqué (31 January 2013) UN Doc S/PV.6914; UNSC Official Communiqué (28 February 
2013) UN Doc S/PV.6927; UNSC Official Communiqué (30 April 2013) UN Doc S/PV.6958; UNSC Official 
Communiqué (30 May 2013) UN Doc S/PV.6972; UNSC Official Communiqué (27 June 2013) UN Doc 
S/PV.6992; UNSC Official Communiqué (29 August 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7027. 
1405 UNSC Official Communiqué (27 February 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7122; UNSC Official Communiqué (31 March 
2014) UN Doc S/PV.7151; UNSC Official Communiqué (30 April 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7166; UNSC Official 
Communiqué (29 May 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7189. 
1406 UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (26 July 2010) UN Doc S/2010/507, ¶28. 
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President confirms the need for “more effective use . . . of public meetings, informal interactive 
dialogues and Arria-formula meetings.”1407 As discussed earlier, transparency “constitute[s] a 
‘prerequisite’ of accountability”1408 
 Efforts to reform the Council from an accountability perspective have hitherto failed in 
gaining notable traction. Despite recognition that “[t]ransparency, accountability and coherence 
are key elements that the Security Council should observe in all its activities, approaches and 
procedures”1409 and that  “decisions on behalf of the membership of the United Nations are more 
effective when they are taken in a transparent, inclusive and accountable manner,”1410 any active 
movement in this direction has been almost static. For example, the initiative pioneered by Brazil 
of “interaction with the broader membership through briefings, not only at the beginning of each 
presidency, but also at the conclusion . . . [was] see[n] as a voluntary exercise in accountability . . 
. which has, unfortunately, not been replicated by other members of the Council.”1411 The most 
notable recent attempt for internal Council accountability reform came in the shape of a draft 
General Assembly resolution1412 proposed by the Small Five Group1413 that laid “out a clear road 
map . . . for improving the Council’s transparency, accountability, distribution of tasks and 
fulfilment of responsibilities through a stronger use of [UN] legal and political instruments”;1414 
however, “opposition to the proposal was fierce, particularly on the part of the five permanent 
members . . . [and] procedural legalism, which was unjustified but institutionally legitimate . . . 
forced [the withdrawal of] the draft resolution.”1415 This simple five page document contained 
                                                 
1407 UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (28 August 2013) UN Doc S/2013/515, ¶2(a). 
1408 Tzanakopoulos (n 17) 392. 
1409 Guatemala, UNSC Verbatim Record (29 October 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7052, 7. See also, eg South Africa, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (30 November 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6672, 11, which “support[s] the call for formalizing 
the Council’s rules of procedure in order to improve its transparency and accountability”; Brazil, ibid 16, which 
“highlight[ed] the importance of enhanced procedures that could help to monitor and assess the manner in which the 
resolutions adopted by the Council are interpreted and implemented, in particular those that authorize the use of 
force”; Senegal, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 November 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6870 (Resumption 1), 10, where 
“[r]egarding the Council’s working methods, Africa favours a more accessible, democratic, representative, 
accountable, transparent and effective Security Council that is and must be able to respond in a timely manner.” 
1410 Switzerland, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 November 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6672, 18. 
1411 Brazil, ibid. 
1412 UNGA Draft Res (15 May 2012) UN Doc A/66/L.42/Rev.2. 
1413 Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland. 
1414 Costa Rica, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 November 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6870 (Resumption 1), 4. 
1415 ibid. 
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recommendations for improved relationship with the Assembly,1416 increased input from 
Member States1417 and most importantly, pivotal accountability elements such as  
 
[e]xplaining the reasons for resorting to a veto or declaring its intention to do so, 
in particular with regard to its consistency with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law. A copy of the 
explanation should be circulated as a separate Security Council document to all 
members of the Organization.1418 
 
The rejection, however, signalled the start of another initiative, calling for increased 
accountability. Founded in May 2013, the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group 
“is a cross-regional group of 22 States aiming at enhancing the effectiveness of the Security 
Council through the improvement of its working methods.”1419 The group does not fall within the 
traditional school of Council reform – it assumes the Council’s continuation in its present 
composition – but attempts to find pragmatic methods of increasing elements related to Council 
accountability and “to strengthen the responsibility, coherence and transparency of the Security 
Council.”1420 As a relatively new initiative, it is difficult to measure its efficacy and until now it 
has limited itself to supporting initiatives taken by existing mechanisms rather than making 
concrete recommendations itself.1421  
                                                 
1416 UNGA Draft Res (15 May 2012) UN Doc A/66/L.42/Rev.2, ¶1 ff. 
1417 ibid ¶8. 
1418 ibid ¶19 [emphasis added]. This self-imposed imperative, though not a panacea to the Council’s lack of 
adherence to the rule of law in many cases, would be a veritable leap in the direction of accountability; the veto is 
arguably the most divisive power at the discretion of any Council Member and, as seen in Chapter X has led to 
accusations of abuse and arbitrary usage by P5 Members. Moreover, the components of transparency and 
accountability are interlinked and thus, in light of my findings in Chapter X, it is perhaps unsurprising that these 
Council Members were against the initiative of more transparency and accountability for their use of the veto. 
1419 UNSC ‘Letter dated 19 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (23 September 2013) UN Doc S/2013/568, 1. Its 
members are Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, 
Maldives, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tanzania and Uruguay. 
1420 Luxembourg, UNSC Verbatim Record (29 October 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7052, 4. 
1421 See, eg UNSC ‘Letter dated 19 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (23 September 2013) UN Doc S/2013/568, 1: “ACT 
commends all members of the Informal Working Group for their work leading to the adoption on 28 August of the 
aforementioned presidential note on enhancing efficiency and transparency as well as on the interaction and 
dialogue with non-Security Council members and bodies.” 
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Externally-facing, too, the Council has made hesitant efforts to ensure accountability to 
individuals affected by its decisions. The Ombudsperson Office1422 appears to be the sole attempt 
by the Council to self-regulate on any notable level; yet, this is limited in its scope – focusing 
only on the list of Al-Qaeda targeted sanctions list.1423 There have been no efforts to instigate 
similar processes for other sanctions regimes, which led to criticism by the Ombudsperson 
herself in the most recent discussion on Council reform that “it remains a procedure applicable 
only in the context of one targeted sanctions regime.”1424 Aside from the lack of judicial 
review1425 in the appointment of the Ombudsperson1426 and transparency in disclosure of the 
reasoning behind a decision,1427 the Office of the Ombudsperson has no powers of 
recommendation to maintain or remove individuals from the sanctions list and the Council is in 
no way answerable to it; rather, the Ombudsperson’s mandate is curtailed to preparing a 
“Comprehensive Report that will exclusively . . . [b]ased on an analysis of all the information 
available . . lay out for the [Al-Qaeda Sanctions] Committee the principal arguments concerning 
the delisting request.”1428 Indeed, the decision is taken by the Committee – which itself monitors 
                                                 
1422 Established under UNSC Res 1904 (17 December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1904. See earlier discussion of the 
Ombudsperson in III.5.3.1. 
1423 UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267. 
1424 Ms Prost, UNSC Verbatim Record (23 October 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7285, 2. ibid: “The ramifications of this, 
given the requirements of Article I of the Charter of the United Nations, in terms of international law and human 
rights obligations, is evidently a matter for the consideration of the Security Council and of States . . . [O]ther 
regimes benefit from the focal point mechanism . . . [b]ut the law is clear that, even with improvements, the focal 
point mechanism, by its very nature and structure, does not have the fundamental characteristics necessary to serve 
as an independent review mechanism or to deliver an effective remedy.” 
1425 Both in terms of the process of appointing an Ombudsperson and the function of the Office of the 
Ombudsperson. 
1426 UNSC Res 1904 (17 December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1904, ¶20: The Council “requests the Secretary-General, 
in close consultation with the [Al-Qaeda Sanctions] Committee, to appoint an eminent individual of high moral 
character, impartiality and integrity with high qualifications and experience in relevant fields, such as legal, human 
rights, counter-terrorism and sanctions, to be Ombudsperson” [emphasis in original]. 
1427 UNSC ‘Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson pursuant to Security Council resolution 2161 (2014)’ (31 July 
2014) UN Doc S/2014/553, ¶46: “As discussed in detail in the seventh report (S/2014/73, paras. 49-52), the 
Ombudsperson process also suffers from limited public transparency. As noted, the comprehensive report, which 
details the reasoning of the Ombudsperson, is not made available to the petitioner or the public. As a result, the only 
information about a decision that the petitioner will receive is that conveyed through the reasons, which are 
provided. This is the sole mechanism prescribed by resolution for possible disclosure of factual information and 
findings in a case other than the Office of the Ombudsperson, the Committee and now, under resolution 2161 
(2014), an interested State. However, there is no provision in the resolution for publication of those reasons by the 
Ombudsperson, a measure that would enhance the general transparency of the process. Unfortunately, resolution 
2161 (2014) does not address disclosure by the Ombudsperson, and an obvious deficiency in transparency therefore 
remains. This is particularly perplexing given that the petitioner is free to disseminate the reasons —in whole or in 
part —while the Ombudsperson must continue to keep the information confidential. The benefits of, or reasons for, 
this non-disclosure requirement remain opaque.” 
1428 ibid Annex II, ¶7.  
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the implementation of the sanctions rather than measuring Council compliance with the rule of 
law1429 – and later informs the Ombudsperson of this decision.1430 However, even with respect to 
full access to documents in order to create such reports, the Office of the Ombudsperson has 
repeatedly made the same comments regarding increased transparency in each report that it has 
filed since 20131431 and even as recently as July 2014 raised concerns that the Council may 
choose to ignore its reasoning.1432 
In fact, accountability in this respect appears to be taking steps backwards; whereas in 
2011, where a delisting request has been rejected, description to the petitioner of reasoning “to 
the extent possible and drawing upon the Ombudsperson’s Comprehensive Report”1433 was a 
requirement, in 2014 the “Comprehensive Report, and any information contained therein, should 
be treated as strictly confidential and not shared with the petitioner or any other Member 
State.”1434  
 
XI.3 Sibling UN Organs 
Of the four1435 remaining organs of the UN referred to in the UN Charter,1436  there are two that 
are potentially eligible or suitable for review of the Council.1437 As the “principal judicial organ 
                                                 
1429 UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267, ¶6 (1999). 
1430 UNSC Res 1904 (17 December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1904, Annex II, ¶11. 
1431 UNSC ‘Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson pursuant to Security Council resolution 2083 (2012)’ (31 
January 2014) UN Doc S/2014/73, ¶71: “further steps can be taken to enhance the effectiveness of the process. It is 
imperative that increased access be provided to classified or confidential material concerning particular listings. This 
is the only means of ensuring that the Ombudsperson can deliver on the mandate to comprehensively consider the 
delisting case and provide a fully informed recommendation. See also, UNSC ‘Report of the Office of the 
Ombudsperson pursuant to Security Council resolution 2083 (2012)’ (31 July 2013) UN Doc S/2013/452, ¶58; 
‘Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson pursuant to Security Council resolution 2083 (2012)’ (31 January 2013) 
UN Doc S/2013/71, ¶60; ‘Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson pursuant to Security Council resolution 1989 
(2011)’ (30 July 2012) UN Doc S/2012/590, ¶58. 
1432 UNSC ‘Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson pursuant to Security Council resolution 2161 (2014)’ (31 July 
2014) UN Doc S/2014/553, ¶51: “There is some progress on the important question of reasons for the decisions 
taken to grant or deny the petition contained in resolution 2161 (2014), which should ensure a more timely delivery 
of reasons. However, there remains a fundamental inconsistency between the decision-making process and the 
delivery of reasons, particularly in retention cases. This creates the potential for an unfair process if the reasons are 
not consistent with the comprehensive report of the Ombudsperson” [emphasis added]. 
1433 UNSC Res 1989 (17 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1989, ¶14(a). 
1434 UNSC Res 2161 (17 June 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2161, ¶13(c). 
1435 The Trusteeship Council has been disbanded. 
1436 UN Charter (1945) art 7(1). 
1437 Under Charter art 97, the Secretary-General is the “chief administrative officer of the Organization” and, though 
he “may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance 
of international peace and security,” (UN Charter (1945) art 99) the post-holder – and by extension the Secretariat 
which they lead – lacks the requisite mandate for the official judicial or political review of any actions taken by UN 
organs; similarly, the mandate of the Economic and Social Council, whilst including the power to “make or initiate 
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of the United Nations”1438 the ICJ is the sole existing candidate for judicial review of the 
Council. Despite the political nature of the Council in its decision-making process, this is not 
mutually exclusive to assessment of the legality of its actions. As the Council is bound by the 
parameters of its powers under the Charter and is obliged to observe the limitations of both 
international norms and the rule of law, judicial review – at least of the procedure followed and 
its adherence to the components of the rule of law – should be a task for the ICJ. The decision-
making process of the Council impact myriad other elements of international law, particularly 
the Council’s bold ventures into legislating and the impact this has on establishing international 
norms and precedent. However, other elements also touch on the international legal plane, such 
as the intersection between international human rights law and Council-mandated sanctions or 
military action. As a result, the ICJ’s power to review the Council must be examined. 
The Assembly, too, has powers of review that can be invoked to review decisions of the 
Council. As the democratic counterweight to the exclusive Council, the Assembly potentially 
provides a forum for discussion and action that is more representative of the international 
community. Under the Charter, it is authorised to “discuss any questions or any matters within 
the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided 
for in the present Charter.”1439 This has overwhelming potential and in essence translates into a 
competency to not only review the Council’s powers itself in the Assembly but to discuss the 
ICJ’s powers to review the Council should such powers not exist. Moreover, the Assembly is 
tasked with considering “general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international 
peace and security”1440 and was designed for extensive interaction with both the Council in an 
advisory role1441 and as an organ “encouraging the progressive development of international law 
                                                                                                                                                             
studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, education, health and related matters” 
(UN Charter (1945) art 62(1)) also lacks the required mandate for oversight of the Council. Indeed, whilst it is 
authorised to make recommendations to the General Assembly, Members of the UN and certain specialised agencies 
(UN Charter (1945) art 62(3)), prepare draft conventions for the Assembly (UN Charter (1945) art 62(4)), and call 
international conferences on matters within its competences (UN Charter (1945) art 92), there is no specific 
reference in the Charter to any interaction with the Council itself; this highlights the narrow interpretation of the 
meaning of peace and security that was initially envisioned by the Charter drafters, which has now expanded to 
include elements of human security, health and socio-cultural rights that were traditionally within the exclusive 
remit of the Economic and Social Council. Whilst there has been an evolution of the definition of peace and security 
that has allowed the Council to include parts of its fellow organ’s work in its own, there has been no reciprocity and 
the Economic and Social Council is as ill-suited to review of the Council today as in 1945. 
1438 ibid art 92. 
1439 ibid art 10 [emphasis added]. 
1440 ibid art 11(1). 
1441 ibid art 11-12. 
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and its codification.”1442 In light of recent Council practice of legislating, this latter responsibility 
should be addressed under the powers granted to the Assembly in Article 10. 
  
IX.3.1 The International Court of Justice 
In contrast to the notion that the Council should be seen exclusively through a political lens, 
Orakhelashvili sees “the entire process of maintenance of peace and security [as] a legal 
process”1443 and considers that “[p]eace and security can and shall be maintained only in so far as 
the relevant legal norms provide for this.”1444 Accordingly, De Wet explores whether judicial 
criteria should even be used to measure a threat to international peace, concluding that the 
“United Nations does not yet acknowledge a positive definition of peace that provides the 
Security Council with an unlimited discretion in determining whether a threat to the peace 
exists.”1445 She claims that “such an all-inclusive definition would undermine the structure of the 
Security Council, which would be incapable of effectively restoring or maintaining an all-
inclusive concept of peace.”1446 Writing in 2004, she viewed the definition of peace and security 
remaining “negatively” interpreted by the Council: when discussing the East Timor conflict, she 
claims that since “it had an international dimension as it involved Indonesian armed forces . . . it 
would therefore not be accurate to interpret the threats to the peace contained in UNSC Res 1264 
(1999) and UNSC Res 1272 (1999) as being underpinned exclusively by large scale violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law”1447; international terrorism does not, in de Wet’s opinion, 
relate “to a de-linking of a ‘threat to peace’ from the potential outbreak of international armed 
conflict”1448; and, at the time of writing, “the Security Council [had] not (yet) determined that the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic constitutes a threat to peace in terms of Article 39 of the Charter.”1449  
In the decade since de Wet’s analysis new threats to the peace that fall outside the limited 
scope of international conflict have emerged on topics as wide-ranging as internal armed 
conflicts in Sudan and Libya,1450 the threat posed by climate change1451 and the use of sexual 
                                                 
1442 ibid art 13. 
1443 Orakhelashvili (n 53) 147. 
1444 ibid. 
1445 de Wet (n 34) 367. 
1446 ibid. 
1447 ibid 167. 
1448 ibid 172. 
1449 ibid 174. 
1450 Both conflicts were the subjects of Security Council resolutions: UNSC 1593 (2005) and 1973 (2012) 
respectively. 
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violence as a tactic of war,1452 leading to a substantial evolution in the definition of a threat to the 
peace;1453 today, as this thesis has shown, it has become an all-encompassing concept for the 
Council. Nonetheless, the principle behind her assertions remain correct and the Court may have 
no role to play in determining a threat to the peace. There would, today, remain no basis upon 
which the Court would have the right to qualify or moderate any Council determination of a 
threat to the peace under Article 39 of the Charter;1454 the Charter is explicit in stipulating that 
the Council “shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace”1455 and to subjugate such a 
decision to the Court would be to permit a judiciary to make a political decision, for which the 
Court is as ill-equipped as the Council is to carry out the ICJ’s functions. 
Nonetheless, there may yet be a role for the ICJ in reviewing the legitimacy of Council 
action. Whilst there is no explicit provision for it in the Charter, it has been long been identified 
by the ICJ and others1456 that the United Nations as an organisation has a legal personality.1457 
Judicial review of the Council’s resolutions has been touched upon at the ICJ in previous years, 
most notably in 1992 when the Court declined to grant Provisional Measures to Libya in its 
Lockerbie case;1458 from the perspective of ICJ judicial review of the Security Council, this was a 
disappointing decision. During the course deliberations, it was identified that  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
1451 This was the subject of discussion in UNSC Verbatim Record (20 July 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6587. 
1452 UNSC Res 1820 (19 June 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1820. 
1453 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 July 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6587, 7: “The Council needs to keep pace with the 
emerging threats of the twenty-first century. Old threats have not disappeared, but new threats are upon us, and they 
demand more of us than business as usual. The Council has shown an impressive ability in the past to embrace its 
responsibilities to combat new peace and security threats, as it has done over the past 20 years in adapting traditional 
peacekeeping tools to address new and more complex political and security crises around the world.” 
1454 For an excellent discussion on this topic, see Sarooshi (n 11). 
1455 UN Charter (1945) art 39. 
1456 Reparations case (n 1042) 179: “In the opinion of the Court, the Organization was intended to exercise and 
enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of 
possession of a large measure of international personality, and the capacity to operate upon an international plane. It 
is at present the supreme type of international organization, and it could not carry out the intentions of its founders if 
it was devoid of international personality. See, also, eg Nigel D White, The United Nations System: Towards 
International Justice (Lynne Rienner 2002) 28 ff; ‘Status, priveleges and immunities of international organizations, 
their fficials, experts, etc.”, [1985] Ybk LC 145, 158, where ““[t]he Swiss Federal Council recognises the 
international personality and legal capacity of the United Nations.” 
1457 Reparations case (n 1042) 179): “[i]t must be acknowledged that its Members, by entrusting certain functions to 
it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to enable those 
functions to be effectively discharged.”  However, the Council itself, as a constituent organ of the UN, does not have 
a separate legal personality to the organisation.  
1458 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States ofAmerica) (Provisional Measures: Order) [1992] ICJ Rep 
114, 127. 
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the Court is the guardian of legality for the international community as a whole, 
both within and without the United Nations. One may therefore legitimately 
suppose that the intention of the founders was not to encourage a blinkered 
parallelism of functions but a fruitful interaction.1459 
 
Nonetheless, this acceptance of concurrent jurisdiction and the Court’s previous rulings in 
support of this principle in its Hostages1460 and Nicaragua1461 cases, the Court appears to have 
folded before the fact that the resolution of Council1462 on the matter had been issued. The 
Council’s Chapter VII resolution demanding the extradition of suspects in the Lockerbie 
bombings would have been in direct opposition to any Provisional Measures issued by the Court; 
indeed, Judge Bedjaoui highlighted the crux of the matter when he alluded to “the grave question 
of . . . the possible inconsistency between the decisions of the two organs and of how to deal with 
so delicate a situation.”1463 Accordingly, despite the fact that UNSC Res 748 was adopted after 
the Libyan Applications to the ICJ and lengthy discussions at the Court and even in light of the 
recognition that “the Court . . . was not obliged to take into account a resolution passed after the 
closure of the proceedings and to apply it, retroactively as it were, to the case which had been 
submitted to it,”1464 the Court considered the resolution.  In short, aware of the case pending 
before the ICJ, the Council nonetheless adopted a resolution in an apparent effort to either 
circumvent or eclipse any decision of the Court; reciprocally, even though the resolution was 
adopted ex post facto to the Court’s initial consideration of the case, the Court recognized its 
admissibility and chose to dismiss the request for Provisional Measures. 
 Should it have wished to, the Council was well aware of its powers under Charter article 96(1) 
to request an advisory opinion from the Court; indeed, it had already done such in the 1971 
Namibia case1465 subsequent to UNSC Res 276.1466 The absence of a referral to the Court “may 
                                                 
1459 ibid Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs, 138 [emphasis added]. 
1460 United States of America v Iran (n 1018) ¶37: “never has the view been put forward before that, because a legal 
dispute submitted to the Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should decline to resolve for the 
parties the legal questions at issue between them. Nor can any basis for such a view of the Court's functions or 
jurisdiction be found in the Charter or the Statute of the Court ; if the Court were, contrary toits settled 
jurisprudence, to adopt such a view, it would impose a far-reaching and unwarranted restriction upon the role of the 
Court in the peacefulsolution of international disputes.” 
1461 Nicaragua (n 237) ¶106: “the Court considers that even the existence of active negotiations in which both 
parties might be involved should not prevent both the Security Council and the Court from exercising their 
separate functions under the Charter and the Statute of the Court.” 
1462 UNSC Res 748 (31 March 1992) UN Doc S/RES/748. 
1463 Lockerbie (n 1458), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui, 143. 
1464 ibid 151. 
1465 Namibia (n 102) 17. 
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be regrettable, but there is, alas, no provision in the Charter making it mandatory to consult the 
Court.”1467 Joyner recommends a revisitation of the “arguments of long provenance regarding the 
Court’s jurisdiction rationae personae, and amendment of Article 36 of its Statute to make its 
compulsory jurisdiction truly universal”1468 but it is questionable how this can be realistically 
implemented. For the time being, at least, the jurisdiction of the ICJ over the Council remains 
exclusively advisory and instigated by the Council itself on an ad hoc basis. Key to this, 
certainly, is the recognition by certain judges that the Court is not empowered to  
 
exercise judicial review of the decisions of the Security Council. . . [and is] 
particularly without power to overrule or undercut decisions of the Security 
Council made by it in pursuance of its authority under Articles 39, 41 and 42 of 
the Charter to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and to decide upon responsive measures to be taken to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.1469 
 
Although the ICJ has previously held that it is “not the function of a court merely to provide a 
basis for political action if no question of actual legal rights is involved,”1470 this cannot be 
interpreted to be the case in situations where the Council’s action has legislative or legally 
binding effects.1471 Moreover, for the Council to adopt a resolution on the same subject that the 
Court has begun addressing that later emerged to be contradictory suggests a lack of inter-organ 
cooperation; a similar complementarity must be forthcoming from the Council, notwithstanding 
the capacity of both to be seized of the same matter simultaneously. That is to say, for a 
resolution contrary to the content of a case seised by the Court to emerge after the Court has 
begun consideration of the matter is likely – particularly in light of the political considerations of 
the Council – to be an effort to prejudice the course of justice at the Court. Indeed, such action 
by the Council is a step away from accountability rather than a move towards; rather than using 
                                                                                                                                                             
1466 UNSC Res 276 (30 January 1970) UN Doc S/RES/276. 
1467 Lockerbie (n 1458), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui, 152 [emphasis added]. 
1468 Joyner, International Law (n 51) 189. 
1469 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States ofAmerica) (Preliminary Objections) [1992] ICJ Rep 115, 
127, Dissenting opinion of President Schwebel, 53-4. 
1470 Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections) [1963] ICJ 
Rep 15, 37. 
1471 Kosovo Advisory Opinion (n 174) ¶46: “[w]hile the interpretation and application of a decision of one of the 
political organs of the United Nations is, in the first place, the responsibility of the organ which took that decision, 
the Court, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, has also frequently been required to consider the 
interpretation and legal effects of such decisions.” 
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the powers granted to the Council to refer a question to the Court for an advisory opinion on its 
legality, the Council mobilised to undermine the activity of the Court. This fact was recognised 
in the dissenting opinion of Judge El-Kosheri on the Lockerbie case.1472 
Naturally, there is an argument to be made for the dismissal of the case and for judicial 
review to be limited from a pragmatic perspective. To empower the Court to decide a case in 
opposition to an existing Chapter VII resolution risks “appearing to offer to recalcitrant States a 
means to parry and frustrate decisions of the Security Council by way of appeal to the Court.”1473 
However, the Court has previously differentiated between advisory opinions a sterner judicial 
review of the Council.1474 Martenczuk acknowledges that there “might be disagreement over the 
effect of a judgment finding a Council resolution to be invalid”1475 but finds that “justiciability 
could not act to prevent the judicial review of Security Council resolutions by the Court.”1476  
The political nature of a dispute is therefore no bar to the intervention of the Court. Indeed, an 
examination of the ICJ Statute shows that the “Court shall have the power to indicate, if it 
considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to 
preserve the respective rights of either party”1477 and that “[p]ending the final decision, notice of 
the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council,”1478 
indicating that the Court is well within its jurisdiction to ensure that provisional measures are 
adopted where necessary. Moreover, the decision to dismiss the Lockerbie case – irrespective of 
its consideration after a further six years of sanctions1479 on Libya – underscores Judge 
Shahabuddeen’s questions at the time, which remain valid to this very day:  
 
Are there any limits to the Council’s powers of appreciation?  . . . [I]s there any 
conceivable point beyond which a legal issue may properly arise as the 
competence of the Security Council to produce such overriding results? If there 
                                                 
1472 Lockerbie (n 1458), Dissenting Opinion of Judge El-Kosheri, 210. 
1473 Lockerbie (n 1469), Dissenting opinion of President Schwebel, 53. 
1474 Kosovo Advisory Opinion (n 174) ¶33: “The advisory jurisdiction is not a form of judicial recourse for States but 
the means by which the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as other organs of the United Nations 
and bodies specifically empowered to do so by the General Assembly in accordance with Article 96, paragraph 2, of 
the Charter, may obtain the Court’s opinion in order to assist them in their activities.” 
1475 Martenczuk (n 53) 528. 
1476 ibid 529. 
1477 Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) art 41(1). 
1478 ibid art 41(2). 
1479 UNSC Res 1192 (1998) suspended the sanctions following the arrival of the two accused Pan Am flight 
bombers. 
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are any limits, what are those limits, and what body, other than the Security 
Council, is competent to say what those limits are?1480 
 
The Court can, however, assess the legality of enforcement action both within the Charter and 
against international norms and law. Martencuk argues that “it does not appear . . . that it was the 
intention of the Charter to preclude the examination of the validity of decisions of the UN 
political organs, for instance when this validity is relevant to the decision of a dispute between 
two UN Member States.”1481 Particularly with reference to the Lockerbie case, he argues that 
“the lack of a power of judicial review was not even mentioned as a possible objection to the 
jurisdiction of the Court.”1482 Sanctions regimes, for example, can be measured against 
international human rights norms; the scope of military intervention can be analysed against 
international humanitarian law and the mandate issued by the Council, which would have 
avoided – or confirmed – allegations such as those made by Russia that NATO exceeded the 
powers granted to it under UNSC Res 1973; and the very extent of the powers that the Council 
has assumed can be assessed on an ad hoc, even retrospective, basis. In the event that an 
advisory opinion is sought by the Council from the Court on the legality of a decision that it has 
taken – such as the imposition of general and open-ended legislation upon States through 
Chapter VII resolutions – the jurisdiction rationae materiae of the Court is clear and the motion 
itself would augment the faith of the wider UN and international community in the volition of the 
Council to increase its transparency and accountability efforts.1483  
Even if – due to the inevitable delay that a referral to the ICJ would take and which 
would be incompatible with the urgency that is frequently encompassed by a threat to the peace 
and the need for a response – an advisory opinion is sought after the adoption of a Chapter VII 
resolution, the advisory opinion would serve multiple functions. Primarily, referral to the Court 
may partially eliminate the necessity for reform of the Council’s composition, as many of the 
sentiments of injustice and exploitation by P5 Members of their positions on the Council would 
                                                 
1480 Lockerbie (n 1458), Judge Shahabuddeen’s Separate Opinion, 142. 
1481 Martenczuk (n 53) 526-7. 
1482 ibid 527. See, also, Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice and 
the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie case” (1994) 88(4) AJIL 646 where “[t]he Court did not ground 
the dismissal on the absence of a jurisdictional basis.” 
1483 The Court may base its decisions on an interpretation of the Charter as well as general principles and customary 
international law. 
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be undermined by the validity of judicial review.1484 Moreover, as a focused, reasoned and legal 
opinion, the Council can make use of the Court’s advisory judgment as precedent in its future 
decision-making process on both the same threat and specifically analogous threats and, in the 
same way that it refers to previous resolutions and UN documents in its preamble, can refer to 
the advisory opinion in both its discussions1485 and in subsequent resolutions. For the Council to 
seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ for a situation and later referred to by the Council’s within 
the framework of its desire to ‘remain seized of the situation’1486 would be a marked step towards 
accountability for the Council. This would allow for so-called “course-correction” in the 
response to – but not the identification of – a threat to the peace.  
More fundamentally, the reasoning behind the outcome of the advisory opinion can be 
used to better shape the response of the Council in its general decision-making process. Frequent 
recourse to the ICJ would result in recommendations for general best practice, legitimacy of the 
scope of powers of the Council1487 and increased authority to the Council. From such advisory 
opinions, the Council could confirm or seek to modify its behaviour and enforcement action: 
agreement by the Court of a Council response would free the Council from the burden of 
justification of its actions and allegations of ulterior motives; similarly, a statement by the Court 
that the Council has exceeded its mandate of powers would set the threshold beyond which the 
Council would be trespassing. This is particularly important in cases where the Council takes 
new action, such as its foray into generic legislation; were the Council to have submitted UNSC 
Res 1373 for analysis, for example, subsequent disagreement with the legality of the contents of 
the resolution would have been moot, as the ICJ would have pronounced its legal opinion. 
Subsequent resolutions such as 1540 and 2178 which build upon the model of UNSC Res 1373 
would have unequivocally been either valid or ultra vires in their foundation. Such decisions on 
ultra vires action can also be included in the ICJ advisory opinions; in this way, the ICJ could 
                                                 
1484 This may, of course, be hindered by the fact that the P5 States always have judges on the Court, but would at the 
very least demonstrate a willingness on the part of the Council to request legal advice from a valid, legitimate 
source. 
1485 Verbatim records would be the ideal place to search for reference to the Court in deliberations and negotiations 
on the Council. 
1486 This phrase concludes the vast majority of resolutions dealing with ongoing situations and paves the way for 
future resolutions or decisions on a matter. To incorporate the ICJ advisory opinion as a source of input into the 
decision-making process going forward would allow the Council a wider yet more thorough perspective on a 
situation. 
1487 If the Court were to agree with the legality of Council action after having studied them in depth, despite 
protestations of Member States, this would add legitimacy to the actions of the Council. 
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pronounce on the scope of the Council’s powers to respond to an international threat, whilst 
avoiding entering into any discussions on the determination of the threat itself. 
Nonetheless, this has not been the case and the Council has made no efforts to refer to the 
Court any significant questions of either Charter interpretation or substantive matters for judicial 
review despite intensive calls as recently as 2009 by members of the Non-Aligned 
Movement.1488Whilst in recent years, the Council has “emphasized the key role of the [ICJ] . . . 
in adjudicating disputes among States and the value of its work and call[ed] upon States that 
have not yet done so to consider accepting the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with its 
Statute,”1489 the Council has not made any attempts to make use of its powers to seek advisory 
opinions. This, despite the fact that advisory opinions were recognised as a means to enhance 
international peace and security that have been successfully resorted to in the past and to 
promote the rule of law by the Council.1490 
It would appear, therefore, that the Council has no intention to refer any element of the 
legality of its decision-making process – even ex post facto – to the ICJ for any form of judicial 
review. As a result, although the Council is not legibus solutus, at least from the perspective of 
the ICJ there is neither a willingness from the Court to rule on the legality of the political 
decisions of the Council, nor is there any volition from the Council as an organ to request legal 
clarification on the extent of its Charter powers, the legality of the ramifications of its political 
decisions or any other aspect of the decision-making process. 
 
XI.3.2 The General Assembly 
If the Court is either unwilling or unable to rule on the legality of the Council’s decision-making 
process, then one may also turn to the Assembly for a form of review. Charter article 10 grants 
                                                 
1488 UNGA ‘Letter dated 24 July 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed 
to the Secretary-General’ (14 September 2009) UN Doc A/63/965-S/2009/514, Annex ¶18.9: “[urging] the Security 
Council to make greater use of the ICJ, the principal judicial organ of the UN, as a source of advisory opinions and 
interpretation of relevant norms of international law, and on controversial issues, further urge the Council to use the 
ICJ as a source of interpreting relevant international law, and also urge the Council to consider its decisions be 
reviewed by the ICJ, bearing in mind the need to ensure their adherence to the UN Charter, and international law.” 
1489 UNSC Presidential Statement 11 (2010) UN Doc S/PRST/2010/11, ¶2. 
1490 South Africa, UNSC Verbatim Record (29 June 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6347 (Resumption 1), 16: “A . . . possible 
role that the Security Council can play in the promotion of the rule of law through the use of the International Court 
of Justice is through regular recourse to advisory opinions from the Court . . . [T]he General Assembly has not been 
shy about requesting advisory opinions, and we encourage the Security Council to follow suit when faced with 
questions of legal complexity. In this regard, we remind the Council of the important consequences of its decision to 
request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, which resulted in the now famous 1971 Namibia 
opinion.” 
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the most expansive powers to the Assembly in its review of the “powers and functions”1491 of the 
Council, allowing it to discuss both and make “recommendations to . . . the Security Council  . . . 
on any such question or matters,”1492 notwithstanding Charter Article 12.1493 In essence, the 
Assembly may discuss the scope, content and function of the Council’s Charter powers, provided 
this does not interfere with a dispute or situation that the Council is addressing; it may also 
recommend for them to alter or curb its behaviour based on Assembly discussions. The 
Assembly has made use of or hinted at this privilege in over forty resolutions since 19901494 and 
– promisingly – has discussed the scope of reform of Council working methods,1495 reflecting the 
assertion that  
 
                                                 
1491 UN Charter (1945) art 10. 
1492 ibid. 
1493 “1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in 
the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or 
situation unless the Security Council so requests. 2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, 
shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace 
and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or 
the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council 
ceases to deal with such matters.” 
1494 UNGA Res 47/120B (20 September 1993) UN Doc A/RES/47/120B; UNGA Res 48/25 (10 December 1993) 
UN Doc A/RES/48/25; UNGA Res 48/42 (14 March 1992) UN Doc A/RES/48/42UNGA Res 48/264 (17 August 
1994) UN Doc A/RES/48/264; UNGA Res 49/31 (30 January 1995) UN Doc A/RES/49/31; UNGA Res 49/57 (17 
February 1995) UN Doc A/RES/49/57; UNGA Res 50/6 (9 November 1995) UN Doc A/RES/50/6; UNGA Res 
50/30 (22 December 1995) UN Doc A/RES/50/30; UNGA Res 50/151 (9 February 1996) UN Doc A/RES/51/151; 
UNGA Res 51/193 (11 March 1996) UN Doc A/RES/51/193; UNGA Res 51/208 (16 January 1997) UN Doc 
A/RES/51/208; UNGA Res 51/55 (9 January 1997) UN Doc A/RES/51/55; UNGA Res 52/20 (9 January 2001) UN 
Doc A/RES/52/20; UNGA Res 52/162 (15 January 1998) UN Doc A/RES/52/162; UNGA Res 53/71 (4 January 
1999) UN Doc A/RES/53/71; UNGA Res 53/91 (29 January 1999) UN Doc A/RES/53/91; UNGA Res 53/107 (20 
January 1999) UN Doc A/RES/53/107; UNGA Res 55/2 (18 September 2000) UN Doc A/RES/55/2; UNGA Res 
56/87 (31 January 2002) UN Doc A/RES/56/87; UNGA Res 57/25 (3 February 2003) UN Doc A/RES/57/25; 
UNGA Res 57/337 (18 July 2003) UN Doc A/RES/57/337; UNGA Res 58/80 (8 January 2004) UN Doc 
A/RES/58/80; UNGA Res 58/187 (22 March 2004) UN Doc A/RES/58/187; UNGA Res 59/45 (16 December 2004) 
UN Doc A/RES/59/45; UNGA Res 59/213 (3 March 2005) UN Doc A/RES/59/213; UNGA Res 59/313 (21 
September 2005) UN Doc A/RES/59/313; UNGA Res 59/314 (26 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/59/314; UNGA 
Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1; UNGA Res 60/286 (9 October 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/286; 
UNGA Res 61/296 (5 October 2007) UN Doc A/RES/61/296; UNGA Res 62/159 (11 March 2008) UN Doc 
A/RES/62/159; UNGA Res 62/275 (7 October 2008) UN Doc A/RES/62/275; UNGA Res 63/114 (26 February 
2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/114; UNGA Res 63/159 (4 February 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/159; UNGA Res 63/185 
(3 March 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/185; UNGA Res 63/304 (11 August 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/304; UNGA Res 
63/310 (7 October 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/310; UNGA Res 64/168 (22 January 2010) UN Doc A/RES/64/168; 
UNGA Res 65/221 (5 April 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/221; UNGA Res 66/171 (30 March 2012) UN Doc 
A/RES/66/171; UNGA Res 68/178 (28 January 2014) UN Doc A/RES/68/178; UNGA Res 68/307 (18 September 
2014) UN Doc A/RES/68/307. 
1495 See eg, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 April 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6300, 27; 
Qatar, ibid (Resumption 1), 26; Egypt, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 November 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6672, 25. 
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[i]t is impossible to read Article 30 in such a way as to make it immune from the 
General Assembly’s explicit authority to discuss and make recommendations on 
any matters within the scope of the Charter relating to the functions of any organ 
of the United Nations – including the Council – and to make recommendations to 
the Council on these matters . . . The Council may have the responsibility of 
formally adopting its rules of procedure, but the General Assembly is clearly 
empowered not only to discuss the Council’s working methods but to make 
recommendations to the Council, whether or not those recommendations touch on 
and concern the rules of procedure.1496  
 
However, the Assembly has not requested action from the Council in recent years, nor has it 
requested action from the Council in accordance with Article 11 of the Charter, although it has 
“encourage[d] the Security Council to consider appropriate measures to ensure accountability in 
the Syrian Arab Republic”1497 and felt it necessary to remind the Council of its “primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”1498 Yet despite all these 
previous references to article 11 of the Charter and the repeated reaffirmation of “the role and 
authority of the General Assembly, including on questions relating to international peace and 
security,”1499 the Assembly has failed to make an impact on the working methods of the Council. 
Several efforts of States to support the powers of the Assembly under Article 10 have not borne 
fruit;1500 the Council is still stagnant in its reform and remains inwards-looking for review and 
implementable guidance. 
Whilst Article 10 permits the Assembly to make recommendations on the scope of the 
Council’s powers – which is has not done – as well as matters of reform – which appear to have 
been ignored – it does not, however, issue the Assembly with the power to monitor or review the 
actual decisions of the Council. That is to say, the Assembly does not have a mandate that, even 
in the most liberal of interpretations, would permit it the power of review of Council actions or 
                                                 
1496 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, ibid. 
1497 UNGA Res 68/182 (30 January 2014) UN Doc A/RES/68/182, ¶10. 
1498 ibid ¶12. 
1499 See eg UNGA Res 68/307 (18 September 2014) UN Doc A/RES/68/307, ¶6; UNGA Res 68/297 (18 September 
2013) UN Doc A/RES/67/297, ¶4; UNGA Res 66/294 (8 October 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/294, ¶4; UNGA Res 
65/315 (11 October 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/315. 
1500 eg Switzerland, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 April 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6300, 27, representing the Group of five 
small nations (S5) and stressing the outcome of the 2005 World Summit in line with Article 10; Jordan, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (30 November 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6672, 23, presenting a new draft Assembly resolution 
containing measures to enhance the implementation of UNSC Presidential Note S/2010/507 (2010) on the “right 
accorded to the General Assembly under Article 10.” 
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decisions. The Assembly can choose to make use of UNGA Res 377A (1950)1501 – also known 
as the Uniting for Peace resolution – to intervene in situations where “the Security Council, 
because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”1502 but this lacks the 
potential to excel beyond a mere auxiliary measure to the Council. Uniting for Peace does not 
authorise the Assembly to review the Council itself, but rather to attempt to fill in where the 
Council has reached an impasse. The working methods, legality of Council action, scope of 
Council powers and other integral elements of Charter interpretation have been eliminated from 
discussion at the Assembly despite their potential for inclusion under Article 10. The Assembly 
is incapable of grasping fully the matters under examination at the Council due to a lack of 
cooperation between the two organs. The Council’s reports to the Assembly have been labelled 
as “a bland summary and listing of meetings and outcome documents”1503and it has been 
identified that “there is a need to ensure more informative annual Security Council reporting to 
the General Assembly.”1504 Although it is known to the Council that “there is a need to increase 
transparency and coordination between the Security Council and the General Assembly,”1505 
little reform has taken materialised; “despite the current positive trends in the working methods 
of the Security Council, [it has] yet to live up to the expectations of the 2005 World Summit, 
mainly with respect to representativity and legitimacy, to efficiency and effectiveness, to 
transparency and accountability, and to the implementation of Council decisions.”1506  
 
XI.4 Conclusions 
Despite an explicit mechanism for review of the Council by the ICJ under article 96, 
disappointingly, this has not been made use of by either organ for the purposes of subjecting 
Council behaviour to a standard of review. Under article 96, in combination with its mandate 
under article 10 of the Charter, it is also discouraging to note that the Assembly has not made use 
of its prerogative to request advisory opinions from the ICJ in order to review Council behaviour. 
De Wet’s summation in 2004 that the ICJ be used by means of an authorisation of “the 
                                                 
1501 UNGA Res 377(V) (3 November 1950) UN Doc A/RES/377(V). 
1502 ibid ¶1. 
1503 India, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 April 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6300, 19. 
1504 India, UNSC Verbatim Record (29 October 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7052, 23. 
1505 Jordan, UNSC Verbatim Record (23 October 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7285, 18. 
1506 Rwanda, ibid 14. 
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Secretary-General to request advisory opinions that can guide the United Nations political organs 
in relation to the legality of their own actions . . .”1507 was by her own admission unlikely, and 
she stated that the “advisory opinion procedure will probably remain under-utilised in future.”1508 
This has, disappointingly, been proven correct; the Assembly, despite having numerous tools at 
its discretion to review the Council or refer the process of decision-making to the ICJ, has failed 
to utilise them in the promotion of the rule of law. 
In both cases, the Council has made no efforts to ensure that it subjects its decision-
making process to the minimum legal standards expected from a rule of law. Such advisory 
opinions, although technically not legally binding, would be significantly influential in the 
evolution of Charter interpretation and defining the parameters of Council powers; moreover, 
given the primacy of the ICJ as the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations”, a legal 
opinion on matters of Council practice based on its history would be integral to any genuine 
efforts of reform - indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the Council might achieve this without 
such judicial input.  
 
  
                                                 
1507 de Wet (n 34) 373. 
1508 ibid. 
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CHAPTER XII 
THE CASE FOR A RULE OF LAW TRIBUNAL 
 
XII.1 Introduction 
The Council has acknowledged that the rule of law should apply internally, although it has not 
effected this adequately in the years since. As a result, there remains a long journey to be made 
for the Council and the outlook is bleak for full Council compliance in and of itself; it would 
appear that external stimuli or oversight is required to bring the Council in line with the 
components of the international rule of law. The Council has shown that it is hesitant or 
unwilling to make the required changes over the course of the quarter of a decade since the end 
of the Cold War and in components such as Accountability and Transparency it appears to have 
regressed rather than evolving.  
Hitherto, in focusing on the decision-making process of the Council, this thesis has 
deliberately omitted detailed discussion of the repercussions of action taken by the Council on 
States and individuals at the domestic level, as it has centred entirely on the process rather than 
the outcome of decisions. Whilst I intend to briefly discuss these, I also intend to propose a new 
solution to the evidenced disregard for rule of law on the Council, by arguing the case for the 
creation of a bespoke subsidiary organ by the Council to exclusively judicially review the 
Council. Such an establishment can effect rapid change and immediately increase compliance 
with components such as transparency and accountability, but requires the involvement and 
engagement of the Council itself. 
 
XII.2 Regional and individual State review 
Both regional courts and individual State actions can, in some ways, play a vital role in providing 
a counter-balance to the real world application of decisions of the Council upon citizens of its 
Member States. By dealing with the outcomes and implementation of the resolutions, although 
the Council itself remains out of reach for review, regional courts can empower themselves – and 
the States over which they hold jurisdiction – to grant the right to interpret within the scope of 
other applicable international law and obligations the decisions of the Council. Moreover, it 
would appear that States may either individually or as a group take measures to shape the 
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decisions of the Council into effect with input from other obligations,1509 or even to refuse 
compliance altogether in certain circumstances. States may find that a “Council decision 
infringing the applicable international law constitutes an internationally wrongful act by the UN 
[which] . . . can be invoked by any member as a breach of an obligation owed to the international 
community as a whole.”1510 Consequently, they may refuse to comply with the resolution. In this 
way, effectively, the Council’s decisions – although not the process – are reviewed.  
 
XII.2.1 Regional Courts 
The Kadi cases are prime examples for analysis of the interaction of the regional and domestic 
Court system with the resolutions of the Security Council.1511 Over the course of four landmark 
cases – spanning almost a decade – the European Court of Justice tackled the dynamic between 
obligations of States as part of the European Community and their obligations to the UN Charter 
to carry out decisions of the Council. That is to say that, notwithstanding the legality or lack 
thereof upon which a Council resolution is adopted1512 – which is not the remit of any domestic 
or regional court to enter into discussion over1513 – the implementation of measures mandated by 
the Council can and should be filtered through the lens of other State obligations such as the 
adherence to fundamental rights of their citizens.1514 That the Council orders compliance with a 
resolution under Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter no longer supersedes the obligations of States 
                                                 
1509 See eg, UNSC ‘Letter dated 18 September 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and 
entities addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (20 September 2006) UN Doc S/2006/750, Annex III, ¶6, 
where the Pakistan High Court of Sindh ruled in favour of Al-Rashid Trust in a petition against the freezing of its 
assets as a result of its “finding that the legislation under which the Government had acted, the United Nations 
(Security Council) Act 1948, required for its implementation a statutory notification (SRO) for each individual and 
entity subject to the sanctions”; and ibid ¶11, where “[i]n the Al-Qadi case, the State Council (Danistay) issued a 
judgement on 4 July 2006, cancelling the relevant sections of the Cabinet decision of 22 December 2001 that had 
frozen Al-Qadi’s assets in Turkey. The State Council based its decision on the fact that the information and 
documents of the United Nations Security Council which alleged that Al-Qadi was associated with Al-Qaida should 
have been (but were not) presented to the judiciary in Turkey to enable an evaluation of the materials”; Nada (n 
855). 
1510 Simma and others (n 363) 1786. 
1511 See also, eg HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2; Abdelrazik v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs), [2010] 
1 FCR 267, 2009 FC 580 (Can LII). 
1512 Kadi III (n 854) ¶87: “Judicial review of the lawfulness of the contested regulation is not equivalent to review of 
the validity of the resolution which that regulation implements.” 
1513 ibid: “Nor is such judicial review intended to substitute the political judgment of the Courts of the European 
Union for that of the competent international authorities.” 
1514 ibid: “Its purpose is solely to ensure observance of the requirement that Security Council Resolutions are 
implemented within the European Union in a manner compatible with the fundamental principles of European 
Union law. More specifically, such review contributes to ensuring that a balance is struck between the requirements 
of international peace and security, on the one hand, and the protection of fundamental rights, on the other.”  
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to incorporate judicial review into their own practices that serve as manifestations of the will of 
the Council. In this way, Security Council resolutions are reduced from their quasi-sacrosanct 
enormity to measures comparable with other sources of international law.1515 
There is now a precedent for the review of the implementation of Security Council 
resolutions and, although this does not touch upon the legitimacy, legality or scope of Council 
activity and decision-making, it does venture some way towards ensuring that individuals are not 
subjected to lengthy and illegal measures without judicial review. Elberling notes the “recent 
trend towards judicial review of Security Council measures by national and regional courts”1516, 
qualifying that “with regard to legislative resolutions . . . it will be the national implementation, 
not the Security Council resolution itself, that is the focus of judicial review.”1517  
The final Kadi judgment came only a year ago1518 and it is yet to be seen whether other 
regional courts will adopt the same attitude towards the hierarchy of State obligations against the 
backdrop of the Charter and Council resolutions. Throughout the years, the Kadi judgements 
have had an impact on the domestic interpretation of the resolutions of the Council1519 and can 
go some way towards shifting attitudes even at the ICJ level.1520 Nonetheless, the effect of Kadi 
is not a substitute for the effective adoption of rule of law elements by the Council; there are a 
great deal of issues that fall outside of the scope of jurisdiction adopted under Kadi, including the 
allegations of double-standards, the encroachment of the Council on the mandates of other 
organs and the equitable participation in the decision-making process. These are issues that the 
courts in regional or domestic systems have no place in pronouncing upon. However, in both 
principle and effect, it is noteworthy that a regional Court has assumed the responsibility of 
overturning the implications of a Council resolution, granting itself supremacy over the effects of 
the decision-making process of the Council – albeit in the ring-fenced arena of sanction measures 
of an adopted Chapter VII resolution. 
 
                                                 
1515 ibid ¶88: “[T]he General Court’s approach is consistent with European Union law, which requires respect for 
fundamental rights and the guarantee of independent and impartial judicial review, including review of European 
Union measures based on international law.” 
1516 Elberling (n 3) 353. 
1517 ibid 360. 
1518 Kadi III (n 854). 
1519 See eg Hay v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 1677; A, K, M, Q & G v HM Treasury [2008] EWHC 869. 
1520 Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) art 38(1) allows for the application to its interpretation of the 
law “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law” and “the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations” 
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XII.2.2 State disobedience 
Numerous authors have also referred to State disobedience as a means of post-decision review 
for the Council; Elberling, for example, terms this a State’s “right to last resort”1521 whereas 
Joyner posits that “UN members are not obligated to comply with the decisions of the Council 
one whit further than those decisions themselves comply with the provisions of the Charter.”1522 
Tzanakopoulos argues that such type of review can autopoetically impact on the Council; his 
argument that it is the “fear of disobedience (predominantly as non-implementation) or non-
cooperation (when it can impose no obligation) that forces the Security Council to concede to 
demands for (some) transparency”1523 supports an ongoing “pattern of reaction-protest-threat of 
disobedience or non-cooperation [that] allows the Member States to keep the Security Council in 
check.”1524 He acknowledges too that, whilst “[d]isobedience is in the first instance illegal, as it 
constitutes a breach of the obligation of [Member States] to comply with [Security Council] 
decisions (Article 25 [UN Charter]) . . . [t]he threat of massive disobedience – which has now 
found legal justification – is a potent tool for inducing compliance of a powerful organ with 
international law.”1525 Cogan concurs, arguing “that noncompliance – particularly operational 
noncompliance – is a necessary component of less capable legal systems, such as international 
law.”1526  
Whilst scholarly support for State disobedience is widespread, and the act itself can 
counterbalance illegal and illegitimate Council decisions, it does so on an ad hoc, individual 
basis. Moreover, the threshold necessary for such State disobedience is set high. Such action 
would need to be taken only as a last resort and based on the clear illegality of a resolution, in 
accordance with the ICJ’s interpretation, for “when the Organization takes action which warrants 
the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United 
Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization.”1527 As a result, 
States must be compelled by a strong motive in order to cast doubt upon a resolution of the 
                                                 
1521 Elberling (n 3) 354. 
1522 Joyner, ‘Legal Hegemon’ (n 51) 234, referring to de Wet (n 34) 377. 
1523 Tzanakopoulos (n 17) 387. 
1524 ibid. 
1525 Tzanakopoulos (n 11) 202. 
1526 Cogan, (n 3) 193. See, also Cogan, (n 3) 190, where Cogan defines operational noncompliance as situations 
where States opt “to take actions that reflect current or developing expectations of lawfulness or make existing law 
effective – that is to bridge the operational gaps in the international system” 
1527 Certain Expenses (n 1041) 168. 
273 
 
Council.1528 Joyner sees one such scenario as the legislating by the Council and argues that 
“because of the procedural invalidity of the Security Council’s passage of Resolution 1540, the 
resolution itself is void of legal effect ab initio.”1529  
As a result, in reality, although the Council appears to have relied on the opinions of 
regional groups in a few resolutions that it has adopted1530 or avoided,1531 instances of State 
disobedience are rare; the African Union’s response to the Lockerbie illustration is one such 
example.1532 Due to the short and uninformative nature of both the Council Presidential 
Statement1533 and accompanying verbatim records,1534 it is difficult to discern to what extent this 
OAU resolution played a part in the deliberations to end sanctions on Libya four months after its 
adoption but during the discussions that led to the adoption of UNSC Res 1973, the praise 
heaped on the “Arab League, which, to its great credit, instead of acting on its own went to the 
                                                 
1528 Erika de Wet and André Nollkaemper, ‘Review of Security Council Decisions by National Courts’ in 45 
German Ybk Intl L 166, 189: States are only obliged “to carry out those decisions that were adopted in accordance 
with the Charter i.e. in accordance with its purposes and principles and the norms of jus cogens,”  
1529 Joyner, International Law (n 51) 197. He goes even further in ‘Legal Hegemon’ (n 51) 257 to propose the 
creation of an international bill of rights for States, which would “form an effective legal curtailment of the authority 
of the Security Council to restrict this fundamental right and would serve to protect developing countries in their 
exercise of this right” (ibid).1529 I would argue, however, that any international bill of rights would need to extend 
beyond the textual enshrinement of rules or laws to the practicability and enforcement mechanisms that might 
govern these rules – what might be referred to as “institution building” or “community-capacity building” at the 
national level. See, eg OHCHR ‘Monitoring legal systems’ (Geneva/London 2006) UN Doc HR/PUB/06/3, 1 where 
“[d]eveloping a justice system that protects human rights and promotes the rule of law is a critical aspect of securing 
peace and preventing future conflict”; UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General: The rule of law and transitional 
justice in conflict and post-conflict societies’ (12 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/634, ¶16 where the Secretary-
General noted that “efforts to build the rule of law require the support and involvement of national stakeholders to 
ensure the authority and legitimacy required for rule of law initiatives to achieve results [and that t]he involvement 
of national actors in coordinating and developing rule of law strategies should be further encouraged.” 
1530 US, UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498, 5 relied on the fact that “[o]n March 12, the 
League of Arab States called on the Security Council to establish a no-fly zone and to take other measures to protect 
civilians”; China, ibid 9 “attache[d] great importance to the relevant position by the 22-member Arab League on the 
establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya. We also attach great importance to the position of African countries and 
the African Union.” 
1531 China, UNSC Verbatim Record (12 January 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5619, 2 (2007), in exercising its veto on a 
resolution concerning Myanmar, relied on the fact that “[j]ust yesterday, on 11 January 2007, the ASEAN Ministers 
meeting in the Philippines reaffirmed that Myanmar is no threat to international peace and security.” 
1532 Organization for African Unity (Council of Ministers) ‘The Crisis between the Great Socialist People’s Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya and the United States of America and the United Kingdom’ (OAU Addis Ababa 1998) 
AHG/Dec.127 (XXXIV), ¶2-3. In response to Council action over the Lockerbie incident, the Organisation of 
African Unity announced its decision “not to comply any longer with Security Council Resolutions 748 (1992) and 
883 (1993) on sanctions, with effect from September 1998 . . . [and] DECIDE[d] on moral and religious grounds and 
with immediate effect that the OAU and its members will not comply from now on with the sanctions imposed 
against Libya related to religious obligations, providing humanitarian emergencies or fulfilling OAU statutory 
obligations”,  
1533 UNSC Presidential Statement 10 (1999) UN Doc S/PRST/1999/10. 
1534 UNSC Verbatim Record (8 April 1999) UN Doc S/PV.3992. 
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Council to call for it to discharge the functions assigned to it by the Charter,”1535 suggests an 
acknowledgement that States are empowered to act in the absence of the Security Council where 
required.  
Furthermore, aside from localised results in isolated incidents, State disobedience itself 
appears to have made little difference in the long term. Despite the remarks of Tzanakopoulos et 
al on the potency of State disobedience and its potential as a catalyst for change on the Council, 
the legislating of the Council has continued, most recently with UNSC Res 2178,1536 the 
structure of the Council remains unchanged, the controversial veto remains active and little 
appears to have been achieved in the way of Council reform within the framework of a rule of 
law. Such an approach also risks being ineffective in all but a handful of cases, due to the lengthy 
and time-consuming nature of a states examining individual decisions and resolutions on a case-
by-case basis. Finally, State disobedience requires the existence of a resolution in order to be 
effective; in the absence of a resolution – where the Council has chosen not to act, like in Syria – 
State disobedience cannot occur. 
 
XII.3 The creation of a bespoke judicial mechanism 
Such State disobedience, as is the case with regional mechanisms, can be a useful tool in 
attempts to rein in the metaphorical “wild horses” of Council overextension or ultra vires action, 
but in no part does it attempt to impose a framework to govern the Council or attempt to 
establish other mechanisms to bring the Council in line with the rule of law in its decision-
making process.  In short, current mechanisms are “inadequate in terms of ensuring full 
compliance of the Council and the UN with their international legal obligations.”1537 The veto 
cannot serve as an effective curb to Council powers as it was originally intended,1538 State 
disobedience can only effect any change rarely and after the decision-making process and the 
existing review mechanisms for sanctions are drastically minimal in scope and unable to make 
                                                 
1535 Colombia, UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498, 7-8. 
1536 UNSC Res 2178 (24 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2178 continues the precedent of UNSC Res 1373 (2001) 
and UNSCR Res 1540 (2004) before it. 
1537 Tzanakopoulos (n 11) 203. 
1538 See, eg Simma and others (n 363) 1774: “the problem is, first, that the guardian of legality would not be the 
Security Council as a whole, but in fact each veto power for itself. Scound and most importantly, the veto is mainly 
exercised on political grounds. It need not (and in most cases does not) comprise any legal scrutiny.” 
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fully enforceable recommendations.1539 Drastic and novel steps must be taken in bringing the 
Council in line with the rule of law, as it has repeatedly acknowledged that it should. 
 As a result, the establishment of an independent judicial mechanism by the Council to oversee 
the Council’s compliance with the various components of the rule of law should be considered. 
This Rule of Law Tribunal would be mandated first to design a rule of law framework – based on 
the sources I have identified and discussed – to which the Council should comply, following 
which it would examine and review the working methods, composition, decisions, omissions and 
other actions of the Council relevant to such a rule of law framework. It could pronounce on the 
absence of transparency in the Council decision-making process and propose solutions to reduce 
opacity within the Council, thereby paving the way for accountability; it would also review the 
equitable distribution of the decision-making process, perhaps by recommending the expansion 
of Council members to render it more proportionally representative; and it may also provide an 
‘Amparo’1540 mechanism for States, wherein States may present any violations they may see of 
the UN Charter in an extension of State disobedience.1541 
The establishment of such a subsidiary organ to the Council needs little discussion with 
respect to legality: the Charter explicitly grants the Council full scope to “establish such 
subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions”1542 and the Council 
has historically relied upon this provision numerous times in the establishment of counter-
terrorism committees,1543 sanctions committees,1544 standing committees1545 and peacekeeping 
operations. The Council has also established an advisory subsidiary body – the Peacebuilding 
Commission1546 – in part under article 291547 “[t]o provide recommendations and information to 
                                                 
1539 The Office of the Ombudsperson has repeatedly criticised the process and structure of its own establishment. 
1540 Constitutional complaint or verfassungsregicht provides direct access to a Constitutional Court by citizens and 
allows individuals to argue for any violations of the State’s constitution before a court. 
1541 My proposed equivalent would permit States to present their complaints before the Rule of Law Tribunal either 
as an individual State or as a group of States, in an effort to provide a legal interpretation and analysis of the Charter 
and its provision by a competent and authoritative body that has direct access to, if not power over, the Council. 
1542 UN Charter (1945) art 29. 
1543 Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning Counter-Terrorism; Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). 
1544 eg Somalia and Eritrea (2002, 2009); Al-Qaeda (1999, 2011); the Taliban (2011); Iraq (2003); Liberia (2003); 
Democratic Republic of Congo (2003); Cote d’Ivoire (2004); Sudan (2005); Lebanon (2005); Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (2006),;Iran (2006); Libya (2011); and Guinea-Bissau (2012). 
1545 eg Committee of Experts (1946); the Committee on Admission of New Member States (1946); and the 
Committee on Meetings away from UN Headquarters (1972). 
1546 The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is an intergovernmental advisory body that supports peace efforts in 
countries emerging from conflict. 
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improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop 
best practices”1548; a Rule of Law Tribunal would therefore build on existing and previous 
mechanisms for coordination and best practice.   
Some may argue that the establishment of a judicial body by the Council would lack 
legitimacy and would play a biased role in a wider Council agenda; such arguments have been 
discussed at great length in relation to the international criminal tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.1549 With the establishment of an independent judiciary composed of 
independent judges, allegations of bias could soon be disproved; moreover, with frequent 
referrals to and implementation of the recommendations of such a subsidiary organ by the 
Council, the Rule of Law Tribunal would rapidly gain the legitimacy required to be an effective 
tool in the decision-making process.1550 Nonetheless, any legitimacy would rapidly be 
undermined were the Council to choose not to implement the recommendations and decisions of 
the Tribunal. 
The difficulty would therefore not be so much legitimacy and legality, but rather the 
dynamic between the Council and the Rule of Law Tribunal. It may be that the Council has 
demonstrated the rhetoric necessary to create a shift in its internal attitude to the rule of law, 
albeit without following this with effective actions. However, the creation of a Tribunal itself 
would be a step in the direction of transparency, accountability and respect for the rule of law. It 
would be equally important to make use of the judicial decisions of the Rule of Law Tribunal. In 
light of the reticence towards reform shown by the P5 members of the Council, it is unlikely that 
subsidiary organ would exercise any considerable power or mandatory jurisdiction over the 
Council itself; as a result, the creation of the Tribunal would be highly likely to be in an advisory 
capacity. Whilst this may appear similar to the dynamic with the ICJ, it would have an added 
benefit over any other judiciary advisory bodies in being specialised in the work of the Council. 
This would allow the Tribunal to exponentially consolidate its own subject knowledge and 
                                                                                                                                                             
1547 UNSC Res 1645 (20 December 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1645, ¶1: “acting concurrently with the General 
Assembly, in accordance with Articles 7, 22 and 29 of the Charter of the United Nations.” 
1548 ibid ¶2 (c). 
1549 For further discussion on the legitimacy of the ICTY, see eg Franck (n 472); José E Alvarez, ‘The Quest for 
Legitimacy: Review Essay of Thomas Franck’s The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations’, (1999) 24 N Y U J Intl 
L & Pol 199; Caron (n 796); Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN: A 
Dialectical View’ (1995) 6 EJIL 325 
1550 See, M Cherif Bassioni, ‘The ICC – Quo Vadis?” (2006) 4(3) JICJ 421, 424, where “it was not the Tadic case 
that gave credibility and legitimacy to the ICTY but the flow of cases that followed.” 
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practice based on its own precedent as the years progressed; it would also allow it to 
accommodate the political element of the Council’s work as a hybrid politico-legal entity. A 
prime example of this would be the balance between practicality on the one hand and equitable 
participation in the decision-making process on the other, as alluded to in Chapter X.2. The 
Tribunal would be able to examine the facts and propose amendments accommodating the 
requirement for both. 
As a bespoke solution, the Tribunal could operate in perpetuity providing swift and 
detailed judicial review of the Council both in situations of which the Council is seized and 
ongoing reform of the Council’s working methods. The Council would then incorporate the 
findings, recommendations and decisions of the Tribunal into its working methods, its decision-
making process and its composition. The recommendations themselves would carry more 
authority than simply the protestations of a State or group of States and would be legally justified 
based upon Charter law, international law and the obligations of the Council to respect agreed 
components of the rule of law. Martenczuk, referring to the ICJ, saw that “advisory opinions, 
which also do not have binding force on the political organs of the United Nations . . . have 
generally been respected due to the judicial authority and impartiality of the Court.”1551 There is 
no reason to doubt that such respect would also be attached to the decisions and 
recommendations of the Tribunal. As lamented by many States, the Rules of Procedure for the 
Council remain to this day provisional; amending them, therefore, would provide little difficulty. 
The only remaining barrier to the establishment of such a subsidiary organ, therefore, appears to 
be the Council’s own volition. As the Costa Rican representative lamented, “much progress can 
be made by improving the working methods of the Security Council. All that is missing is the 
political will to do so.”1552 
 
  
                                                 
1551 Martenczuk (n 53) 528. 
1552 Costa Rica, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 November 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6870 (Resumption 1), 5. 
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CHAPTER XIII 
THESIS CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Security Council is entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and 
security; this thesis has argued that in fulfilling this responsibility, it should comply with 
standards of the rule of law that have been delineated and examined throughout the preceding 
Chapters. This thesis has therefore identified the components of the rule of law relevant to the 
Security Council and evidenced using primary material such as resolutions and verbatim records 
both the intentions and resulting decisions that have emerged from the Council. It has then 
examined the extent to which it has complied with these rule of law components in its decision-
making process, which includes its composition. As a result, it is clear that – whilst Council 
practice since 1990 appears to have evolved in some cases – on many fronts it has stagnated or 
deteriorated and there has been little serious volition for transition in the quarter of a decade that 
have passed since the fall of Communism that signalled the seismic shift in its political 
composition and renewed vigour of passing resolutions. 
This thesis therefore concludes that there are no components of the rule of law to which 
Council action currently fully complies. The Council has undoubtedly improved in its human 
rights considerations, moving from a sanctions regime that crippled entire nations in the early 
1990’s to more targeted sanctions and measures that, as a result of being more focused, produce 
less collateral effects on the populations of target States. It has also made efforts to establish 
committees to monitor its sanctions regimes and has created and established an ombudsman to 
monitor the enforcement of anti-terrorism measures taken under Chapter VII. However, more 
action is needed to incorporate human rights considerations into resolutions dealing with military 
intervention and peacekeeping. Whilst advances have been made on the front of compliance with 
human rights standards, the Council remains an exclusive club primarily governed by the 
national interests of the P5 members. It would appear that seizure of a matter by the Council 
remains arbitrary and that even once seized, effective Council action is taken only where a 
decision or resolution does not run contrary to the national interests of one of the P5 Members: 
responses to the continuing situations in Israel and Syria are muted despite their key strategic 
value to international peace and importance to redressing the balance of international peace in 
the Middle East region; meanwhile, during the same time period, sanctions and the use of “all 
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necessary means” are authorised against States that pose threats to international peace and are 
not close political or economic allies of the P5, such as South Sudan,1553 the Congo1554 and 
Libya.1555  
At times, these interests are in direct conflict: the situation in Syria is permissive, if not 
supportive, of the spread of international terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and, despite 
resolutions condemning and even authorising the military intervention against international 
terrorist groups such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda1556 as well as general resolutions condemning 
international terrorism,1557 no action under Chapter VII – either under article 41 or 42 – has been 
taken thusfar against State or non-State actors in Syria. At other times, the standards imposed by 
the Council appear malleable to the country in question: whilst India is engaged in talks to sign a 
civil nuclear pact by 20151558 and Pakistan continue to test nuclear warheads capable of mid-
range payload delivery, Iran and the DPRK have been subject to numerous rounds of sanctions 
by the Council for civilian and military nuclear aspirations. 
The Council’s record on transparency, too, is in critical need of reform, with increasing 
use being made of the private meetings in contravention of the working methods it has adopted 
itself. Moreover, the transparency afforded by public promulgation of information is superficial, 
since minutes or verbatim records of private meetings are not publicly disseminated. The 
decision-making process itself remains obscure, with the Council relying increasingly on closed-
door meetings after a failed period of attempted transparency; where invitations to meetings are 
distributed, at times these are delayed, thereby eliminating the opportunity for non-Council 
Member States to attend and participate. Allegations of cliques or “mini-Councils” are also 
concerning from the perspective of transparency, where some Member States have expressed 
their discontent at the fait accompli attitude taken on the Council. Whereas during the Cold War 
years, the P5 would explain their vote and the reasoning behind any use of the veto in the 
                                                 
1553 UNSC Res 1996 (8 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1996. 
1554 UNSC Res 1925 (28 May 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1925; UNSC Res 1991 (28 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1991. 
1555 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973. 
1556 UNSC Res 1386 (20 December 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1386 led to the expansion of ISAF’s mandate under 
UNSC Res 1510 (13 October 2003) UN S/RES/1510. This enabled NATO to expand outside of Kabul to the 
remainder of Afghanistan once they had assumed control of the mission in August 2003.  
1557 eg UNSC Res 2178 (24 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2178; UNSC Res 2170 (15 August 2014) UN Doc 
S/RES/2170; UNSC Res 1624 (14 September 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1624. 
1558 See eg ‘India, EU to sign civil nuclear pact by 2015’ CNN-IBN (16 November 2014) 
<http://ibnlive.in.com/news/india-eu-to-sign-civil-nuclear-pact-by-2015/513090-2.html> accessed 16 December 
2014. 
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interests of transparency and mutual understanding, recent verbatim records display an increased 
recourse to opacity in statements of P5 Member State representatives. Despite non-P5 Member 
State calls for more openness and their warnings of the derogatory effect such Council behaviour 
has on the legitimacy of the organ, as highlighted in Chapter IV, the use of closed meetings is on 
the rise. 
This trend is continued in the Council’s attitude towards legal certainty, which remains 
lacking in the decisions of the Council. There is a renewed effort by the Council to use the 
gateway Article 39 determination in its Chapter VII resolutions, even at times referring explicitly 
to the Article of Chapter VII under which action is taken;1559 yet, whilst at times there does 
appear a pattern of determinations under Article 39 of the Charter, the Council is not consistent 
in this practice, which in turn undermines the nature of its work, calls into question its integrity 
and raises questions of arbitrary behaviour. Moreover, resolutions are not always clear in 
establishing the precise nature of the threat, nor indeed how the measures taken seek to impart 
international peace to the situation the Council is tackling in a resolution; whilst the Council 
clearly makes efforts to establish the grounds for the use of Chapter VII resolutions under 
Chapter 39, it has increasingly grown lax in specifying the legal basis for its action or the precise 
threat to which it is responding. This type of action, more than simply leading to accusations that 
the Council is misusing its prerogative to invoke Chapter VII powers, is in fact more serious: 
Chapter VII, as argued in Chapter V.3, may only be invoked once a determination of a threat to 
the peace is made. As such, the use of Article 41 and 42 of the Charter by the Council without 
such determination is an ultra vires action on the part of the Charter – a clear contravention of 
the rule of law.  
This is even more serious given the lack of equality before the law, as highlighted by the 
juxtaposition of the Iranian and Japanese nuclear situations. Indeed, coupled with the lack of 
legal certainty, the absence of equality before the law in situations that the Council deals with is 
even more damning for its decision-making process. The selective nature with which it addresses 
situations and its varied responses to analogous threats to the international peace cannot be 
overcome by simply citing the need for ad hoc responses to different situations. The Council 
should ensure that the same standard is applied not only to similar situations and threats, but also 
                                                 
1559 eg UNSC Res 2141 (5 March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2141, which explicitly states that the Council is “[a]cting 
under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations” [emphasis in original]. 
281 
 
that it holds itself accountable to the same standard. Without ensuring that all Member States are 
treated equally under international law and by the Council itself, the organ risks creating a 
hierarchy where some States are above the law, which is a grave violation of this component of 
the rule of law as well as contravening standards of predictability. 
The Council has also shown that it has encroached upon the jurisdiction and powers of 
sibling UN organs, as well as over-reaching in its own jurisdiction by imposing legislative 
obligations upon UN Member States. The frequently self-serving use of the veto by some P5 
members, coupled with the decision to abuse the powers of Chapter VII and to foray into the 
judicial or norm-setting roles of the ICJ or Assembly are blatant displays of a disregard for the 
separation of powers and indifference to the ultra vires nature of certain actions that other 
Member States have warned against. Rather than working in unison with other organs as the 
Council was accustomed to doing in the early years of the UN, the Council has, over the past 20 
years, grown bolder in the exploitation of its kompetenz kompetenz, aware of the absence of a 
steering committee or overarching governing body to reign in its actions. Indeed, the ICTY, the 
ICJ and the ECJ have all rejected the opportunity to give legal opinions on the actions of the 
Council, preferring to address the specific issue they are tasked with rather than offer any general 
rules or guidance. 
Finally, the most damaging component of the rule of law for the integrity and legitimacy 
of the Council is that of equitable participation, which for decades has been paid lip service 
without a single shred of reform. Notwithstanding the de facto reform of the Russian Federation 
filling the seat of the former USSR, which was a move of necessity, the Council is a snapshot of 
an antiquated political landscape that pre-dates not only the fall of the second superpower, but 
also the rise of numerous other significant nations on the international plane. The current 
composition of the Council all but ignores the post-colonialist rise of BRICS nations, the global 
South and the African continent, which at 54 recognised nations forms over a quarter of the 
entire UN membership. Nations and regions that rightfully should be represented on the Council 
as permanent members – with or without the veto – have been shunned in favour of more talks 
that result in the perpetual inclusion of reform on the agenda of the Assembly and no action 
taken. In true Council fashion, protection of national interests has become paramount even with 
respect to any equitable, democratic element of its composition. 
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  Whilst State actions and regional mechanisms in the aftermath of a resolution can in certain 
cases counter-balance any violations or omissions of the Council with respect to the rights of the 
individual, there is little that can be done at the subordinate level.1560 Moreover, this thesis has 
focused on how to ensure that the Council complies with the rule of law in its decision-making 
process, rather than how the Council’s decisions themselves comply with the international rule of 
law. Accordingly, any change needs to be effected internally, at the deliberative stages of a 
resolution and prior to this in the composition of the Council itself. The Council has not 
succeeded at effectively monitoring and curbing its own powers, processes and accessibility and 
therefore an independent mechanism needs to be established to monitor and advise it. In light of 
the construction of the Charter, the exclusive jurisdictions granted to the Council and the 
requirement for at least the acquiescence of the P5 Council Members to any changes, initiatives 
to reform the Council have thusfar failed. By removing the review mechanism from the Council 
itself and granting powers of recommendation and review to a bespoke subsidiary judicial organ, 
exclusively mandated to deal with the decisions and decision-making process of the Council, a 
large part of the political considerations that have typically plagued the Council’s efficiency, 
barred the organ from taking action, hindered its maintenance of the international peace and 
stalled any efforts towards equitable participation would be removed.  
This Rule of Law Tribunal mechanism recognises and incorporates the existing realities 
of the Council and acknowledges the antiquated founding document of the UN that no longer 
adequately reflects the political and economic situations that led to the establishment of the 
Council. However, it also provides a way to reform the Council’s decision-making process 
without grand changes to the UN Charter.1561 If the Charter were to be rewritten today, it would 
not be difficult to imagine a drastically different Council with somewhat dissimilar permanent 
members to the current P5. In order to remain relevant to the world today and in the absence of 
an entire overhaul of the Charter and the United Nations system, the creation of an independent 
judiciary that oversees the decision-making process of the Council is the most effective and 
                                                 
1560 Whilst the international plane is horizontal, I use the term “subordinate” here to refer to the subjects of binding 
resolutions – States – and those subsequently lower in the vertical domestic hierarchy – individuals. 
1561 The Council has previously taken unofficial steps in Council composition to avoid the redrafting or amendment 
of the UN Charter: in 1991, Russia assumed the USSR seat on the Council with no objections and no official vote, 
unlike the People’s Republic of China in 1971. Neither amended the UN Charter, yet the Council functions based on 
the same principles as the original Charter despite these substitutions. The Charter also makes reference to the 
requirement for a positive vote from all P5 Members for a resolution to pass; in practice, an abstention has been 
accepted. 
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feasible option for the Council to comply with the principles of international law and the 
components of the rule of law.  
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